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The topic of this thesis is the confrontations between William Gladstone and the 
Bank of England. These confrontations have remained a mystery to authors who noted 
them, but have generally been ignored by others. This thesis demonstrates that 
Gladstone’s measures taken against the Bank were reasonable, intelligent, and 
important for the development of nineteenth-century British government finance. To 
accomplish this task, this thesis refutes the opinions of three twentieth-century authors 
who have claimed that many of Gladstone’s measures, as well as his reading, were 
irrational, ridiculous, and impolitic. My primary sources include the Gladstone Diaries, 
with special attention to a little-used source, Volume 14, the indexes to the Diaries. The 
day-to-day Diaries and the indexes show how much Gladstone read about financial 
matters, and suggest that his actions were based to a large extent upon his reading. In 
addition, I have used Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates and nineteenth-century 
periodicals and books on banking and finance to understand the political and economic 
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Finance and politics in nineteenth century Britain went hand in hand, although at 
times one hand appeared to palsied and the other arthritic, and neither hand seemed to 
know where the body politic was leading them. In 1854, William Gladstone challenged 
the Bank of England over a seemingly insignificant cash-flow problem called the 
Deficiency Note. At first sight this challenge may be seen as just another evidence of 
the government’s faltering finance. Gladstone did not treat it that way. Instead, he made 
it the first step in a campaign against the Bank that lasted until at least 1866 when he 
stepped down from his fourth tour as Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
Gladstone turned Victorian economics around with his handling of the Bank, both 
by what he did and what he did not do. His first step was to investigate the problems 
apparent in government finance. This he did by listening to debates and reading as 
many books on finance and economics as were available at his local bookstores. The 
second was to interview government officials, especially those in the permanent civil 
service, to identify policies, procedures, habits, and prejudices that were costing the 
government money. Then he began working on solutions. His confrontation with the 
Bank of England over Deficiency Bills in 1854 gained for him his first solution. His 
second came in the Public Moneys Act of that year which placed tighter controls on 
deposits of revenues, banking procedures, and tracking, to avoid losses and increase 
the Treasury’s control on public moneys. The culmination of his first phase of reform 
came in the Exchequer and Auditor Act of 1866, remembered by Treasury officials as 
one of the most important acts of the nineteenth century. 
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I contend that these acts were not random, but part of a concerted effort to get 
the government’s money problems under control. In expending a good deal of energy, a 
considerable amount of time, and not a little justified anger, he moved government 
finance off dead center and began reforming it. By ruffling the feathers of the mighty 
Bank of England, he also served notice that the government would not be treated as an 
underage heir of a doubtful estate, but as the mature, seasoned, and educated master 
of the estate with all its rights and privileges respected. This dramatic change in the way 
the government did business helped make it a more respected and far more powerful 
European power in the second half of the nineteenth century, and it is a transformation 
which deserves more study. 
Gladstone was well educated in financial numbers when he first became 
Chancellor of the Exchequer of Britain in December of 1852. He was the son and 
brother of international merchants. He held a first from Oxford in mathematics and 
optics. He had worked tirelessly to save his brother-in-law’s estate from bankruptcy and 
sale. He was beginning to be a rich man in his own right in 1852, and he saw the 
government’s financial health as his special responsibility. During the next fourteen 
years he used the increasing number of books in economics and finance, as well as his 
numerous contacts with bankers and businessmen, to transform himself into a financial 
specialist. From 1852 to 1866 he did more than any other nineteenth-century Chancellor 
of the Exchequer to shore up and restructure Britain’s financial government. 
In those years, his budgets were well accepted both by parliament and the 
people. His blunders were few and generally detrimental neither to his career nor to the 
government and people of Britain. He used his political skills, such as knowledge of the 
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men and agendas that might support or oppose him, to extend his power and get his 
legislation passed. He quickly became master of the budget and taxation numbers that 
constituted Britain’s financial strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, he failed in the 
one great mission he had set for himself: bringing the Bank of England completely to 
heel. The period of this thesis is 1833 when Gladstone entered the House of Commons 
of Great Britain, until 1866, when he stepped down as part of Lord John Russell’s last 
government. In that time, three Bank Charter Renewal Acts were passed under three 
prime ministers and three Chancellors of the Exchequer; although Gladstone was 
Chancellor of the Exchequer for ten years during this thirty-three-year period, he was 
not chancellor when these Acts were passed and had no opportunity to offer to the 
House of Commons a Banking Act to suit his preferences. Thus, he was forced to find 
other ways of dealing with the Bank of England. This thesis studies the methods he 
used and assesses whether he was successful or not. 
Following the line of reasoning presented in this work, more investigation is 
needed. Several lines of investigation present themselves: to do more research on 
Gladstone and his reading; to gain a more complete understanding of the banking 
structure of the nineteenth century and to evaluate the position of the Bank of England; 
and to explore other avenues that contribute to the understanding of the man, the 
period, and the banking industry. 
As this thesis will show, Gladstone was a formidable reader. The first line of 
research will lead to a greater understanding of Gladstone’s reading and his interaction 
with the books and other works he read on banking, taxation, and finance, three steps 
are required: to read what Gladstone read; to find the very books he read, where 
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possible, and search for marginalia; and to find any manuscript documents he may have 
written on various books as he read them. Reading the same books Gladstone read is 
the first step, fortunately not as drastic a step as it might sound. My research for this 
thesis has identified a total of more than three hundred books of interest—in banking, 
government finance and taxation, trade, and related topics. It should be possible to 
identify a statistically significant subset of these books accessible through libraries, 
purchase, travel, or other means, and to identify the ideas that Gladstone may have 
recognized and accepted. 
Within this first line of research, the next step is to find Gladstone’s copies of 
these books if possible. The first place to look for them is the Temple of Peace, 
Gladstone’s private, non-religious library, on the Hawarden Estate where Gladstone 
made his home. These books may contain marginalia of interest to the further study of 
Gladstone as an economist and politician. 
The second line of inquiry is the body of letters he wrote to his wife, his father, 
and his brother Robertson. It is not necessary to read all the Gladstone letters. One can 
match the dates on which Gladstone read a specific book and look at the letters written 
on that date (identified in the Diaries) to find comments of interest. 
The third line of research encompasses the Bank of England. The Bank has 
made its archive collection available to researchers, and has placed its hand list on its 
web-site.1 The archive itself is huge, covering as it does more than three hundred years 
of business and finance throughout its colonial outposts, and in its trade with North and 
South American, Asian, and African countries and banks. While the bulk of this 
                                            
1The source is http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/history/archive/holdings.htm  
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collection need not concern me, four types of records do: The first body of records is the 
correspondence and meeting notes between Chancellors of the Exchequer and the 
various the governors and deputy governors of the Bank of England regarding the 
passage of the Bank Charter Renewal Acts. The second is a study of the letters 
Gladstone sent to the Bank, identified by notes in the Gladstone Diaries. The third is the 
internal memoranda of the Bank during periods of crisis. For example, Sir John 
Clapham has written that the court of the Bank were not concerned in the latter days of 
1857 commercial crisis, but even he admits that the court’s attitude was somewhat out 
of touch with the real problems raised by the crisis. If the Bank was vulnerable, either to 
a take-over by the government, which Gladstone contemplated, or a competitor this 
vulnerability may appear. The cool exterior of the Bank may have disguised an inward 
weakness that could have been exploited.  
The fourth line of study on the Bank of England side is the study of the 
Freshfields holdings. Freshfields was a firm of solicitors who handled a good deal of 
business for Gladstone, including the bankruptcy and restoration of the Oak Farm mines 
and the Hawarden estate. Gladstone wrote to Freshfields often, and research in those 
files, held by the Bank of England, will show whether the Bank of England became 
embroiled in Oak Farm, whether Freshfields was the law firm that supported the Bank of 
England in 1853, or whether Gladstone had other dealings with Freshfields that can be 
pulled from these files. 
The fifth line of research is to reconstruct the details of the budgets of the 1850s 
and 1860s, from Stafford Henry Northcote’s and Sidney Buxton’s studies of the period, 
to reconstruct Gladstone’s budgets in more detail, with a view to understanding how the 
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budgets affected commercial growth and crisis. One element of this research is the 
relationship between private and public borrowing. Another is between taxation and 
income. Revenues from taxation generally rose in the nineteenth century, but the 
question is whether they rose at a rate commensurate with the government’s needs for 
money to manage its small wars and colonial empires. With the rise of detailed 
statistical studies both of the Bank of England and the government, it is possible to 
develop an almost modern understanding of national economics and the budgets of the 
third quarter of the nineteenth century. What the government did affected people’s lives. 
What the people thought and spent affected the government’s budgets. This line of 
study would reveal just how the interactions took place. 
The sixth line of investigation is English banking. To understand the Bank’s 
vulnerability as well as to test Gladstone’s understanding of the banking environment, it 
is necessary to gain more background on the country banks, joint-stock banks, Scottish 
and Irish banks, stock jobbers, and the Exchange of London. The (a) collapse of the 
country and private banks or (b) their purchase by the “big five” are only two of the 
trends that made the government’s attempts to deal with these banks problematic. But 
this information is essential since the Bank of England was neither the government’s 
only debt holder nor its only adversary in producing banking legislation. Nor did the 
Bank England accept the role of central bank suggested by its powers and the tenor of 
Bank Acts in the nineteenth century. 
Modern financial and economic writers fall into two camps: those who believe the 
modern methods of banking and investing will last long into the future, and those who 
believe that like the nineteenth century, the twenty-first century is one of banking 
 
 7
innovation and occasional failure. If we must understand the thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century banks to understand those of the nineteenth, then it is necessary to understand 
the nineteenth in order to understand that of the twenty-first. 
Why is this research important? Put another way, what benefit does this research 
promise to the numerous students of nineteenth-century Great Britain, that great 
“Victorian” presence so dominant in the world. The benefits range from understanding 
the lives of Victorian fatherhood to a narrowing of the breach between economic 
historians on the one hand and social and political historians on the other over 
continuing problems in our understanding of British economic life. Gladstone was the 
greatest and longest remembered Chancellor of the Exchequer of the nineteenth 
century. To understand what he did and why he did it, in the environment in which he 







In 1852 a dark cloud hung over Great Britain—the cloud of competition from her 
continental neighbors, France, Germany, and Russia. With colonial expansion taking 
place all over the world, Britain was constantly confronted by well-financed spies, 
trading posts, contending claims for territory, dazzling promises of wealth just out of 
reach, and the need for more armies, more naval vessels, and a greater understanding 
of how to bring that wealth home. The key was banking. Banking not only financed the 
governments that Britain contended against, but also financed the private adventurers, 
traders, and territorial developers who roamed that world looking for riches and 
advantages. To finance their territorial expansion, Germany and France had developed 
sophisticated modern banking that worked hand and hand with the governments and 
the explorers. Great Britain, with the oldest national bank, the Bank of England, founded 
in 1694 specifically to finance the government, had fallen behind. The Bank had grown 
complacent and powerful, but with its deep concern for profit and its apparently shallow 
concern for the welfare of the people or the government, it failed to participated in 
government goals and welfare to the extent that William Ewart Gladstone, who became 
Chancellor of the Exchequer for the first time in 1852, could have wished. 
Part of the problem was of the government’s own making. The Hanover line of 
kings was spendthrift. Government schemes for making money, such as lotteries and 
tontines, had failed. Customs taxes for everything from sugar and tea to cheap French 
silk gloves and shoes had made food and essential goods too expensive for poor and 
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lower middling classes to afford. Excise taxes had strangled British industry. Ideas for 
ending the national debt through the use of sinking funds and other schemes had been 
proven senseless and unworkable. The modern concepts of balanced budgets, 
reasonable and predictable taxation, a sensible fiscal policy, and a control on 
emergency borrowing had only been partially and imperfectly tried. Meanwhile, the 
Bank of England was treating the British government with contempt as were her 
enemies. A serious and dramatic overhaul was required if Britain was to continue to 
compete. Enter William Gladstone. 
 
From the time I took office as chancellor of the exchequer I began to learn that 
the state held in the face of the Bank and the City an essentially false position as 
to finance. When those relations began [1694], the state was justly in ill ordour as 
a fraudulent bankrupt who was ready on occasion to add force to fraud. After the 
revolution it [the government] adopted better methods although often for unwise 
purposes, and in order to induce monied men to be lenders it came forward 
under the countenance of the Bank as its sponsor. Hence a position of 
subserviency which, as the idea of public faith grew up and gradually attained to 
solidity, it became the interest of the Bank and the City to prolong. This was done 
by amicable and accommodating measures toward the government, whose 
position was thus cushioned and made easy in order that it might be willing to 
give it [the Bank] a continued acquiescence. The hinge of the whole situation was 
this: the government itself was not to be a substantive power in matters of 
finance, but was to leave the money power supreme and unquestioned [to the 
Bank of England]. In the conditions of that situation I was reluctant to 
acquiesce… I was tenaciously opposed by the governor and deputy governor of 
the Bank, who had seats in parliament, and I had the City for an antagonist on 
almost every occasion.1 
William Gladstone is rightly remembered in Victorian history for many things: his 
intelligent and intelligently argued budgets, his leadership in the House of Commons, 
his somewhat prudish and at times stuffy way of responding to distasteful political 
problems (contrasted with his eager response to political problems in which he could 
                                            
1William E. Gladstone, undated fragment, entitled “Mr. Gladstone and the Bank;” in John Morley, 
The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1903), 650-651 (emphasis added). 
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take a leadership role), his religious beliefs, and his studies of Homer and other 
classical writers. Less remembered are Gladstone’s adventures as a traveler, the 
friendship offered to a wide range of persons from great men to prostitutes, and his 
steadfast presence as a husband and father. But if his budgets are remembered, his 
other accomplishments as Chancellor of the Exchequer have been largely forgotten. 
Victorian finance has generally been consigned to the specialist realm of the economic 
historian and then abandoned. The last study of Gladstone as an economist was 
published in 1931 and is hardly penetrating. 
The twentieth-century view of Gladstone is taken up in detail later in this chapter. 
One contemporary friend as well as economic writer was Walter Bagehot. Bagehot did 
not know what to make of Gladstone’s constant, dazzling shifts in preference, from 
conservative politician to liberal, from solid Church of England advocate to ecumenical 
gadfly. One of the most contentious and least remembered shifts is his reversal of roles 
vis-à-vis the Bank of England. During his first Chancellorship of the Exchequer, 
Gladstone found the Bank pretentious, condescending, threatening, and irresponsible. 
When he confronted the Bank over a long-standing procedure that favored the Bank, its 
governor and directors threatened the first-time chancellor with the law. Gladstone 
responded with vigor, angry words, and his own application to the law. Gladstone won. 
The Bank was astonished. 
Gladstone believed that the Bank held the government in contempt, and he set 
about to change that situation. He was on shaky ground. Chancellors of the Exchequer 
came and went. The Bank, founded in 1694 specifically to finance the government and 
support it in its efforts to borrow, would go on forever. Gladstone wanted respect from 
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the Bank and an improved working relationship. His challenge in 1854 did not 
accomplish this goal. His work as chancellor from 1859-1865 while he served in 
Viscount Palmerston’s second government gained him some respect. His work while he 
served in Lord John Russell’s government from 1865-1866 achieved more respect from 
the Bank and also performed the supreme act of getting the government’s finances 
under more control so that it deserved the respect it gained from the Bank and kept it. 
His technical improvements in government fiscal operation also saved the British 
taxpayer money, improved life through reduced taxes, and paid for fortifications against 
an enemy that never materialized. 
I contend that this little noticed and largely ignored passage between the 
government of Great Britain under the fiscal leadership of William Gladstone and the 
Bank of England is an important turn in the history of Victorian reform and government. I 
also argue in this work that the answer to the question of why Gladstone challenged the 
Bank of England is that he educated himself on finance, economics, book keeping, 
trade and a host of other subjects through his regular habit of reading useful works. 
Gladstone regularly worked sixteen- to eighteen-hour days, and read during 
every spare minute of his life. The answer to many of his lightning shifts that so 
disconcerted his contemporaries and more modern historians lies in the multitude of 
books he read. This MA thesis argues that these books helped him evolve as a man 
and politician. Gladstone served as Chancellor of the Exchequer five times, as prime 
minister four times, and all the time, he read as many books a day as he could lay his 
hands on. This thesis investigates the numbers of books he read on banking and 
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finance during the years leading up to and including his first four chancellorships, 1833-
1866. 
Gladstone must be re-examined in light of his reading. He requires to be recast 
as a Chancellor of the Exchequer, head and shoulders above the others who held the 
seals. His general economic theory – on taxation, spending, and borrowing – was based 
that of Sir Robert Peel. Nevertheless, throughout his life he refined his ideas and 
abandoned Peel on some details because of the books he read, parliamentary debates 
he read, and his education provided by bankers, economists, and statisticians. In his 
hears at Exchequer, he was the first to see British finance as a three dimensional 
problem with the axes of money, time, and results, and he was the first man to attempt 
to educate Britain and the British on the elements of what could be accomplished 
economically. 
Gladstone was one of the most widely read and published men of his time, 
making full and impartial use of the works of hundreds of authors. His interest and 
influence in the publishing field alone would excite our interests if we had no other 
reason to look at Gladstone’s life. However, his use of reading on financial topics should 
excite the attention of economic historians who have grown jaded over studies of cotton 
mill and railways and who find the Bank of England boring.  
Another problem to be reevaluated is the strange case of Peelite economic 
theory, placed in the hands of a man Peel came to distrust and dislike, but a man 
capable of extending Peelitism to its greatest expression. Gladstone’s discipleship with 
Peel gave the younger man a direction, but Gladstone was the man who carved out the 
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hills, built the bridges, and laid out the great road, and set the British government on 
what he saw as the correct path for the future. 
Gladstone has been described as pettifogging and cheeseparing—a man bent on 
irrational penury, a man who stopped the salary of a bishop, a man against government 
spending, a man capable of crippling Britain’s physical safety and her colonial future. In 
the twentieth century, the charges laid against him and the excuses made for him by H. 
C. G. Matthew, Roy Jenkins, Richard Shannon, and Travis L. Crosby, have cast doubt 
on sanity and probity of the entire Victorian era and its ability to order its own affairs, 
manage its empire, maintain civil order, and embellish its homes and cities. How can a 
man with as many foibles and failings have led this nation to further greatness and 
garnered the praise of twentieth-century writers of any stature. The rhythms of historical 
writing suggest however that the time has come to return to Gladstone and restudy his 
intentions, his methods, and the ways in which he educated himself to accomplish his 
job. Gladstone was an advanced autodidact. Working days that would cripple a normal 
man he carefully attended to government business, wrote numberless letters, and read 
every chance he got. 
A revision of our thinking about Gladstone and government finance requires and 
equal reevaluation of Britain and her finances in light of her colonial accomplishments 
and expectations, her position as a world power, and her possession of a nine-digit 
national debt which no amount of financial invention or bookkeeping magic could erase. 
This thesis does not enquire into the problem of whether the empire was profitable. This 
is not an essay on the moral problems of a national debt. This is a study of a gigantic 
economic, manufacturing, and mercantile machine that had money to spend and spent 
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it, and Gladstone’s efforts to understand and control that spending on the national level. 
Gladstone’s job was to figure out how best to spend the money Britain had available to 
her. To understand Britain’s spending, it is necessary to understand her relationship 
with her financier, the Bank of England. Gladstone distrusted the Bank of England. 
Thus, one necessary element of this thesis, and of any further and more detailed 
studies of Gladstone’s finance must be a new look at the Bank of England. The question 
to answer is: what was it about the Bank that caused Gladstone and many other 
nineteenth-century bankers and businessmen to distrust the Bank. 
I contend that the answers to many questions, speculations, and uncomfortable 
problems remaining with Victorian history may receive better answers if we understand 
that Victorians read, and that among them, Gladstone read voraciously. While historians 
understand Gladstone’s reading in the classics, theology, travel, fiction, and the theater, 
they have avoided the wealth of material available to Gladstone that subsequently 
appeared in his Diary notations and on his bookshelves. The topics include banking, 
currency, taxation, prices, trade, war, manufacturing, invention, and science. Based on 
the wealth of detail I collected during the research phase of this present study, I believe 
that Gladstone the reader and Gladstone the economist were part of a single 
phenomenon: a Victorian man using the resources of his time to improve life in his time.  
To argue thus I go much further into a specific area of nineteenth-century British 
history than any writer—economic or social historian—has traveled. Victorian history 
records many stories of connections—business man and banker, science and mine 
safety, savings banks and the poor, soap and respectability, steel and cotton. Yet that 
history is also full of disconnects, in military matters, medicine, and the welfare of whole 
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portions of the body politic, such as women, children, the poor, the Irish, Welsh renters 
and Scottish highlanders. 
In this context Gladstone stands alone as a man able to make connections 
between, for example, government revenue and respectability—considered as a 
problem of excise duties on soap, and then to use his position to make economic 
changes that helped fight disease and helped young women enter respectable service 
through the use of soap, and by making it cheaper for the poor to purchase. 
When we apply what Gladstone was capable of to the problems that Britain 
faced, we come immediately to the problem of government finance. For at least nine 
centuries English and British kings and their governments had been in debt. Failures in 
estimating and bookkeeping, poor tax-collection procedures, and waste routinely drove 
governments to borrow. Governments, and especially kings, did not always pay their 
debts. The Bank of England was formed in 1694 to finance the government. But it was 
also formed as a for-profit company. After its formation, the Bank of England came to 
think of itself rightly or wrongly as the conservator for a rich and spoiled heir, the 
government. 
Gladstone appointed himself tutor and lawyer, with the expressed purpose of 
educating the heir and helping it, the government, come of age. As Germany and 
France were also discovering in the nineteenth century, no nation could achieve world 
power without the strength of its banking system. Britain grew up under Gladstone’s 
hand. The Bank of England, and Britain’s network of other banks, private and 
partnerships, Irish, Welsh, and Scottish may have provided the strongest banking 
network in the world, but it was a network where the government was entitled to 
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exercise a cautionary, restraining, and sometimes helping hand to guarantee that 
strength. Gladstone appears to have been the first Chancellor of the Exchequer who 
saw that a private bank in Carlyle might be entitled to the same rights as the mighty 
Bank of England. In doing so, he appears to have improved the climate in which 
banking as a total network was allowed to think and grow. 
In doing so, Gladstone helped to create a climate in which economics, statistics, 
and political economy also grew as disciplines. The positions of economics professor, 
economist, statistician, and economic writer also grew. At the same time, Britain 
multiplied the numbers of resources available to those who wished to study economics, 
mathematics, statistics, and overall numeracy. The results included increasing 
sophistication in statistical reporting and production and better understanding of costs, 
prices, and profit. 
In a far-flung empire, Britain’s word, her banks, and her bankers carried 
excessive clout. Gladstone’s war budget speech of 1854 demonstrates that he saw the 
importance of making the government’s financial position well known in Europe as a 
guaranty of the sabers she was rattling in defense of the Ottoman empire. Finance had 
become a big and increasingly public part of world domination. In this context, 
Gladstone’s efforts to get the Bank’s attention, force it to work more constructively with 
the government, and rein in some of its privileges, while allowing it to maintain its 






Who Was Gladstone 
This thesis contents that Gladstone was a wise and educated economist who 
used his powers effectively to rein in the Bank of England. This topic has not been tried 
before, and in its approach conflicts with the opinions of others. Several historians and 
biographers have written about Gladstone’s evangelical Anglican upbringing, based on 
the teachings of his mother and his sister Anne. They have enlarged on the Scottish 
and mercantile background given him by his father and his brothers. His education at 
Oxford has been documented; his double-first has been noted. As the son of a wealthy 
man, set up with a handsome allowance, Gladstone might have taken up a great many 
pursuits, but he decided on public life and service.2 He married well but not grandly, 
choosing a young woman of good family and high spiritual values. Neither his election 
to parliament, nor his pursuit of eligible young women and eventual marriage interrupted 
his reading. Throughout his adult life he followed the habits of his youth and university—
continuing to read widely and deeply in any subject that interested him. This 
combination of reading and national, almost messianic, purpose led Gladstone to some 
youthful extravagances, such as his work on the relation between the established 
church and the state,3 but it also led to far more promising jobs, including his 
organizational work in the Admiralty, Board of Trade, the Colonial Office, and the 
                                            
 2 He was admitted as a law student at Lincoln’s Inn in 1833, after he was first elected for Newark. 
He withdrew from Lincoln’s Inn in 1839. His parliamentary record, serving on numerous committees and 
even writing legislation, suggests that he was learning far more in Parliament than he was at Lincoln’s, 
but the law education should not be overlooked in his progress as a legislator and cabinet member. See 
Morley, Gladstone, 1:98. 
3The Church in its Relations with the State was published in December, 1838. It was Gladstone’s 
first major work. Pious and biased in favor of the established Anglican Church, its meanings were swept 
away by the revolution pushed upon the Church by the rising Roman Catholic influence on one side and 
the constant challenges offered by the dissenters on the other. Gladstone’s mentor, Sir Robert Peel, 
found the book embarrassing. Nevertheless, Gladstone revised and published the book a second time in 
1841. Morley, Gladstone, 1: 172, 175, 181. 
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Exchequer. In short, Gladstone trained himself to be a useful and well educated man. 
His self-training, what we might call advanced auto-didacticism, has not been 
well understood, and this misunderstanding has led some historians to paint Gladstone 
as a willful, angry, dictatorial, and vengeful man; they have not judged his behavior as 
that of a man dealing with conflicting inner feelings, exacerbated by his insistence on 
reading conflicting theories on important topics. Instead, as this thesis will show, 
Gladstone’s reading may have been a coping strategy, as Travis Crosby claims,4 but 
certainly not the irrational behavior roundly criticized by Roy Jenkins.5 Instead, his 
reading appears more like the activity of a man whose mind is insatiable for knowledge, 
who lived and worked during a period where the publishing business exploded and 
authors were insatiable for an audience. As he read, Gladstone began to see that one 
of the government’s major problems was its relationship with the Bank of England. If his 
reading failed to help him find a way to turn the Bank of England into a servant of the 
government it also may have suggested better ways of dealing with the problem. 
His hard work and study, documented in the chapters that follow led him first to 
the notice of Sir Robert Peel and then to that of the Earl of Aberdeen. Gladstone moved 
from post to post under Peel, his progress hampered only by his hero-worship, his 
sense of his own unworthiness, and his sometimes priggish attempts to resign over 
insignificant issues. In addition to the offices he held, Gladstone sat near or next to Peel 
in the House of Commons, handing Peel figures during his speeches, and taking the 
floor himself whenever Peel requested. He was with Peel on many occasions where the 
                                            
4Travis L. Crosby, The Two Mr. Gladstones: A Study in Psychology and History (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1997). 
5Roy Jenkins, Gladstone: A Biography (New York: Random House, 1997). 
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presence of a junior cabinet member might be questionable, and was certainly present 
during the great debates over budgets, customs and excise repeal, and the Corn Laws 
of the 1842-1846 government. Gladstone also attended Peel during the debates on the 
1844 Charter for the Bank of England was approved. 
The Bank Charter Act of 1844 was Gladstone’s introduction to the inner workings 
of the Bank of England, its officers, its character, and its functions with respect to the 
government, the City of London, and the business of the nation. His reaction to the 
Bank was, under Peel, muted. Borrowing from the Bank of England for the continuance 
of government business was a Peelite rule, and one of the first elements of government 
on which Gladstone silently began to differ with Sir Robert.  
Table 1 shows how the national debt from 1688 to 1853, just before the Crimean 
War.6 This table is not inclusive, for Inglis Palgrave has not been able to create a single 
series for either the expenses of the reign or the growth of the national debt. Palgrave 
has only been able to assemble both the total cost of the war and the national debt at 
the termination of the war for one period, the 1793-1815 wars with Napoleon. The entire 
British national debt of 1815 does not, in all likelihood, derive from the wars with the 
French. George III and his numerous children had been very expensive to support. If 
Gladstone had access to the national debt numbers for the years before he came down 
                                            
6Harry Inglis Palgrave, Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy, ed. Henry Higgs, (New York: 
MacMillan, 1926), 2:3. This mix of values probably arises from poor government accounting procedures, 
lack of effective audits, and lack of determined parliamentary oversight. Also see Norman J. Silberling, 
“Financial and Monetary Policy of Great Britain During the Napoleonic Wars,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 38, no. 2 (February 1924): 214-233. Silberling had documented the sources of revenues, 
both from revenues and from taxes for the years 1790-1816, including the interest charges, the capital 
charges and the amounts of money spent on civil government and war services. See Table I, in Silberling, 
“British Net Public Expenditure, with Principal [sic] Headings, 1790-1816.” 
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from Oxford, and it is clear from this research that he read on Pitt’s life and his 
speeches, he must have seen how badly Britain had been financed in the past. 
Table 1: Governmental Expenses and the National Debt (£) 
 
Years Monarch Event Total Cost National Debt at Termination 
1688-1702 William III Entire Reign 15,730,439 — 
1702-1713 Anne Reign and War of Spanish Succession 121,750,667 — 
1775-1786 George III American War of Independence 121,267,993 — 
1793-1815 George III Napoleonic War 603,842,171 848,282,477 
1853 Victoria Begin Crimean War — 775,041,272 
1855 Victoria End Crimean War — 808,108,722 
 
Two very important reasons why the government could not control the costs of 
wars were the use of loans and subsidies to pay allies and the practice of hiring 
mercenaries to fight Britain’s wars for her. Neither practice was peculiar to Britain. 
Mercenaries have been used throughout history. But loans (that might never be repaid), 
subsidies, and mercenaries were expensive, and the cost of war was expected to be 
balanced against the benefits received. When Britain fought and won quickly, the costs 
were waived as necessary. When Britain fought and failed to gain an early, decisive 
victory, the costs were reevaluated and often regretted. Sir John Clapham, who was 
later to write a history of the Bank of England, puts the total amount of money paid to 
allies and prospective allies between 1793 and 1816 at more than £57,000,000. In the 
Crimean War, Britain did not pay France  subsidies to France, but she did pay for 
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Scandinavian mercenaries and other anticipated and unanticipated expenses, such as 
the longer than anticipated siege of Sebastopol.7 
Gladstone served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1852 to 1855 and again 
from 1859 to 1866. In these periods he wrestled both with the budgets and with the 
Bank of England. In 1856, Gladstone left a puzzling pair of documents (lists of tasks) 
that appear to spell out a massive financial reorganization of both the government and 
the Bank.8 Both are lists of reforms, one of twenty-one items, the other of six, seeking to 
disband the Exchequer and replace it with “a true ministry of finance.” The twenty-one 
item list also speaks of further revisions of several customs and tariffs, and an end to 
the income tax. Finally, both lists revises the form and operation of the Bank of England, 
by removing the Issue Department from the Bank and transferring it to the government 
wholesale, while reforming the remainder of the Bank to act as an “agent of the 
government.” Few historians have noticed this list. However, H. C. G. Matthew regarded 
it as a mature plan of a seasoned government official to be carried out when next 
Gladstone was in government.9 Matthew also believed that Gladstone introduced, step 
                                            
7John Clapham, “Loans and Subsidies in Time of War, 1893-1914,” The Economic Journal 27, 
no. 108 (December 1917): 495-501; J. D. Woodruff, “Allied Debts, 1702-1914,” Journal of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 5, no. 3 (May 1926): 134-149. 
8These lists appear in their entirety in Chapter 6. The plans appear in William Gladstone, The 
Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Ministerial/Prime-Ministerial Correspondence, ed. H. C. G. 
Matthew, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968-1994) 5:16/2/56, 20/2/56. In his references Matthew has used 
the English convention of day/month/year for all references (two-digit year). For references to the 
Gladstone Diaries, this thesis uses Matthew’s style. Matthew found these memoranda significant and 
their presence contributes to Matthew’s description of Gladstone as a seasoned statesman with a 
program ready to hand for the next time he found himself in government. See H. C. G. Matthew, 
Gladstone, 1809-1874 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986): 106, 109. 
9Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 106. Morley, Gladstone 1: 556, quoted Sir James Graham, 
“Your financial scheme … is conceived in the very spirit of Peel.” However, Morley’s Chronology for 
volume 1 fails to mention the penning of either the list or the letter, and does not, apparently, take up the 
theme again. Francis W. Hurst, who was Morley’s reader for Gladstone’s financial papers, since Morley 
admitted lack of knowledge in that area, has offered a chapter entitled “Post-War Finance and Policy, 
1856-1859” in Gladstone as Financier and Economist (London: Ernest Benn, 1931): 167-175. This 




by step, the items in his 1856 list, completing his task with the passage of the 
Exchequer and Audit Act. 
The topic of this thesis, the relationship between Gladstone and the Bank of 
England, came from attempts to understand these reform lists and Matthew’s response 
to them. Given the legal maneuvering legal maneuvering with the Bank of England 
during Gladstone’s first term in office, and the wide-ranging topics of the list itself, the 
urge to find out what really happened became an overpowering temptation to 
research.10 It is difficult to call this list a plan. It carried with it no enabling paragraphs, 
no strategy or tactics for accomplishing the tasks he set for himself, and no guidelines 
for knowing when the plan had been successfully completed. 
If William Gladstone truly mastered and split the Bank by taking one half of its 
operation into the government, while dismantling the Exchequer along the way, as 
Matthew argues, I wondered where the proof lay hidden. When he wrote his biography 
of Gladstone, Jenkins had already served as a twentieth-century chancellor. The Bank 
of England had gone through several changes—nationalization, the end of the gold 
standard, membership in many international monetary and financial partnerships—but 
none of them took place during Gladstone’s terms in office. In the twenty-first century, 
the Exchequer has not gone away, and it still has a chancellor.  
Gladstone was not the first chancellor to challenge the Bank. Beginning with 
Robert Walpole,11 the government had tried several times to flex its economic and fiscal 
                                                                                                                                             
Jenkins, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, did not mention it in the chapter that covers 1855-1861, 
entitled “Health and Wealth.” See Jenkins, Gladstone, A Biography, 172-185. Other modern authors have 
also failed to take an interest. 
10See Gladstone, Diaries 5: February, 1856. 
11Robert Walpole, Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1715 and 1717, 1742. See John S. Sainty, 
Treasury Officials, 1660-1870 (London: University of London Athlone Press, 1972), 158. 
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muscles, seeking better financial terms. Some progress had been made, but a 
government consisting of alternating parties with alternating political and fiscal beliefs 
was not and could not be consistent. The differences among Whigs, conservatives, and 
the rising Peelite contingent brought nascent competing economic theories into earnest 
opposition as Chapter 3 shows.12 Meanwhile, the Bank occupied a strong bargaining 
position, anchored on one hundred and fifty years of service to the government and 
investors, able to quote the great David Ricardo as their economic theorist. The Bank 
raised loans for the government whenever needed. The Bank paid a “bounty” each time 
its charter was renewed. The Bank was believed to control both the interest rate and the 
“management fee” paid by the government on new loans.13 The Bank, in short, believed 
in its privileges and seems to have regarded itself the guardian of the government in 
borrowing matters. 
Gladstone, at other times characterized as a wily politician, appears temporarily 
to have sacrificed political reality when he contemplated reforming the financial and 
monetary system of the nation. When he wrote his plan, or list, in 1856 he was out of 
office and impatient. He was numerate, but not yet an economist, and there is no 
surprise in this. In spite of the assertions of the Banking and Currency schools, 
                                            
12The Currency school preached a single bank of currency issue and control. This doctrine was 
based on the belief that the amount of currency in circulation directly controlled the health of the 
economy. In opposition, the Banking school believed that prices controlled the economy, and that a single 
bank of issue could only be tolerated if the bank carefully monitored prices, raising and lowering the 
circulation to keep pace with prices. Thomas Tooke and James Wilson (founder and editor of The 
Economist magazine) were, in 1844, the sole proponents of the Banking School, and were generally 
ignored. Norman Gash says that the Currency School had found its “bastion” in the Bank of England. 
Gash calls Tooke’s position (Banking School) “a highly modern and sophisticated theory.” See Norman 
Gash, Sir Robert Peel: The Life of Sir Robert Peel after 1830 (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), 
432-433. Tooke’s position also supports the requirements of a modern central bank, a position that the 
Bank of England was not yet willing to take on. 




economists were unsure of, or unwilling to acknowledge, the various factors involved in 
the analysis of any one problem—wages; prices; exports and imports; balances of 
trade; easy credit; available currency; over- and under-consumption; the poor; national 
debt; bankruptcies; savings; industrial output; and other factors. Economists were just 
beginning to face two problems, whether each item in this list affected the others, and if 
so, how. Uncertainty is evident in t heir writing: much of it focused either on currency or 
taxation. Their work did little to clarify problems faced by industrialists, international 
traders, small-town banks, and land-owners. Economists lacked both the mathematical 
skills and the range of statistical methods required to reach what we now accept as a 
reasonable theory of economics. So sure of themselves in parliamentary committees 
and in the press, the economists were in fact on shaky ground. Received wisdom 
regarding money derives from the seventeenth-century Mercantilists, not from wisdom 
gathered from the Industrial Revolution. Industrial growth was not a uniform, perceptible 
process but uneven and “enhanced by the specific conditions of the Anglo-French wars, 
resulted in an apparently general rise in prices.” 
 
As to the functional value of a theory developed on this basis and proposed to be 
applied to the solution of monetary problems, we have to realize that: (a) The 
analysis of this rise of prices was carried on with the help of a scientific method 
which did not and could not include a concept of qualitative change. Quite the 
contrary, “received doctrine” as well as the outward appearance of the economic 
process seemed to suggest a merely quantitative expansion without any 
fundamental qualitative change in the structure of production. (b) The result of 
such an attitude toward the phenomenon of rising prices was to conceive of them 
as deviations from the otherwise static condition. (c) Such theoretical position did 
not prove fatal for that time for the reason that the actual though temporary 
economic conditions tended to obscure the imminent structural change indicated 
in the rise of prices.14 
                                            
14Karl H. Niebyl, “A Reexamination of the Classical Theory of Inflation,” The American Economic 




The Banking Landscape 
Gladstone swore his oath as a member of parliament in 1833. One structural 
change was already taking place. The banking landscape in England and Wales was 
complex and growing more so.15 Two levels of banking existed: the country banks 
(some one hundred years old),   and the Bank of England (one hundred and forty years 
old). In 1833, under the new Bank Charter, they would soon be joined by joint-stock 
banks, with more partners, more capital, and more willingness to be flexible than the 
Bank of England. 
A relatively large number of country banks had been started in the eighteenth 
century, by cattle dealers, manufacturers, and others, who saw that this or that town 
needed a bank. Country, or private, banks were defined as small banking companies 
with facilities for deposits and loans; sometimes issue of currency was available to 
customers. Most were owned by one or two men, and their only problems generally 
occurred when the bank collapsed, or when a banking customer tried to exchange his 
local currency for Bank of England notes: he was usually turned down. Because country 
banks or issue were required to purchase stamps for their paper currency, and because 
the wiser of the bank managers established an account with the Bank of England or a 
London bill-broker, we can be fairly certain of their numbers and operations.16 They 
                                                                                                                                             
accurately describes the situation in which anyone who believed that profit could be made also believed 
that profit should be made. Many companies were started on this shaky economic belief, and many 
bankruptcies, especially in the years of panic, followed. Also see Henry Oliver, “War and Inflation since 
1790 in England, France, Germany, and the United States,” The American Economic Review 30, no. 5 
(February 1941): 344-351. Oliver calculated that at the start of the Napoleonic Wars in 1793, British and 
German prices rose approximately seventy-five per cent and American prices nearly doubled. 
15Irish and Scottish banks, many having been formed under existing Irish or Scots law before the 
Act of Union (1707), were “grandfathered” under the laws of these nations, and could not be changed by 
laws that pertained to English banking. Their operation is not a focus of this thesis. 
16The cost of the stamp for bank notes is documented in James William Gilbart, The History and 




numbered in the hundreds. Many had business that was cyclical in nature, based on the 
farming year, or on a longer but generally dependable manufacturing cycle. 
Joint-stock banks grew from the same investment impulses that drove cotton 
mills to enlarge both in operation and in ownership, and the growth of larger, long-
distance railways requiring a great deal of capital. A joint-stock bank was considered to 
have six or more partners. From 1694, when the Bank of England was founded, until 
1826, when an Act allowed joint-stock banks were allowed to form, the Bank of England 
was the only joint-stock bank in England and Wales. (It had been formed by charter.)17 
The 1826 Act also allowed the Bank of England to establish branches in various cities. 
The Act also allowed formation of joint-stock banks and restricted paper currency issue 
by private banks. Joint-stock banks were defined as companies with six or more 
partners. They were allowed to form in any location outside a circle with a sixty-five mile 
radius of the City of London (a one-mile square). 
Gladstone’s was a period of joint-stock banks. The banking companies 
proliferated in the same way that joint-stock companies in railroads, cotton, and other 
large-capital companies grew. The greatest spokesman for joint-stock banking in its 
early days was James William Gilbart, who became manager of the London and 
Westminster Bank (non-issuing) situated not far from the main office of the Bank of 
England.18 
                                                                                                                                             
Gilbart puts the number of issuing banks in 1822 at 552. For the numbers of country banks, see L. S. 
Pressnell, Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 11.  
17Gilbart, Principles of Banking, 63. 
18James William Gilbart (1794-1863) gained his first experience of joint-stock banking during a 
six-and-a-half-year employment managing branches of the Provincial Bank of Ireland in Kilkenny and 
Waterford. He wrote constantly on banking. When he moved to London in 1833 he joined the London and 
Westminster Bank. See Robert Brown, “Gilbart, James William (1794-1863),” Oxford Dictionary of 




The Bank of England 
The Bank of England was founded in 1694 as an adventurer company (and a 
joint-stock bank) on the same model as the British East India Company. It was 
managed by a governor and deputy governor and a bureaucracy of chief clerks, clerks 
and other employees. The governor and deputy governor met weekly with a “court” of 
shareholders elected from the entire company of shareholders. These men approved or 
disapproved the actions of the governor and deputy governor, set interest and discount 
rates, discussed banking strategy, and then returned to their other duties (outside 
companies, banks, legal offices, and the government). The Bank printed paper 
currency, not as money, but as promissory notes, guaranteeing the holder that he or 
she would be entitled to turn in the currency and withdraw an equal amount of gold. This 
operation was called convertibility, and was to be come one of the most hotly debated 
problems in banking in the nineteenth century. Bank of England notes were used in the 
eighteenth century primarily in London and along the major travel and trade routes in 
England but not much in the countryside. 
The Bank’s charter typically ran for twenty-two years from the time of passage, 
but both the Bank and the government were allowed exercised an option of reviewing 
the charter after a shorter period. Each charter typically affirmed all or most of the 
Bank’s existing rights under the previous charters, but added new rights and a few 
responsibilities to it. The main purpose of most charter renewals appears to have been 
                                                                                                                                             
see Clapham, Bank of England 2:134. Clapham describes the obstacles thrown in the way of the London 
and Westminster: “doing what they could to cold-shoulder the London and Westminster,” such as refusing 
to allow it to use the bankers’ clearing house. 
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to reaffirm the Bank’s monopolies, and, from the government side, to collect a bounty 
from the Bank. 
 Through the Bank Charter Acts in 1826, 1833, 1844, and 1857, the Bank of 
England increased its concessions from the government. In 1826, for example, the 
Bank of England gave up its monopoly as the only legally founded joint-stock bank in 
the country, and allowed non-issuing joint-stock banks to enter the London territory 
defined by the sixty-five mile radius. In exchange, the Bank was allowed to set up 
branches cities in England and Wales. In 1833, as a response to fears of gold drains 
from the Bank’s vaults, the Bank Charter Renewal Act restricted export of gold to the 
Bank of England and made Bank of England notes legal tender for all payments. The 
theory behind the gold limitation was that gold was too heavy to transport very great 
distances, and the major port of England was London. The only way to get gold for 
export was thus to purchase it from the Bank of England , making the Bank responsible 
for managing any significant international gold transfer and reporting it to the 
government and the public.19  
The quid pro quo that existed between the Bank and the government is shown in 
detail in a section of the letter Lord Althorp sent to the Bank at the beginning of the 
legislative year: 
 
                                            
19The history of the Bank of England was lovingly and protectively presented in Sir John 
Clapham’s two- volume study of the Bank. Clapham, Bank of England, 2: 172-181, 183-4, describes the 
Act of 1844. An older and more comprehensive history of the 1826 and 1833 Acts appears in Gilbart, 
Principles of Banking, 61-63, 80-92. Also see Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates series 3, xviii (30 May-1 
July 1833): 169, 1308, 1361; second reading xx (27 July-29 August 1833): 239; third reading and 
passage in House of Commons xx: 764; third reading and passage in House of Lords xx: 876. In his 
introduction to the bill, Lord Althorp said his main concern was to protect the Bank of England from gold 
drains when the European markets were said to “turn against us.”  
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His Majesty’s government desires me to call your attention to the advantages 
which these different propositions are likely to confer upon the bank. Their 
tendency must be to extend the circulation of its notes, and by relieving bills of 
short dates from the usury laws to facilitate its operation. While, on the other 
hand, the only relaxation in its exclusive privileges as they at present exist, which 
is required—is the permission given to joint-stock banks, established at a greater 
distance than sixty-five miles from the metropolis to draw bills and issue notes 
payable in London. His majesty’s government, therefore, think they have a right 
to expect some considerable pecuniary advantages from the bank in the 
management of the government business.20 
In 1844, the Bank was given strict rules of currency issue, but the Issue 
Department also received £14,000,000 in government securities to use as a reserve 
when its issue went beyond the limits of its gold bullion reserve. The Act also strictly 
limited the ability of private banks to issue currency, increase their partnerships, or 
amalgamate with other banking entities. In any of these cases, the bank would lose its 
right of issue, and the amount of the sacrificed issue would be added to that of the Bank 
of England. In 1857, the Bank of England was temporarily strengthened by a removal of 
limited liability from joint-stock banks. This move allowed all members of a joint-stock 
company to be sued for their public and private wealth, a plan thought to inhibit 
formation of more joint-stock banks. The history of the passage of this Bank Charter Act 
is greatly muddled by two other efforts that arose at the same time: the governmental 
concern about the great financial crisis of 1857 (giving rise to the formation of a select 
committee on the commercial crisis) and a proposed Act to indemnify the Bank of 
England against litigation based on the charge that it had issued currency and credit 
beyond the limits set forth in the Bank Act of 1844.21 In 1858 parliament restored limited 
liability to joint-stock-bank partners. 
                                            
20Lord Althorp to the Governor of the Bank of England, May 2, 1833, in Gilbart, Principles of 
Banking, 81. 
21For the history of the Bank Charter Act, the select committee, and the Act to indemnify the Bank 




The Structure of this Thesis 
This work is organized to focus primarily on the period 1852 to 1866 and 
encompass Gladstone’s four chancellorships under Aberdeen, Palmerston, and Russell. 
Chapters 3 to 7 are chronological, showing Gladstone’s educative process and also 
showing how he came to grips with the banking and governmental problems he faced, 
chose a strategy and tactics likely to improve the government’s position, openly 
opposed the Bank’s profits and assertions of monopoly powers, and attempted to 
support private banking. Gladstone leaned, I believe, strongly on the education he was 
receiving from those around him and from the books he was reading to understand his 
job, improve his performance in managing budgets, and contribute to Britain’s prosperity 
and colonial power. 
In addition, I take the position that Gladstone’s actions vis-à-vis the Bank of 
England were not part of some public tirade or outraged personal glorification, but a 
concerted effort to gain his goals on behalf of his country. Gladstone was aware that his 
powers were limited. Thus, the problem of the thesis is to build up a story first of what 
Gladstone did, then to build up the historical rationale for what he did, and finally to find 
the contributing factors in his behavior to help us understand why he followed a 
somewhat torturous but effective course of public action in dealing with the Bank of 
England from 1853 to 1866. To accomplish these tasks, it is necessary to show that 
Gladstone’s course of actions expressed neither rage nor withdrawal, but a continuous 
effort to confront, legislate, and get the best deal he could for his government and his 
people. That he succeeded is grudgingly acknowledged in an aside by Sir John 
                                                                                                                                             
debates that they are somewhat difficult to follow. They are taken up in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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Clapham, who finally wrote, “in this period, Gladstone did better for the people of Britain 
than he did for the Bank of England.”22 
To help us understand Gladstone as an advanced autodidact, Chapter 2 
explores the intellectual milieu in which he lived and worked, including the rise of 
bookstores and journals and social engagements at which books were sometimes 
discussed. It also explores the way he trained himself in various areas of the rising 
culture of Victorian education and improvement. Gladstone read deeply on many topics. 
This thesis identifies the books he read that are germane to the topic. It also explores 
some suggestive passages found in the Gladstone Diaries, such as the visits of 
deputations and meetings with well known bankers outside the Bank of England. 
The next five chapters are chronological in nature, exploring the five periods of 
his life encompassed by this thesis: the Peel years (1833-1846) appear in Chapter 3. 
The years 1846-1852, following the fall of the long Peel government, are described in 
Chapter 4. Gladstone’s first two terms as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852-1855) 
comprise Chapter 5. Chapter 6 follows the agonizing years out of office (1855-1859) 
when he wrote his list of financial reforms. Chapter 7 inquires into major events in his 
long Chancellorship of the Exchequer, 1859-1866. 
From 1833 to 1846, we see Gladstone change from naive optimist to a more 
worldly-wise politician under the guidance of Sir Robert Peel. This chapter looks at his 
relationship with his fellow “Peelites,” a hardy band of Members of Parliament who 
followed Peel into the cabinet and the front benches of the House of Commons. Out of 
office, they used their considerable clout to swing parliamentary votes. One of their 
                                            
22Clapham, Bank of England 2: 256. 
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primary functions during these years was to consolidate and understand the Peel 
agenda so that in office they could act as a cohesive ruling unit. One of their other 
priorities was to educate Gladstone. This chapter begins a study carried through in the 
other four chronological chapters. It examines Gladstone’s reading list. Reading was the 
primary method used by Gladstone to educate and inform his thinking. 
In the post-Peel-governmental years from 1846 to 1852, Gladstone began to see 
that Peelitism was not a satisfactory springboard for his political future. In this period he 
first began to toy with the possibility of falling back on the conservative party or moving 
forward toward an unlikely but emerging liberalism. It was an especially difficult time for 
Gladstone and some of his friends because Peel, refusing to take office again in his 
own right, had cast his lot with the Russell-Whig government. He did this because he 
saw the Russell government as the only way to keep the conservatives out of office. He 
feared that the conservatives would throw out Free Trade, reinstate the Corn Laws, 
restore the tariffs and customs, and again raise prices on goods and commodities 
important to English consumers. Gladstone attended on Peel but refused to follow the 
Peel line of blind support for Russell. In keeping with his growing independence, 
Gladstone expanded his reading to include books on banking, trade, and finance. 
Gladstone joined Lord Aberdeen’s 1852-1855 government as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and found himself attempting to finance a war (Crimea) that he personally 
opposed. While his view of his own importance was badly shaken by the war and by the 
House of Common’s overthrow of Aberdeen’s government, his confidence as a man of 
numbers, and thus as Chancellor of the Exchequer, grew. Because of the two-plus 
years of close work with fellow Peelites, Gladstone left office more sure of himself as a 
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Peelite and as a numerate man ready to serve the nation, but less sure from where his 
next cabinet post would come. His reading increased during this period, and the book 
list at the end of the chapter shows how he continued to improve himself through his 
reading, confident that it would lead to some good in his character and also support his 
aspirations. 
In Chapter 6 we find Gladstone attempting to come to grips with the dual urges to 
enter government and to stay out of it. He firmly believed that the Peelites should only 
join a strong government so they could carry out a Peelite financial policy. Both Lord 
Palmerston and the Earl of Derby courted him for office; in fact, he served in 
Palmerston’s government for fewer than three weeks and then resigned. He became 
somewhat fretful and fractious, mostly avoiding debate on financial matters but offering 
a near filibuster over a divorce bill brought up in the House of Commons. This was the 
period in which he wrote his financial plan, shared it with his fellow Peelite, Sir James 
Graham, and then apparently shelved it. Nevertheless, he read faithfully and constantly 
on money matters, as his reading list for this chapter shows. 
The final chronological chapter (Chapter 7) shows the return of Gladstone to the 
Exchequer with what Matthew called a mature plan of a seasoned politician: a plan of 
social reform. Matthew suggests that Gladstone introduced the plan point by point, and 
suggests that Gladstone succeeded in accomplishing all the goals he set for himself in 
1856. This chapter challenges Matthew’s belief by considering what Gladstone did 
accomplish, where he failed, and how one act of legislation has made Gladstone a 
champion of fiscal probity and reform for the next one hundred years. As this chapter 
will show, Gladstone took the politically correct, defensible, and financially responsible 
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position of cleaning up the government’s operation in order to present itself in a better 
and more formidable light to the Bank of England. His reading list for this period shows 
his focus on finance, taxation, and government for this period. 
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a brief essay on Gladstone’s legacy. Morley, 
Matthew, Jenkins, Shannon, Crosby, Buxton, and Northcote have not ended the 
discussion of Gladstone. The Diaries still have a good deal to yield, as do the 
parliamentary debates and the budgets. This thesis is not a biography but a study of the 
relationships between Gladstone and his government, between Gladstone and the Bank 
of England, and between the Bank of England and the government.  
 
The Resources for this Thesis 
Those who begin to write a thesis are endowed by their mentors with certain 
inalienable rules: Work on it every day. Do not get distracted. Do the research properly. 
Remember to footnote everything. Learn the secondary sources. In the case of this 
thesis, the work was overwhelming, and so interesting I worked every day and dreamt 
about the work nearly every night. The primary sources were a constant delight. 
Gladstone’s Diaries, thirteen volumes of his writings accompanied by a volume of 
indexes,23 illustrate a picture of a larger-than-life man, interested in a great many topics, 
many of which gave him material for his public and parliamentary speeches. Many of his 
notes contribute to an understanding of Gladstone’s budgets, the welfare of the nation, 
and the financial needs of working people.  
                                            
23The Gladstone Diaries, volumes 1 & 2, ed. M. R. D. Foot; volumes 3 & 4, eds. M. R. D. Foot, H. 
C. G. Matthew; volumes 5-14, ed. H. G. C. Matthew. The entire fourteen-volume set was published by the 
Oxford University Press in the period 1968 to 1994. 
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His Diaries also show that he was also an ardent family man. He taught 
Scriptures, Latin, and Greek to his sons and daughters. He tended his wife in her post-
partum nursing, read to her and prayed with her. He visited his father, sister, brothers, 
aunts and uncles, and withheld his disappointment when they berated and blamed him, 
especially when his father consistently accused him of breaking family faith by siding 
with Sir Robert Peel on free trade. Gladstone also read. Bursting from the pages of 
these Diaries are references to material that Gladstone read, much of it on the classics 
and religion; and also poetry, drama, and novels. But he also read much more—on 
banking, the Bank of England, government finance and taxation, and the wealth and 
operations of other nations in Europe—and these were very much to the point of this 
thesis. By contrast, the secondary sources were disappointing, and drove me back to 
the primary evidence. 
As this section will show, the secondary sources began well enough, with 
Matthew’s study of Gladstone, but did not, in general, provide the kind of aid I had 
hoped for in this MA thesis. The later twentieth-century sources are of two types: first, 
those about Gladstone’s religious and classical studies; and second, the “psychological 
studies.” These latter paint Gladstone as an often irrational, unreliable man, subject to 
loud singing, flagellation, rages, and other extreme behavior. Each of these studies 
presents Gladstone as useful and rational one minute, angry and irrational the next. 
Neither of these types of secondary work helped me focus on Gladstone the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, economist, and financier. They did not help me find the answers to 
the problems of what Gladstone did about the government’s money. 
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Returning to earlier sources was beneficial—a study of finance written by Sidney 
Buxton while Gladstone was still alive,24 and the family’s official biography of the great 
man, written immediately after his death by John Morley.25 Both studies favor 
Gladstone. Morley’s satisfied the family, and Morley himself believed strongly in 
Gladstone’s greatness. Buxton spent a great many more pages on Gladstone’s budgets 
than on those of the other Chancellors of the Exchequer of the period. Nevertheless, 
these works are very detailed and quite useful. John Morley’s three-volume work on 
Gladstone’s life, family, politics, finances, classical works, and church-related writings 
was begun immediately after Gladstone’s death. Morley was a journalist and MP, and 
often visited Gladstone at his office, his home in London, and at the Hawarden, the 
Glynne family that Gladstone rescued from bankruptcy and made his family seat. In the 
biography, Morley shows that he had asked Gladstone numerous questions about 
political life, and Morley used these question-and- answer sessions to great advantage 
as he wrote. During some of these interviews, Gladstone appears either to have found 
or to have written down notes for Morley (such as the one quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter). Morley also used Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, The Times, and other 
sources such as letters, to round out chapters on Gladstone and the church, his political 
activities, his financial acumen, his love of and interaction with his family, and his 
pastimes. Later works have leaned heavily on Morley’s work.  
                                            
24Sidney Buxton, Finance and Politics: an Historical Study, 1789-1885 (London: John Murray, 
1888). This work provides budget tables for the years 1862 to 1886-87. 
25The Gladstone family selected Morley to write Gladstone’s biography with the intent of 
producing a definitive work. Morley was allowed to use Gladstone’s original journals, but after publication 
of the three-volume life, the journals were archived, and access to them denied to other historians. See 
later in this chapter. 
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Less well known but extraordinarily useful is Sydney Buxton’s two-volume work 
Politics and Finance, written while Gladstone was still alive. Buxton focused on the 
budgets of the nation from 1862 to 1886-7 (providing us with twenty-five years of 
Victorian budgets, heavily notated). Buxton’s work deliberately follows upon the work of 
Stafford Henry Northcote, a one-time aide to Gladstone and co-author of the Northcote-
Trevelyan report, authorized by Gladstone and considered one of the most powerful 
governmental works of the nineteenth century.26 While Morley focused on Gladstone 
the man, Northcote and Buxton focused on government finances, detailing from first-
hand experience the budgets of various governments and the political reasoning behind 
these budgets. In doing so, they annotated the actions of Gladstone the economist as 
he responded to one or another national crisis through the power of the national budget. 
Northcote’s treatment, published in 1862, also produces the budgets, and provides a 
year by year account of the decisions made to keep the government in funds. 
Buxton’s work provides far less detail about Gladstone’s life but far more detail 
on government finance, the political environment in which finance decisions were made, 
and Gladstone’s thoughts and feelings about them. This is not, per se, a memoir of 
Gladstone’s finance, but of a government’s finance. Nevertheless, Morley’s insight into 
the role of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Finance Minister, is useful to our 
understanding of what Gladstone accomplished: 
 
The business of a Finance Minister is a two-fold one. To know how to impose 
taxation when required, in the way least burdensome to the country as a whole, 
and to the individual taxpayer; and to know how to remit, when remission is 
                                            
26Stafford H. Northcote, Lord Iddelsleigh, Twenty Years of Financial Policy. A Summary of the 




possible, in a way that will give the most impetus to trade, and most distinct to 
the taxpayer.27 
Francis W. Hirst worked with John Morley on the biography, reading and 
commenting on the financial material Gladstone provided. His independent work, based 
in large part on his earlier work for Morley, was written in 1931. He described his work 
as “imperfect but not uncritical … an even-handed study of Gladstonian finance” 
suggested by the financial problems of his own time.28 His treatment of Gladstonian 
finance follows closely on the work performed by Morley and Sydney Buxton, both of 
whom were members of Gladstone’s late-life coterie.29 Hirst’s work, however, has more 
bite than Morley’s. For example, he mocks Oxford’s slow movement “in her political orbit 
from antiquated conceptions and prejudices.”30 His only new material is that provided by 
Gladstone’s youngest son, Henry Neville, who contributed a personal recollection.31 
Letters give a flavor to Gladstone’s thinking on finance, and the pressures he 
withstood. Useful in this context are Phillip Guedalla’s two compilations: Gladstone and 
Palmerston and The Queen and Mr. Gladstone.32 When he was in office, the Queen’s 
finances were Gladstone’s responsibility. For example, from 1852 to 1855 Gladstone 
was master of the Mint as well as Chancellor of the Exchequer. As such, he was 
                                            
27Sydney Buxton, Mr. Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer: A Study (London: John Murray, 
1901), 162. 
28Francis W. Hirst, Gladstone as Financier and Economist (London: Ernest Benn, 1931), vii-viii. 
29Morley and Buxton attended Gladstone in the 1880s and 1890s. For numerous references to 
Morley, see Gladstone, Diaries 14:763-764. For Buxton, see Diaries 14:629. 
30Hirst, Gladstone as Financier, 113. 
31Hirst, Gladstone as Financier, 300. Hirst may be thanked for giving us with a picture of 
Gladstone in the robe of Chancellor of the Exchequer, the hotly contested garment that Disraeli refused to 
give up in 1852. Gladstone, Diaries 4:6/3/53. 
32The Queen and Mr. Gladstone, ed. Philip Guedalla (Garden City: Doubleday Doran, 1934), 175, 
186. Also see William M. Kuhn, “Queen Victoria’s Civil List: What did she do with it?” The Historical 
Journal 36, no. 3 (September 1993): 645-665; W. Menzies Whitelaw, “The Financial Plight of a Queen’s 
Consort,” The American Historical Review 42, no. 4 (July 1937): 691-699; Patrick Linstead, “The Prince 
Consort, F. R. S., and the Founding of the Imperial College,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of 
London 17, no. 1 (May, 1962): 15-31.  
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responsible for the massive recoinage that took place during this period, and was thus 
the Queen’s “contact man” over problems with the casting of her image on the coins 
produced by the Mint. In addition, Gladstone was also responsible for Victoria’s 
allowance, requiring several line items in great budgetary heading called Supply. Having 
a queen costs money. More money is required if she has a consort, many children, 
several castles, and ladies and gentlemen of the court. If the queen gives grants 
pensions, travels, and entertains potentates, and if the queen feels she is strapped for 
cash, her first thought is that the government should pay rather than straining her tiny 
purse. 
Gladstone’s letters to the Queen were always correct, couched in the third 
person, and carefully reasoned. Hers, on the other hand, ranged from expressions of 
concern for his health to petulance and anger. On the casting of a coin with her image, 
she announced “the portrait is so frightful that the Queen cannot sanction it …all her 
sitting & all her corrections have proved utterly useless.” Her letters on expenses were 
even more petulant, forcefully reminding Gladstone at one point that the oath she had 
sworn required her to turn all her revenues over to the government while the 
government remitted to her only what Parliament agreed to in terms of allowances, 
annuities, and marriage portions. From finance, her pen ventured into budgets and 
foreign policy, and annoyed not only Gladstone but Palmerston as well.33 
Of more importance to this thesis are the letters between Gladstone and 
Palmerston on the budget in general, the size of the Army and Navy, fortifications, 
                                            
33William Gladstone and Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, Gladstone and Palmerston: 
Being the Correspondence of Lord Palmerston with Mr. Gladstone, 1851-1865 (New York & London: 
Harper & Brothers, 1928). See especially letters 275-276 on allowances for the Queen’s daughters and 
letter 260 on the expenses of the Prince of Wales’ trip to Canada. 
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government purchase of railroads, and other financial matters that affected each budget 
Gladstone wrote while he served in the four cabinets covered in this work. 
The modern, secondary sources provide the researcher with a mixed company. 
In his introduction to a collection of papers written to commemorate the hundredth 
anniversary of Gladstone’s death, David Bebbington categorized the scholarship related 
to Gladstone.34 Bebbington’s first category consists of those historians and biographers 
who wish “to keep the statesman’s memory green.” He includes John Morley and F. W. 
Hirst in this category. A second category consists of those historians who used the 
Gladstone Diaries and thus began an era of detailed research, a division that suggests 
the Diaries might not support the “green” Gladstone. Bebbington cites the work of J. L. 
Hammond, author of Gladstone and the Irish Nation (1938), in this category. Bebbington 
based his categorization on access to the Gladstone Diaries. The Diaries are extremely 
important to the study of Gladstone. Gladstone recorded his life in his Diaries for most 
of his life. For many years, research was hampered because the family considered 
Gladstone personal journals (later presented as the Gladstone Diaries), his letters, and 
parliamentary papers, some of which were available but unsorted, to be deeply religious 
or inclusive of problematic material relating to the Gladstone family and Gladstone’s 
work with prostitutes.35 
The Gladstone Diaries were brought to public view beginning In 1968. This 
enormous work commenced with a special grant to support the research: it was known 
                                            
34David Bebbington, “Introduction,” in Gladstone Centenary Essays, David Bebbington and Roger 
Swift, eds. (Liverpool: University Press, 2000), 1-3. 
35See Derek Beals, “Gladstone and His Diary: ‘Myself, the Worst of All Interlocutors’,” The 
Historical Journal 25 no. 2 (June 1982): 463-469. 
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that the volumes, which sold for £40 the pair, would not be commercially successful.36 
As the Diaries were published, Bebbington writes that more flavors of Gladstone began 
to appear: Victorian history that bows to Gladstone but centers on a left-wing or Marxist 
interpretation; the high politics school with right-wing in orientation; and what 
Bebbington classifies “the older Liberal tradition of the nineteenth century.” 
I chose to work on the main period of 1853 to 1866.37 I used specific volumes of 
the Diaries, listed in the Bibliography. Because my work stopped at 1866, I often found 
the first or second volume of a work useful while later volumes in the same set were not. 
This selection process applies to Morley, where volumes 1 and 2 were of utmost 
importance but volume 3 was not.38 H. C. G. Matthew produced two volumes. The first 
one was useful, covering the dates 1809, the date of Gladstone’s birth, to 1874. 
Matthew’s presentation is sedate but light-handed, and given to generalization. His 
assertions about Gladstone’s inter-chancellorship period and his work in the second 
Palmerston government (1859-1865) have given me the topic of this thesis, precisely 
because his light-handedness and his failure to support his reasoning with relationships, 
dates, and other anchoring details left me with a very large question to be answered.  
Richard Shannon has produced two volumes on Gladstone’s life, but only the 
first is used. With Shannon’s work, we enter into the world of historiography challenging 
                                            
36Beals, “Gladstone and His Diary,” 463. 
37Gladstone served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from December 1852 to February 1855 in the 
Earl of Aberdeen’s government. He served for less than three weeks in February 1855 in Viscount 
Palmerston’s first government. He served in Viscount Palmerston’s second government from June 1859 
until the Viscount’s death in October 1865, and carried on in the government formed by Lord John Russell 
until June 1866. In Gladstone’s second tour as first lord of the Treasury, April 1880 to June 1885, he also 
served as his own Chancellor of the Exchequer. This dual position caused something of a constitutional 
stir until Gladstone pointed to his two predecessors, Pitt the Younger and Sir Robert Peel, who had 
served in both positions simultaneously. 
38John Morley, Gladstone. Volume 1 encompasses the years 1809-1859; volume 2, 1859-1880. 
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the Gladstone ethos by using his own words against him. For Shannon and others like 
him, Gladstone required rethinking. Keeping the great man’s name green was not 
Shannon’s object. Shannon was one of the first beneficiaries of the release of the 
Gladstone Diaries; he appears to have read them avidly but selectively.39 His biography 
of Gladstone begins quite gently describing a young man with wintry thoughts,40 not 
quite brave enough to ask the third woman with whom he fell in love to cast her lot with 
him. But soon Shannon gives way to a harder vision in which Gladstone 
metamorphoses from wistful young man to a growling vindictive character,41 suffering 
paranoia and then helpless inflexibility in his confrontations with the Bank of England.42 
By the time Shannon arrives at Gladstone’s tour of duty in the Ionian Islands, he is 
accusing Gladstone of many sins: the lust for petty tyranny, an overwhelming urgency to 
scuttle the career of a friend, the willingness to give up his base in England for a low-
level position of high commissioner in the Ionian Islands.43 
One writer who should have had an inside track on Mr. Gladstone, his budgets, 
and his overall economic policies was Roy Jenkins, the post-war Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. One could wish that this book had not been written for so wide an audience, 
or that Lord Jenkins might have provided us with just a little modern insight into 
Gladstone’s budgets and finance. He did not. A glance at his endnotes shows that his 
main source was the Gladstone Diaries, although Jenkins had read Richard Shannon’s 
                                            








study and commented on Gladstone’s morbidity, using Shannon as a source.44 While 
most of his book consists of a play-by-play of Gladstone’s life, Jenkins took several 
opportunities to show how Gladstone had gone astray with various (to Jenkins) highly 
irrational or objectionable indiscretions: Gladstone’s long journey to Italy to try to 
retrieve Lord Lincoln’s eloping and very pregnant wife,45 his attempt to tax charitable 
donations,46 his speech on the North and South,47 and his attempts to reform ladies of 
the night. Jenkins devoted a sixteen-page chapter to Gladstone’s work with prostitutes, 
his self-conscious self-scourging, and wondered in print about a summer-long season in 
which Gladstone chastised himself only once.48  
Another voice that reflects a “new look” at Gladstone is Travis L. Crosby’s The 
Two Mr. Gladstones, A Study in Psychology and History.49 Crosby’s index gives us 
clues to the Gladstone of the Diaries, but a Gladstone filtered through Crosby’s 
admittedly experimental, psychological approach introducing topics such as anger as a 
means of control,50 psychological incoherence,51 emotion-focused coping, and escape-
avoidance coping.52 To Crosby, stress forced Gladstone into these coping strategies. 
Reading constituted an emotion-focused strategy, while travel was for escape 
avoidance. Crosby is not uniformly wedded to scandal and intrigue, nor is he anxious to 
condemn Gladstone as the century’s greatest mad man. He says, for example, that 
                                            
44Jenkins, Gladstone, A Biography, 65. 
45Ibid., 93-95. 
46Ibid., 241: Jenkins called this a Don Quixote attack. 
47Ibid., 241: Jenkins called this nonsense. 
48Ibid., 107. 
49Travis L. Crosby, The Two Mr. Gladstones, A Study in Psychology and History (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1997. 
50Ibid., 6, 15, 231 n.4. 




anger may have beneficial effects, not when it leads to violence, but when it is drawn on 
and reflective of cognitive behavior, a way of fighting back.53  
Crosby’s work received mixed reviews, but for the purposes of this thesis, three 
reviews are useful because they point to the pitfalls of seeing the model instead of 
seeing the man. Judith M. Hughes writes that Gladstone was curiously absent from 
Crosby’s work. She feels that Crosby’s characterization of the two Gladstones, one as 
the private man of work and discipline and the other as the public man of anger and 
aggressive verbal attacks—often against hapless opponents—does not advance our 
understanding of the Grand Old Man.54 T. A. Jenkins describes Crosby as an 
accomplished political historian, but also finds Crosby’s characterization minimalist, and 
Crosby’s treatment throughout Gladstone’s life as repetitive.55 Stewart Weaver 
mentions the juxtaposition between the release of Crosby’s book and that of Roy 
Jenkins as a shame. Weaver believes Lord Jenkins produced a far more readable book. 
Thanking Crosby for avoiding a Freudian approach, Weaver is nevertheless unhappy 
with the reductionist approach embodied in the idea of coping strategies. In his 
conclusion, Weaver writes that “Crosby proves conclusively and absolutely to anyone 
who may still doubt that Gladstone was a man of great volatility and passion. Those 
who want to understand more of what he was passionate about may have to turn 
elsewhere.”56 
                                            
53Ibid., 6. 
54Judith M. Hughes, review of The Two Gladstones by Travis L. Crosby, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 28, no. 3 (Winter, 1998): 449-450. 
55T. A. Jenkins, review of The Two Gladstones by Travis L. Crosby, The English Historical 
Review 113, no. 454 (November 1998): 1348-1349. 
56Stewart A. Weaver, review of The Two Gladstones by Travis L. Crosby, The American Historical 
Review 103, no. 4 (October 1998): 1251-1252. 
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And thus, the dichotomy in Gladstone studies can be established: The “green” 
view is that of Victorian financial genius. The “grey” view is that of a man in deadly peril 
of losing his composure and his sanity. One may, with proper curiosity, ask where to 
find the Victorian man who was not frustrated with some portion of his life, or with all of 
it, and who functioned as well as Gladstone did. Biographies of many Victorian ministers 
and prime ministers show men with dark thoughts, personal aberrations, trouble with 
their wives and children, and difficulties of coping with recalcitrant governments. 
To factor the darker interpretations of Gladstone’s life in with the energetic and 
vehement way in which he attacked mid-Victorian finance is to undermine his 
accomplishments. Government officials and financial historians have been astonished 
at how much he accomplished. I argue that Gladstone’s energy in the 1850s was 
translated into legislative energy in the 1860s, and that his battles with the Bank 
probably made him stronger, leading to a proper understanding of what could be fixed, 
what couldn’t, and what shouldn’t have been tampered with. Shannon and Crosby do 
not aid this effort. And books like Jenkins’ must be read very carefully to sort the useful 
financial analysis from the less useful personal criticism. 
It is true that Gladstone was hated—by The Times, many Whigs, some 
conservatives, and much of the time by that sardonic novelist, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli. Gladstone was bound to be hated: he 
held strong opinions on finance and religion, spoke and wrote what was on his mind 
(often speaking for two, three, or four hours without rest), got published, and earned 
money from his writing. He was a man who was everywhere, seemingly, at once. On his 
mission to the Ionian Islands, for example, a trip that was part idyll and part political 
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expediency (the need to remove a loyal Peelite and friend from a mission gone badly 
wrong), Gladstone was hounded by the press. Reports of every dinner, ball, opera, 
meeting, and speech were lovingly telegraphed back to London where they were 
reported to give Disraeli his daily dose of heartburn. 
What one does not find in these character analyses is Gladstone the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, economist, or financier. Those historians who were more interested in 
politics apparently have found much more to explore in Gladstone’s stints as first lord of 
the Treasury and prime minister, his expertise in managing Whigs and liberals, or the 
politics of Ireland than in his ability to manage money. An author who has again turned 
the historiography of Gladstone around is Eugenio F. Biagini’s Gladstone.57 Biagini 
seems to have understood Gladstone’s rhetoric, especially that which focused on 
finance, better than his predecessors. Biagini notes that Gladstone’s 1853 budget 
speech, the first of his long career, combined Peelite financial orthodoxy and a moralist-
populist approach to public opinion. He also notes that Gladstone’s financial approach 
“was a further development of his Peelite creed: its ingredients were a balanced budget, 
regular surpluses, and a careful consideration of the social and political implication of 
various taxes.”58 
 
Sources for the History of Banking 
The history of banking and the Bank of England is extensive and rich. To 
understand what Gladstone did and did not do are required to understand banking in 
                                            
57Eugenio F. Biagini, Gladstone (Houndsmills, Hampshire; MacMillan and New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000), 31-36, 40-42, 53-56, 75-78. These pages describe Gladstone’s financial approach to 
government. 
58Biagini, Gladstone, 32-33. 
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Britain as it stood in Gladstone’s time. The history of banking in England covers, all-told, 
at least a thousand years of credit, coinage, wealth, and downfall. As a truly ancient 
institution, even though partially transplanted, it defies the first-time student’s attempts 
to understand the Victorian era of banking unless one is willing to go all the way back to 
the Normans, their needs for money, and the Jewish money-lenders and Italian bankers 
who provided it. Such a huge subject, with its multiplicities of sources and arguments, is 
far too large to attempt in a thesis, but an understanding of the wealth and complexity of 
this history, as well as a feeling for the terms, transplants, and people involved, is 
required to bring readers a little up to speed. To appreciate the historical fact that 
Gladstone could meet and interact with nineteenth century bankers, and to judge his 
support of, for example, Lionel Rothschild’s repeated attempts to enter parliament, it is 
necessary to understand how banking, Gladstone, and to some small extent, Lionel 
Rothschild, all came to be involved. 
For the reader’s convenience, I offer the following list of my major banking 
sources, and the reasons I have found them useful. This exposition falls conveniently 
into episodes: medieval, Tudor, and “modern,” meaning England after the 
Commonwealth. With minor exceptions, medieval and Tudor banking was foreign 
banking, first provided by French Jews, and then provided by Tuscan merchants turned 
bankers. Tudor banking was dominated by banks in Antwerp and Germany. The first 
true English banking flourished only after the Restoration. All three periods are studded 
with luminaries, philosophers, bankrupts, con-men, and here and there a very cautious 





The first bankers to an English king were the Jews, who arrived from France with 
or very soon after the conquest. B. Lionel Abrahams has written that the Jews were 
indeed French, that they brought money with them, and that, as they had no other skills, 
they made their living lending money. They lent to the king “when the ferm of his 
counties, or his feudal dues were late in coming in.” 59 They also lent to the barons and 
to those who followed the king’s court from one town to another, and to those who were 
required to plead before the Papal Curia at Rome.60 The Jews held themselves aloof 
from the life of the towns they inhabited, eating different food, refusing to participate in 
Watch and Ward. Unable to own land or join guilds in their former homes, they did not 
purchase land or join the trades in their new homes. Thus, Abrahams says that while 
the Normans looked like Englishmen one hundred years after their immigration, the 
Jews did not. They remained “other” although a very useful other.61 
Henry III found the Jews useful as long as they had money to lend or confiscate 
to finance expeditions to Brittany and Gascony. Henry took one-third of their wealth 
(1230), levied a tallage of 60,000 marks (1244), and confiscated what wealth his men 
could find in sweeps through the Jewish neighborhoods (1250, 1252, 1254, and 1255). 
These raids were so vicious that the Jews petitioned to be allowed to leave the 
country.62 
Edward I inherited from his father (1272) and returned to England in 1274.63 
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Edward was later to be known as a great reformer, but as a law-giver, he was, like most 
medieval kings, supremely short-sighted, giving law, but then discovering that his new 
law conflicted with older rules. This was certainly the case for the Jews. His father had 
impoverished the Jews although nobles and churches had risked the wrath of the king 
by pledging land to the Jews as surety on loans and those loans were outstanding.64 
Mavis Mate has shown that the chapter of Canterbury Cathedral was deeply in debt to 
the Jews, paying high rates of interest, and was borrowing in one place to pay its debts 
in another.65 Edward had heard the preaching of various church fathers on usury and 
was willing to use them as a guide.66 He ordered an inquisition into usury of the 
Florentine bankers already operating in his kingdom with a view to suppression, and 
used the same logic against the Jews.67 The contraction of their business through raids 
and confiscations meant that the Jews could no longer support the king. They were 
being surpassed by the Italian banking companies—Florence, Rome, Milan, Pisa, 
Lucca, Sienna, and Asti.68 The result was that Edward was able to borrow great sums of 
money from as many as thirty-four Italian bankers, while the Jews, no longer rich 
enough to lend to the king, were not longer useful.69 
The first step in the expulsion of the Jews from England was the recoinage of 
1279. Edward’s judicial commissions looked into offences concerning currency, and the 
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Jews suffered from this enquiry. Any evidence either of debased metallic currency or 
export of metallic currency abroad led to severe punishments.70 In 1275, following the 
teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, Edward sent the Jews to practice merchandise or live 
by their labors.71 But the Jews failed to become what the king wanted because other 
laws and local rules kept them from trade, from the guilds, and from farming and land-
holding. Abrahams says the Jews were tempted to transgress against the usury laws 
because they were desperate. To overcome the laws, a Jewish lender could agree with 
his gentile borrower to hide the interest payments, but if caught, both could be 
punished. In one famous round-up, both Jews and Christians were found guilty. Three 
Christians were condemned to death, but two-hundred ninety-three Jews were hanged, 
drawn, and quartered.72 
 
The crimes of the Jews were no greater than those of the Christians around 
them, though they called for heavier punishment. Christians clipped and coined; 
Christians still lent money on usury. And a certain amount of crime among Jews 
could not but be looked for as a natural result of the terrible difficulties in the way 
of the social revolution that had been demanded of them. Edward saw that he 
had been trying to do too much at once.73 
Edward was forced to admit to himself that the country needed money-lenders, 
but he could not abide the Jews. He found his method of getting rid of them by charging 
them in 1295 with defacing the legal English coinage. 74 
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The Tuscan bankers, notably the Florentines and Luccans brought their own 
coins, and better still, the first European credit institutions, with them. Bankers did three 
types of business in England: they lent to the king, they dealt in wool with the nobility, 
and they transacted credit business between the great monasteries and the Holy See. 
Richard W. Kaeuper’s Bankers to the Crown shows how the Riccardi of Lucca lent 
money to Edward I and introduced the “Riccardi system.” The Riccardi system ensured 
that England’s debt was funded debt—that is, loans for which the source of repayment 
was guaranteed up front, in the Riccardi case through collection of the export customs 
on wool by Riccardi agents instead of governmental servants.75  
The Florentine banks, the Bardi and the Peruzzi, lent to Edward III, in part, 
attempting to help finance the opening stages of the Hundred Years War. They adapted 
the Riccardi system to their own purposes until they ran into credit difficulties. Two 
studies, one by Edwin S. Hunt and one by Hunt and James M. Murray, provide us with a 
good deal of information on the Florentines and what for them was very nearly a world 
market-place.  
Hunt’s solo effort, the book that resulted from his dissertation, is The Medieval 
Super-companies.76  Hunt shows how the Peruzzi, one of the bankers to Edward III, 
carried on business. Hunt has negated the commonly held and often repeated belief 
that Edward III bankrupted three Florentine companies—the Peruzzi, the Bardi, and the 
Acciaiouli. He has demonstrated that Acciaiouli never did business with Edward. The 
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Bardi and Peruzzi, he writes, were victims of the Florentine government’s take-over of 
the grain cartel from the private bankers, and the animosity of the French king who 
evicted all foreign bankers from his borders.  
The Hunt-Murray book, A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1550,77 
shows that after the first waves of the Black Death, merchants recovered the fine art of 
banking from its beginnings dating back to the Athenians and Romans. The locations of 
medieval fairs served as sign-posts on these merchants’ trade routes, which took them 
easily as far as England and its monarchy. Hunt and Murray also discuss the use of 
credit and credit instruments that provided long-distance banking to any king, noble, or 
bishop who could afford it.  
The Medici came later than the Bardi and Peruzzi and are better known as 
bankers than any of the previous companies. The Medici were actually smaller than 
either the Bardi or Peruzzi in their hey-day. The Medici are well represented by two 
books that show the family’s banking organization and operation: The first, Raymond de 
Roover’s The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank,78  describes the Medici network, 
with branches all over Italy as well as Lyons, Avignon, Geneva, Bruges, and London 
(1451-1480). Part of their success in managing their branches was the use of an 
advanced form of double-entry bookkeeping which gave them a clear view of their 
profits and losses and helped them determine when to close a branch that was not 
contributing to profit. They became involved in several wars, including the War of the 
Roses. The second book, Christopher Hibbert’s The House of Medici, is more 
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concerned with the political and social facets of the Medici life in Florence, but is also 
useful for placing some of their financial dealings in their political context.79 
 
Tudor Period 
In the Tudor period, international trade and banking had long periods of 
prosperity in spite of wars and the upheavals of the Reformation. England and Scotland 
began to support small-scale manufacture (notably cloth and stockings) and a 
prosperous international trade during this period. Richard David Richards’ book The 
Early History of Banking80 describes the Tudor and later periods. In his early chapters 
he introduces us to important characters and organizations that supported English 
banking until it could support itself: the Antwerp bankers, the Fuggers, and Sir Thomas 
Gresham, the English merchant who borrowed money on behalf of Henry VIII and 
Elizabeth I wherever and whenever he could.81 Here we find the first mentions of terms 
like retailing and exchange brokers, the stock-jobber, and the money scrivener, all 
precursors of nineteenth-century banking. Richards begins with English and Antwerpian 
“pioneers” in banking, giving the merest mention of the Florentines who came before. In 
his second chapter he takes us through the Royal Mint and the Tower of London, used 
as depositories, and explains concepts such as assignability and cheques. 
The activities of Sir Thomas Gresham—his founding of the Grasshopper Bank (at 
the sign of the Grasshopper), his contribution of the Royal Exchange building to the City 
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of London, and his financial support of Henry and Elizabeth—are well represented in 
George Chandler’s two-volume Four Centuries of Banking.82 Again, this book covers a 
long period of time and therefore its chapters may be used individually to study a 
number of problems. In the early chapters, Chandler has described two banks, the 
Grasshopper, owned by Gresham, and another bank, the Liver Bird. Chandler’s story 
shows how the two banks evolved and then merged under one sign-board. In the 
nineteenth century the bank began to purchase and foreclose on other banks, growing 
into the nation-wide Martins Bank Ltd.  
Of Sir Thomas Gresham we gain some useful knowledge.83 He does not seem to 
be the author of what has become “Gresham’s Law” that bad money drives out good. 
He was the author of many letters to Elizabeth I in which he earnestly begged her to pay 
her debts if only so she could borrow more. 
Elizabeth borrowed from, among others, the family bank of the Fugger. Jacob 
Fugger the Rich84 is an adulatory little book highlighting the life, wealth, and right-
thinking of the founder of the clan. A more complete study of the entire family, their 
investments, and the profits they made from lending, primarily to central European 
royalty, is Richard Ehrenberg’s Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance.85 
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Ehrenberg emphasizes new facets of banking introduced by the Fuggers, in war 
finance, the beginnings of public credit, and the problems of lending to princes and 
cities. Here we see repeated an aspect of lending we saw with the Riccardi: the demand 
on the part of the bankers for a funded debt. The Fuggers lent to kings only if the source 
of repayment was a well known, valued source of income. In the case of the Fuggers 
the collateral that funded the debt was silver in mines held by the nobility. The Fugger 
also accepted German real estate and was allowed to foreclose on the land in certain 
circumstances. 
The reign of Elizabeth saw the emergence of many major trends in banking that 
became received wisdom in the nineteenth century and were no longer questioned. The 
great banks lent to governments (public credit). Wherever possible they ensured their 
payment at the beginning of the loan (funded debt). Banks began to expect that every 
credit transaction would lead to a profitable continuing business in which they fully 
intended to make a profit. Banks paid dividends to their investors, dividends over which 
the government had no control. Because they worked in public credit, banks were 
always political in nature. Finally, banks believed in tradition. In 1853, when Gladstone 
refused to make the government’s payments to the Bank of England in the manner used 
by former Chancellors of the Exchequer, the Bank demanded that he return to the old, 
“legal” way of doing business. The Bank threatened to go to law, forcing Gladstone to 
turn to his own legal team, the Chancellor and the Solicitor General. When these two 
members of the government ruled that the traditional payment method was not 
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embodied in law, the Bank of England was outraged. Tradition was, apparently, as good 
as law to the Bank. 
 
Modern Banking in Britain 
The “Modern Period” period of banking here is used to describe the period in 
which English banking finally became national, and then an international operation. It 
was supported from within, by English bankers, not foreign ones. The continental loans 
of previous periods passed into history. England needed its own banks, linked to 
shipping, manufacturing, the coffee houses, the government, and the people. From the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth century, banking and its cousin, the money market, 
became allies and strengthened British finance dramatically. 
 Two sources are indicative of this rise of banking. The first is W. R. Bisschop’s 
The Rise of the London Money Market, 1640-1826.86 The money market is an adjunct 
to banking as well as a business in its own right. In 1640, the money market was a 
steadily growing business, applied primarily to the purchase and sale of shares: in 
businesses, in shipping ventures, in merchant adventurer companies, and in 
government investments. One of Bisschop’s major topics is the way in which the money 
markets began to work with the rising class of modern bankers and the new Bank of 
England. By the time Gladstone entered the Exchequer, the money market (known as 
“the City” after the territory it occupied) provided a useful bridge between the Bank of 
England and its interests on the one hand and the government of Great Britain on the 
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other. By providing the market for government securities, the City gave investors a way 
to share in the wealth of government finance. 
Frank Melton’s Sir Robert Clayton and the Origins of Deposit Banking, 1658-
1685 describes one of the most important functions of early banking: safety.87 Deposit 
banking is generally overlooked, but the importance of security, whether it be the Mint, 
the Tower of London, or the vaults of the Bank of England, should not be overlooked 
since a banker’s probity and the security of his operation attracted and continues to 
attract influential customers. In the nineteenth century deposit banking took on added 
importance when bankers and economists argued about whether a bank should 
maintain a reserve equal to the amount of deposits it carried, so that it could cover itself 
in case of a run of depositors seeking withdrawals. 
Three books deserve mention because they explain how Scottish banking began 
in the same period as English banking but under different rules. The History of the 
British Linen Bank88  is really the history of the Edinburgh Linen Co-Partnery, a linen 
warehousing and shipping company that began to finance linen producers and shippers. 
When the Scots linen industry began to fail, the company turned more and more to 
banking, diversified in terms of the customers it accepted, and began to open branches 
in Scotland. (The bank was barred from doing business in England). The Linen Bank 
and other Scots banks were also barred by distance and prejudice from using the 
London clearing house. Instead, they were required to ship money between branches 
and to exchange with one another. Security was essential. The bank’s instructions (in 
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Appendix 7 of the history) for messengers is a telling document of safety and reliability: 
bank officers were to travel by first class, placing parcels in iron portmanteaux strapped 
to their wrists; they were to travel by hired carriages with steady coachmen, and they 
were to practice safe handling of money parcels throughout. Richard Saville’s massive 
and detailed Bank of Scotland89 describes the history of Scots banking, the founding 
and management of Bank of Scotland (no article “The”), and the bank’s response to 
various crises. One of the most important chapters for those studying British banking is 
“The Mind of the Scottish Bankers.” As the next reference will show, the English and 
Welsh banking systems were constantly compared unfavorably with the dour and less 
volatile Scottish banking system. These comparisons led to two recurring questions: 
could the Scots banks be brought under English control? - the answer was no. Should 
the English banks follow a more Scottish model? - the answer was yes, but they 
probably could not and would not. The chapter “The Mind of the Scottish Banker” shows 
how Adam Smith arrived at some of his beliefs about money and banking. A student of 
English banking philosophy does well to study Saville’s early chapters to understand the 
differences. 
These two books lead us to Lawrence White’s Free Banking in Britain.90 White’s 
thesis is that Scotland’s banks were “free” in the sense that they were formed without 
political interference, while the periodic renewals of the Bank of England’s charter were 
always fraught with the Bank’s demands for more benefits and equal demands for 
squelching the growing number of country or joint-stock banks that competed freely with 
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the Bank. White introduces a well documented theory of free banking in Chapter 1 and 
explains how free banking worked in Scotland both before and after the Bank Act of 
1844 (which legally had no effect on the Scots and Irish banks). In this presentation, he 
raises the one problem that confounded Sir Robert Peel’s political and banking theories 
of the 1840s—that on the one hand Peel could foster and fight for free trade, while on 
the other he could foster a monopoly, the Bank of England. In White’s view, the 
continued battle over currency in the English banking sys tem confused and misled the 
English people, the government, and the bankers themselves. 
While they showed no particular interest in Scottish banking, the English did 
concern themselves with banking in their former colonies of America, the new United 
States. James William Gilbart’s History of Banking in America91  and John H. Wood’s A 
History of Central Banking in Great Britain and the United States92 were written nearly 
one hundred and seventy years apart, but they look at many of the same problems. The 
United States, not America, was one of Britain’s great trading partners. A commercial 
crisis in one country could threaten the commercial health of the other country.93  
The United States had practice in the creation and use of a central bank, the 
Bank of the United States, incorporated by Act of Congress in 1816. The charter was 
strict, but with a capitalization of $35,000,000, the bank might, with continuation of its 
charter, have been able to handle the growth of the nation if it had continued to be 
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chartered. Instead Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill that would have given the bank its 
first renewal for another twenty-year term. Gilbart has produced a number of passages 
from Jackson’s veto message, words that may have warmed the hearts of many Bank 
of England officials and investors. 
In the nineteenth century, central banking was a great topic in Britain. Two 
movements were afoot, one to turn the Bank of England into a central bank, and one to 
create a new central bank to replace the Bank of England as banker to the 
government—a banker with at least some of the same powers that had been granted to 
the Bank of the United States. The Bank of England resisted both movements 
strenuously. Gilbart’s book is extremely fresh, full of figures and long quotes. Gilbart, 
who also seems to have had a good deal of inside information about the Bank of 
England, as seen in his History and Principles of Banking, also shows how the Bank of 
England was fighting to avoid becoming that government-centric, all-powerful friend of 
the economy, a true central bank. John Wood has taken the story further, showing how 
the Bank of England evolved and was forced into the mold of a central bank. Wood also 
offers a critical examination of banking in the United States up to the year 2000. 
 
The Bank of England 
In nineteenth-century English banking history, all roads led to the Bank of 
England. Three topics emerge along the way: the history of the Bank itself, the 1844 
Bank Act and its aftermath, and the problem of the Bank of England as a central bank. 
The Bank of England began as a merchant adventurer company in the model of 
the British East India Company, with a charter to lend money to the king. Its charter was 
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renewed approximately every eleven years until the nineteenth century when the Bank 
took on the mantle of de facto power, began openly to express its interests in profit, and 
assumed an even more condescending attitude toward the government it had financed 
for so long. Investments in the government were good business, because, with sufficient 
numbers of bankers and investors in parliament, the government could be made to pay 
its debts and make its interest payments on time and in full, even if the Bank was 
required to lend it more money to do so. The Bank saw the government as an 
unsophisticated borrower, attempting without mathematics or success to pay off its 
debts by schemes with unhappy names, such as sinking funds94 and dead-weight 
annuities.95 
Gladstone’s intention was to turn the government into an intelligent borrower, 
and, if possible, to pay off the national debt without raising taxation to a politically 
insensitive level. His skirmish with the Bank in 1854 was effective. It centered on two 
problems that were peripheral to the real problems of the Bank’s power and the 
enormous size of the national debt. These problems were the dates on which the 
government made quarterly payments to the Bank, and the ways in which the Bank lent 
money to the government money without approval by key government officials. 
The generally accepted history of the Bank of England was published in 1945 by 
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Sir John Clapham.96 Perhaps it served the Bank of England’s interests well at the time, 
but to modern eyes it is biased, condescending, and sometimes scurrilous, expressing a 
definite bias against Jews, Quakers, and Gladstone. It is also lacking in tables that 
would have pulled Clapham’s numbers together into meaningful data. It is not the only 
work on the Bank’s history, but it is still, after sixty years, the most quoted. One of the 
great mysteries of English history is why a really modern history of the Bank, free of 
slurs and full of data, structured on the lines of that Richard Saville took in his work on 
Bank of Scotland, has not been written. 
Having found and used the histories available, problems still exist. Two 
approaches then present themselves to the scholar: one is to keep on digging and 
looking, reading bibliographies from modern works and tracking down books. The other 
is to begin with T. A. Stephens’s highly useful and sometimes delightful Bibliography of 
the Bank of England compiled in 1897.97 This work concentrates on publications about 
and related to the Bank of England, beginning in the 1650s, a period in which writers 
understood England’s need for a bank and were attempting to find a model. Their 
search was embodied in such books as Seasonable Observations Humbly Offered to 
His Highness the Lord Protector by Samuel Lambe (1658).98 Stephens’ work ends with 
1889 publications, such as An Account of the Operations under the National Debt 
Conversion Act, 1888, and the National Debt Recemption Act, 1889. He has provided 
two indexes, one listing people, which includes Peel but does not include Gladstone, 
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and one listing titles. Stephens’ book is doubly useful because in each chronological 
chapter of this thesis (three-seven) I have included a list of Gladstone’s reading on 
banking, and have identified the books that appear in Stephens’s bibliography and were 
read by Gladstone. 
By 1843-44, as Stephens’ bibliography shows, debate about currency was the 
most important topic of interest to readers of banking literature. Currency had been a 
topic of debate ever since the Bank of England was allowed to issue paper notes. For 
example, and it is only one example of the numerous works published, Sir Francis 
Baring authored Observations on the Establishment of the Bank of England and on the 
Paper Circulation of the Country in 1797.99 Fifty-seven years later John E. Cairnes 
published An Examination into the Principles of Currency Involved in the Bank Charter 
Act of 1844.100 British banking appears to have been so obsessed with the currency 
problem that Britain could not focus on other difficulties that existed in finance and 
commercial management, nor could they solve the currency problem in areas such as 
finding small coins and notes to pay workers. Thus, the currency question appeared in 
book after book without finding a viable solution. 
The idea of central banking was a problem for the Bank of England in the 
nineteenth century. The Bank’s directors did not wish to assume the role or 
responsibilities of a central bank: bankers’ bank, supporter of commerce, banker to the 
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government, final arbiter on interest rates, international spokesman on national banking, 
and sympathetic friend of the people. It was banker to the government; that function had 
been its reason for foundation. It willingly set discount and interest rates for its own 
operation, but it did not presume to set rates for other bankers. And as a profit-making 
business, it tended to be nobody’s friend. The governor, deputy governor and directors 
of the Bank of England had other views. In 1832, John Horsley Palmer, who was then 
the Bank’s governor, stated what he saw as the Bank of England’s primary functions: 
 
To furnish the paper money with which the pubic act around them, and to be a 
safe deposit for the public money, and for the money of individuals who prefer a 
public body like the Bank to private bankers.101 
To Elmer Wood, author of English Theories of Central Banking Control, 1819-
1858,102 central banking was about control in all its facets, including: country banks, 
especially those of issue; the discount rate; prices; public deposits; securities and 
exchanges; and the truly sticky problem of Bank reform. In each chapter, Wood focused 
on one of these areas of control, such as attempts to rein in the private banks, or the 
way in which the Bank might affect prices through cheap credit. In the nineteenth 
century, each problem mentioned by Wood presented a problem to economists and 
bank theorists, and these problems were often played out in the debate in the House of 
Commons. Economists were only vaguely aware that banking was somehow connected 
with even more worries elsewhere: over-production; prices of raw materials and wages; 
international balances of payments; and overall business fluctuations. Business 
                                            
101John Horsley Palmer, Testimony to the Committee of Secrecy on the Renewal of the Bank of 
England Charter, 1832, Q. 181, quoted in Edward Victor Morgan, The Theory and Practice of Central 
Banking, 1797-1913 (Cambridge: University Press, 1943; reprint, London: Frank Cass, 1965): 1. 
102Elmer Wood, English Theories of Central Banking Control, 1819-1858, with some Account of 
Contemporary Procedure, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939). 
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fluctuations occurred in nearly every decade. Before 1844 downturns were generally 
blamed on the private banks and their tendency to over-issue. After 1844 they were 
generally blamed on the Bank Act of 1844 and the Bank’s tendency to wait too long 
before clamping down on credit and issue. The rising discipline of economics had not 
yet reached the point that the statisticians had: the identification of problems that led to 
serious fluctuations in the economy.103 Wood’s work is studded with tables, charts, and 
footnotes that lead the reader to the main theorists of the time, demonstrating, for 
example, that Gladstone would certainly have had access to the books and articles that 
would give him ways to approach control of the Bank. 
Edward Victor Morgan’s book The Theory and Practice of Central Banking, 1797-
1913 compares the theory of central banking with its actual history in England and 
Wales. He shows why it took so long to centralize the Bank and mold it into the bank the 
government so desperately needed. He states that the modern central bank has four 
functions: manager of the national debt and banker to the government, regulator of the 
currency, banker’s banker, and lender of last resort.104 He uses the testimony of the 
governors and deputy governors of the Bank of England before secret and select 
committees to show how the Bank resisted being forced into any other role than the one 
they had chosen for themselves. We cannot help but notice how the Bank’s functions, 
listed in John Horsley Palmer’s statement quoted above, fail to match the list written 
more than one hundred years later by Morgan. Even on the topic of currency issue they 
                                            
103As result of a bullion and coinage drain at the Bank of England in 1797 the government allowed 
the Bank to stop exchanging notes for gold coin and bullion (convertibility). This period ended in 1821. 
The Napoleonic wars had led to inflation, where the price of gold, if it could be had, far exceeded the 
statutory value of £3, 17s. 10-1/2d.  
104Morgan, Central Banking, 1. 
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disagree. Palmer listed currency issue, while Morgan called for control. 
 
The Economists and the Schools 
Banking theorists were not, by and large, economists. Their views were clouded 
by what was good for their banks, their pocketbooks, or their corners of the British 
economy. This uncomfortable truth places writers like John Horsley Palmer, Sir Francis 
Baring, and William Gilbart, for example, on the fringes of economic theory. It does not, 
however, remove them from the main chorus of published authorities on economic 
theory, primarily because they all had banks to back them (Bank of England, Barings 
Bank, and the London and Westminster, for example) that were able pay printers for the 
publication of their thoughts. The economists were a smaller and somewhat struggling 
group, not because they could not publish, but because there were so few. Moreover, 
their messages were more complex than that of the bankers, the modern profession of 
economist was younger than that of banker, and investors had a greater stake in the 
success of banks than in the success of economics. 
The first “modern economist” to affect English banking beliefs was Sir Thomas 
Mun (1571-1641), not Adam Smith as some historians insist. Mun’s followers comprised 
the Mercantilist school; its most famous publication was Mun’s England’s Treasure by 
Forraign Trade.105 Mun argued against excessive controls on foreign trade and foreign 
exchange, provided always that England maintained the trade advantage and the 
quantity of gold bullion in her vaults. Mun believed the primary business of England was 
                                            
105Thomas Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade (downloaded from 
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3113/mun/index.html Dec. 21, 2005). 
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to maintain a positive trade with the world. In the arguments about convertibility (of gold 
for paper currency) and “runs” on the Bank’s gold supply, we see the lasting effects of 
Mun’s arguments in debates about ratios (gold versus securities in the vaults) and in the 
insistence that Bank of England notes were not money but promissory notes payable in 
gold. 
Adam Smith came later, publishing An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations in 1776.106 Smith clearly believed that economics and politics 
encompassed many more concerns than whether gold could be used as money and 
whether it ought to be stored in Britain’s vaults. His first book begins with a discussion of 
division of labor—an argument introduced by Aristotle. Smith demonstrated that limits 
on division of labor, and thus manufacturing, farming, transport, banking, and other 
human endeavors, were based on the limits of the marketplace. He believed that 
derivative incomes, from stocks, from interest, from rent, and probably from writing, 
were reasonable sources of income that benefited the owner and did no harm to the 
person who had to pay. For the next century, many writers paid lip service to Adam 
Smith and quoted him whenever possible. They used his arguments to defend the rise 
of factories, smoke, and polluted waters. They failed to see what Smith saw: that 
national economy was to be taken as a whole, not in part. They fastened on currency, 
the evils of country banks, and the need for colonies (Book IV, Chapter vii) without 
understanding the ways colonies contributed to national goals and the ways these 
colonies interfered with other national goals.107 
                                            
106Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, R. H. Campbell, 
A. S. Skinner, eds. (Oxford: University Press, 1976, photo reproduction with minor corrections, 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981). 




One writer who benefited from Adam Smith’s work was David Ricardo, bill-broker 
turned parliamentarian, turned writer. A quiet man with decided opinions, Ricardo fell 
under the guidance of James Mill, father of John Stuart Mill and several other children, 
for whom writing was not a pleasure but a necessity. Ricardo was soon publishing 
under the elder Mill’s tutelage. Ricardo believed in limitations on currency, and thus 
provided the philosophical backing for the position taken up by the Bank of England. But 
Ricardo’s beliefs went much farther, and, tempered by the fortune he had made as a bill 
broker, he saw the economy from the standpoint of the ways in which men become rich. 
On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation came from a statement that 
Ricardo made to Mill, “The improvements in agriculture raise the profits of stock, and 
produce immediately no other effects.”108 His work included chapters on rent, profits, 
natural and market prices, wages, profits, foreign trade, and many types of taxes, poor 
rates, and the difference between value and riches. Most important, he argued that 
although the value of paper currency should be pegged to the value of metal, the two 
should not necessarily be interchangeable. However, he also stated that compelling 
banks of issue to pay in gold was the only way of ensuring that these banks would 
remain honest.  
Like Smith, Ricardo was a long-winded and somewhat torturous writer, but he 
                                                                                                                                             
Bentham who published An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), A Manual of 
Political Economy (1795), Anarchical Fallacies (1795), Principles of the Civil Code (1802), and Defense of 
Usury; Shewing the Impolity of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains in a 
Series of Letters to a Friend to Which is Added a Letter to Adam Smith, Esq., LLD. On the 
Discouragements Opposed by the Above Restraints to the Progress of Inventive Industry. 1787. For John 
Stuart Mill’s biography of Bentham, reprinted from the London and Westminster Review, August, 1838 
(revised and included in Dissertations and Discussion 1), see 
http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/3113/bentham/bentham, downloaded Nov. 14, 2005. Also see T. W. 
Hutchison, “Bentham as an Economist,” The Economic Journal 66, no. 262, (June 1956): 288-306. 
108The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo 1, On the Principles of Political Economy 
and Taxation, ed. Piero Sraffa (Cambridge: University Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1966). 
 
 69
had the advantage of developing a coterie of followers: James Mill, Colonel Robert 
Torrens, and John Ramsay MacCulloch. These men made Ricardo’s works 
approachable and understandable, and did much to spread Ricardo’s fame. The 1844 
Bank Charter Act had been described in David Ricardo’s 1824 Plan for the 
Establishment of a National Bank, a charter that separated currency issue from banking. 
As the agitation that followed the Act shows, neither Ricardo nor the Act had solved 
Britain’s financial problems: prices of manufactured goods, the money supply, over- and 
under-investment resulting in a stream of bankruptcies, and especially the price of 
money in terms of wages, raw materials, government support and supervision, and the 
promise of more (colonial) customers for goods. 
Thomas Tooke was also a Ricardian at the beginning of his career. But Tooke 
began to believe that the quantity theory of money, as represented by the Currency 
School, as it came to be called, was not the correct focus for a description of British 
economics. Tooke believed the real problem was prices. He had seen and recognized 
the way inflation had affected the value of the pound from 1797 to 1821. As he thought 
about the problem of inflation, he came to believe that prices provided a better way to 
measure the interchangeability of goods and therefore, to borrow from Smith, the limits 
of the market. Thomas Tooke wrote just as much as Ricardo. His Considerations on the 
State of the Currency109  contained new thinking on interest rates. His first two volumes 
of the six-volume work History of Prices covered the period 1783 to 1814 and concluded 
that bad harvests and interruptions of trade by war had led to high prices. He concluded 
                                            
109Thomas Tooke, Consideration on the State of the Currency (Variorum of the first and second 
editions, in Reprints of Economic Classics 2, Number 8, Sydney: University Press, 1996). 
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that good harvests, increased trade, and improvements in manufacturing had led to 
lower prices.110 His work on prices eventually grew to six volumes (with the help of his 
friend and colleague, statistician William Newmarch).111 But it was not well received or 
understood. Phyllis Deane, the twentieth-century economic historian, says that the 
1850s and the 1860s constituted a period of relative prosperity in the British economy 
and a general complacency in economic thought. Meetings of the Political Economy 
Club debated topics such as “Was Ricardo right when he said ________”112 but the 
members did not concern themselves with the prices of goods. 
Two more names are required to fill out the picture of the information available in 
the area of banking: Samuel Jones Loyd, later Lord Overstone, and Walter Bagehot. 
Samuel Jones Loyd appeared before a large number of secret and select committees 
on banking, his last appearance during the commercial crisis and Bank Charter 
Renewal crisis of 1857.113 He was not simply a banker and author: he was also a 
publisher, who brought to the attention of the public an economics writer named John 
Ramsay MacCulloch. Jones Loyd was anxious that the public be fully informed about 
the true nature of banking and currency.114 He was not shy. For example, after his 
                                            
110G. H. Murray, ‘Tooke, Thomas (1774-1858)’, rev. Arie Arnnon, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [Http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27546, accessed 10 
Sept 2005]. 
111See for example, Thomas Tooke, A History of Prices, and the State of the Circulation, from 
1839 to 1847 Inclusive: with a General Review of the Currency Question and Remarks on the Operation 
of the Act 7 & 8 Vict. c. 32 4 (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans [sic], 1848). 
112David Ricardo, Plan for the Establishment of a National Bank (London: John Murray, 1824); in 
Phyllis Deane, The Evolution of Economic Ideas (Cambridge: University Press, 1978): 94. 
113For a good representation of the types of materials covered in parliamentary debates over 
banking and currency, see Select Statutes, Documents, and Reports Relating to British Banking, 1832-
1928, ed. T. E. Gregory (Oxford: University Press, 1929; reprint, London: Frank Cass, 1964). 
114A very fine study of Lord Overstone’s position in the banking and political world can be found in 
Lloyd Alvin Helms, The Contributions of Lord Overstone to the Theory of Currency and Banking (Urbana: 
The University of Illinois Press, 1939).  
 
 71
testimony in 1857 before a select committee of the House of Commons, he paid to have 
his testimony published in book form.115 
In addition to publishing his own work, he also published works he thought 
contained useful information. A Select Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts and 
Other Publications on Paper Currency and Banking was first privately published under 
the editorship of John MacCulloch in 1857.116 Another select collection on the national 
debt and the sinking fund also appeared in 1857. It too contained selections hand-
picked by Lord Overstone for the education and intellectual improvement of his 
friends.117 
Walter Bagehot (1826-1877) has been called the Victorian’s most versatile 
genius—banker, economist, political thinker, critic, and writer.118 He was the son of a 
private banker in Langport; the bank later was expanded as the country’s first joint-stock 
bank. He became a writer and in 1856 met James Wilson, founder and editor of The 
Economist, the first publication in England devoted exclusively to economic thought. 
When Wilson left England to take up the post of Chancellor of the Indian Exchequer, 
Bagehot became editor of his now father-in-law’s magazine. He then wrote two articles 
every week for the magazine on current affairs. This demand for output made him an 
                                            
115Samuel Jones Loyd, The Evidence Given by Lord Overstone before the Select Committee of 
the House of Commons in 1857 on Bank Acts, with Additions (London: Longman, Brown and Company, 
1858; reprinted, Clifton: Augustus M. Kelley, 1973). 
116John Ramsay MacCulloch, A Select Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts and Other 
Publications on Paper Currency and Banking (London: Private printing of 150 copies; reprint, New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1966). This work includes “The Utility of Country Banks Considered” (1802), “Just, 
though rather too favourable), and “Treatise on the Coins of the Realm” (1805) by the first Earl of 
Liverpool, which MacCulloch calls one of the most valuable of that class of publications. 
117John Ramsay MacCulloch, A Select Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts and Other 
Publications on the National Debt and the Sinking Fund (London: Private printing of 150 copies; reprint, 
New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966). William Gladstone read both these books and served on many of 
the committees where Overstone testified. 
118Norman St. John-Stevas, Bagehot’s Historical Essays (New York: University Press, 1965): vii. 
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expert on many subjects including all the economic debates that raged around him. 
Bagehot was believed to be the only man in England outside its management that 
completely understood the Bank of England. Bagehot was a friend and adviser to 
Gladstone and helped Gladstone modify the Banks Notes Issue Bill in 1865, the bill 
which offered rights of issue to any bank willing to pay for the license. In addition to 
working with Gladstone, Bagehot wrote four articles about him, “Mr. Gladstone” (1860, 
“Mr. Gladstone’s Chapter of Autobiography” (1868), “Mr. Gladstone and the People” 
(1871), and “Mr. Gladstone on Home Rule for Ireland” (1871).119 
 
Conclusion 
The books listed above are only a sample of the histories and biographies 
available to the reader who wishes to take on both Gladstone and the Bank of England 
in one thesis. In 1856, Gladstone wished to paddle rapidly in a slow-moving river, find a 
place to dam and reroute that river, and make it into the useful waterway he believed he 
wanted. Nine hundred years of history were against him. Traditions in banking were 
against him. By 1866, this thesis contends, he had read sufficient history and modern 
writing on banking, finance, currency, gold, and trade that he took another route, 
bypassing the Bank of England, and joining the reform movement in the government. 
His Exchequer and Audit Departments Act was widely admired. This single Act when a 
long way to put the government’s financial affairs in order. Gladstone also came to 
accept the National Debt as a fact of life. This thesis shows how this transition from 
                                            
119These articles are included in St. John-Stevas, Historical Essays. They are also included in the 
longer and more comprehensive work, The Works and Life of Walter Bagehot, ed. Mrs. Russell 
Barrington, (Longmans, Green, 1915). 
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warrior to political strategist was accomplished, leaving Gladstone with fewer financial 




GLADSTONE AS READER—THE SOURCES 
Introduction 
This chapter examines available evidence that helps to define William Gladstone 
as MP and Chancellor of the Exchequer. I contend that Gladstone was an advanced 
student and his Diaries show that he was a constant reader. Furthermore, I contend that 
his reading on taxation, government finance, and other topics helped him in his goals of 
creating budgets and policy that contributed to Britain’s prosperity, health, welfare and 
internal peace. This chapter examines my sources for this contention—his Diaries, 
edited by M. R. D. Foote and H. C. G. Matthew, and Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 
and his contacts, including the writings and testimony of Samuel Jones Loyd, Lord 
Overstone.  
Part of this chapter is given over to those classic and more modern works of 
economic theory to show, first, the broad range of theories about finance and 
economics available to the interested reader in 1833, the year Gladstone came down 
from Oxford and entered politics; second, the materials that Gladstone wisely did not 
read; and third, the ways his understanding might have been strengthened if he had 
benefited from some writers such as the Physiocrats and the Mercantilists. 
 My examination of economic and financial theory began after I read the record of 
Gladstone’s disagreements with the Bank of England. Much about nineteenth-century 
economics appears to be incomprehensible unless one understands the history of 
banking, as shown in Chapter 1, or understands the importance of gold to early 
merchant theorists such as the Mercantilists. Britain was, whether her theorists 
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understood it or not, in difficult financial and economic straits in the period under study. 
The first gigantic fires of the industrial revolution were dying down and Britain was 
encountering competition around the world for pursuit of colonies and markets. The 
growth of railroads rekindled investors’ interests in spending money to make money. 
They built iron horses not only in Britain but in the colonies and protectorates around the 
world. In the 1850s, Britain began iron-cladding her ships. Each new scientific discovery 
and engineering breakthrough saved the nation from slipping from her leading position 
in the world, encouraged investors, increased enrolment in technical schools and thus 
the number of engineers and other experts able to spread the learning and growth. 
Economic theory failed to keep pace. The men able to push the economists into 
understanding what was happening or might be happening required courage and 
knowledge. Gladstone was such a man. Gladstone’s strength and courage came from 
his faith and his determined but not, I think, messianic sense of purpose. This purpose 
drove him to public service and public finance. His family life grounded him. His father 
and one brother were merchants, accustomed to dealing in finance. His brother-in-law 
Stephen Glynne was a failed entrepreneur desperately in need of saving: Gladstone 
managed to solve Stephen’s financial problems while leaving his brother-in-law with a 
modest competence and a helping hand whenever needed. His numerical skills coupled 
with his rich desire to learn more gave him the knowledge to keep Britain on track. 
Gladstone read. If we miss that facet of his character, we have missed much of 
Gladstone as a man. 
This thesis aims at redefining Gladstone as a man much educated by his reading 
and personal contacts who, persuaded by his learning and experience as well as guided 
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by his religion and family values, saw a good deal that was wrong with the government 
he served. This is a man who labored to be of service to his country, who occasionally 
evinced deep disappointment and sometimes anger and despair. There was much 
about Victorian England that justified occasional anger and unhappiness: too many 
babies and too many of the poor died early of terrible diseases such as cholera; 
England wasted her resources in colonial actions and a perilous war (Crimea) with 
lasting repercussions both for popular feeling and the national debt; England could be 
accused of over-zealous recriminations against the Irish; England’s wealth emerged at 
the costs of poisoned rivers and cloud-black skies; the church h that Gladstone loved 
was flawed and threatened both by dissenters and resurgent Roman Catholicism. 
Gladstone tried hard to understand national problems and to turn every office in which 
he worked into a triumph for himself and for England. Gladstone—a man of deep 
religious piety, enormous energy, sound political judgment, a large ego, and a good 
intellect—wanted to do more, and was often frustrated in his attempts. 
Repositioning Gladstone requires sources, and these are well at hand. They are 
the same ones that have been used before, but used in different ways: The Gladstone 
Diaries have been quoted, but the indexes in Volume 14 of the Diaries are little used.1 
Volume 14 contains three indexes: Dramatis Personae, “Gladstone’s Readings,” and a 
general index. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, Series 3, have been used, but they 
can be made to yield more. Many historians, including Shannon, Crosby, Matthew, and 
Jenkins, have used the Diaries. Others, notably Morley, have used Hansard’s to quote 
speeches. The chapters that follow use these resources in other ways: the aim here is 
                                            
1Gladstone, Diaries. The indexes appear in Volume 14. 
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to go beyond the speeches in Hansard’s and the jottings in The Diaries and to 
demonstrate how some of Gladstone’s changes of attitude and behavior, especially his 
apparent abandonment of Peel and his declared war on the Bank of England, reflect his 
contacts with social and political acquaintances and the reading matter he absorbed. 
Further, it is possible to show how the readings, for example, changed his point of view 
on such topics as the Bank of England. 
His Diaries show Gladstone to be a whole, evolving, socially and politically 
sensitive man. While he may very well have used books and public contacts as coping 
strategies, he also used them to educate himself and shape his response to the 
discourse of the day. This thesis is not a biography. It looks only in passing at elements 
of a “whole man” such as his relationship with his family. It is a history of a man and an 
institution, and shows how Gladstone, as David, searched for the sling and a small 
stone that would call the Bank to attention, not bring it crashing down. As Chapter 7 and 
8 demonstrate, this is what seems to have happened. 
When we look, the evidence is suddenly all around us. Georgina Battiscombe, 
author of a book on Catherine Gladstone, comments that the new Mrs. Gladstone soon 
learned her husband was not entirely her own: that she could not while away twenty 
minutes or two hours between trains in pleasant conversation with him. As soon as they 
were on the train, on the boat, on the platform, or in the waiting room, he pulled a book 
from his pocket and put his nose, and his concentration, into it.2 The new husband was 
training his new wife to respect his inclinations. He was, as this thesis will show, a 
                                            




lifelong reader, advanced autodidact, and self-made economic politician. His reading 
habits and his social and political contacts deserve more credit for his progress than has 
been given.3  
A reexamination of Hansard is also in order, not merely for the substance of the 
many speeches, which have been commented on, but for the social milieu and the 
debate that surrounded the budget and other money bills in the House of Commons.4 
In H. C. G. Matthew’s three indexes to the Gladstone Diaries, each line item is 
followed by at least one date of contact: for people, this is a date of first meeting, birth, 
or other significant date. In the Readings section, this is a date on which Gladstone 
recorded reading the work. The Dramatis Personae provides us with an interpersonal 
history of Gladstone from his personal contacts in the political, social, family, church, 
statistical and economic, or public sphere. “Gladstone’s Readings” includes most (but 
not all) the books, plays, pamphlets, poetry, and journals Gladstone read. The general 
index is of use for work with categories, such as “inventions.” Gladstone read widely on 
inventions, and the general index lists many of these events by date and invention 
name, but does not, for example, mention the huge steam-driven chain-saw that 
Gladstone once saw demonstrated.5 This thesis pays scant attention to duchesses, 
prelates, soldiers, and Oxonians. It focuses on political economists, bankers, and 
                                            
3Michael Bentley says the Duchess of Sutherland created a political salon for Gladstone’s benefit, 
and counseled him on occasion. However, it is reasonable to assume that for Gladstone and the Duchess 
to maintain the salon, many people must have been exposed to Gladstone’s thoughts and positions, and 
he must have benefited from theirs. See Michael Bentley, “Victorian Politics and the Linguistic Turn,” The 
Historical Journal 42, no. 3 (September 1999): 883-902, esp. 887, n.24. 
4All references to Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates in this paper refer to Series 3. For 
Gladstone’s first budget speech and the form that the reporting took, see Hansard’s 3, cxxv:1350. 
5Gladstone’s participation in an experiment with various types of gun cotton caused windows in 
Downing Street to be shattered. See Gladstone, Diaries 8:1/8/72. 
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economic writers whom Gladstone met or read. Thus, this thesis ignores charges to 
clergy, biographies of politicians, and travelogues and concentrates on works of finance, 
political economy, taxation, and the cost of war. 
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates give us a good deal more than apparently 
faithful representations of Gladstone’s speeches. During Gladstone’s parliamentary 
career, the editors of Hansard made significant advances in improving their reporting. 
These improvements appear in the front matter, the body text, and the indexes. The 
body text, whose numbered columns provide addresses for various speeches, debates, 
and outcomes of individual bills, was enhanced several times between 1853 and 1866, 
and the changes made to improve front and back matter help researchers piece 
together personalities and parliamentary developments.6 For example, the name of the 
speaker in debate appears at the bottom of the left-hand column of the page, a 
convenience for following a long speech in an imperfect reproduction of the 
proceedings.  
Contacts were hugely important to a Victorian politician. In the late 1840s, 
Gladstone met and worked with Prince Albert on the Great Exhibition of 1851. Albert is 
said to have recommended Gladstone to the Queen as a possible Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in the Earl of Aberdeen’s government. This contact certainly resulted in 
invitations to him, his wife, and later his children to the various palaces where they 
mingled with kings, queens, duchesses, and other members of the highest strata of 
                                            
6In 1857, the Hansard’s typesetters were still struggled to cope with really tangled problems such 
as the concurring debates on a renewal of the Bank Charter, an indemnity bill to save the Bank from 
prosecution for inadvertent over-issue, and the financial crisis of 1857. See Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Hansard’s also had problems with the names of bills and debates, offering different titles for a bill as it 
was debated, sent to committee, withdrawn, recommitted, or otherwise modified in passage. See, for 
example, the debate on the Banks of Issues [sic] bill in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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British society; the Prince of Wales included young Willy Gladstone in his entourage for 
a tour of Europe.7 The Prince and Princess or Wales as well as other royals visited the 
Gladstones more than once.8 The Diaries show a good deal of this contact. Gladstone 
also hobnobbed socially with the very men he often opposed, such as banking 
magnates and opposition politicians.9 
Given Gladstone’s reading habits, we should not be surprised that his interests 
the Corn Laws, mid-Victorian budgets, the Crimean War, and the constantly changing 
European political situation triggered conversations in company about these various 
problems. Gladstone developed, for example, a relationship with many members of the 
powerful Rothschild banking family, both those who lived in England, and those who 
visited, or in one case were exiled there. Knowing of this relationship, we may 
reasonably ask how an inquisitive and numerate Chancellor of the Exchequer could 
avoid exploiting the tremendous personal expertise of family members as well as the 
international spy network and courier service provided by the Rothschild family.10 
                                            
7Gladstone, Diaries 6:13/1/63. 
8Ibid. 6:23/6/64: Gladstone and his wife dined with the Prince and Princess of Wales at 
Marlborough House. In Diaries 6:8/7/64 we learn the prince rode with Granville and Gladstone. 
9Ibid., 5:3/6/59. Gladstone even carried on a social relationship with Bonamy Dobree, director, 
deputy governor, and governor (1859-1861) of the Bank of England because of the interest they shared in 
fine china. Gladstone saw Dobree’s collection in June, 1859. He met several other governors and 
directors socially over the years. 
 10Ibid., 14:221. This entry lists thirteen members of the Rothschild family with whom Gladstone 
either met or corresponded. When one recognizes the power of this single family in Europe, one must 
accept that Gladstone derived some benefit from this acquaintance. See Niall Ferguson, The House of 
Rothschild, Money’s Prophets, 1798-1848 (New York: Viking, 1998): 9, 15, 380, 385. The index for this 
book contains four references to Gladstone. By contrast, Stanley Weintraub, Charlotte and Lionel, a 




Gladstone’s Reading Habits 
H. C. G. Matthew calls the record of “Gladstone’s Reading” a “very remarkable 
cultural document in itself”: 
 
There are many records of the contents of prominent persons’ libraries, but I 
know of no other major figure who attempted to record, day by day, his or her 
reading over a life-time, let alone a life-time as long as Gladstone’s! Since a part 
of each day was systematically reserved for reading even when Chancellor or 
Prime Minister … and since Gladstone read as eclectically as any Victorian, the 
record of his reading is a tour not only of Victorian high culture—and it certainly is 
that—but also of the by-ways of nineteenth-century political, religious and literary 
life.11 
The Diaries begin in 1825 when Gladstone was fifteen years old, and recorded 
his reading habits from then on. He was sent to Eton a year later. In 1828 he went up to 
Oxford to study humane letters, and also to learn mathematics and optics. The study of 
humane letters was an accepted curriculum for young men of the rising merchant class 
in that period. That Gladstone should also have chosen to study mathematics and 
optics, with its excursions into physics, logarithms, and differential calculus, appears 
somewhat surprising when Matthew states that Gladstone was sadly deficient in math 
and required tutoring before he could enter Christ Church.12 His decision to sit 
examinations in this tough second school attests to the mastery he thought he had 
achieved, and his resulting first shows that he had not misjudged himself. It would be a 
mistake to ignore the “other” first in mathematics, because it made him a known 
commodity, a numerate person: numbers simply made sense to him. The audiences for 
his budget and other speeches would consist primarily of two mentalities: the ill-
                                            
11H. C. G. Matthew, “Preface,” in Gladstone, Diaries 14: v. 
12Matthew, H. C. G. “Gladstone, William Ewart (1809-1898). Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004. [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10787, downloaded 1 
April, 2005], printed page 3. 
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numerate, who could understand nothing larger than small numbers and sums, and the 
highly numerate, those who managed banks, breweries, factories, and large farms, and 
well understood their profits and losses, saw them in three dimensions, and looked at 
government finance the same way. MPs and lords who might mistrust him on Italy, free 
trade, or the church, may have found they could put more faith in him if they could trust 
his numbers.  
Chapters 3-7 list the books and articles related to this politically numerate 
position. I have organized these readings into six categories, all directly related to the 
main topic of this thesis, and loosely connected with the audiences he faced when he 
rose to deliver a budget address: 
Accounting and Trade includes topics related to the mercantile interests in 
Britain: trade, free trade, the Corn Laws, and the American Civil War. The segment on 
the Bank of England collects all the books he read on the Bank as well as the materials 
he read on the highly controversial Bank Act of 1844. Banking sums the books he read 
on country and private banks, joint-stock banks, and arguments about currency. 
Government Finance brings together the books Gladstone read on government 
budgets and finance, Indian finance, the national debt, and taxation. Political Economy 
pulls together the works Gladstone read by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas 
Tooke, and a host of others whose opinions he followed, even when he did not 
particularly agree with their ideas.  
Cost of War is a necessary final category for four reasons: the dramatic rise in 
the national debt caused by the prolonged Napoleonic Wars, the costly mistakes made 
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in fighting the Crimean War, the costs of “Victoria’s little wars” 13and the threat of a 
European war held over Gladstone’s head while Viscount Palmerston dabbled in United 
States and European politics. These books are listed individually, in the chapters that 
follow, by category, author, publication date, and the date on which Gladstone first 
recorded reading them. Table 2 is a summary from which some trends emerge. 


















and Trade 38 7 2 1 16 64




1 1 2 9 4 17 5 3.4 
Banking 20 6 15 12 44 97 5 19.4 
Government 
Finance — 24 22 4 41 91 4 22.75 
Political 
Economy — 7 4 3 6 20 4 5.0 




59 46 55 40 119 315 — — 
Total Years 
in Period 14 6 2 5 7 33 — — 
Ave per 
Year 4.2 7.6 22.5 8.0 17.0 9.5 — — 
aThe early hump in this category derives from Gladstone’s readings in the Corn Laws. 
Particular attention should be given to specialty collections of titles, such as the 
three books Gladstone read on accounting, bookkeeping, and double entry 
                                            
13Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (Ware: Wordsworth, 1999): 3. 
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bookkeeping.14 The fine art of double entry bookkeeping, with its over-arching structure 
of accountancy, was not new when Gladstone entered government. Coombs, Edwards, 
and Greener have traced the rising need for effective bookkeeping in government back 
to 1822 when a Select Committee on Public Accounts attached an appendix to their 
yearly report listing proposed accounts and explanatory papers. In 1829, a study of the 
mode of bookkeeping in the official accounts included specimens of a cash book, 
journal, and ledger, all standard accounting documents, each with a defined purpose, 
and each providing a step in any audit trail required.15 We should note that the early 
bump in reading arises from Gladstone’s extensive reading on the Corn Laws. 
Industry had already established accountancy and bookkeeping as primary 
requisites to management and profitability. Unlike the opinions of investors, parents, 
and friends, accountancy gave the manager an unbiased and unvarnished view of his 
operation, and some indication of whether or not his company could be a success. In 
his study of James Watt, Jr., and Samuel Oldnow, Robert Williams wrote that  
 
Accounting had attractions that appealed to the rational, materialist, positivist 
philosophy that each [Watt and Oldnow] had adopted because it provided a 
system of measurement leading to an objectivity that was not otherwise obtained. 
Also, accounting provided a quantification of performance that accorded well with 
the pragmatic outlook of both men and provided an order from the apparent 
                                            
14Double entry bookkeeping is an accounting system in which two entries are made for every 
transaction: one in the debit column of the account from which the sum is withdrawn, and the second in 
the credit column of the account where the same sum is deposited. See Gerald Klein, Dictionary of 
Banking, 2nd edition (London: Pitman, 1995): 89. For the ways in which double entry bookkeeping began 
to enter the business of the various departments and agencies, see Double Entry Bookkeeping in British 
Central Government, 1822-1856, Hugh Coombs, John Richard Edwards, Hugh Greener, eds. (New York: 
Garland, 1997). This book provides a history and documents describing the government’s progress in 
adopting double-entry bookkeeping, the departments that had made the attempt, and forms for various 
exchanges. Note that Inland Revenue did not require double-entry bookkeeping at that time. For the Civil 
Service examination questions see idem, 308-314. 
15Coombs, Edwards, Greener, Double Entry, 37. 
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chaos of a multitude of activities which complemented and supported the 
observations each made.16 
Publications of the Academy of Accounting Historians have shown that 
accountancy was no new idea but an approach to government and merchant business 
at least hundreds if not thousands of years old.17 Gladstone read on accounting, and 
promoted government accountancy when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1853. 
It should not surprise us when Civil Service examinations were introduced that they 
emphasized numeracy.18 Many business men served in parliament, and were capable 
of demanding the same level of financial responsibility from the government that they 
demanded from their factories. Accountancy was a rising profession. Given the wide 
range of revenue and spending departments in the British government, the massive size 
of the British national debt, and the difficulties of collecting some revenues, many 
parliamentarians must have believed that much-improved accounting procedures would 
aid the government in getting its fiscal offices in order. 
                                            
16For a detailed study of the apparent first attempts to arrive at a complete accounting system in 
industry, see Robert B. Williams, Accounting for Steam and Cotton: Two Eighteenth Century Case 
Studies (New York & London: Garland, 1997). Williams says management accounting in industry 
improved during the industrial revolution. The driving factors were accountants and managers who saw 
the benefits of the practice and the new philosophies that supported it, including religion. Another study of 
bookkeeping is Y. W. Yarney, “Scientific Bookkeeping and the Rise of Capitalism,” The Economic History 
Review, new series 1, no. 2/3 (1949): 99-113. 
17For a sample of the history of accountancy, see Hermann Kellenbenz, “The State of 
Bookkeeping in Upper Germany at the Time of the Fuggers and Welsers,” The Academy of Accounting 
Historians 1 (1979): 87-98; George J. Costouros, “Early Greek Accounting on Estates (Fourth Century B. 
C.)” The Academy of Accounting Historians 2 (1979): 1-6; David A. R. Forrester, “Aspects of French 
Accounting History (1985), The Academy of Accounting Historians 4 (1989): 56-81. 
18For the focus on numeracy in the Civil Service examinations, see Double Entry Bookkeeping, 
301-314. This passage contains excerpts from BPP 1856: 361, “The First Report of her Majesty’s Civil 
Service Commissioners for Conducting the Examinations of the Young Men … to be Appointed to … 
Junior Positions in Civil Service Positions …,” including Table B, “Differential Standards of Qualification 
Established by the Various … Departments” and Appendix III, “Examination Papers” for double entry 
bookkeeping. Arithmetic (including vulgar and decimal fractions) was required the offices of the Admiralty, 
Civil Service Commission, Colonial Office, Customs, Exchequer, Factory Inspectors, Inland Revenue, 
Metropolitan Police Office, Poor Law Board, Treasury, War Department, and Office of Woods. The Office 
of Works required arithmetic including interest. Purchase of stock and exchanges was required for the 
Paymaster General’s Office. Vulgar fractions only were required for the Metropolitan Police Courts, 
National Debt Office, and the Post Office. 
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The accounting tests included in a Civil Service examination for one of the 
departments listed in BPP 1856:361, bear only a slight superficial resemblance to the 
mathematics, optics, and physics that Gladstone studied at Oxford. But Gladstone 
believed in economy, and apparently had no difficulty in relating economy to efficiency 
in government, especially if it led to increased revenues, fewer losses, and more 
efficient management. His mercantile background might have been all the education he 
needed to understand double-entry bookkeeping, but to a man with a first in 
mathematics and optics and a zealous mind for learning, efficient bookkeeping would 
have made a great deal of sense and was quickly grasped. He taught his wife to keep 
simple and accurate accounts, bailed his brother-in-law out of bankruptcy, built up the 
Hawarden Estate until it was debt-free, and passed the estate on to his first son and 
that son’s heirs. He prided himself in understanding his worth and his earnings, and in 
his expectations in order. 
The reason for this instant grasp of accounting was probably that like optics, 
mathematics, and the rising discipline of statistics, accountancy is in its own way three- 
dimensional: the axes are time, numbers, and results.19 Accounting not only shows past 
results but also allows a person to predict the outcomes of changes in approach: 
instead of changing the size or type of lens, as one would do in optics, or increasing 
slightly the denominator of a fraction, accountancy allows a Chancellor the Exchequer, 
for example, to change the type of tax, rate of tax, or the way in which the tax was 
collected and understand the change in revenue that would occur. Because the whole 
                                            
19A standard accounting or business management response to an unreasonable demand is that 
“You can have it fast, have it good, or have it cheap. Pick one.” 
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point of accountancy is accuracy without bias, it is the ideal tool for a politician who 
must balance resources with policy. It is also a language. In university, Gladstone had 
learned to speak the languages of optics, physics, and mathematics, and added them to 
the other languages he spoke and read, like Greek, Latin, and French. By learning 
accountancy, he learned to speak another. 
Gladstone augmented his talent for numbers with voluminous reading in 
economics and finance. Matthew noted Gladstone’s reading in Victorian culture—
political, religious, and literary life—but shied away from political economics, 
manufacturing, medicine, invention, and other more technical topics. These, too, were 
part of the Victorian culture.20  
Nothing Gladstone ever read was apparently lost: Books he studied at Eton and 
Oxford remained on his book shelves and offered their guidance long after he entered 
Parliament. His readings on the church, religion, and the church fathers have been 
documented.21 Agatha Ramm, for example, found that Gladstone followed Aristotle in 
finding harmony between scientific knowledge and “things that are not variable, that is, 
things eternal, things having no end and no beginning.” She shows that in his book 
Church Principles he rested his understanding on book vi of the Nichomachean 
Ethics.22 But as this thesis shows, his readings in science, manufacturing, invention, 
railroads, shipping, and other “hard” subjects were numerous, consistent with his 
character, and for at least one historian, Jenkins, infuriating. 
                                            
20The second index in Diaries 14 is “Gladstone’s Readings.” Among many other topics, this index 
lists titles of books on manufacturing, mathematics, inventions, geology, medicine, and other technical 
topics. 
21See for example, Agatha Ramm, “Gladstone’s Religion,” The Historical Journal 28, no. 2 (June 
1985): 327-340. 
22Ramm, “Gladstone’s Religion,” 332. 
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Historians have used the Gladstone’s Diaries to understand the man, the 
theologue, and the Homerian scholar. But the Diaries show us much more, such as his 
involvement in his family and their accomplishments.23 They also show us how and 
when he trained himself to be an educated chancellor and prime minister. Gladstone 
read as many as four books at a time and typically worked a sixteen hour day, in spite 
of his busy social and political life. True to his biographers he read classics, Biblical 
studies, and theology. Gladstone also read about the modern church whenever he 
could: for example, he seems to have read every pastoral charge a bishop ever wrote to 
his flock. In addition, Gladstone created a program that continued his adult education 
and his growth as a politician and man24. He read any book that supported one of his 
interests: he had trouble with his skin, eyes, colon, and throat; he suffered occasional 
headaches; he read books on medicine whenever he could lay hands on them.25 He 
received deputations of manufacturers of all types, and read books on industry and 
accounting. He traveled and read books on travel. 
Historians who understand Gladstone as a deeply religious man and continuing 
                                            
23Crosby says Gladstone spent scant attention to his family, but the Diaries show that Gladstone 
remembered their birthdays; delighted in showing off his children in church and on Rotten Row; taught his 
sons and daughters Latin and Greek; concerned himself with their performances on the piano forte and 
the cricket fields; attended their parties and their illnesses; and talked himself through his boys’ 
sometimes lackluster progress in schools and exams. He doted on his grandchildren. Such criticisms are 
surprising to one who has read the Diaries thoroughly, and one would be tempted to ask how other 
Victorian gentlemen stood up as fathers in comparison with Gladstone. 
24The books that contain his marginal comments and manuscripts in answer to specific authors 
and ideas are contained at the St. Deiniol’s Library on the Hawarden Estate. However, even without his 
marginalia and private manuscripts, we can gain directions and insights into his readings by the titles and 
sheer volume of his reading on individual topics. 
25Matthew lists thirty-six medicines and treatments; see Gladstone, Diaries 14: 756. He records, 
for example, a conversation with “Mr. Lane” whom Matthew identifies as “probably Hunter Lane, (d. 
1853); Edinburgh surgeon and writer on medicine”; see Diaries 3: 31/8/46. The family physician, Dr. 
Locock, treated the entire family, from the baby Harry to William Gladstone and his wife, and was the 
doctor on call even if the Gladstones were traveling. As an example, see Gladstone’s son Harry’s 
complaints, Diaries 4: 23/2/54. 
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classical scholar have often missed other character developments spelled out in his 
Diaries by his readings in and study of political economics, government finance, 
banking, and a host of related topics. In doing so they have missed the clues that might 
have helped them understand Gladstone the economist, finance minister, economic 
politician, and sometimes contradictory thinker, or Gladstone’s changing reaction to the 
Church of England as the established church of Great Britain and Ireland.  
Matthew identified a shift in focus between the 1830s and 1840s. In the 1830s, 
Matthew says that Gladstone’s reading was largely theoretical, consistent with his 
beliefs as a young parliamentarian, “seeking right rather than results.”26 Matthew 
comments that during the thirties Gladstone did not try to make himself a spokesman or 
accepted authority on a matter, but tried to seek the correct and right way of settling 
issues. By the mid-forties, after he came into Sir Robert Peel’s sphere of influence, 
Gladstone’s voracious reading habits shifted from theoretical to practical; by then he 
was embroiled sequentially in the free-trade problem and repeal of the Corn Law.27 
 There are, of course, problems with sources. When they edited the Diaries, M. 
R. D. Foote and H. G. C. Matthew expended a good deal of effort to track down the 
journal articles, pamphlets, and books Gladstone recorded. These references appear in 
footnotes throughout the Diaries, and are collected, as far as they can be identified, in 
                                            
26Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 32. It is also consistent in a young man thrown so early into 
national politics after a university grounding in the classics. 
27Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 98. Gladstone was only peripherally involved in the Bank Act. 
See Gladstone, Diaries 3 (February, 1844). He attended some meetings at Peel’s house and thought he 
understood Peel’s position on a single bank of issue. The Subject Index in Vol. 14 shows one place 
where Matthew’s index breaks down, listing no references to Peel for 1844, even when Gladstone 
specifically attended meetings that included the governor and deputy governor. See idem, 14:621, which 
lists panics, profits, deficiency bills, private issues, and the Overend & Gurney attack on the Bank of 
England but fails to mention Gladstone’s attendance at early meetings. 
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Volume 14.28 Gladstone referred to many of his books and pamphlets by a partial name; 
his faithful editors attempted to identify every one of these mysteries, and were 
generally successful. Yet they were unable to identify every document. Their footnotes 
in the Diaries volumes 1 through 13 often include tags such as “unknown,” “not traced,” 
and “probably.” Some titles appear in the index in Volume 14 without an author’s name, 
or without a publication date or both. Nevertheless, one must be impressed at the 
number of titles, authors, and publication dates the editors managed to identify.29 Their 
work in this one area must have been daunting. Gladstone haunted bookstores, 
appears to have left standing orders with several booksellers, and recorded many 
letters to booksellers. He is known to have moved five thousand books from Fasque (his 
father’s home) to London when his father died. He later moved a similar load to 
Hawarden Castle.30  
We cannot be certain that because he mentioned a book, journal, or pamphlet 
Gladstone read it in its entirety; the only assurances would consist of jotted notes or 
marginalia in the book itself, repeated entries in the Diaries over a number of days, or 
the phrase “finished ________.” Without marginalia or a memorandum, we cannot tell in 
most cases whether he agreed or disagreed with the author. In other cases Gladstone 
was clear in his Diaries. In 1856 he read Frances Isabella (Fanny) Duberley’s Journal 
Kept During the Russian War; from the Departure of the Army from England in April 
1854 to the Fall of Sebastopol (1855).31 Gladstone dismissed it as a “poor thing.” 
                                            
28Ibid., 285 - 609.  
29Ibid., 14:285-609, 425 pages in all. 




Gladstone read The Merchant of Venice on 1 June, 1855.32 While Matthew lists 
Macbeth, Measure for Measure, and Much Ado about Nothing as Shakespearian plays 
Gladstone read and/or saw, he missed Merchant.33 While those of us who have 
attempted to put together an index of any book will say sympathetically, “no wonder,” it 
is, nevertheless, a pitfall that should be taken into consideration in any attempt to prove 
that Gladstone either read or did not read a specific publication—sermon, poem, novel, 
play, or three-volume history. 
There are other skips as well. The indexes are sometimes disappointing. For 
example, in Dramatis Personae the entry for Gladstone family members lists Catherine 
Jessy (daughter), Helen (daughter), Henry Neville (son), Herbert John (son), Stephen 
Edward (son), and William Henry (son). Mary and Agnes (daughters) are missing.34 In 
the Subject Index, the entry for Agnes is marked “See Wickam.”35 Mary, who should 
have appeared between John Nielson and Robertson, is still missing.36 The reason 
cannot be lack of attention on Matthew’s part, for Matthew’s work is monumental. It may 
have been a matter of time, or too few assistants, or a typesetting error. To the 
researcher, it is a trip-wire which requires care in case other problems also exist. 
Little problems like these suggest that a firm reliance on the indexes sets a trap 
for researchers who do not pay close attention to the Diaries themselves. This is 
particularly true when Gladstone read (and wrote) on so much and about so many 
topics. He constantly read what he could find about himself, commenting occasionally 
                                            







that he should not be proud, or that the criticism aimed at him should make him a better 
person. He was genuinely miserable when Sir Robert Peel refused even to comment on 
his book Church and State.37 When his work on Homer appeared, he commented that 
he was so weak he actually read it for two hours.38  
He read both when he was happy and when he was unhappy. Travis L. Crosby 
has documented Gladstone’s mood swings and has identified one of Gladstone’s 
coping mechanisms as withdrawal. Withdraw he might, grieve he certainly did, but 
rarely without a book in his hand. His readings in the thirty-three year period of office 
from 1833 when he entered parliament to 1866, if sometimes idiosyncratic, are 
important to our understanding of the man. Books, pamphlets, and journals gave him, 
on the one hand, facts, theories, and opinions—weapons he could use in the debates 
and governmental duties into which he threw himself—the Corn Laws, taxation, and the 
Crimean War. On the other hand, his books seem truly to have educated him, softened 
some of his edginess, tempered his temper, introduced him to new writers and new 
ideas, and given him the mental superiority and surety in debate that he craved but 
could not always claim on his own merits.  
The Diaries show us that he used two approaches to filling his bookshelves and 
his mind: His first was reading from the bottom up, as when he read books on the Corn 
Laws and from them began to master political economy as a whole. His second 
approach was to descend on the bookstores and purchase anything that suited his 
needs or fancies, building up collections on medicine, finance, the Bank Act of 1844, 
                                            
37Ibid., 2: 9/2/39. Gladstone and Peel also disagreed on religion in 1841. See idem, 3:9/5/41, 
10/10/41, 17/10/41. 
38Gladstone, Diaries 5:26/3/58. For the Edinburgh Review article, see idem, 5:21/10/58. 
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inventions, poetry, and travel literature, as books were published. He does not appear to 
have created a top-down strategy, but picked up books on such topics as political 
economy as he went along. 
This is certainly the case with a topic like medicine. During the 1859-1866 
session alone, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer for the third and fourth times, 
he read the books on medicine listed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Gladstone’s Reading in Medicine during his Second Chancellorship 
 
Author Title Publication Date Date Read 
B. Winslow On Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Disorders of the Mind 1860 29 July 1860 
Charles 
Barrett Paper on wind-pipe construction 1861 14 May 1861 
Sir. J.A. 
Simpson 
Antiquarian Notices of Syphilis in Scotland 
in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries 1862 22 May 1862 
Unknown 
Report of the Committee on Venereal 
Diseases in the Army and Navy (PRO WO 
33/12; S. Whitbread, Chairman) 
1863 18 Feb 1863 
 
The list in this table should not be interpreted as a personal Gladstone problem 
with syphilis.39 Nor can we assume that he had more than the usual minor problems 
with his wind-pipe or his brain. The condition of the Army was a constant concern given 
Palmerston’s interests in Europe. In addition, we should note that in every case, 
Gladstone read the item in the same year in which it was published. He simply took in 
what he could find to read if it concerned him at all, read it, and sometimes commented 
                                            
39Gladstone did not suffer from syphilis. The Subject Index in volume 14 does not list the disease 




on it. There is no question that his reading, as well as his personal contacts, penetrated 
his thinking and changed the way he viewed certain phenomena in his world. A short 
memorandum on political economics is appropriate to quote in its entirety because it 
appears to have been triggered either by something he was reading or his 
conversations with “Mr. Kay … on matters of religion …” 
 
Pol[itical]. Ec[onomics]. The question arises and it is of course a very serious one 
whether the system of modern industry is not merely liable to abuse but 
fundamentally and essentially at variance with the principles of the gospel [sic]. It 
appears to me that this question must be deliberately answered in the negative. 
The principle of accumulation of stock or capital arises out of the division of 
labour. But the division of labour economises labour & multiples its power 
[Aristotle, Adam Smith]. It seems therefore to be a beneficial & laudable use of 
the faculties which God has given us--and one that honours the Giver. The 
division of labour prevents each man from supplying his own wants as is the 
case among mere savages: it thus requires him to purchase, & to live upon stock 
while he is preparing what he is to sell. On the accumulation of stock hangs all 
the rest.1  
This kind of passage suggests how much and how rationally Gladstone was 
working to reconcile his political, religious, economic, and even social learning and 
belief into a workable set of ideals from which to run a family, a family investment, or a 
country. 
 
Gladstone’s Re-reading and Non-reading 
Once established in public life, Gladstone retained and reread many of the books 
he had read at Eton and Oxford. He was never far away from Plato’s Republic, St. 
Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, or Politics.41 Matthew 
                                            
40Gladstone, Diaries 3:31/8/46. 
41He picked up Plato’s Republic at least twice: Diaries, 1:23/8/32, 16/12/32. He records reading 
Plato’s Laws in October, 1837. He may either have read for the first time, or repeated a visit to St. 
Augustine’s de Civitate Dei: idem 2:20/12/36, 2:24/10/37. He read Aristotle’s Politics at Oxford, but looked 
at it repeatedly after he came down: idem, 2:6/22/34, 5:14/8/56, 5:3/9/60, and 6:16/8/61. 
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says that Aristotle gave Gladstone the ability to analyze and categorize society as a 
natural organism. He “gained the concept of a vision of human society not yet realized” 
from Plato.42 Bebbington believes that Aristotle’s sense of justice required a person with 
the state of mind that disposed him to perform just actions.43 Gladstone aspired to this 
lofty goal, castigating himself whenever he failed.  
These books cannot be dismissed merely as religious or classical books. Both 
Plato and St. Augustine believed in an idealization of political and social intercourse. 
Gladstone read both repeatedly. Plato’s ideal city was a calm metropolis, based on the 
golden idea of balance, an antidote to the boisterous, mercantile Athens in which he 
lived. Augustine based his city on his belief in God’s perfection played out in real life. 
The same Greek city-state that infused Plato with the need for a sense of balance, and 
with authoritarian rule to maintain it, caused Aristotle to concern himself with the nature 
of money. It is Aristotle who fostered that confusion about the nature of money that was 
later to haunt the medievalists. In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle accepted a non-
metallic version of money that served as a measure of value, a way for the seller of 
shoes to trade with a seller of houses.44 Aristotle believed metallic money was an 
unnatural substance, unable to serve man in the same ways that shoes, food, and 
houses did. Aristotle’s view at that time was based on his idea of value based strictly on 
utility. Aristotle failed to understand credit transactions, used extensively in Athenian 
business for overseas trade.45 He condemned all forms of usury as wealth-taking, 
                                            
42Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 33-36 
43David Bebbington, The Mind of Gladstone: Religion, Homer, and Politics (Oxford: University 
Press, 2004), 23. 
44Barry J. Gordon, Economic Analysis before Adam Smith, Hesiod to Lessius (New York: Barnes 
& Noble, 1975), 44 - 45. 




showing a distinct lack of political sympathy for the capitalists with whom he lived.46 In 
the Politics, written some years later, however, money emerged as a commodity in its 
own right, like wheat or wool. Aristotle wrote that it must have value in and of itself. He 
then wrote that men required “iron, silver, and the like” to facilitate trade between 
communities.” 47 
Joseph Schumpeter, says S. Todd Lowry, stated flatly that Aristotle had no 
theory of price.48 Other writers disagree. Barry Gordon found that Aristotle intended all 
goods should have a price,49 and Lowry himself believed that in Aristotle’s model of 
justice, the concept of price was fundamental.50 On Aristotle, Meikle has written: 
 
The interpretation of these passages [on money in Nicomachean Ethics and the 
Politics] is now in a chaotic state. Even the object of Aristotle’s inquiries is 
disputed. It has been seen as economic analysis, as entirely ethical and having 
nothing to do with economic analysis, and as snobbish political prejudice against 
traders and money-makers. The chapters are usually thought to lack intellectual 
cohesion, and to amount to little more than an expression of aristocratic anti-
business attitudes. Few parts of the Aristotelian corpus are held in lower esteem, 
and they are seldom included in selected editions of Aristotle’s works.51 
If scholarship is in such disarray, it is immaterial to our understanding of 
Gladstone as a reader of Aristotle. Gladstone read Aristotle, but he was, in his political 
and personal dealings, a modernist, well versed in the use of stocks, credit, cheques, 
and overseas transactions, and unworried about the meaning of gold. Nor were the 
problems of medieval (Roman Catholic) scholastics. His readings show he did not 
                                                                                                                                             
Ideas 3, no. 3 (June 1942): 296. 
46Gordon, Hesiod to Lessius, 36-37. See also, Scott Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 1. Meikle says the main texts are Nicomachean Ethics, book 5, chapter 
5 and the Politics, book 1, chapters 8-10. 
47Ibid., 36-37; Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought, 1.  
48S. Todd Lowry, “Recent Literature on Ancient Greek Economic Thought,” Journal of Economic 
Literature 17, no. 1 (March 1979): 67. 
49Gordon, Hesiod to Lessius, 46. 
50Lowry, “Recent Literature,” 72. 
51Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought: 1, n.3. 
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attempt to enter the world of he medievalists, except to understand the feudal history of 
land and land transfer as described in Blackstone. What follows, however, is useful, not 
because Gladstone read the works of the medieval scholars, the Mercantilists, and the 
Physiocrats, but because he did not, and thus found himself confronting a mix of beliefs 
and myths about money, finance, and politics that he failed to crack in his attempt to 
reorganize the government’s relationship with the Bank of England. This body of 
information is what I call Gladstone’s “nonreading.” Had he read more, with an 
economic view of what he was reading, he might have understood more. 
Between the year 1000 and 1500, most “economic” writing was performed by 
churchmen of two types: those who paid more attention to the work of bankers and 
merchants than to ancient beliefs, and those who wrote after Aristotle’s works were 
translated. 
The earlier group includes such writers as Ivo of Chartres (b. 1080), who had 
read the Codex Theodosianus (438), the Lex Romana Visigothorum (506), eighth 
century Bavarian law, and the ninth century capitularies of Benedictus Diaconus. Ivo 
preached on such topics as buyer’s remorse, stating flatly that once a transaction was 
complete, the purchaser could not return goods because the price was too high.52 This 
was new thinking, designed to protect the merchant in his dealing with princes and other 
wealthy people. Giraldus Cambrensis (b. ~ 1146) worried that a nation must maintain its 
own stock of essentials to avoid famine in time of war or pestilence, when the prices of 
necessary goods would soar. The reason is obvious. In war or in famine, a nation could 
                                            




be brought to its knees either by an enemy’s embargo or blockade, or high prices 
demanded by merchants.53 In these two examples we see a worldly-wise church 
attempting to come to grips with the realities of the world. Ivo gave consideration to the 
merchant; Giraldus gave wise council to the prince and his people.54 
After Aristotle’s works were translated, however, the mood changed.55 St. 
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225 -1274) studied under Albert the Great (1193-1280). Albert 
had read Aristotle.56 Albert took to heart Aristotle’s earlier definition of money, that 
money existed only as a way to facilitate exchanges. Aquinas followed Albert and 
quoted Aristotle when he wrote Summa Theologica. Money, he said, was sterile, and 
could not grow itself. Aquinas was particularly harsh on the merchants and bankers, 
now beginning to do a wide business across Europe, for taking profit from the exchange 
of different moneys across Europe.57  
Wood has argued that quite by accident Albertus managed to abstract both the 
idea of a marketplace and price from Aristotle’s chapter on the shoemaker.58 Albertus 
used these findings to assert that the just price of any commodity was its current price, 
established in the marketplace in the absence of monopolistic trading practices, a 
position similar to that of Aristotle.59 
St. Thomas’s teaching ran contrary to the very real facts of English secular and 
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church history. By 1279 the number of rents paid in money had overtaken the number of 
rents paid in labor; the amount of hard currency paid in taxes rose sharply in the early 
fourteenth century, while a drop in the value of a silver penny made paying rents and 
taxes easier.60 Many peasants were paying their tithes in money, not kind. Wood quotes 
N. J. Mayhew who calculated the amount of money in circulation in England in 1200 
(£250,000) compared to the amount available in the early 1300s (£1,100,000) as proof 
that most transactions began to be carried out in money.61 Mate has shown that the 
brothers and chapter of Canterbury Cathedral were nearly always in debt, and paying 
usurious rates of interest to their creditors as well.62 
When Gladstone made his transition from the theoretical 1830s to the more 
concrete 1840s, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and Dante made the transition with him, 
but not as his fundamental philosophers in economic theory.63 Other writers, such as 
Ivo, never entered Gladstone’s library. This is too bad, because Ivo and Geraldus would 
have made sense to the hard-headed financiers of the 1850s. Modern price theory as 
well as the role of government in supporting trade, agriculture, and industry arose not 
from the writings of church fathers, but from the more worldly English Mercantilists and 
the French Physiocrats.  
The Mercantilists and Physiocrats paralleled some incidental English writers who 
also helped to set the mold of nineteenth century British economics. For example, the 
first modern attempt to explain supply and demand, and, incidentally, inflation, came in 
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1601 when Geoffrey Malynes published A Treatise of a Canker of England’s Common 
Wealth (1601): 
 
… plentie of money maketh generally all things dear, and scarcity of money 
maketh likewise generally things good cheape … Whereas things particularly are 
also dear or good cheape, according to the plentie or scarcity of the things 
themselves, or the use of them.64  
Rice Vaughan wrote On Coins and Coinage (published in 1623 and republished 
in 1655) showing the varying relationships between ancient and modern gold and 
silver.65 John Locke (1632-1704) wrote Some Considerations of the Consequences of 
Lowering the Interest and Raising the Value of Money (1692).66 Nicholas Barbon 
responded Discourse Concerning Coining the New Money Lighter [devaluation], a reply 
to Locke.67 These materials were aimed at helping government officials, merchants, and 
investors solve the problems associated with money; they now seem somewhat hit or 
miss. Nevertheless, they are the first works representing a new trend of churchless, and 
sometimes unschooled, economic writers. They were also coincident with and only 
slightly separated from the Mercantilists then coming to the fore.  
The best known Mercantilist was Sir Thomas Mun, author of England’s Treasure 
by Forraign Trade. Mun argued against excessive controls on foreign trade and foreign 
exchange, provided always that England maintained the advantage in foreign trade and 
the quantity of gold bullion in her vaults: 
 
It is not the power of exchange that doth enforce the treasure where the rich 
prince will have it, but it is the money proceeding off wards in foreign trade that 
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doth enforce the exchange, and rules of the price thereof high or low, according 
to the plenty or scarcity of said money.68  
The English writers, including Mun, removed money from the medieval-
scholastic, Aristotelian cocoon of a zero-sum game, moved England toward an 
optimistic, every-one-who-works-wins mentality. Oblivious of the change in the amount 
of money circulating in England between 1200 and 1300, medievalists had argued that 
every economic victory automatically involved an equal and opposite loss (now called a 
zero-sum game). In the seventeenth century, international trade convinced men that 
every one could win, but winning required some care. The most important tenets that 
identify Mercantilism are the importance of bullion and control of the balance of trade in 
England’s favor.69 Mun and his followers argued that as a trading country, England was 
only strong if she maintained more bullion in her coffers than her trading partners. 
Instead of replacing the zero-sum game, therefore, Mun had merely moved it off-shore. 
By insisting that England must control the bullion supply, Mun made the Indians, the 
Chinese, and Britain’s other trading partners into the losers. The reason was that 
although the sum of trade in the world would continue to grow, it could not grow 
uniformly. Those nations that had gold and wanted goods, such as India, would lose 
their gold. The sum of gold in the world was growing because of discovery, but in the 
hands of two other countries—Spain and Portugal—not England.  
The Mercantilists argued both for and against government intervention, asking for 
monopolies and the movement of bullion into the hands of merchants, and for support of 
laissez-faire operations in the shipping lanes. In 1622-23, for example, Mun served on 
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the Privy Council commission on trade, arguing against trade restrictions on exports of 
precious metals because they stopped merchants from gaining a profit.70 The mixed 
messages from the Mercantilists, arguing at one moment against trade restrictions and 
then in favor of them (by, for example, the granting of monopolies) caused later 
economists to undervalue the benefits the Mercantilists gave to Britain. By forgetting 
that the Mercantilists correctly identified Britain as exactly what it would later be called, 
a nation of shopkeepers, they ignored the both the weight the Mercantilists gave to the 
later concept of free trade, and to their often resented but popular attitude that Britain 
should take the lead in world-wide trade and world-wide riches. The Victorians, more 
than they were willing to admit, assented to the Mercantilist position, including the 
continuance of the two most important monopolies still in operation, the British East 
India Company and the Bank of England. 
The French contribution to British monetary policy and thinking came from the 
Physiocrats, seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century writers attempting to find ways 
to finance their increasingly expensive kings.71 Their arguments sound ancient to 
modern ears, for they wrote and preached that the only wealth in a nation lay in its land 
and its farmers, and that a single tax, on farming, was the only dependable way to 
support the king. However, they also presaged Peel’s and Gladstone’s attacks on the 
customs and excise taxes in England. The Physiocrats recommend abolition of the 
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internal tolls and customs collected on the roads and rivers of France. They argued that 
if the tolls were struck down, internal smuggling would cease, men would have more 
money in their pockets, and the land tax would be far easier to collect. Their 
dissatisfaction with industry was based on their belief that industry could never replace 
land as a source of wealth in the nation. 
Francois Quesnay, one of the French Physiocrats, is notable both for his 
understanding of the ways in which money is transferred from hand to hand and for his 
creation of the Tableau Economique.72 The Tableau is graphic study of cash flow, and 
was, for its time, a unique tool. Adam Smith saw the Tableau during in his travels in  
France, studied it, and used it when he wrote An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations.73  
 
Coming to the Nineteenth Century 
When Gladstone came down from Oxford, he enrolled in Lincoln’s Inn as a legal 
student. Gladstone first read William Blackstone’s Commentaries (four volumes) on 
English law (1765), in 1832,74 and again in 1839,75 and 1850.76 Blackstone, the 
commentator who first attempted to understand the various types of English land law or 
the relationship between king and parliament, and to make sense of many precedent-
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setting legal judgments of the past, was required reading for all lawyers and judges in 
the Victorian period.  
 
Anyone wanting to understand the political or ideological background to the party 
and factional conflicts of George III’s early years of the American War of 
Independence will need to turn to these pristine commentaries.77 
Gladstone also read one of the two edited versions of Adam Smith’s An Enquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (3 vols., 1776).78 Blackstone and 
Adam Smith may have provided Gladstone with a reasonable replacement for histories 
of England. The existing examples of history writing focused on kings and wars, not 
economics. As a boy he had Tobias Smollett’s A History of England … Designed as a 
Continuation of Mr. Hume’s (1790).79 He also read Thomas Babington Macaulay’s The 
History of England, from the Accession of James II (1849). Adding Macaulay’s five 
volumes of history to Blackstone on jurisprudence and Adam Smith’ Wealth of Nations, 
he may have had about as good a foundation in history as was possible for the times.80 
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From Blackstone and Smith, Gladstone may have learned a good deal of history en 
passant: Blackstone carefully described history as it applied to law. Smith’s detailed 
writing on the modern world of 1776, took landholding through to a discussion of rents 
before moving on to real prices of manufactures, accumulation of capital (banks of 
deposit). From these Gladstone gained an interesting accumulation of history, historic 
examples, and descriptions of a number of problems in English money and banking. 
The medieval scholastic churchmen had risen out of the universities. The 
Physiocrats were French landowners and nobles. The Mercantilists were merchants. 
The Physiocrats looked down on manufacturers and merchants. Both the university 
men and the land-owning men claimed privileges for themselves in commenting on 
economic affairs that they could not grant to merchants. Hence, while merchants 
followed the thinking of the Mercantilists, the churchmen and the Physiocrats did not, 
and were generally sidelined by the rising merchant class and the needs for money that 
came from trade. It was not until Adam Smith began to lecture and publish that a man 
came to the fore who fit the profile of an authority that critics wanted to read on money 
matters.81 Smith had been trained at the University of Glasgow, a center of the Scottish 
enlightenment, by another professor, Francis Hutcheson, and Smith’s roots in the 
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classics were very deep. Joseph Schumpeter, a twentieth-century economic historian 
has suggested that the first five chapters of the Wealth of Nations recapitulates 
Aristotle.82  
Smith’s work were refined in his public lectures, first in Edinburgh in 1750 and 
1751, and then at the University of Glasgow. Smith thought himself a moral philosopher, 
and his belief in an inborn human decency, as well as man’s need to better himself, 
must have fallen pleasantly on the ears of those who believed that theirs was an age of 
improvement.83 What Adam Smith assumed is as important as what he wrote. He 
assumed, for example, writing in 1776, that all paper currency was and would continue 
to be convertible into gold coin by the Bank of England and the “subsidiary banks.”84 He 
wrote that the Mercantilists were wrong on the subjects of gold bullion and the need for 
a positive balance of trade with other nations, two ideas he might have withdrawn if he 
had foreseen the Bank’s suspension of payments in 1793.85 And, he earnestly regretted 
any attempt, such as the creation of a monopoly, by the government to form, control, or 
reform trade. 
 
Gladstone’s Practical Reading 
Adam Smith takes us to the nineteenth century and the great money-bullion-
banking crises that were to plague bankers, manufacturers, investors, and the 
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government for long days to come. The problem was identified by Henry Thornton 
(1760-1815), a different class of man from Smith. Thornton was a sophisticated banker, 
comfortable in international trade, and the man sometimes credited with founding the 
Banking School of the nineteenth century classical economists.86 The Napoleonic War 
had left England with two problems: a massive debt and a need to resurrect her 
international trade. The Bank of England had suspended cash (gold) payments in 1793. 
This suspension held until 1821, when an ounce of gold had risen in price from the 
statutory £3 17s. 10-1/2d. to more than £6.87 When convertibility was restored, and the 
Bank began to allow withdrawals of gold to those who required it, the price had to fall 
steadily to maintain economic stability. This fall was dramatic, representing nearly half 
of the lower price of gold and a third of the higher price. Those who held gold suffered. 
Those who held notes rejoiced. 
But the end of war and the end of inflation did not create stability. Within five 
years, Great Britain had suffered deflation and commercial crisis, partially caused by the 
fall in the price of gold, and also in the fall of other prices. This fall in prices 
demonstrated Malynes’ premise. It also demonstrated one of the real problems with 
wartime affluence and production: that a market not driven by war-time demand for 
production and an international economy still disturbed by the aftermath of war were not 
a good combination. War was to be avoided so that trade could return to normal. 
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Thornton believed that the question in 1811 was not the state of the bullion, but 
whether the Bank of England should consider the state of the exchanges (such as 
money, grain, coal, gold, and wool) when it regulated to currency issue. He showed how 
the opinion of the Bank of England differed from that of the Bullion Committee: 
 
The Bank and the Bullion Committee were at variance on this leading and 
essential point. The Committee affirmed, that the quantity of money [affected] the 
price of Bullion and … the state of the Exchanges. All the Directors of the Bank 
who had been examined, affirmed that it had not … This is the great practical 
question. If the Bank had in their own hand the power of improving the 
Exchange, and lowering the price of Bullion, and did not use it, if they had the 
means of restoring, or contributing to restore, the standard of the country, and did 
not at all believe that they possessed it, then it became the House, who had 
exempted them from the necessity of making payments in cash, supposing to 
agree with [its own] Bullion Committee, to take care that the Bank should resort 
to the proper remedy of the present evil, by interposing some suggestion of their 
own on the subject. 88 
Thornton’s practical approach to the convertibility question, the problem of 
whether paper could be traded directly for gold, and at what price, was a voice crying in 
the wilderness. His suggestions, first that the amount of gold was not the problem but 
that prices were, and second that the House of Commons should have the right to 
overrule the Bank of England in the way it did business, were thoughtful, intelligent, well 
reasoned, and neglected for the rest of the nineteenth century. His thinking gave 
Thomas Tooke the change in insight that led him to write several books on the 
“currency question” and six volumes of a comprehensive study of the history of prices in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Together, Thornton and Tooke argued long 
and well against the Bank of England and its gold standard. And they were powerless to 
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change either the la w or people’s way of thinking about gold. The gold standard 
continued until the twentieth century. 
When Gladstone came to office in 1833, Britain was finally recovering from the 
problems caused by the Napoleonic Wars. His father, for example, had retained 
sufficient income to support his son in a reasonable style at Oxford and set him up in 
London with an allowance of £1000 a year, not a bad stipend for a young man studying 
at the bar and entering parliament. Nothing stopped Gladstone from reading, but he 
began to find his way slowly. His first excursions into modern political economics were 
when he read two books in the year they were published: Archibald Alison’s The 
Principles of Population and their Connection with Human Happiness (1840)89 and John 
MacGregor’s The Commercial and Financial Legislation of Europe and America; with a 
Pro-forma Revision … of Taxation (1841).90  
With this modest training in the broader world outlined above, William Gladstone 
entered under Sir Robert Peel’s tutelage, and poured himself into free trade and repeal 
of the Corn Laws with enthusiasm. This was a “bottom-up” excursion into learning. From 
1841 to 1846 he read approximately thirty works centered on the Corn Laws. He began 
with R. N. B.’s Corn and Wages (1841),91 and Sir David Salomons’ The Corn Laws; 
Their Effects on the Trade of the Country Considered, with Suggestions for a 
Compromise (1841).92 Every book in this category contained the words ‘corn’ or ‘corn 
laws’ in the title. Without exception, every title tied corn and the Corn Laws to another 
topic—workmen’s wages, trade, food prices, manufacturing costs and profits, national 
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finance, and foreign trade. He read, for example, Thomas Jevons’ The Prosperity of 
Landholders not Dependent on the Corn Laws (1840) in 1841;93 he confronted 
manufacturing and wages in James Wilson’s Fluctuations of Currency, Commerce and 
Manufactures Referable to the Corn Laws (1840). Interspersed with corn, Gladstone 
read the work of Jacob Omnium (Matthew James Higgins) entitled Cheap Sugar … 
Three Letters (1848),94 Charles Newdigate’s A Letter to the Right Hon. H. Labouchere95 
on the Balance of Trade … During the Last Four years (1849);96 and George Frederick 
Young’s Free Trade and the Navigation Laws.97 
The scope of Gladstone’s reading expanded in many directions related to 
political economics in the years that followed. Without the guidance of a strict Oxford 
tutor he made his own way, his curriculum partly decided by political winds blowing 
through parliament and partly determined by book reviews and booksellers’ display 
windows. Evidence of his hit-or-miss collecting and reading appears before and during 
the Corn Law debates: while he was reading on corn, for example, he also dipped into 
or read Henry Booth’s Carrying Question in Reference to Railways and Canals (1841);98 
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Ichabod Charles Wright’s Thoughts on the Currency;99 Nicholas Carlisle’s 
Correspondence on the Mint: Memoir or William Wyon … Chief Engraver of the Royal 
Mint (1837);100 The Economist 79, on the German Zollverein (trading domain);101 and B. 
van Owen’s Ought Baron de Rothschild to Sit in Parliament? An Imaginary 
Conversation.102 
Having identified political economy as a separate and useful topic, he read John 
Ramsay McCulloch’s The Principles of Political Economy (1830),103 J. P. Corry’s 
Competition and its Influence in Producing Distress (1842),104 and The Economist 75, 
“F[riedrich] List on Political Economy” (1842).105 He also began reading the first two 
volumes of Thomas Tooke’s master work on prices, History of Prices and the State of 
Circulation (1838 on).106 The purpose of this last-named book was to convince bankers 
and investors that prices, not the amount of currency in circulation, controlled the 
economy. Tooke began his economic career as a follower of David Ricardo107 and the 
Currency School, those who believed that the quantity theory of money was the source 
of economic success or distress, and the writers who did most to convince readers and 
members of parliament that the Bank of England was right. Tooke soon identified the 
                                            








107David Ricardo (1772-1823) became a prodigious author within a few short years. His 
publications include The High Price of Bullion, A Proof the Depreciation of Bank Notes (1811); Reply to 
Mr. Bosanquet’s Practical Observation on the Report of the Bullion Committee (1811); An Essay on the 
Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock … (1815); Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency; 
with Observations on the Profits of the Bank of England, as they Regard the Public and the Proprietors of 
Bank Stock; On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817); On the Protection of Agriculture 
(1822); and Plan for the Establishment of a National Bank (1824). 
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flaws in Ricardo’s thinking, and founded, based on Henry Thornton’s work, a rival group 
called the Banking School. Tooke’s work on prices eventually led some economists 
away from Ricardo to a more workable understanding of Britain’s economy, but it was a 
long road, not completed until late in the nineteenth century. Gladstone also read 
Thomas Tooke’s Inquiry into the Currency Principle (1844) in the year it was 
published.108  
By the middle of the 1840s, Gladstone was well launched on his career as a 
reader of political economy and satellite topics, including banking, the costs of war, 
currency, taxation, and the government’s budget, and relocated from theoretical to 
practical thinker. Gladstone was not the only man of public affairs who was reading: the 
publishing business centered on finance and money was flourishing. Matthew’s 
comment, that Gladstone’s record of reading is unique and useful, does not negate the 
fact that Victorians were reading and the market for non-fiction books appears to have 
been prodigious and growing.109 There can be little question that in the midst of 
governmental turmoil, the demands of a large family, travel, estate building, social 
events, and a host of other demands on his time, Gladstone would not have maintained 
his studies if they had not helped him survive and flourish as a politician. In the chapters 
that follow, we confront not only the political and economic situation in which the country 
found itself, the behavior of the Bank of England, and the ways in which Gladstone 
reacted to it, but also look at what he was reading that might have contributed to his 
reactions. 
                                            
108Gladstone, Diaries 3:2/5/44. Gladstone read Henry Thornton’s An Enquiry into the Nature and 
Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802) in 1854. 
109Martin Daunton, “Introduction,” in The Organisation of Knowledge, 3. 
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His reading has confounded some of his biographers. He maintained touch with 
the scientific world, perhaps because he believed that improvements in science and 
technology would make Britain and her people richer, or perhaps because he had an 
active mind interested in a wide number of ideas. This interest drove one of his 
biographers to exasperation: Roy Jenkins calls it “wild and almost pointless eclecticism” 
when Gladstone read “Colt on his revolvers” on 28 October, 1853. 
 
in the first year of his chancellorship of the Exchequer, he had at least perused a 
published work by the American inventor of a type of pistol (a side-arm in which 
Gladstone was neither in theory nor in practice particularly interested) and which 
bore the unpromising title of On the Application of Machining to the Manufacture 
of Rotating Chambered-Breach Fire-arms and their Peculiarities.110 
Here, we are confronted with a historian who has accepted stereotype instead of 
looking at the man. Jenkins did not expect Gladstone to read a book on arms 
manufacture, and got quite cranky about it. Jenkins, Gladstone, 179. The original entry 
is in Gladstone, Diaries, volume 4, 28/10/53.111 The Subject Index in Diaries, Volume 14 
refutes Jenkins’ lament. Under an entry entitled “inventions, G’s interest in,” Matthew 
has found many new ideas, including but not limited to Ansell’s fire damp apparatus 
(19/3/66); the gun cotton experiment that shattered Downing Street windows (1/8/72); 
Leger’s magnetoscope (27/3/52); a reaping machine demonstrated on the Hawarden 
estate (13/8/52); the telegraph (20/3/39, 4/7/40); and the telephone (18/3/78, 30/4/79). 
This thesis makes no claim to be a psycho-history. Instead, in this and other points, it 
focuses on facts: Gladstone was the son of Liverpool and Scotland. He had lost a finger 
                                            
110Jenkins, Gladstone, 179. The original entry is in Gladstone, Diaries 4:28/10/53.  
111Gladstone was among the first to rely heavily on the trains for long-distance transportation, to 
send his wife and precious first newborn to visit her mother on a train, and to invest in railroad stocks. He 
read widely on machinery: see, for example, a reference to Sir Travers Twiss, Two Lectures on 
Machinery, in Gladstone, Diaries 3:16/5/44. 
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in a gun accident. He had welcomed and was vitally interested in the invention and 
improvement of railways; he took personal pride in racing between Hawarden and 
London on the rails.112 He must have been aware that war was on the horizon and that 
various members of the cabinet and the Army complained about lack of proper 
equipment. He would later (1872) invite the makers of gun-cotton and members of the 
Ordinance Committee to Downing Street to give a demonstration of the firing power of 
various forms of gun-cotton. He was a man of inexhaustible energy who liked felling 
trees (and, one suspects, hearing crash when the tree hit the ground). He may have 
been in one of his any-book-that-takes-my-fancy moods at a bookstore: a mood he 
enjoyed to the fullest. Why should a man whose fancy was addressed, and whose 
wealth was not threatened, not take the opportunity to read such a book?113 
Much of what Gladstone read was supplemented by those he saw and 
interviewed, notably trade deputations—bankers, merchants, brewers, wine importers, 
and the like, and inventors. Seeing deputations was part of his normal course of work in 
the offices he held in Sir Robert Peel’s government of the mid-1840s, and then in his 
office as Chancellor of the Exchequer. In 1853, for example, he recorded seeing a Mr. 
Archer on 17 March, in the middle of preparing for the budget. Matthew noted that 
                                            
112Ibid., 29/12/41, 21/5/42, 23/5/43, and 10/8/43. At the Board of Trade, Gladstone worked on 
proposals for the exportation of machinery used for goods manufacture. To understand the complexities 
of the problems Gladstone was dealing with, see Kristine Bruland, British Technology and European 
Industrialization: The Norwegian Textile Industry in the Mid Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1989), 1-3. In this study, Bruland identified the British prohibition against export of machinery as a 
major barrier to industrialization in countries that were not Britain’s direct competitors. Britain also forbade 
emigration of skilled artisans from the early 1700s, and began to prohibit machinery export in 1750. This 
was a Board of Trade problem which Gladstone handled, and saw the repeal of the previous laws through 
parliament in 1843. 
113Ibid., 14:725-726. Matthew records more than a dozen inventions in which he took an interest 
in. For gun cotton, see idem, 8:1/8/72. For the illumination of Big Ben with electricity, see idem, 8:6/5/73. 
For linotype, see idem, 12:26/6/89. Gladstone read at least one other book on firearms: Westley 
Richards’ Loading at Breech and Loading at Muzzle, for Military Weapons (1863), idem, 6:12/7/64. 
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Henry Archer had invented a machine for perforating postage stamps; the Treasury 
bought the patent for £4000.114 
Gladstone read several journals of the day and was a member of the Political 
Economy Club and the Statistical Society of London (later the Royal Statistical Society). 
Frank Fetter has studied the economic writers of articles on the nineteenth-century 
political journals and the economists and commentators who wrote for them, and has 
shown that the new professions in journalism were becoming a source of gentlemanly 
occupation for large numbers of trained and self-trained writers.115  
Gladstone also read foreign journals, such as Revue Dieux Mondes. He read any 
book he could acquire and language seems not to have been a problem. Matthew says 
he read Latin, Greek, French, and Italian; had what Matthew called a working 
knowledge of German; and “got by” in Spanish.116 Overall, Gladstone’s reading must be 
seen as part of both his public and private life. The books he read offer us a new way to 
examine the history of this evolving man and give us insights into lesser known 
influences on his life. The societies he belonged to, his book sellers, the authors he 
read, all contributed to his growing knowledge and expertise. 
 
Political and Social Contacts 
Gladstone was a public man. Recluse students reading history in the twenty-first 
century this term may not completely understand this concept. Gladstone recorded 
                                            
114Ibid., 4:17/3/53, n.4; PRO, T 25/551, f. 414. 
115Frank Whitson Fetter,  
116Gladstone certainly read Latin and Greek. More important to his financial studies was his ability 
to read French, as illustrated by his ability to read Revue des Deux Mondes, as well as German and 
Italian, used in correspondence with prominent economists in those lands. See the Readings lists at the 
end of chapters 3-7. 
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whole days when he attended an assembly; went to church; rode with his children; 
dined in one large party; and attended another party, play, or opera later in the evening. 
If he had done no public business during the day, he would still be allowed to have time 
off. When we consider his reading, the letters he wrote and received, and the political 
contacts he may have made during such a day, his day could hardly be described as a 
waste of taxpayers’ money. Members of parliament were expected to be members of 
society, learning about the latest fashions, hearing the latest music, attending the latest 
plays, discussing the latest books and scandals, and mingling, talking, and considering 
together.117 Weddings and business deals (often equally important) were arranged at 
social gatherings. Proposed bills were whispered, introductions to useful people 
accomplished, clothes and hairstyles criticized, opera stars lionized, paintings deplored, 
and all in an aura of diamonds, satins, champaign, music, and dancing. 
Gladstone paid close attention to his political and social responsibilities and 
opportunities. His first appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer appears to owe 
something to his work with the Prince Consort on the 1851 Great Exposition. His regular 
visits to various palaces during his first chancellorship cemented his friendship with the 
Prince. He regularly attended the Lord Mayor’s dinner (where he gave thanks on behalf 
                                            
 117Gladstone, Diaries 14:788-790. Matthew records three and a half columns of visits to political 
hostesses, including Lady Molesworth Andalusia; Charlotte, Duchess of Beaufort; Charlotte, Duchess of 
Buccleuch; Constance, Lady Battersea; Emily, Lady Palmerston; Frances, Lady Londonderry; Frances, 
Lady Salisbury; Frances, Lady Waldegrave; Georgina, Lady Salisbury; Harriet, Duchess of Sutherland; 
Ishbel [sic], Lady Aberdeen; Lady Ashburton; Lady Cararvon; Lady de Grey/Lady Ripon; Lady Granville; 
Lady Jersey; Lady John Russell; Lady Spencer; Louisa, Lady Landsdowne; Louise, Duchess of 
Manchester; Maria, Lady Grey; Mary, Lady Salisbury; and Mary Ann Disraeli, Lady Beaconsfield. These 
contacts included evening parties, day excursions, weekends, and longer visits. The opportunities for 
political exchanges and discussions of economic problems seem endless. Matthew is correct to list these 
as political hostesses of political meetings. In a society where rank, money, and position meant too much 




of the government),118 opened of museums paid for with taxpayer money, took himself 
to political breakfasts and meetings of the Cabinet. He met most of the most important 
people in London. The deputations have already been mentioned. There were also 
meetings with individuals and endless letters to write, often in return for letters he 
received. When he did not have a book in his hand his life was an endless flow of 
people.  
Dramatis Personae lists these people, the mayors, bishops, guests, friends, 
bankers, merchants, booksellers, wine merchants, economists, young ladies who 
married, guests, hosts, painters, singers, musicians, travelers, foreign politicians, 
military officers, and crown princes with whom the Gladstones hobnobbed on an 
increasingly regular basis. Given a man who read much and questioned much, it would 
be unwise to assume that he did not pick the brain of every one of these people who 
might add to his education. 
 
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates as Sources 
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates provides major speeches verbatim, and 
reported debated in the third person. Thus, Gladstone’s budget speeches are presented 
in total and in the first person. Debate that followed is presented in a manner similar to 
modern newspaper reporting. “Mr. Jones said he thanked the Right Hon. Gentleman for 
his comments and … “ Thus, it is possible to follow much of the debate clearly and to 
identify debaters who agreed with a speech, those who did not, and those who wished 
                                            
118Ibid., 3:22/4/46 provides an example. 
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to ask questions, and even those who wished to quibble over definitions, scheduling, or 
minor details. 
Much systematic analysis and many comments have been made about 
Gladstone’s budget speeches—the words he said and the way he delivered specific 
lines. The 1853 speech is hailed as a triumph, as is the 1860 speech in a different vane. 
Hansard’s reports what was said during open debate in the House of Lords and the 
House of Commons where Gladstone spent most of his adult life. In these responses, 
for example, we find substance for the relationship between Gladstone and Disraeli. 
Disraeli almost always had a response to the budget speech. We also find the friends 
and other foes who rose to thank, criticize, or cross-examine the chancellor on some 
point or other.  
There are some things Hansard cannot show us, such the panic in the Aberdeen 
cabinet meetings of 1853 when Gladstone’s budget proposals, including an increase of 
the income tax and extension of the income tax to Ireland. In these debates, Edward 
Ellice recommended that the cabinet plan for dissolution.119 For these problems, one 
needs the Diaries and the notes of various cabinet members. 
Hansard’s is published in volumes, several volumes to each yearly session. Each 
volume carries a title page which shows the inclusive dates of the debates presented in 
the volume. Thus, it is possible and desirable in the case of Gladstone’s parliamentary 
life to compare the dates in the Diaries with the dates of the debates, to understand the 
context in which Gladstone either thundered into action, often speaking for more than 
two hours at a stretch, and those times when he sat silent. In the chapters that follow, 
                                            
119Ibid., 4:20/8/53 ff. Ellice was a liberal MP. 
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references to these volumes include the volume number and the column number, not 
the page number, of the speech or debate. 
The improvements made to Hansard’s reporting format over the period of 
Gladstone’s four chancellorships deserve comment. In 1853 Hansard’s presented the 
whole of deliberations of the House of Lords first of each volume, while the dealings of 
the House of Commons trailed after. By 1863, the text for each day’s proceedings in 
one house was interleaved with that of the other, allowing the user to see how the Lords 
responded to Commons on key issues and how both houses responded to a crisis, such 
as the Trent affair. Changes in the table of contents are also very useful: in addition to 
faithfully presenting the interleaved meetings of Commons and Lords, the table of 
contents was expanded several times during the period of interest for this thesis to note 
motions, debates, and the entire Supply list with estimated or approved pounds, 
shillings, and pence, for both the proposed funds and the amounts that were finally 
passed. In short, a researcher who uses Hansard‘s Series 3 would, by 1866, be able to 
use the tables of contents to learn a good deal and would be more efficient in picking 
out the relevant material in the actual columns of debate in interior pages.  
Hansard’s is thus a contextual work of great interest. The government, the 
speaker of the House, the party whips, and the schedule show us how bills were 
managed in the House of Commons. Hansard’s is also a useful tool in the scholar’s 
attempts to understand how Parliament worked in the nineteenth century. As future 
chapters will show, Hansard’s, read in conjunction with the Diaries, give us a far more 




Gladstone as Autodidact 
The term autodidact was often used in the nineteenth century to describe a 
young person who must make his or her way to make in the world, and who chose a 
course of reading accompanied by the occasional lecture or night-school course to 
further her or his education. Gladstone had no need to make his way in the world, and 
when he came down from Oxford, he had the education that many men expected to live 
on for the rest of their lives. And then he read continually for the next sixty-five years, 
always in an effort to inform himself. 
As a political economist in government service, seeking to finance that 
government, Gladstone appears to have felt he was required to learn as much as he 
could about banking, money, coinage, prices (such as the cost of naval ships or tents 
for the Crimea), and interest. History and the scale of nineteenth-century non-fiction 
publishing were on his side. One cannot fault him for his tireless efforts to fill his 
bookshelves and to learn from the books that went into those shelves. The chapters that 
follow include tables of Gladstone’s readings on specific economic topics, such as the 
Corn Laws, the Bank Act of 1844, the Bank of England, and generally financial other 
topics. In a few cases, I have also included descriptions of meetings with bankers, 
economists, statisticians, government officials, and others whose contributions to 
Gladstone’s advanced education cannot be gainsaid. 
I have described Gladstone as an advanced autodidact, a man whose learning 
carried him far forward of the young mechanics and clerks anxious to move up in their 
professions, gain a good salary, and be able to marry. Gladstone was at another level 
altogether. His social and financial position would have allowed him to live a 
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comfortable and careless life if his mercantile and gently evangelical upbringing would 
have allowed it. But he was driven; this thesis does not deny that fact. That he was 
sometimes angry, sorrowful, or dispirited is also not denied. What is apparent, however, 
that he used books, contacts, and his work, not only to carry him through the day, not 
only as coping strategies, but as a way up and onward. Though he rarely mentions the 





LIFE WITH PEEL, 1833-1846 
Introduction 
The period 1833-1846 provided Gladstone with the groundwork for his entire 
political career, gave him important parliamentary and cabinet experience, exposed him 
to the working process of turning bills into acts, and trained him in drafting major bills. 
Historians of this period tend to focus on what Gladstone learned as an aide to Peel, as 
well as Gladstone’s authorship of a reactionary work on the rights of the Anglican 
Church, his pettifogging on a vote of money for an Irish seminary, and his Puseyism in 
church matters. They have failed, however, to notice how a young man of high moral 
standards was finding his legs in the cut and thrust of parliamentary life. Nor do they 
notice how Gladstone’s resignation over Maynooth while he remained in the House of 
Commons while at another he served in the cabinet but held no seat in the House, and 
how these two experiences  may have changed his view about parliamentary life. 
This knowledge is crucial. Gladstone’s ability to draft a bill, his increasingly clear 
understanding of parliamentary politics, his improving notion of his own strengths and 
weaknesses, and his implacable notion of what was right as well as possible, made him 
a strong and often formidable leader throughout his life. 
 
Reading and Peel 
This chapter begins the examination of Gladstone’s political and economic life as 
it was informed by the books he read, the social contacts he made, and the political 
discourse around him. Two main sources of change entered his life when he came 
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down from Oxford: Sir Robert Peel and a new course of reading, not directed by tutors 
but Gladstone’s own instincts. This chapter begins where it must, with Gladstone’s 
relationship with Sir Robert Peel and the men who came to be known as the Peelites. 
The relationship usually friendly but often strained; it exhibited some of the character of 
a parent to child rather than a strictly political one. This relationship had a strong 
financial component, as both Biagini and H. Theodore Hoppen have explained: a 
collection of policies that came to be known as “Peelitism.”1 
Peel saw promise in Gladstone. Peel also thought him too precious, too much of 
a snob, and far too self-interested for his own good. Peel believed it was entirely 
possible that Gladstone would ruin a fine career if he continued on the solemn course 
the younger man pursued in the 1830s.2 For Peel to judge Gladstone in this critical way 
exposes us to the problem of Sir Robert himself. Considered cold by many, Peel could 
be passionate, and was sometimes deluded or easily fooled, as he was over his inability 
to control a young queen whose preference for ladies in waiting was tempered by her 
Whig upbringing.3 
In choosing the men for his cabinets, Peel depended on the loyalty of old allies 
and friends, but he also had an appreciation for and an interest in helping the new man. 
                                            
  1See Asa Briggs, The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867 (London and New York: Longman, 
1979), 332. According to Briggs, the Peelite platform comprised three components: restoring and 
reforming national finance, legislation to redress social and economic problems, and governmental 
administrative reform. Briggs believes Peel was not good at solving social problems directly, but used his 
economic reforms to help ensure a better life for British workers. He writes that Peel accomplished his 
first goal, and part of the third, and that in the long run he also accomplished some second-component 
goals. Gladstone became one of his most ardent and accomplished subalterns in the fight.  
2Gash, Life of Peel, 1972), 186. Also see Boyd Hilton, “Peel: A Reappraisal,” The Historical 
Journal 22, no. 3 (September 1979): 585-614; and Terrance Andrew Jenkins, Sir Robert Peel 
(Houndsmill: Macmillan Press, 1999); Gladstone, Diaries 2: 1/3/38. Peel’s reaction to Gladstone’s book, 
The State in its Relations with the Church, puzzled Gladstone, who expected praise and was greeted with 
silence.  
3Gash, Life of Peel, 220 ff. 
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In 1829, Peel told Wellington that his [Peel’s] preference in public life was for working 
with “what the world would call young men.”4 Gladstone was such a man. The younger 
MP began to mention Peel in his Diaries in 1829, 1830, and 1831 while he was still at 
Oxford.5 He first recorded dining with Peel in June, 1833, the same year as he made his 
maiden speech in parliament on the slave trade and sugar plantations.6 He was invited 
to meetings at Peel’s House in the same year, and continued to attend Sir Robert 
regularly until just before Peel’s death. Gladstone was struck by Peel’s warmth.7 On 
Peel’s side, this regard could be better described, perhaps, as tolerant. Peel, whose 
double first was in the same two schools as Gladstone’s, drew Gladstone into political 
matters that far exceeded Gladstone’s mandate as a junior official or even cabinet 
member. In response, Gladstone read copiously on trade and the Corn Laws, and made 
his first excursions into the banking literature, with the aim of being able to participate in 
cabinet discussions.  
But it was not Peel who started Gladstone reading and learning. Gladstone 
began very early to educate himself. On April 26th, he wrote in his Diary that “Mr. Finley 
here. I kept him long, and got an admirable lecture on currency and manufacturing.”8  
On June 11, he recorded “reading Huskisson on currency again.”9  
Peel’s adoption of the youthful Gladstone may have been a problem for Peel’s 
                                            
4Ibid., 92. 
5Gladstone, Diaries 1:5/2/29, 1:5/10/30, 29/11/30, and 7/7/31. 
6Gladstone recorded dining with Peel at least sixteen times between 1833 and 1850 in addition to 
the meetings he attended at Sir Robert’s house in London and a visit to Drayton in 1836. Ibid., 14:782. 
7Gash, Life of Peel, 123. 
8Gladstone, Diaries 2:26/4/33, 2:18/5/36. Finley seems to have been one of his teachers: he 
appeared again in May, 1836, on the Factory Bill.  
9Ibid., 2:21/6/33; 2:14/6/33; 2:5/6/33. Gladstone recorded the fact that he had indeed finished 
reading Huskisson on currency. 
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other adherents. His coterie already contained men of distinction, responsibility, 
education, position, and experience: the Duke of Wellington, “the Lords” Aberdeen, 
Ripon, and Ellenborough, as well as the numerate Sir James Graham. Gladstone, W. 
M. Praed, and Sidney Herbert, all taken into the 1834 government, were a generation 
younger than Peel, and far younger than Wellington and Graham.10 Gladstone worked 
hard to improve, to make himself worthy of notice in his first and subsequent 
appointments. As this chapter will show, reading was one of his many sacrifices to his 
hope of advancement with Peel.11 
Peel attempted to teach Gladstone a good deal about parliamentary life: how to 
pace himself during debate, how to deliver a convincing speech,12 how to work with 
other members of the government, how to remain courteous during debate, how to 
resign gracefully, and (sometimes by encouragement and sometimes through 
resistance) how to get his way on a topic of vital importance. “Getting his way” with 
grace was the most difficult lesson Gladstone had to learn. He was considered priggish, 
a perfectionist, and self-important; he had trouble giving way to others, a problem he 
would have to some extent for the rest of his life. Gladstone’s opinions, threats of 
resignation, arguments, and pettishness appear again and again. One example was his 
disagreement with others in the government on the export of opium to China, a decision 
                                            
10Gash, Life of Peel, 92. 
11See the Diaries January 1835 entries, esp 2:9/1/35. Gladstone’s appointment as a junior lord of 
the Treasury and then as an official of the Colonial Office sets the trend. He immediately started attending 
meetings and reading papers about and by the Treasury. On January 9 he recorded a meeting with Peel 
on Treasury business. His tenure at Treasury ended when Peel made him vice president of the Board of 
Trade. 
12See, for example, Morley, Gladstone 1:228-229. When Peel asked him to speak on suspension 
of the Jamaican constitution. Gladstone did not take this as unvarnished complement. He wrote that “the 
longer I live, the more I feel my own (intrinsically) utter powerlessness in the House of Commons.” His 
book, The State in its Relationship with the Church, had just come out, and Gladstone finally surmised 
that Peel was embarrassed, and yet was still willing to support Gladstone by setting him up to speak. 
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that for Gladstone was moral, and nothing else.13 Another was his much maligned 
resignation over the Maynooth grant.14 
While Gladstone’s book, The State in its Relations to the Church, was published 
outside the government, the Maynooth grant problem was fought in the cabinet over a 
period of eleven months with Gladstone alone on one side. Matthew wrote that 
Gladstone found the cabinet wanting in steadfast principle, and that the Maynooth grant 
may have been more important symbolically than practicality. Gladstone’s book had 
committed him to opposition of Irish Catholicism in the 1830s. Maynooth appears to 
have been the last time Gladstone fought for that idealism that Matthew had identified in 
the 1830s, and the last kick that sent him into the realities and practicality of the 1840s. 
To Matthew, Gladstone believed his battle was to defend a national religion, but in the 
mid 1800s, with so many non-conforming churches and a resurgence of Catholicism, a 
national religion was a bog in which “Gladstone’s model for State and Church sank to its 
axles.”15 The battle between Gladstone and the rest of the cabinet took eleven months. 
 
Jenkins wrote that Gladstone’s act was practically unconscionable: 
He therefore spent the whole of 1844 plaguing his colleagues with his 
conscience. As at that time the Conservative Party was racked by the issue of 
whether it would allow Peel to usher in the much more stable and prosperous 
Britain of the third quarter of the nineteenth century or whether it would respond 
to what became the atavism of Disraeli, Stanley and Bentinck, and as on the big 
issue Gladstone was wholly on the side of Peel, his obsession was totally lacking 
in proportion. Peel’s comment that ‘I really have great difficulty sometimes in 
                                            
13Gladstone, Diaries, 3:18/3/40, 3:24/3/40, 3:8/4/40, 3:14/5/40,10:10/4/81, 10:21/4/81. Also see 
idem, 14:772. Opium would haunt Gladstone throughout his career. 
14 See Jenkins, Gladstone, a Biography, 69. Gladstone, Diaries 3:11/2/44 ff, 3:1/3/44, 3:2/3/44, 
3:25/11/44, 3:9/1/45. The British government had made a payment (subvention) to the Roman Catholic 
Seminary of Maynooth since the Act of Union in 1800. In The State in its Relations with the Church, 
Gladstone had blasted this action as cowardice, and an insult to Dean Swift and other Anglo-Irish divines 
of the previous 150 years. Peel proposed to raise the grant to £30,000 per year and to make the grant 
permanent. 
15Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 68. 
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comprehending what Gladstone means’ seems in the circumstances remarkably 
restrained.16 
Nonconformists, Tories, and churchmen applauded Gladstone. They hoped to 
find in him an alternate to Peel to lead a party in opposition to Disraeli. But it was 
Gladstone’s last resignation on a principle which he could not in truth bases a 
convincing constitutional argument.17 It was not the last time he would confuse his 
critics. His letter to Peel, recommending himself for the position of British envoy to the 
Vatican, was coldly rejected by Peel in July 1845.18 
Travis Crosby makes clear that Gladstone did not understand Peel’s efforts to 
use resuscitation of Maynooth to “encourage a friendlier Catholic hierarchy.” Peel 
wanted to raise faculty salaries and make much-needed repairs to the infrastructure. 
When Gladstone stood on his book, Peel told him no one would remember his former 
pledges. Gladstone resigned on 4 February, 1845, and then astonished the House of 
Commons on 11 April by saying he had changed his mind.19 Matthew says this reversal 
was “perplexing and casuistic” and “idiosyncratic and perverse.” Crosby says these 
comments do not seem too strong. He calls Gladstone’s resignation a coping strategy of 
withdrawal, and his change of vote was a strategy of engagement.20 
In general, however, Gladstone often became Peel’s “go-to” man on money 
matters: when Peel sent Gladstone into action, the older man was not usually 
dissatisfied. In one debate Peel asked Gladstone to speak for the government. 
                                            
16Jenkins, Gladstone, 69-70. 
17Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 69. 
18Jenkins, Gladstone, 70. 
19Crosby, Two Mr. Gladstones, 1997), 42-44. 
20Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 69; quoted in Crosby, Two Mr. Gladstones, 44, n.49. These 
are strong words for Matthew to have used, possibly the strongest criticism of Gladstone in all Matthew’s 
work on the topic.  
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Gladstone asked, “Shall I be short and concise?” Peel responded, “No, be long and 
diffuse. It is all important in the House of Commons to state your case in many different 
ways, so as to produce an effect on men of many ways of thinking.”21 
Yet the two men clearly had a strong bond; Peel respected Gladstone as a hard 
worker and devastating speaker. When the Free Trade legislation passed, Peel wrote 
Gladstone’s father (certainly knowing that the old man was against free trade), praising 
the younger man’s performance. Peel mentioned William’s manner “throughout those 
discussions and all others since his appointment to office.” Peel noted the combination 
of “ability, extensive knowledge, temper and discretion” and called attention to his 
“purity of heart and integrity of conduct.”22 
The elder Gladstone responded that he had read Peel’s “kind letter of yesterday” 
with tears in his eyes. He would later harangue William nightly about his support for free 
trade and his apostasy in supporting it. Nevertheless, John Gladstone wrote of his pride 
in all his sons, but wrote of William, “He excels his brothers in talent, but not so in 
soundness of principles, habits of usefulness, or integrity of purpose,” a dig at his son’s 
support of free trade and thus of the praise from Peel. Then the gallant old gentleman 
sought of his new friend help in securing employment for his third son, a naval officer 
probably on half-pay, in his efforts to get into parliament as well: 
 
Whenever we may succeed, I shall consider my cup to be filled, for the second is 
honourably and usefully engaged as a merchant in Liverpool, occupying the 
situation I held there for so many years. 23 
                                            
21Gladstone, Diaries 3:8/5/83, quoted in Morley, Gladstone 1:192, quoting Peel’s advice. 
22Peel’s letter, dated Whitehall, 16 June, 1842, to John Gladstone; in John Morley, Gladstone 
1:257-258. The Peel letter and John Gladstone’s response may or may not be quoted in their entirety: 
thus, we cannot be sure that Sir Robert said anything about free trade or whether he tactfully avoided it; 
he would have been prudent to do so, given John Gladstone’s opinions.  
23Morley, Gladstone 1:258. 
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How Gladstone drifted into free trade is problem. Matthew says that in 
Gladstone’s case, this drift may be seen as part of a tendency to realize “the beauty, joy 
and technical satisfaction of departmental work” and a “life-long passionate effort of 
‘working the institutions of the country’.”24 This is consistent with Matthew’s later 
assertion that Gladstone was an executive minister—a wonderful turn of speech to 
express a difficult concept. William Ashworth’s evidence on trade and customs 
problems before the 1840s overhaul is overwhelming and makes the transition for 
Gladstone seem far easier: the customs and excise taxes of Britain before the 1844 
reductions comprised an a pair of institutions—the Customs Office and the Excise 
Department—that had failed catastrophically.25 Thus, Gladstone seems to have viewed 
quite rationally the complete chaos in this area of revenue; saw the mathematical pitfalls 
related to basing dependable government revenue on a complex set of rules; sternly 
disapproved of losses resulting from smuggling; and regretted the high costs associated 
with collecting the revenues. In support of Peel’s free trade initiatives, Gladstone 
streamlined collection, reduced the numbers of tariffs to end smuggling, and set up 
conditions where revenue collection yielded higher revenues. Gladstone was later to 
say that this type of effort led to a recovery of revenues at the higher level in about three 
years.26  
 
Working for Sir Robert 
Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850) served her majesty as prime minister in 1834-1835, 
                                            
24Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 67. 
25William J. Ashworth, Customs and Excise: Trade, Production, and Consumption in England, 
1640-1845 (Oxford: University Press, 2003), 1. 
26Gladstone, Diaries 3:3/4/44. Gladstone records reading a partial report on customs frauds. 
 
  130
1841-1845, and 1845-1846.27 Gladstone entered the Treasury Board in 1834 under 
Peel,28 served as under secretary for the Colonies in 1835,29 became vice president of 
the Board of Trade 1841-1843,30 and succeeded to the presidency of the Board of 
Trade, 1843-1845.31 He served as secretary for War and the Colonies in 1845-1846 
(where he held office in the cabinet without having a seat in the Commons).32 In all, 
Gladstone served his first five appointments to her majesty’s governments under Sir 
Robert Peel. 
Gladstone might have lost the chance to serve in the Board of Trade if his own 
stubbornness, his “ability to see three sides to every question and insist on discussing 
them all” had succeeded in tiring or overwhelming Peel. Francis Bonham, Storekeeper 
to the Ordinance and a Peel supporter, had made a list of ministerial appointments for 
Peel in 1841, and had then filled in many of the lower positions with possible names. 
Gladstone was on this list. When Peel summoned Gladstone, the younger man argued 
his own unfitness “for the mundane post” while Peel argued that Gladstone’s 
understanding of finance made him perfectly fit—for the post and as representative of 
the Board in the House of Commons. Gladstone’s letter of acceptance next day covered 
seven pages. Peel thanked him in one.33 
Yet the Board, like all his other appointments, led to an increased scope of 
command and understanding on finance—introducing him to the customs collectors, the 
                                            
27He resigned and was recalled in 1845. 
28Ibid., 2:20/12/34. 
29Ibid., 2:26/1/35 ff. 
30Ibid., 3:31/8/41 ff. 
31Ibid., 3:13/5/43, 3:15/5/43. 
32Ibid., 3:22/12/45 ff. 
33Gash, Life of Peel, 277. 
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Revenue Commission, bankers such as John Brocklehurst, a liberal MP and silk 
manufacturer. His new position informed him on “rough rice” and the many types of 
sugar imported into England. Less than six months after he took office, he was writing a 
finance report for Peel, arguing for a house tax to replace the income tax, studying the 
export of machinery, recasting a draft on a treaty with Brazil and sending up his own 
paper on corn.34 
Important legislation appears to have been the trigger for enormous upsurges in 
Gladstone’s reading. Morley had called the Peel government of the 1840s “one of the 
four or five most memorable administrations of the century.”35 Gladstone later wrote that 
the Peel government was notable for  
 
purity in patronage, financial strictness, loyal adherence to the principle of public 
economy, jealous regard to the rights of parliament, a single eye to the public 
interest, strong aversion to extension of territorial responsibilities and a frank 
admission of the rights of foreign countries as equal to those of their own.36 
To prepare himself for the work on customs and excise reduction planned by 
Peel and organized to a sizeable extent by Gladstone, the vice president of the Board of 
Trade read parliamentary reports and the records of the board. He also read a good 
deal of other material as well, such as Chimney Sweeping Described, with a View to the 
Emancipation of Climbing Boys (1816)37 and J. E. Tennant’s A Treatise on the 
Copyright of Designs for Printed Fabrics (1841).38 In 1842, when the first tariff reforms 
                                            
34Gladstone, Diaries 3, October and November, 1841; Morley, Gladstone 2:253. In the debates of 
February, 1842, Gladstone found communication with Peel difficult and offered to resign. After this affair 
Gladstone realized that Peel was not good in managing personal and sectional dilemmas, and cites this 
problem as the cause of difficulties with the sugar duties and the Factory Act 1844.  
35Ibid., 247. 
36Gladstone, undated fragment of a letter to the Queen, quoted in Morley, Gladstone 1: 247. 




were presented in Parliament, Gladstone had done most of the work, reading the 
sources, interviewing deputations, running numbers, and feeding Peel the papers of 
reference he needed during the debates.39 
When he came to work on the Corn Laws, however, the materials he found to 
read was far more public, for the topic had been under debate for some time. Gladstone 
read Frederick John Robinson’s The Influence of Taxation on the Price of Corn 
Considered (1815) and thirteen other books that are clearly identified with the Corn 
Laws in 1841 alone.40 In 1842, he included Sir James Robert Graham’s Free Trade in 
Corn the Real Interest of the Landlord, and the True Policy of the State. By a 
Cumberland Landowner (1828), and four other books clearly associated with the Corn 
Laws. He continued to read on the Corn Laws until 1846. 
To accompany his readings he used his position in the government to sound out 
people whose opinions he valued: 
 
Yesterday evening at the Palace I had some conversation with Molesorth on the 
Corn Laws and the state of parties. He said ‘We who do not really belong to 
either the Whig or Tory party in the House of Commons are in a most painful 
position. For my part, I do not consider that I have given an independent vote 
since I voted with you in 1839 on the Jamaica Bill.41 
Tariff reduction and renewal of the charter of the Bank of England were both 
enacted in 1844. Tariff reduction was Gladstone’s bailiwick. The Bank Act was not. 
                                            
39Gash, Life of Peel, 326. Gash says the man who had done the most to enhance his own 
reputation was Gladstone. It was Gladstone himself who answered Russell on corn and Miles on cattle, 
using “knowledge and authority” with what Peel called “signal ability.” There were to be four tariff 
reductions: 1842, 1845, 1853, and 1860. Gladstone managed all of them, and would later say that the 
first one cost six times as much trouble as the other three combined. He spoke one hundred and twenty-
nine times during the session. Morley, Gladstone 2:255 
40A list of books and pamphlets Gladstone read on the Corn Law and those connected with the 
Bank Act of 1844 appears at the end of this chapter. 
41Gladstone, Diaries 3:4/6/41.  
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Gladstone was, by 1844, completely au courant with the workings of the Board of Trade 
and its numbers. His was a rational mind, and we cannot forget the old urge not to take 
a stand but to work for “what was right,” a legacy of the 1830s that Matthew has 
described. He saw, for example, that the poor should be able to keep clean, and thus 
saw that taxes on soap went against this ideal. He saw also that food, warm drinks, and 
sugar warmed the heart as well as the belly. In learning the details of the more than one 
thousand imposts placed on imports and internal manufacture, he must have been 
confused more than once. If an Oxford man with a double first could be confused, then 
it was highly likely that first-time customs inspectors could be confused while a wily man 
could work the system to his own benefit and profit. The system desperately needed 
simplification. 
The Bank Act of 1844 is entitled “An Act to Regulate the Issue of Bank Notes, 
and for Giving to the Governor and Bank of England Certain Privileges for a Limited 
Period. Various authors refer to the Act by other names, such as “Currency Act of 
1844,” and as “Peel’s Act.” It was, to be sure, Peel’s agenda, not Gladstone’s. And 
although Gladstone attended meetings at Peel’s house about the Bank Act, he attended 
by sufferance, not because he was expected to make a contribution on the same scale 
as he had on the tariff reform, free trade, or the Corn Laws. Gladstone is widely 
accepted as Peel’s greatest disciple, and by far the youngest (thirty-six). A man still 
young could be expected to carry on the program that Sir Robert had instigated, 
continually increasing freedom of trade and improving the c conditions under which the 
growing manufacturing base would continue to prosper. History shows that Gladstone 
did just that. Theoretically, with their family backgrounds in trade, their Oxford 
 
  134
educations, and their identical double firsts, Gladstone should have been a carbon copy 
and historic follower in the Peel tradition. Such is not the case. If we look for places 
where Gladstone went astray, they were not in administrative and analytical 
performance. Gladstone followed where the numbers led him. As this thesis will show, 
the power of the Bank of England, as evidenced in the passing of the 1844 Bank 
Charter Renewal, is one of the places where Gladstone eventually pulled away from 
Peel. 
Hilton says Peel was a consummate politician, capable of getting what he wanted 
in parliament. Hilton writes that in the bullion problem of 1819, Peel relied on his books 
far more than he did on the advice of the two most prominent financial wizards of the 
day, Herries and Huskisson.42 The 1819 secret committee, chaired by Peel, had been 
directed to determine whether the Bank could resume gold payments suspended in 
1797. Peel wrote to his brother that he approached the problem with an open mind.43 
But the political atmosphere was strained in 1819 and there was great pressure for the 
committee to report a decision that would cure all ills. Hilton has shown that the Bullion 
Report, written by Peel, states almost a complete antithesis to the testimony taken in 
committee and thus appears to have been based on his pro-bullionist reading.44 
Between restructuring the customs and excise charges and strengthening the 
                                            
42Hilton, “Peel, A Reappraisal,” 589-590. 
43Ibid., 589. 
44Ibid., 590. Hilton quotes Peel’s letter to his brother: “there are facts apparently at variance with 
their theory.” For a partial list of books concerned with Bank of England currency issue and the problems 
perceived in the process, see T. A. Stephens, Bibliography of the Bank of England (London: Effingham & 
Co, 1897; reprint New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968), 32-48. The battle began in print as early as 1802 
with Henry Thornton’s An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802); 
and T. Fortune’s A Concise and Authentic History of the Bank of England, with Dissertations on Metals 
and Coin, Bank Notes and Bills of Exchange, to which is Added their Charter (3rd ed., 1802). 
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Bank of England’s monopoly on bullion and paper issue, Gladstone somehow veered 
off Peel’s line of thinking and developed one of his own. Gladstone was continually 
curious, asking questions of everyone about everyone. Stafford Henry Northcote called 
Gladstone the patron saint of the coal whippers for his constant attention to the 
longshoremen who worked in coal.45  
Peel often worried about Gladstone’s youthful indiscretions. Biographers are 
divided: Crosby and Shannon believe these petty arguments and miscalculations, such 
as his Maynooth resignations, as great problems—shadows that hung over Gladstone 
his entire life. Morley and Matthew prefer to point to the numerous times Peel asked 
Gladstone to speak on a specific topic, the faith Peel put in Gladstone’s assessment of 
the Board of Trade and its problems, and the amount of time the two men spent in each 
other’s company, talking, consulting, and working their agenda. In the end, Peel decided 
to keep Gladstone despite the distractions. In a letter to Gladstone on May 13, 1843, 
Peel wrote: 
 
If it were not for the occasion of the vacancy I should have had unmixed 
satisfaction in thus availing myself of the earliest opportunity that occurred since 
the formation of the government, of giving a wider scope to your ability to render 
public service, and of strengthening that government by inviting your aid as a 
minister to the crown.46 
For once, Gladstone gave in without a fight, and succeeded Ripon at the 
president of the Board of Trade.  
An important source of education was the committee work he performed in the 
1830s and 1840s. In 1836 he joined a committee on aborigines, a member on the 
                                            
45Gladstone, Diaries 3:26/7/43 lists a coal whippers’ deputation, one of many, and shows that he 
spoke in parliament for one hour on coal whippers on 1/8/43. Sir Stafford became a private secretary to 
Gladstone in 1842.  
46Quoted in Morley, Gladstone, I:263. 
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committee for land disposal in the colonies, and the committee meeting on negro 
apprenticeships.47 In 1837, he found himself on a committee for colonial accounts; in 
December he served the committee for the education of poor children. In 1839, he 
suddenly found that he had ten committee memberships simultaneously: Milbank 
[penitentiary], Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, Church Building Metropolis, 
Church Commercial School, National Schools, Upper Canada, Clergy, Additional 
Curates Fund, Carlton Library, and the Oxford and Cambridge Club.48 
Two other opportunities for education presented themselves to Gladstone in the 
1840s—the Political Economy Club and the Statistical Society of London. The Political 
Economy Club had been founded in the 1821 by Robert Torrens as a method of giving 
the floor to other economists, including himself, and to break David Ricardo’s 
dominance in debate. It was a powerful organization, including economic writers, 
economists, bankers, government officials, and others who understood economics and 
wished to have a forum of debate. Thomas Tooke spoke on tariffs in December 184249 
and Walter Coulson spoke on duties in April of 1843.50 Gladstone’s membership in the 
Royal Statistical Society, as it came to be called, must have begun in the 1840s, 
because in 1852 he served on the council of the society, and he became president in 
1868-69.51 Research on the impact of these two organizations on Gladstone’s maturity 
and sense of belonging might pay the careful researcher. Here were two organizations 
                                            
47For a list of the cabinet committees on which Gladstone served, see Gladstone, Diaries 14: 631-
632.  
48Gladstone, Diaries 2:1/2/39. Also, Morley, Gladstone 1:219. Morley calls the period 1839-1841 
the end of Gladstone’s apprenticeship. 
49Gladstone, Diaries 3: 1/12/42. 




that dealt primarily in numbers, not primarily in political expediency. If Gladstone felt the 
frictions of party politics and the problems he encountered in understanding his place in 
government, he may have had fewer insecurities about attending one of these non-
political meetings. In economic and statistical debates, he may have felt safe and 
respected, a feeling he did not always record in his parliamentary and cabinet work. He 
read what the other members read; in meetings he could express himself as a 
mathematician on technical economics without fear of recrimination by his non-
economic government colleagues. Even when speakers in these two gatherings 
disagreed with Gladstone’s policies or theories, they were forced to produce highly 
technical arguments, far above the level of expertise that the publishing clergymen, 
phrenologists, and back-benchers could produce in economic debate. 
Given their close relationship, historians worry about the relatively cool response 
Gladstone gave in public to Peel’s death, the sense that he had come out from under 
Peel’s wing to be his own man. Gladstone continued to pay homage to Peel, at 
unveilings of statues and busts, in his readings of biographies and histories, and in his 
retention of fellow Peelites as friends and consultants, all the good actions of a good 
protégé. Gladstone’s track record shows a movement kicked off by Peel and then taking 
Gladstone further than Peel was willing to go himself: toward a far more liberal stance 
on many topics, including reform, foreign policy, and Ireland. Peel’s effect on Gladstone 
was to shock him out of his conservative, protectionist, slave-holding past, a past based 
on Gladstone’s father’s loving support and general assurance of the right t; and to push 
him toward a new understanding of nineteenth-Britain. It was Peel who was thought to 
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be a conservative, and yet fostered positions that were to kill the old conservative 
coalition. 
 
The Bank Act of 1844 
A new Bank Act was a much desired thing in 1844. The Bank’s charter was 
generally renewed on an eleven-year cycle; the previous renewal had been in 1833.52 
There had been commercial and economic crises in 1835-6 and again in 1838.53 At the 
beginning of the 1844 parliamentary session, however, industry was improving and the 
Chartist Movement, that great movement of the 1830s, was relatively silent, although 
they would agitate again in 1848.54 The 1842 Corn Law, a technical adjustment that 
stopped short of repeal, seemed to be holding the price of corn steady, and the cabinet 
was distinctly unready to discuss any more changes to the protective tariff.55 With 
                                            
52Gash, Life of Peel, 431. The 1833 charter, allowing joint-stock banks to operate in London, gave 
the Bank and the government an option for renewing the chart after it had run for eleven years or more 
(twenty-one years in total). Gash notes that parliament rarely met before February 1 and often stayed in 
session past August 1, giving the government an opportunity to renew the charter over the course of a 
session. Gash argues that Peel saw the 1844 as fortuitous, a chance to repair the nation’s economic 
faults and leave Peel’s name writ large in subsequent histories. 
53A commercial crisis does not necessarily lead to a financial crisis, unless several conditions are 
met: multiple industries are affected, the crisis goes on for so many months that merchants and 
industrialists fail to pay their debts, and the level of bankruptcies rises above average. In 1860 and 1861, 
Britain did not suffer a general financial or economic crisis because the American Civil War only affected 
the cotton industry, the mill owners did their best to keep the mills operating in some fashion, no 
extraordinary financial resources were needed to avoid panic in other industries. 
54The Chartists were a labor movement who took their name from a list of reforms they wished to 
seen enacted, called the Charter. Theodore Hoppen says that however much the Chartists made an 
impression on the government, they were never big enough or broadly based enough to generated wide-
scale changes in working class life that they are sometimes credited with. Hoppen, Mid-Victorian 
Generation, 66. Nevertheless, the government took Chartist meetings and marches seriously, and the 
year 1844 was remarkably quiet. They would agitate again in 1848, the year when revolution swept 
Europe. See idem, 129-131. Also see Briggs, Age of Improvement: 286. Briggs quotes a witness before a 
Select Committee in 1833 who said that when times were good it was difficult to get the working classes 
to “talk of politics.” 1844 was such a year.  
55Gash, Life of Peel: 429. 
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industry improving, there was a perceived need for new investment, but the previous 
growth periods had often led to over-stimulation56—in the modern parlance, crashes.57 
Gash believes that Peel had a personal stake in renewing the Bank Charter, 
intending that the new Bank Act would finally control the economy and put a stop to 
commercial crises.58 Peel’s position was still as solidly bullionist as it had been in 1819. 
The bullion theory states that the precious metals, gold and silver, are the only true 
measures of value, and that paper money has no meaning unless it can be used directly 
and exactly in exchange for gold. Yet the experience of the Napoleonic Wars had 
shown that the price of gold varied dramatically: 
 
That the note circulation of the Bank of England had expanded from an average 
of about 10 to 11 millions in 1795 to nearly 20 millions in 1809. Specie payments 
having been suspended in 1797, and the paper circulation having been 
increased, the foreign Exchanges became unfavourable to this country, and the 
paper circulation was depreciated in comparison with gold (average depreciation 
of value of currency 13.5 per cent 1810); gold in bars being at the price of from 
£4 10s. to £4 12s. per ounce in the early months of 1810, at that date about 15-
1/2 per cent above the mint price … 
                                            
56Ibid., 431, 432. Gash notes that the crashes of 1825, 1832, 1835-6, and 1838-9 had all 
exhibited the same symptoms: high prices, export of gold from England, and continued high levels of 
currency issue by the private and joint-stock banks. With the economic situation uncertain, and excess 
amounts of currency being issued by the banks, inflation must have been a consequence: inflation would 
have driven gold out of its fixed price of £3 17s 10-1/2d, and hence would have wrecked the gold 
standard on which England’s economy was based. 
57In his 1833 speech introducing the Bank of England Charter Bill, Lord Althorp referred to the 
conditions that would cause a crisis: the international markets had “turned against England.” The turn of 
the markets was based on the fall of the British pound against European currency, purchase of cheap 
pounds on an international market such as the Bourse of Amsterdam, and purchase of British gold with 
British pounds at the fixed rate of £3 17s. 10-1/2d. Gold purchased at the fixed British price was sold on 
the European market at the higher price. The speculator took the profits. This situation would continue, 
Lord Althorp argued, until the European gold markets were saturated, the price of gold fell, the value of 
the English pound improved, and the Bank of England was able to purchase gold again. This happened 
several times during the nineteenth  century. But there were also times during the century when 
European notes were seriously devalued against the price of gold, and English speculators performed the 
same trick, buying gold wherever the price was fixed by fiat. Hansard’s xviii, 169 ff. The resulting Act is 3 
& 4 William, c.98. 
58An economic description of The Report of the Bullion Committee appears in Palgrave, 
Dictionary 3: 191-192. 
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The directors of the Bank of England clung stubbornly to their “doctrine” that 
there could not be a possible excess in the issue of Bank of England paper as long as 
issues were made on the basis of this doctrine: convertibility.59 
Hilton says that in 1819 Peel leaned on the government’s most influential 
advisors, William Huskisson and John Charles Herries. In turn, they looked to Peel to 
provide them with “practical information as to the practical workings of the monetary 
system.” Hilton insists that Peel relied far more heavily on his books, which were 
strongly bullionist, than on the testimony of the men who appeared before the 
committee. The testimony was anti-bullionist. The experts wanted the currency released 
from the bondage of gold. Peel seemed wedded to the bullionist theory.60 
Consequently, the Bullion Report became an obsession, and the obsession became 
law. Two years later, Huskisson was trying desperately to have the subsequent Act 
overthrown and the gold standard replaced with bi-metallic currency.61 
Orthodox politicians and financiers followed David Ricardo and the Currency 
School in believing that the amount of paper currency circulating in the marketplace 
must be less than or at most equal to the amount of gold in the Bank of England’s 
vaults. They argued that any additional circulation past the value of the gold supply 
would lead to yet another crisis. Their opponents, the Banking School, argued that the 
problems all lay in the relationship among Bank of England note issue, bullion reserves, 
deposits, and securities, and this relationship could be summed up in one word—prices.  
Peel’s bullionist beliefs followed the Currency School.62 Gash notes that Peel 
                                            
59Palgrave, Dictionary 1: 191. 
60Hilton, “Peel, A Reappraisal,” 590. 
61Ibid., 591. 




may have felt some attraction in bracketing his time in government with a matching 
“Peel Bank Charter Act” in 1844 to match his 1819 Act.  
 
The Act of 1819 had put the currency back on the gold standard but that in itself 
had not ensured that there would always be enough bullion to cover the note 
issue. The Bank of England had come to accept its role as guardian of the 
currency, custodian of the gold reserve, and ultimate source of loans to the 
economy. But these different functions were not always easy to reconcile. There 
was no legal restriction on its issue of paper and the situation was further 
complicated by the existence of over four hundred private and joint stock banks 
entitled to issue their own notes.63 
Bullionists argued that the only security was gold, that the only gold that mattered 
was in the Bank’s vaults, that the only notes that mattered were issued by the Bank of 
England, and that the other four hundred private and joint-stock banks that issued their 
own currency had no say in the matter. This stance had offended many manufacturers, 
merchants, farmers, and others, some of whom were proprietors of or stockholders in 
those four hundred banks. In part, this was a geographical problem: the Bank of 
England was centered in “Lunnon” and its notes rarely circulated in the far reaches of 
the country. When they did, the high denominations (ten and twenty pound notes) were 
of no use to the working and middling classes. The Bank began opening branches in 
various large towns, such as Manchester and Exeter, but was likely to close them if 
business did not  meet the profit levels expected by the Bank’s directors and stock-
holders. The branches that remained in operation were seen more as a threat than an 
                                                                                                                                             
pay the Bank exactly that much in coin and paper currency for every ounce purchased, except, at a 
discount of 1-1/d. As one MP argued during debate, the price of gold was fixed at £3 17s. 12. When gold 
became scarce, as it had been during the Napoleonic war, and would be again when an international 
crisis required payments in gold to be made outside the country, the gold purchaser was not, by law, 
required to pay any more than the stated price; nor, if gold was plentiful, as it was after the Australian and 
Californian strikes, did gold become any cheaper. The inflexibility of the price of gold made raising prices 
for goods in trade somewhat difficult, unless other methods of exchange—tokens, small coins, small-
denomination paper currency, or credit—could take  up the slack. 
63Gash, Life of Peel, 431-432. 
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ally by the smaller banks, and closing a branch suggested that the Bank was only 
interested in larger blocks of currency and operations. Closing a branch also thwarted 
the Bank’s attempts to expand its currency circulation, to capture the hearts and 
depositors of those other banks, and to gain intelligence about the operations of those 
banks.64 Another problem was that Bank advocates refused to acknowledge the good 
repute, high profit levels, or vaults full of assets enjoyed by the owners of many English, 
Scots, and Irish banks. The third problem was the assets themselves. Ricardo’s and 
Peel’s followers believed that the only asset was the Bank’s gold, ignoring the assets 
tied up in factories, exports, land, infrastructure, foreign securities, patents, buildings; 
and the knowledge and skills of the British manufacturers, bankers, and farmers—in 
short, the working stuff of the Industrial Revolution. 
Writing in 1951, H. Mitchell believes that the Bank’s problem was far more 
fundamental:  
 
It seemed as if there was something seriously wrong somewhere and nobody 
quite knew what was the matter… What was wrong was that the Bank of England 
was trying to impose the single standard, gold, upon a world that had not enough 
gold to make it effective. In 1816 the Bank had, against the advice of David 
Ricardo, adopted gold as the single standard and ever since had been struggling 
with no great success to maintain it.65 
Mitchell’s argument is sound, showing how right Malyns had been about prices: if 
the amount of gold rose, then the amount of currency being issued would rise, and then 
                                            
64 See T. A. Stephenson, Bibliography of the Bank of England (London: Effingham Wilson, 1897; 
reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1869), 175-177. The Bank of England opened branch banks in 
Manchester, Gloucester, and Swansea in 1826, the same year in which joint-stock banks were allowed 
for the first time if they operated outside the sixty-five mile radius of London. The Bank opened five more 
in 1827 (Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol, Leeds, and Exeter). The Newcastle branch appeared in 1828. In 
1829 the Bank opened branches in Hull and Norwich. The Exeter branch closed Exeter was closed. The 
Gloucester branch closed in 1849. More branches were closed in the 1850s. 
65H. Mitchell, “The Gold Standard of the Nineteenth Century,” The Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science 17, no. 3 (August 1951), 369-376, 370. These are Canadian dollars. 
 
  143
prices would rise. This spiral would bring them face to face with the problem of inflation, 
a condition that neither bankers nor the Currency School wished to acknowledge. Peel’s 
Act of 1819 had made gold interchangeable with Bank of England notes at the fixed rate 
of £3 17s. 10-1/2d. per ounce of gold (the gold standard). Mitchell says the reasons for 
the crises that followed are not difficult to find. The production of gold and silver, two 
precious metals, peaked in the years 1781-1800 (twenty-year total) at $1,011,000,000 
or $50,550,000 per year.66 He says that the great, far-reaching war with Napoleon cut 
gold production and certainly cut gold shipments (some of it probably is still at the 
bottom of the Atlantic). Gold production for the period 1811-1830 fell to $170,000,000, 
or $8,000,000. 
 
And it was on the monometallic gold standard [that England] was trying to rule 
the commercial markets of the world. What was the consequence? In 1810, 
wholesale prices in Great Britain had touched the all-time high [indexed] of 235. 
In 1850 they had fallen to 92.67  
The governor, deputy governor, directors, and stock-holders of the Bank of 
England, however, saw the problems differently, and believed the time had come to 
establish a more muscular control on English banking. The health of the economy in 
1844 seemed to preclude a slump that might have occurred if the Act were passed 
during a less stable time. Interest rates were moderate, the Bank had a high stock of 
bullion, and government securities were selling at a premium. The government’s 
position was also very good. Henry Goulburn, Chancellor of the Exchequer, asked 
                                            
66Ibid., 370, n.1. Figures from the United States Mint with the value of gold calculated at $20.67 
per fine ounce, and the value of silver calculated to be 1/15 of that of gold, or $1.38 per fine ounce. This 
makes the conversion between the pound and the dollar based on the price of gold at the United States 
Mint on the order of $5 per British pound (£). 
67Ibid., 370. Mitchell has used A. A. Bowley’s revision of Jevons index numbers (to 1885) and 
Sauerbeck to 1900; with the two series equated for 1856-9. 
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parliament for permission to refinance £250,000,000 in consols at 3-1/2 per cent. The 
government’s Consolidated Fund bonds (the “consuls) stood at 102-1/2 (100 being par) 
at the beginning of the year. They would be replaced with 3-1/4 per cent consols that 
saved the government £625,000 per annum  in interest payments per year. The House 
agreed to the proposal and the conversion took place.68  
Goulburn’s April budget was expected to produce a surplus of £4.1 million; 
deducting the deficit of £2.7 million encountered in the previous year, the net surplus 
was £1.4 million. Income tax and customs were expected to be meeting their estimates 
in 1844 as they had in 1843. With the income tax due to expire in 1845, the government 
offered no new expenditures or sweeping deductions in taxation. A third of a million was 
to be set aside for reductions in duties on coffee, currents, vinegar, glass, marine 
insurance, and wool. Peel felt confident that the budget would succeed as a holding 
operation.69 
When the Bank Act was introduced, however, it encountered stiff but 
disorganized opposition. The country, private, and joint-stock banks were not ready to 
bow to the Bank of England. They pinned their hopes on their local MPs and the rising 
Banking School. They argued that the gold standard was not a question.70 
Gash has written that the Banking School’s arguments were modern and 
sophisticated, that the Banking Schools’ arguments looked at the many transactions 
                                            
68Gash, Life of Peel, 430.The importance of this move is that lowering the interest rate on a large 
block of consols (Consolidated Fund) was a strong indicator that the economy was in good shape. For a 
clear and useful description of the introduction of the Consolidated Fund, see “Percents and Sensibility: 
What did Early 19th-Century Literary Characters Live on?” The Economist 377, no. 8458 (December 24, 
2005), 104-105. 
69Gash, Life of Peel, 430-431 
70Hilton, “Peel, A Reappraisal,” 592. 
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taking place daily without resort to gold or paper currency. Workers, many of whom 
were paid less than a pound a week, required small coins. Tradesmen to the middling 
and upper classes ran accounts for purchases; these classes paid with cheques written 
on their banks. Banks credited these payments to the tradesmen’s accounts. 
Tradesmen and manufacturers, cathedrals and churches, universities and towns paid 
with checks or with other credit instruments.71 But there were problems: the Banking 
School required a central bank with clairvoyance and efficient bookkeeping to maintain 
limits on all the issued currency in the kingdom. The central bank was required to study 
prices and adjust currency issue accordingly. The Banking School could not then define 
a mechanism and procedure showing how a central bank was supposed to maintain 
control over the entire banking system in England and Wales, let alone the complex and 
legally different rules of banking in Ireland and Scotland.  
When Gash says the Banking theory was “highly modern and sophisticated,” he 
may mean tone of two things: either that the Currency School and its pettifogging 
relationship between gold and paper currency was already hopelessly out of date, or 
that the Banking School was far ahead of its time in terms of information transfer and 
bookkeeping methods. Whatever the cause, Peel’s contempt for the Banking School is 
obvious: he failed to attend any committee meetings in 1840 where members of the 
Banking School were being questioned.72 
Peel’s decision on the Bank of England run counter to everything he had so far 
attempted to do in his only long term as prime minister. While Palgrave and others have 
                                            
71Gash, Life of Peel, 432. 
72Ibid., 437; Hilton, “Peel, A Reappraisal,” 593. 
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celebrated Peel as a great economist while failing to mention Gladstone, Gash has 
redefined Peel in less generous terms. Gash writes that in 1822 Peel had established 
himself as a liberal economist; in 1842 his stance was to attack poverty and restore 
social stability, and that the only way the government could do that was to “re-prime the 
economy with increased consumption and demand.”73 Nevertheless, Gash argues, Peel 
believed in the quantity theory of financial control promulgated by James Mill, David 
Ricardo, and the Bank of England. He failed to see the dichotomy in his opposing 
stances between fair trade with the concept of a single, controlling bank.74 In pressing 
for a new Bank charter, Peel merely proposed what many still believed to be a realistic 
answer to repeated crises.75 It was also the plan promulgated by the Bank. 
The resulting bill, that set limits on Bank of England issues of currency based on 
a fixed amount of reserve in the vaults of the Issue Department of the Bank 
(approximately £25,000,000), is often referred to as “Peel’s 1844 Bank Act,” usually as 
a criticism of Sir Robert Peel.  
 
Hence the botch which he [Peel] made of the 1844 Bank Charter Act, his 
proudest achievement and one which has been greatly admired by political 
historians though not by economists. Peel saw it as ‘the complement and 
defence of the Act of 1819’, and trusted that it would enable him to ‘outlive the 
abuse which was once so fully lavished on that Act and its proposer’. He failed to 
see that by 1844 the debate on banking was not longer about the merits of 
bullionism.76 
                                            
73Gash, Life of Peel, 328. 
74R. F. Inglis Palgrave included Benjamin Disraeli and Sir Robert Peel in his Dictionary of Political 
Economy, but refused Gladstone a place. For a critical view of Peel and the Bank, see Norman Gash, Life 
of Peel, 431-436. 
75Crises occurred at least four times during the period from 1800 to 1844. Perhaps the most 
spectacular was that of 1826 when the Bank of England was forced to borrow £25,000,000 in gold bullion 
from the Rothschild Bank to protect its reserves and maintain business stability. Clapham, Bank of 
England 2 mentions the following: 1810 (25-26, 29, 33), 1816 (59-60), 1825 (80, 89, 95-102, 109-110), 
1839 (166 seq.). For a description of the Rothschild’s loan to the Bank, see Niall Ferguson, The House of 
Rothschild, Money’s Prophets, 1798-1848 (New York: Viking, 1998), 133-138.  
76Hilton, “Peel, A Reappraisal,” 592. 
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Gladstone’s part in the Act was very small, but his observations are to the point, 
such as these, written on Saturday, 13 January 1844: 
 
Meeting at Sir R. Peel’s on the Bank question with the Gov[erno]r and & Deputy 
Gov[erno]r. Sir Robert Peel is very great on the question of the Currency & Bank 
Charter. He inclines to an approximation by gentle and voluntary means to a final 
system of one Bank of issue.77  
The meetings in January 1844 led to an agreement on the Bank’s plan: splitting 
the Bank completely into two departments—Banking and Issue.78 The Bank of England 
wanted single issue, and Peel was said to be in favor. But the political reality was that 
the more than four hundred banks of issue scattered across the country might set their 
representatives in parliament against the entire deal. Thus, Peel wanted some process 
by which he could eliminate these issuing banks, continually narrowing issue until it was 
down to one Bank. The safeguard lay in the clause that if a bank ceased issue, even for 
one day, it ceased forever, and the bank’s currency bought with Bank of England notes. 
Separation was intended to eliminate Bank of England issue from purely banking 
operations such as deposit and check writing: The Banking Department would continue 
its normal banking procedures. The Issue Department would continue its normal 
procedures, printing money, issuing it to people who wished to purchase notes, and 
recycling notes as they were turned back in to the Bank. Each department was to report 
separately on its assets and transactions in a public journal on a weekly schedule. 
Reporting was especially important for the Issue Department because it was the only 
source of public information related to the exact relationship between currency issue 
                                            
77Gladstone, Diaries, 3:13/1/44, n.11-15, 3:12/1/44. Gladstone reported two hours of conversation 
on the Bank Charter with his father on the previous evening. 
78Gash, Life of Peel, 434. 
 
  148
and the gold reserve. But the problem with the theoretical operation of the Bank of 
England was its actual practice. Many speakers and writers referred to the “bullion 
supply” without stating whether that supply lay in the Issue Department or in the 
Banking Department. 
The supply in the Issue Department was the only gold bullion that could, 
theoretically, be used to back the issue of Bank of England Notes. The bullion supply in 
the Banking Department allowed merchants and manufacturers to use their banking 
accounts or securities to purchase gold for foreign business and manufacture of jewelry 
and plate. Although there is every suggestion that the Banking Department could 
transfer gold to the Issue Department, in fact, there appears to have been only one vault 
and one source. This was one of the problems that clouded debate. When a question in 
the House of Commons, or a bill was introduced that affected the Bank, those who 
spoke about a Bank reserve of gold generally did not show whether the bullion they 
referred to resided on the Issue side or the Banking side. And if the Banking side were 
properly managed, its own reserve would have stood at  the service of its depositors 
and business associates, not at the service of the Issue Department.79 
Hilton maintains that the 1844 Act was a fine example of Peel’s ability to mix 
political pragmatism with doctrinal rigidity. Peel delivered the bill for its first reading on 
May 6 in what Gash calls a long and lucid speech. Peel emphasized the dangers of 
                                            
79“A Statement of the Affairs of the Bank, Feb. 29, 1832,” in Gilbart, History and Principles of 
Banking, 73. This is the only balance sheet I have seen for the Bank of England. The debit side includes 
a statement, “To bank notes outstanding[,] £18,051,710.” On the credit side, one would expect to see 
some combination of coins and bullion totally a good deal more than £18 million that is the reserve 
backing the issue of the notes. In fact, I can find no total of Exchequer bills, advances, City bonds, loans 
on mortgages, or ownership of a London dock company that matches or exceeds the value of the 
outstanding notes.  
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over-issue. During the debates that followed, he managed to steer his bill through 
competing groups and prejudices and circumnavigate the incompetence of some and 
the self interests of others.80 The final bill gave both the ministry and the Bank most of 
what they wanted. The Issue Department was to maintain a gold reserve on which the 
gold issue would be based. In addition, the Issue Department would receive £14 million 
in government securities to provide the basis for a “fiduciary issue,” a last-ditch source 
of security for issues of paper in the event of an emergency. To use the Fiduciary Issue, 
the Bank was required to report to the government the total of the remaining gold bullion 
in the vaults and show how quickly it was falling. Three ministers of the Crown were 
required to sign the permission letter. The Act limited the currency issue of private and 
joint-stock banks to an amount equal to the average of the previous six months of issue, 
and could not be increased. Banks of issue that suspended issue, or were purchased by 
other banks, must cease issue forever. If an issuing bank ceased issue, closed its 
doors, or forced out of issue by  economic circumstances, the Bank was authorized to 
increase its issue by the amount surrendered by the failing bank.81 These were the 
gentle and voluntary means that Sir Robert expected to occur. 
Although several speakers during the debate predicted that if enacted, the Act 
would ruin English banking, it is unclear that any of the speakers understood the bill’s 
                                            
80Hilton, “Peel, A Reappraisal,” 595. This is an interesting estimate of the debate. Whether the 
members were prejudiced, incompetent, self-interested, or merely disorganized, the problem of a lack of 
concerted opposition was to haunt attempts to change either the gold standard or limit the Bank’s 
privileges for the next ninety years. This is especially apparent in the debates of the 1857-1858 when a 
commercial crisis, a Banking Act, and an Act to indemnify the Bank for over-issue during the crisis all 
blossomed in November and December of 1857, and every evil of past Bank Acts and Bank behavior was 
rehearsed but the debate failed to stop the Charter Act and the Indemnity Act from passing. 
81Clapham, Bank of England 2:417 ff. The last bank of issue other than the Bank of England 
finally ceased issue in the 1920s. The Bank Act of 1844 was finally nullified by later legislation.  
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true ramifications, the sources of many publications in the years to follow. After the Act 
passed, the Bank was expected to use its discretion when it responded to normal 
business and to periodic crises. By raising its discount rate, the rate paid by borrowers 
who used bills of exchange as collateral on loans from the Banking Department, the 
Bank discouraged companies with poor performance or limited managerial skills from 
borrowing; in the meantime, the Bank favored its more affluent and successful 
customers with loans that carried them through the crisis.  
On the currency side, the Bank had two types of control: the sale of gold through 
the redemption of Bank of England notes or government securities; or, the sale of Bank 
notes in exchange for gold.82 Until the Bank Act of 1844 was passed, the Bank used its 
discretion, in both the Banking Department and the Issue Department, when it sold 
either gold or currency. After the Bank Act was passed, the Bank’s discretion on the 
Issue side was replaced with strict rules about the amount of currency the Bank could 
issue in normal practice or in a crisis. 
The Bank governor and deputy governor often let the discount rate run for 
months, or might change it on a week-by-week or day-by-day basis. The Bank 
continued to lend to the best protected, best managed firms, most canny business men 
and least endangered banks just when the less protected, less well managed firms, 
lesser business men and most endangered banks needed the support most. Thus, the 
idea of the Bank being the banker of last resort (a fundamental requirement of a central 
bank) was negated by its lending rules. The Bank Act was suspended in 1857 and 1866 
                                            
82Clapham, Bank of England 2:170-184. The Bank crisis of 1839 triggered this act when the stock 
of gold coin, silver coin, and bullion fell dramatically. 
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to restore order by allowing the Bank to lend money, at rates as high as ten per cent, to 
those who were best able to make use of it. As later chapters will show, the first 
Palmerston government with George Cornewall Lewis as Chancellor allowed the Bank 
to suspend the Charter Act in 1857 in the depth of the crisis. In 1 866, Gladstone 
performed the same function under Russell’s second government, not in response to a 
general crisis but in response to the failure of one large bill brokerage, simply to restore 
confidence to the street. H. Mitchell remarks that when the first suspension took place in 
1847, the economy was far from the rosy state it had enjoyed in 1844. The increase in 
spending on railroads, that would rise to £240,000,000 on the railroads and largely 
cause the demise of the great canals and some of the great roadways on which large 
amounts of money had been spent earlier in the century, was simply money wasted.83 
The relationship between the country banks and the Bank of England was 
already tenuous. In 1826, the Bank began to open branches in the larger cities of 
England.84 There can be little doubt that the Bank intended to increase its reputation 
and extend its control into these cities, and no doubt that branch managers were 
expected to gather information about the private and joint-stock banks doing business 
there. Gash states that Peel “exaggerated the inflationary effects of country bank 
notes,” but that he made the same mistake many others did. 
The Act should have converted the Bank of England from lender to the 
                                            
83Mitchell, “The Gold Standard,” 370, 371. This of course is not entirely true if the roads and 
canals had been properly amortized (depreciated and their value written down in the balance sheets) over 
some multi-year period. In all likelihood, however, they were not amortized, but simply allowed to decay 
without maintenance. If this is the case, then Mitchell’s analysis, while requiring explanation, is entirely 
likely. Mitchell also mentions the building, or rebuilding of a great merchant marine and the conversion of 
shipping from sale to steam. The Bank’s insistence on a gold economy placed serious limits on the 
country’s ability to expand. Mitchell calls the demands for capital continuous and imperative. 
84See Stephenson, Bibliography, 175-177. 
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government, and primer inter paris in the business and banking communities, into the 
British central bank. The Bank obviously wished to control currency unconditionally, and 
the Bank Act tied currency issue by private and joint-stock banks to the limits set by 
their circulation in 1844.85 However, the Bank refused to accept what modern historians 
see as the corollaries of the Act: the movement into the role of all-knowing and all-
responsible central bank, guarantor of all banks and controller of interest rates, issue, 
and business success in Great Britain. This was not a rate that the profit seekers on the 
Bank’s board of directors wished to see.86 
In 1843, Robert Torrens, formerly a Ricardo fan, but now drifting toward a more 
independent view of English finance, published A Letter to Sir Robert Peel … on the 
Condition of England, and of the Means of Removing Distress. Gladstone read this work 
on the first of February. In that same year, T. E. Banfield published Six Letters … to Sir 
Robert Peel Being an Attempt to Exposes his Dangerous Theory of the Rent Advocated 
by Mr. Ricardo and his School (1843). Gladstone read it as well.87 These titles stop 
short of being scurrilous, and without a close reading we cannot be sure that they 
present the same arguments. However, in such cases, the title may have been enough 
to cause public reaction, especially when the name of the prime minister was mentioned 
in each. These titles show that at least some writers who were not directly connected 
                                            
85The Bank may have become nervous about government business, watching its Chancellors of 
the Exchequer convert relatively high-yield securities to new consols at lower rates. Nicholas Vansittart 
converted £153,000,000 or securities paying 4 percent to 3.5 per cents in 1822. See Stephens, 
Bibliography, 178. 
86The Bank was, above all, a for-profit organization, with a responsibility to directors and share-
holders. The totality of the role of central bank must have looked like a very dangerous and possibly 
unprofitable undertaking for the Bank. See Elmer Wood, English Theories of Central Banking Control, 
1819-1858 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939). 
87Gladstone, Diaries 3: 1/2/43; 3/2/43. 
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with Thomas Tooke and the Banking School had taken Peel’s measure and were 
convinced his proposed policies were dangerous. When we add these, the number of 
publications appearing after the passage of the 1844 Act, we begin to see the force of 
the publications that may have turned Gladstone away from Peel on the subject of the 
Bank.88 
 
The Problem with Gold 
The Irish famine should have taught bankers and politicians a lesson: if England 
suffered a cattle plague (which reoccurred several times in the nineteenth century) or 
grain blight before it was harvested, higher than normal corn prices caused poor people 
to starve. Starvation could lead to civil unrest. If foreign exporters sensed a profit, they 
demanded gold. If England exported gold, the amount of currency issue was restricted. 
In such a case, England itself might be driven to the edge of bankruptcy. These were 
the assumptions, but they were dangerous, and no way had been found around them. 
Supporters of the Bank Act and many critics of the Bank Act and the Bank spoke, 
wrote, and operated on the belief that gold was the only asset that could be used to 
purchase foreign grain, in spite of the massive history of international credit deals that 
had been made for hundreds of years. Every speaker in parliamentary debate seemed 
to understand that British business could not sustain itself without continued currency 
issue, but none could see a way around a strict relationship between gold and currency 
                                            
88A list of the banking and currency documents that Gladstone read from 1833 to 1846 appears at 
the end of this chapter. 
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issue. Thus, every famine or problem in the harvest set Britain teetering on the brink of 
a massive commercial crisis. 
Historians might ask why. The argument in favor of gold is Mercantilist. The best 
known Mercantilist was Sir Thomas Mun, author of England’s Treasure by Forraign 
Trade. Mun, writing nearly two centuries earlier, exactly supported Peal and the 
bullionists. Mun argued against excessive controls on foreign trade and foreign 
exchange (free trade), provided always that England maintained the advantage in 
foreign trade and the quantity of gold bullion in her vaults.89 The answer may be 
psychological: the only trade item acceptable for the sale of food might be the most 
basic of trade items—gold. Food is a basic human need. Gold is the good that people 
understood best when they thought in terms of wealth. Such thinking may have been 
the source of the primitive urge to trade the best good for the most valuable commodity.  
The most likely explanation for the Bank’s insistence on the bullion argument in 
the 1844 Act was that it was playing a far more complex game aimed at putting the 
smaller issuing banks out of business by raising the barrier to banking in general until 
none but the really big houses could plan. The Act made it illegal for new banks to open 
for business as currency issuers, and the smaller banks were put on notice that their 
good credit was open to scrutiny. Each time a bank closed—several did during every 
crisis—competition was reduced. In the meantime, however, the Bank of England failed 
to understand the working of other market forces on banking.  
The Bank Act of 1844 was to be the basis of English currency for another eighty 
years after its passage, and as such it was to be Gladstone’s friend or enemy based on 
                                            
89See Chapter 2. 
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how Gladstone reacted. Until the twentieth century, Gladstone remained the only 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to shake the Bank. But his work was slow, and it 
sometimes seemed that he had given up completely. 
 
Conclusion 
In the chapters that follow, three things are evident about Gladstone. First, he 
might read on currency and gold, but he was not about to challenge the Bank on the 
Gold Standard. Second, he rarely thought about gold as a commodity in itself. He 
bought railroad stocks but not stock in gold mines. He wrote checks. He was scrupulous 
about his private and public accounts, but thought in terms of ledgers and journals, 
balance sheets, and budgets, but hardly every did the availability of gold enter into his 
budget calculations. In fact, Gladstone represented what was then modern about 
Victorian England and its finances. Railroads, improvements in farming, the growing 
number of factories, and the growing number of colonies were Britain’s wealth, not gold. 
Third, his ultimate break with Sir Robert Peel’s philosophy over banking came not from 
the Bank Act of 1844 per se, but rather over the growing sense of power that the Bank 
seemed to enjoy in its dealings with the government. Peel had given that power to the 
Bank, and by his legislative abilities, had swept away the opposition that might have 
coalesced in a differently led parliament. It was the power of the Bank, and its opinion of 
the government, not the problem of gold, that Gladstone would fight when he rose to the 
Exchequer. It was the power of the Bank that became Gladstone’s target when he 




Gladstone’s Reading, 1833-1846 
Table 4 lists the books Gladstone read during his training period with Sir Robert 
Peel. If we eliminate Gladstone’s reading in the classics, in religion, and in church 
management and finance, the power of Peel’s leadership becomes apparent. The 
heavy concentration on the Corn Laws under the heading of Accounting and Trade 
suggests that Gladstone became a free trader very early, and later attempts of his 
father to separate him both from free trade and from Peel would be to no avail. The links 
between the Corn Laws and farming, currency, industry, and other topics began to lead 
Gladstone to those topics. We should not be surprises that in this period, when 
Gladstone was graduating from idealist to practical politician, and was immersed in the 
numbers of the Board of Trade in Peel’s 1840s government, that he should begin to 
explore the topics relate d to the Corn Laws and free trade, and to expand his learning 
wherever possible. 
Reading David Ricardo’s Plan shows that Gladstone was at least willing to 
consider an alternative to the Bank of England. His reading on currency and general 
banking suggest that he preferred to develop a well-rounded understanding of currency 
problems instead of following the bullionist position of his chief, Peel.  
Finally, the lack of reading in government finance—taxation, budgets, and the 
national debt—suggests that he had not yet come to understand the very real links 
between what the government did with its money and the effects that government 
finance could have on the country. Nor had he then explored the more fundamental 
area of political economy as a whole, with its fledgling but nevertheless rising 
understanding of the ways in which one facet of an economy was linked to all the 
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others. His study of the cost of war would not become important until Great Britain was 
actually at war in the 1850s, and when the British government assessed its relationship 
with one of its strongest trading partners, the United States, in the 1860s. 
Compared to, for example, a graduate student anxious to gain a degree and 
move on, Gladstone’s progress was painfully slow. But Gladstone was not seeking a 
degree. He was seeking a way to remain in office and to be of service to the country. He 
had no need to travel fast, but he did demonstrate a need to travel only as fast as the 
booksellers, authors, and publishers allowed, by making books available to him. 
Compared to the other politicians of his time, Gladstone’s intensity and achievement are 
certainly far above average for the Victorian age, both because he collected a library, 
which many people did, but because he recorded his progress in reading. 
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Table 4: Gladstone’s Reading, 1833-1846 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Corn Laws Sir James Robert Graham Free Trade in Corn the Real Interest of the Landlord, and the True Policy of the State.  By a Cumberland Landowner (1852) 8 Jan 1842 
Corn Laws H.B.T.  (J. D. Hume) Letters on the Corn Laws, and on the Rights of the Working Classes (1834) 3 Feb 1842 
Corn Laws J. Pennington 
“A Letter to K. Finlay…on Importation of Foreign Corn and the Value of 
Precious Metals in Different Countries to which are Added Observations on 
Money and the Foreign Exchange” (1840) 
30 Dec 1841 
Corn Laws Frederick John Robinson  The Influence of Taxation on the Price of Corn Considered (1815) 20 Jan 1841 
Corn Laws G.F. Muntz Letter upon Corn and Currency (1841) 8 May 1841 
Corn Laws R.N.B. Corn and Wages; of a few Propositions and Remarks on the Variations in the Price of Corn… and Wages (1841) 17 Jun 1841 
Corn Laws Richard Page  (D. Hardcastle) Action of the Corn Laws (1841) 22 Sept 1841 
Corn Laws Thomas Jevons The Prosperity of the Landholders not Dependent on the Corn Laws (1840) 23 Sept 1841 
Corn Laws John Ramsey MacCulloch Statements Illustrative of the Policy and Probable Consequences of the Proposed Repeal [of the Corn Laws] (1841) 12 Oct 1841 
Corn Laws B.W. Noel “A Plea for the Poor, Showing how the Proposed Repeal of Existing Corn Laws will Affect the Interests of the Working Class” (1841) 13 Oct 1841 
Corn Laws A. Merchant The Cost of Producing Foreign Corn, by a Merchant (1841) 16 Oct 1841 
Corn Laws Edward Rudall The Complaints of the Manufacturers Against the Corn Laws Considered… in a Lecture (1840) 18 Oct 1841 
Corn Laws Sir David Salomons The Corn Laws; Their Effects on the Trade of the Country Considered, with Suggestions for a Compromise (1841) 11 Dec 1841 
Corn Laws Sir James Robert Graham Corn and Currency; in an Address to Land Owners (1826) 13 Dec 1841 
Corn Laws James Wilson Influence of the Corn Laws, Commerce and Manufacturers Referable to the Corn Laws (1839) 17 Dec 1841 
Corn Laws James Wilson Fluctuations of Currency, Commerce and Manufactures Referable to the Corn Laws (1840) 21 Dec 1841 
Corn Laws William Wolryche Whitmore A Letter on the Corn Laws to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce (1839) 22 Dec 1841 
Corn Laws Christopher Neville Defense of Free Trade in Corn (1841) 28 Dec 1841 
Corn Laws Edward Stillingfleet Cayley, the Elder Corn Laws, A Speech (1839) 1 Jan 1842 
Corn Laws Parliamentary Paper, 1842, x1.275, Cp. 28, J. Meek 
Information Concerning the Cost and Supply of Various Articles of Agricultural 
Produce… in Several Parts of Northern Europe 6 Jan 1842 
Accounting 
and Trade 
Corn Laws John Richie Speech… [on] the Injustice and Immoral Tendency of the Corn and Provision Laws (1842) 26 Jan 1843 
   (table continues) 
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Table 4 (continued). 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Corn Laws J. Hays Pamphlet on the Corn Laws (1843)b 22 Feb 1843 
Corn Laws Edinburgh Review Anti-Corn Law Prize Essays, Vol. 77 (1843) 22 Feb 1843 
Corn Laws J. Almack Character, Motives, and Proceedings of the Anti-corn Law League (1843) 25 Feb 1843 
Corn Laws Richard Griffiths Welford How Far Will Free Trade in Corn Affect the Farmer (1843) 23 Mar 1843 
Corn Laws Thomas Spring-Rice, 1
st 
Baron Monteagle Corn Laws.  The Consequence of the Sliding Scale (1843) 8 May 1843 
Corn Laws George Game Day 
A Letter to Richard Cobden, Esq., M. P., in Reply to Remarks Contained in his 
Speech, Delivered at Covent-Garden Theater on Wednesday, March 20, 1844 
(1844) 
22 Aug 1844 
Corn Laws A.H. Wylie American Corn and British Manufacturers (1845) 25 Jan 1845 
Corn Laws Unknown An Address on the Corn Laws; by a Protectionist (1844) 13 Feb 1846 
Corn Laws Anonymous A Few Words on the Corn Laws, by a Landowner (1844) 3 Feb 1846 
Corn Laws Robert Torrens Essay on the External Corn Trade (1815) 30 Mar 1846 
Corn Laws Christopher Neville Corn and Currency, in a Letter to A. Alison (1846) 7 Mar 1846 
Corn Laws Unknown Sir Robert Peel and the Corn Law Crisis (npd) 7 Mar 1846 
Corn Laws Anonymous “A Letter to the Queen in behalf of her Suffering People by the Poor Man’s Friend (favoring the Corn Law Report)” (1841) 15 Jan 1842 
Corn Laws British and Foreign Review Corn Laws 12 (1841) 19 Jan 1842 
Corn Laws H. Thompson Speech on the Corn Laws, 1842 (1842) 28 Jan 1842 




Corn Laws Anonymous Conversation on the Corn Laws (npd) 20 May 1846 
Bank of England and the 
1844 Bank Act David Ricardo Plan for the Establishment of a National Bank (1837)
c 9 Mar 1837 
Banking Anonymous Review of the Banking System of Britain (1821) 25 Jun 1833 
Banking Thomas Joplin An Examination of the Report of the Joint Stock Bank Committee (1836) 22 Feb 1837 
Banking John Horsley Palmer The Causes and Consequences of the Pressure upon the Money Market (1837) 7 Mar 1837 
Banking Samuel Jones Loyd Reflections Suggested by … Palmer’s Pamphlet on the Causes and Consequences of the Pressure on the Money Market (1837) 7 Mar 1837 
Banking John Horsley Palmer Reply to the Reflections of Mr. S. Jones Loyd on … Causes… of the Pressure upon the Money Markets (1837) 7 Mar 1837 








Table 4 (continued). 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Banking Anonymous Two Letters to Sir Robert Peel on his Proposed Banking Measures; by an ex MP (1844) 8 Jul 1844 
Currency Mercator (John Gladstone) Letters to the Liverpool Standard [against paper currency] (1833) 25 Jan 1833 
Currency William Huskisson The Question Concerning the Depreciation of our Currency 23 Apr 1833 
Currency PP 1840 iv Report of the Select Committee on Banks of Issue 11 Mar 1840 
Currency W. Leatham Letters on Currency Addressed to C. Wood, Chairman of the Committee of the House of Commons Sitting Now (1840) 14 Jul 1840 
Currency Ichabod Charles Wright Thoughts on Currency (1841) 28 Dec 1841 17 Jan 1844 
Currency John Gellibrand Hubbard The Currency and the Country (1843) 23 Jan 1843, fin. 27 Jan 1844 
Currency Nicholas Carlisle Correspondence on the Mint: Memoir of William Wyon… Chief Engraver of the Royal Mint (1837) 17 Apr 1843 
Currency James Whatman Bosanquet Metallic Paper and Credit Currency, and the Means of Regulating their Quantity and Value (1842) 17 Oct 1843 
Currency Thomas Joplin An Examination of Sir Robert Peel’s Currency Bill of 1844, In a Letter to the Bankers of the [U.K.]d 22 Feb 1844 
Currency Sir William Clay Remarks on the Expediency of Restricting the Issue of Promissory Notes to a Single Issuing Body (1844) 25 Apr 1844 
Currency Thomas Tooke Inquiry into the Currency Principle, the Connecting of Currency with Prices, and the Expediency of a Separation of Issue from Banking (1844) 2 May 1844 





Currency Thomas Tooke History of Prices and the State of Circulation (1838) 14 Nov 1846 
Notes: 
aAll date references are to Volume 3 of the Diaries. Within a Topic, the publications are listed in the order in which Gladstone recorded reading 
them (right-hand column). 
bNot found. 
cPublished posthumously in 1824; possibly republished in 1837. See Stephens, Bibliography, 62.  




PEEL IN DECLINE, 1846-1852 
Introduction 
This period was critical to Gladstone’s development, because, although he 
maintained his allegiance to Peel until the older man’s death in 1850, he was becoming 
his own man. In these years he became independent from his father and brother, 
independent from Peel’s increasingly petulant attitudes, more interested in finding his 
own way, and free to read many books, particularly those that supported his growth and 
allowed his imagination to go free. One outcome of this period was his performance in 
the critical years 1852-1855, his first tours as Chancellor of the Exchequer. In these 
years (Chapter 5) he was ready and able to take charge of British government financial 
policy, and then use it to reshape a new national political and social policy based on his 
financial principles. 
This chapter continues the examination of Gladstone’s attitudes and performance 
in parliament, sometimes under the guidance of Sir Robert Peel and often in concert 
with other Peelites. The political and doctrinal disagreements that took place between 
Gladstone and Peel soured their relationship. These problems did not include the Bank 
of England Charter Act of 1844 or the Bank in general, but were based primarily on 
Peel’s attempts to keep the Russell government in power to continue Britain’s 
commitment to Free Trade. As bewildered as the rest of the still loyal Peel men, 
Gladstone clung to his friends and worked to find his own way. It opened up, as 
demonstrated at the end of this chapter with Gladstone’s attack on Disraeli’s December 
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1852 budget, an act that led to a Peelite coalition government under Lord Aberdeen. In 
that government, for the  first time, Gladstone became Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
This chapter also covers the first suspension of the 1844 Bank Act in the general 
financial crisis in 1847. Free Trade and the Bank Act of 1844 were antithetical—a the 
end of protection on the one hand, granting all merchants free access to markets, and a 
monopoly on the other, limiting the access of merchants and manufacturers to loans 
Free Trade exacerbated banking problems because British merchants who traded 
abroad were often required to export gold to pay for goods, notably in China. From the 
parliamentary debates in Hansard’s debates on a motion to create a committee to look 
into “Commercial Distress,” this chapter shows how the Russell government failed to 
protect Peel and the Bank from loud but disorganized criticism. Although the Russell 
government got through the crisis of 1847 without punishing the Bank, ministers 
nevertheless allowed many critics of Peel and the Bank Act to voice a good deal of 
acrimony in the debates. 
When he resigned Peel was still personally powerful, and the Peelites were still 
numerous and gifted. The government of Lord John Russell that followed was not a 
favorite of the Peelites, but Peel sided with Lord John Russell and personally foreswore 
any future interest in taking office.1 The Peelites, as they called themselves, claimed 
sufficient numbers to swing a vote for or against the government.2 But for the still-young 
                                            
1Gash, Peel, 617. 
2Norman Gash has not been uniformly kind to Peel. Nor was Gladstone at the time. Nevertheless, 
Gladstone’s biographer, John Morley, has been. Morley routinely referred to Peel as a hero, a man of 
high courage. Morley did not emphasize the other side of the relationship—the periods of distrust, the 
times when Peel questioned Gladstone’s judgment, and the Gladstone’s growing distrust of Peel’s. 
Morley thus shows us that however much Gladstone worried, fretted, and even hated Peel’s behavior, in 
his old age Gladstone preferred to remember Sir Robert as courageous heroic, and a first-rate legislator. 
See Morley, Gladstone 1:289. 
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Gladstone, there was now a life of reading, finding a new constituency to represent, 
tending his family, and waiting. Gladstone did not openly attack the Bank, nor did he 
pressure Peel. Yet the inclination must have begun to emerge. Both Gash and J. B. 
Conacher show convincingly that Peel warned off his followers when they wished to 
attack Russell’s government. Having refused to join the Russell government, the 
Peelites had nowhere else to go, and one by one they began to abandon Peel. Gash 
tells the story of Russell’s attempts to invite Lord Lincoln, Dalhousie, and Sidney 
Herbert to join his government, using identical notes to all three. Lincoln wrote to Peel, 
“A new mode of beating up for a cabinet—a circular!”3 Gladstone surely knew about the 
offers, did not receive one himself, and did not record his reaction to not being selected. 
Graham was offered the Governor-Generalship of India, which he turned down, but 
Dalhousie accepted the position. The early collapse of Russell’s scheme to attract first 
Graham, and then Lincoln, Cardwell, or Herbert left Gladstone without an offer, but did 
leave him with friends.4  
Gladstone fostered these friendships, regularly consulting with Lord Aberdeen, 
Sidney Herbert, and Sir James Graham.5 His reading on the 1844 Bank Act was light, 
as was his entire reading effort in the areas of finance, trade, and politics.6 His most 
concentrated effort was in the area of taxation and revenue, reading fourteen books in 
this area between 1846 and 1852. This was a strange period in Gladstone’s life: he was 
                                            
3Gash, Peel, 618-619; Gladstone, Diaries 3:10/7/46, n.6.Gladstone wrote a political memorandum 
in July in which he mentioned hearing from Lord Aberdeen about Lincoln’s and the others’ refusal of Lord 
John’s offers. The memorandum also discussed Peel’s speech about Cobden, which Gladstone and 
Aberdeen deemed unfortunate but an indicator of Peel’s determination never to lead the conservative 
party again. Gladstone commented on the singular approach Sir John had used, attempting to attract the 
Peelites first and, on their acceptance, to “fix upon a policy.”  
4Gash, Peel: 636-637. 
5See Gladstone, Diaries 3:10/7/46. He became estranged from Sir James Graham when Graham 
continued to side strongly with Peel in Peel’s later years. 
6The reading list for this period appears at the end of this chapter. 
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active in parliament (now elected by Oxford University), gregarious, and fairly certain he 
would again attain office. He was once more involved in family life: the salvaging of the 
Hawarden estate, attending his father now in failing health, fussing about his sister, and 
tending personally to the health and welfare of his immediate family.  
During this period Gladstone read intensively. He was out of office and had time 
to read. He read widely on taxation and government finance, and began to come to 
grips with the national debt. He also listened and learned, while speaking little. His 
continuing attendance on Peel became less and less aimed at maintaining his 
relationship with the great man and more and more about maintaining contact with his 
friends, the other Peelites. This hardy group of men was determined to maintain their 
solidarity in spite of what they felt as Peel’s abandonment. 
Gladstone was strongly conflicted on the one hand by his love for Peel the man 
and on the other by his growing dislike of Peel as financier and politician. Gladstone 
accepted these problems. Gladstone accepted, studied, and determined his actions 
upon them. Again, Peel was the key: at the beginning of this period Gladstone was still 
completely loyal to Peel and thought he had been mistaken to lead his government in 
resignation. By the end of this period, Gladstone thought Peel had lived too long.7 
Nevertheless, Gladstone remained loyal to Peel, remembered the older man’s 
mentorship, training, and precepts. These were the foundation upon which Gladstone 
built his newer economic theory, maintaining what he accepted of Peel’s ideas, and 
modifying the rest. 
His reading suggests that he was preparing himself for greater responsibility. He 
                                            
7J. B. Conacher, “Peel and the Peelites, 1846-1850,” The English Historical Review 73, no. 288 
(July 1958): 431-452. 
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was a rising and powerful man residing in a network of powerful and knowledgeable 
friends. In this period he was a man with an anchor chained to his leg, Peel, and a life 
vest made up of the remaining Peelites. While Peel lived and abjured office, all 
remaining Peelites were attached to the same anchor. They would either drown with 
Peel or find a way to swim away.8 Those who criticize Gladstone for his coldness on 
Peel’s death fail to see that the Peelites had effectively been men without a leader for 
several years, but men unable to choose another as long as Peel lived. 
Peelitism was, of course, an untenable political position although its economics 
held up well for another half century.9 To associate a political theory with the name of a 
man who had foresworn government, and who had been generally disliked when he left 
office was not a recipe for success. British politics already had its parties, such as the 
failing Whigs, the weak conservatives, and the Radicals, and its party wings, such as 
the ultra-conservatives. The House of Commons did not really need another party, 
especially one with waning power, such as the Peelites. Privately, Peel swore to keep 
Russell in power as a way to protect free trade. When Gladstone complained that he 
would be isolated in Commons because of Peel’s decision, Peel muttered that it would 
be better for Gladstone to get out of parliament.10 The remaining Peelites would again 
be sought and would again serve, but on their own merits, not on Sir Robert’s coattails. 
                                            
8J. B. Conacher, The Peelites and the Party System, 1846-52 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 
1972), 220, 233. Conacher used the voting records of free trade conservatives in parliament 1847-52 and 
election of free trade conservatives in 1852 to determine the numbers and fates of these men. Looking at 
his data in Peelite versus Derbyite votes, the only clear statement that can be made is that the number of 
Peelites who voted pro-Peelite varied from vote to vote. Conacher has given us his list of votes, showing 
that he used a variety of topics including Jewish disabilities (1847-8), supply for Canada (1849), official 
salaries (1850), and redistribution of seats (1851 and 1852). The highest number of men who voted pro-
Peelite in 1847-8 was 74; 1849: 45; 1850: 58; 1851-2: 55. It appears the Peelites were swimming away. 
9“One of the most interesting and significant splinter groups in the history of British party politics.” 
Conacher, Peelites and Party, 7. 
10Gash, Peel, 617, n.2. 
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Although Gash says the Peel and his followers refused a formal alliance with 
Russell, J. B. Conacher says that Charles Wood, Russell’s Chancellor of Exchequer, 
routinely used Peel as a consultant on matters of finance, and that Russell used Wood 
as a conduit to Peel. Conacher also argues that in Peel’s efforts to maintain for free 
trade, the former prime minister hoped to make the Russell government strong enough 
to stave off the rise of a conservative government and a return to protection.11 In return, 
Wood defended, as much as he could, both Peel and the 1844 Bank Act during the 
debate over the 1847 commercial crisis.  
But the mixture was deadly. By demanding that his loyal followers support 
Russell, while gradually abandoning them, Peel set off a chain reaction that further 
weakened his own diminishing strength and that of the remaining Peelites. 
 
Peel Out of Office 
In 1846, the Peelites were nominally conservatives. J. B. Conacher has 
described them as “the cream of the conservative party that had been rebuilt so 
laboriously under Peel’s leadership.”12 Their strength lay in their quality, not their 
quantity,13 and he says there was not a dandy or a coxcomb among them.14 The solid 
core consisted of about eight men, in two groups: Peel, Aberdeen, Goulburn, and 
Graham in their middle fifties and early sixties; and Lincoln, Dalhousie, Herbert, and 
                                            
11J. B. Conacher, “Peel and the Peelites, 1846-1850,” The English Historical Review 73, no. 288 
(July 1958), 431-452, 442, 445; Gash, Peel, 623. 
12Conacher, Peel, 7. 
13Conacher, “Peel and the Peelites,” 431. 
14Conacher, “Peel and the Peelites,” 432, n.2. Part of Conacher’s analysis comes from a 20,000- 
word, unpublished paper (British Museum, Add. MS. 44745) entitled “Party as it was and as it is,” fols. 
173-222, written in 1855). Conacher calls this a “strange piece,” some of which Gladstone used in his 
article for the Quarterly Review entitled “The Declining Efficiency of Parliament.” 
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Gladstone in their middle thirties.15 To these younger men, Conacher adds three more 
junior men who were not in the core—Sir John Young, Lord Canning, and Edward 
Cardwell. The seven younger men would hold high office again, and would continue to 
operate under the label of Peelite for some time. In 1847, Gladstone records a meeting 
at his house with Lincoln and Henry Goulburn, Lincoln, Herbert, Cardwell, and Young 
on how they should use their remaining influence: they sent out the customary pre-
session letter asking that all known Peel supporters attend the opening session of 
parliament.16 Goulburn called it a party of observation. Peel said such a party would fail. 
Nevertheless, the Peelites took their position on the opposition bench between the red 
box and the Speaker’s chair. Peel sat with them in spite of his prognosis.17 The young 
Peelites hoped for both a following and, if possible, some strength. To do what is not 
clear. To defy Peel and attack Russell were out of the question unless the Peelite rump 
intended to vote with the conservatives. The government depended on Peel. If the 
young Peelites hoped for the strength to oppose both Peel and Russell, they were 
mistaken. 
The commercial crisis, coming later in 1847, was debated loudly and long in 
December of that year. Gash cites three causes for the crisis: railroad expansion,18 the 
continuing crisis in Ireland, and the Bank of England’s inflationary practice of lending 
“cheap” money on low interest rates.19 The continuing food crisis in Ireland required 
                                            
15Conacher, “Peel and the Peelites,” 431. 
16Gash, Peel, 619-620. 
17Gash, Peel, 620-621. 
18For a discussion of railroad investment, see Hirst, Gladstone as Financier, Chapter 8, “Railways 
and Companies,” 86-91. Gladstone was a keen supporter of the railroads, as has been mentioned 
elsewhere, and in his railroad Act of 1844 he worked to ensure safety, inspections, and the government’s 
ability to purchase the railroads as needed. The bill did not control continuing expansion through private 
bills, often duplicating lines between large cities. Low interest rates encouraged railroad expansion. 
19Gash, Peel, 621. This is one case where a historian must give way to an economic historian. Sir 
John Clapham, Bank of England 2: Appendix B, 429 shows the bank rates for 1856, 1857, and 1858. The 
 168
food imports. Instead of using goods or credit to pay for food, British entrepreneurs 
apparently chose to pay with gold. Speculation in grains led to high food prices before 
the spring planting. Foreign suppliers were, perhaps, encouraged by England’s supplies 
of gold to demand coin instead of notes or credit. Food speculation collapsed on reports 
of a good harvest, and the commercial world paid the penalty for greed and good 
rains.20 The crisis occurred when the harvests began to come in and the speculators, 
depending on a bad harvest found themselves committed to paying high prices. They 
found themselves seriously over-extended. In addition, suspicions circulated that the 
Bank had exacerbated the crisis by maintaining a low interest rate (encouraging 
speculation) and speculating in gold on its own behalf. 
On October 21-22, Peel was traveling to Windsor Castle when Sir Charles Wood, 
Russell’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, intercepted him. They met for two hours that 
night and three times the next morning. Peel told Wood to talk to the Bank men—Jones 
Loyd, Cotton, and Norman—but warned Wood not to talk to representatives of the 
money market or northern industrialists. After Wood’s four conversations with Peel, the 
government “advised” the bank to raise its interest rate to “not less than eight per 
cent.”21 Peel’s involvement in this proceeding cannot be denied. There was argument 
about who should state the Bank rate and how long it should be continued.22 The broker 
                                                                                                                                             
lowest rate in 1846 was 27 August when the Bank rate was 3%. In 1847, well before the crisis forced 
excessive bankruptcies, the rate began to rise: 3.5% on 14 January, 1847; 4% on 21 January; 5% on 8 
April, 5.5% on 5 August; 6% on 30 September; 8% on 25 October; after which it fell to 7% and then 6% 
by the end of the year. The Bank’s target rate appears to have been 3%, but  it often fell to 2.5% and 2%. 
The range 2 to 3.5% can safely be classified their “cheap-money” range. As the debate in 1847 
demonstrated, the continental and American rates were in the range of 6-8% (Hansard’s xcv: 401-402). If 
Gash refers to the rates at which railroad entrepreneurs were borrowing, the answer lies in the fact that 
these men, believing “big profits” to be around the corner, thought nothing of borrowing at the higher 
rates, and believed they could manage the payback problems that would arise.  
20Gash, Peel, 627-628. 
21Gash, Peel, 628-629. 
22Clapham, Bank of England 2:209. 
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was Peel. A box arrived for Peel at Windsor Castle on Monday containing all official 
papers concerning the crisis and Russell’s official note that Peel should be given access 
to all correspondence. 
To say that Peel had engineered the temporary suspension of his own Act in 
order to save it and the Bank may be an exaggeration. But we cannot ignore the fact 
that Peel steered Wood away from three groups of men who had a major interest in 
stemming the crisis by putting pressure on the Bank of England and the 1844 Act—
Scottish bankers, northern English bankers, and industrialists. This problem would 
surface during the selection of committee members for a select committee to look into 
the crisis, a standard tactic used in parliament to help forestall criticism. Many claimed 
the Bank had contributed to the failure of businesses. The Bank had exported gold to 
pay for food when it might have done more to protect the nation’s gold supply (by using 
credit instruments for example), and thus to have done more to protect marginal 
businesses operating in a rapidly shifting economy. The Bank had made money cheap 
when it should have been raising the interest rate to forestall speculation in the railroads 
and foodstuffs. Questions asked during the debate suggested that the government 
either was or should have been investigating into the operation of the Bank’s parlour, 
the room where the directors met. Peel recommended that Wood “soften the directive 
on the bank rate” to “not less than eight per cent.” 
Gash refers to the Bank’s management as “the cool-headed men of 
Threadneedle Street” and the hope that “the panic would exhaust itself without the need 
of government interference.” Gash cites Clapham. In fact, what Clapham said was: 
 
They were cool in the Bank Parlour, over confident their critics said. Gold was 
coming in to earn the high rates; there was no doubt of that: £40,000 in 
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sovereigns had arrived from Liverpool … and another ship with £200,000 [was] 
signaled. For each of the two coming weeks they [had] a million and a half “going 
off”—good paper that [would] bring in cash. They believed they could do it, and to 
the last they never asked for relaxation, or even suggested any such thing.23 
In other words, the bankers were not cool because of their management of the 
crisis, but because gold was finally flowing back into their coffers after a period of drain. 
The market was correcting itself automatically.24 Sir Francis Baring, the former Whig 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, recommended a select commission to look into the 
causes of the crisis, and also to look at the ways in which Peel’s Act had influenced the 
crisis. Far from casting doubt on the Act, Baring insisted that it was simply a forestalling 
measure necessary to deflect parliamentary criticism. The results of this innocent 
maneuver were catastrophic, and should be considered one of the steps in the 
downward slope of Peel’s influence. Parliamentarians returned to London for a special 
session on 18 November and stayed until December 20, 1847, and the primary topic 
was the commercial crisis.25 The call for a select committee simply slowed proceedings 
further than they might have been slowed already. 
On 24 November, Lord George Bentinck, a constant critic of Peel, asked Wood 
whether the government intended to give an explanation about the infringement of the 
                                            
23Clapham, Bank of England 2:208. 
24When Sir John writes that gold was flowing into the Bank and that management heads were 
cool, we may reasonably at what point in the crisis did the gold begin to flow. If the European banks had 
just completed one of their self-regulations of the market, the Bank could congratulate itself for surviving 
the crisis of 1847 without having lifted a finger. If the Bank joined in the speculation, then a serious 
question still arises as to the Bank’s fitness to have so much power over English business and 
investment. See Hansard’s xviii, 172. 
25The crisis of 1847 and the crisis of 1857 are alike primarily in three ways: each was triggered by 
an expansion of commercial and industrial activity that caused an overextension of credit; each was 
blamed, reasonably or unreasonably, on the Bank of England for failing to act soon enough to stave off 
the crisis; in each case, the Bank Charter Act of 1844 took additional blame because it did not help the 
country banks which were trying to finance the expansion, but which needed protection that the Bank of 
England failed to give. For the debates on commercial distress, the Bank of England, the Bank Act, and 
the so-called currency crisis, see a question on the Bank Charter Act, Hansard’s xcv:150; for the motion 
by Mr. Hindley for the Production of Papers, 210; for a question on the Bank Charter Act, 228; and for a 
motion by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Wood) for a select committee, 228. The debate on the select 
committee lasted three nights: 30 November, 374 - 477; 2 and 3 December, 531-597 and 604-606. 
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Bank Act. Wood responded with a promise to take the problem up on the following 
Tuesday. On the 25th, Hindley moved for a return to the Bank’s minimum discount rate 
“charged by the Bank of England since the Act of 1844.” On the same night Francis 
Baring, who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer under Melbourne’s second ministry, 
suggested that if the Bank were to be discussed, papers should be produced. On that 
following Tuesday (30 November), Sir Charles gave the government’s view of the crisis: 
it was a well-argued and moderate presentation of the crisis as the government saw it. 
His motion was for a select committee “to inquire into the Causes of the recent 
Commercial Distress, and how far it has been affected by the laws for regulating the 
usage of Bank notes …”26 
Wood’s carefully crafted speech suggested that blame should be shared by all 
sides.27 He stated that the government believed in the principle for regulating the 
circulation of banking. He said that the extension of commercial credit during the period 
leading to the crisis had been unparalleled.28 To Gash’s list of reasons for the crisis, 
Wood added the government’s construction of permanent works.29 Then he rehearsed 
the various ideas for systems that had been presented when the Bank’s charter had 
been renewed in 1844, neatly separating the principles of the Bank charter from 
Tooke’s theory of prices. He also correctly recited the changes in the Bank rate over the 
course of the year.30 In discussing the problem of whether the Bank’s policies or 
business mismanagement had led to many of the failures, Wood quoted Sir John 







Gladstone, who blamed mismanagement and lack of capital far more than he blamed 
the banking industry.31 
In total, Wood’s speech was impressive, so much so that one might miss the 
problems this speech raised. One important problem in the speech and the debate that 
followed was the elasticity of time between crises. Wood described the period 1844-
1847 as a long period, and said the period could just as easily have been fifty years. But 
to him, the period 1839-1847 was a relatively short time, and the period from 1819 (the 
date of the Bullion Report) to 1844, later suggested by Gash as a bookmark set of 
dates, shorter still. In describing the crisis of 1847, Wood compared it to the crises of 
1826 and 1837 as if they were caused by the same problems and brought to the same 
conclusions.32 This may have been an attempt to exonerate the Bank Act of 1844 from 
guilt. A more astute economist would have argued that the Bank Act of 1844 changed 
the situation, by placing such heavy limits on currency issue where before the Bank had 
acted entirely within its discretion. 
The debate lasted three nights; a virtual symphony of Bank, banking, and bank-
related topics emerged: convertibility of paper into gold and vice versa, the Bank of 
England’s needs or obligations to protect its gold supply, 33 the confusion between 
circulation of money in whatever form with capital,34 the question of whether metallic or 
bi-metallic currency would have solved the problems encountered in the crisis,35 
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whether the Bank of England required reorganization, and whether the Bank was finally 
to become a banker’s bank through the control of capital.36 
The first MP to follow Wood was James Wilson, founder and editor of The 
Economist. Wilson’s attack showed his grasp of the problem on points that Wood could 
not defend. He noted that many MPs would wish to add to the list of problems to be 
considered by the committee. He noted how many gentlemen had been shaken badly in 
their views by comparing the events of the previous few months against the events of 
the past. Wilson affirmed that the situation had been changed by the operation of the 
Act of 1844. 
Then Wilson raised a theme which would be repeated for the next several nights: 
the contributions of “the right hon. Baronet the member for Tamworth” to the current 
crisis. Wilson used the term repeatedly, never referring to Peel by name, forcing 
Hansard editors or typesetters to insert the phrase “(Sir Robert Peel)” for clarification in 
line after line of Wilson’s speech. Referring to the Bank Act of 1844 and the committee 
that met in 1841, Wilson quoted the committee’s own findings that there had been too 
little time and too much evidence to report appropriately; he also reminded House 
attendees that the hearings on banking had stopped when parliament was dissolved in 
1841 and not repeated in 1843 or 1844, previous to the passage of the Act.37  
Wilson was one of the best educated and most articulate speakers in the House. 
He well remembered the outcome of the Bullion Committee report and the restoration of 
the gold convertibility or gold standard settlement at the restoration of gold payments in 
1823. Thus he remembered Peel’s contribution to the original problem, and also Peel’s 




success in pushing the Bank Charter Act through parliament in 1844. Wilson’s speech is 
noteworthy because everything he said was either completely true or at least defensible 
on reasonable theoretical or interpretive grounds. As founder and editor of a journal that 
followed and commented on economic problems, Wilson was in an excellent position to 
demonstrate how Peel, Wood, and Samuel Jones Loyd had changed their published 
hopes for and opinions on the Bank Act of 1844. He showed that the end of the usury 
laws in 1846 had  made greater economic growth possible because men could now 
borrow when they wished at any profitable rate the lender cared to name. Under the 
Bank Act and the end of usury laws, good managers had believed they could accept 
higher interest rates, expand their businesses, pay the interest and the loan from profits, 
and celebrate their growth. Many men in the City of London believed themselves safe: 
 
I have heard some of the most eminent men at the head of some of these great 
houses which have failed recently during the last crisis, console themselves by 
the belief that from its self-acting principle, the Bill would save them from the 
revulsions which had formerly happened, so that they did not think it necessary 
to exercise the same degree of care and discretion that they would otherwise 
have felt bound to observe.38 
Peel had warned Wood not to talk to people like Wilson. Thus, the arguments 
Wood used, and those struck down by Wilson and others, were based on Peel’s and the 
Bank’s beliefs. When Wood proposed a select committee on 13 December, 1847, his 
list was heavy with professional parliamentarians and bankers, but was notable for its 
lack of representation of north England industrialists and bankers, Scottish bankers, and 
writers on economics.39 The proposed lack of representation by those who had suffered 
most by the Act of 1844 was the first problem that went unanswered in 1847. The 
                                            
38Ibid., 422. 
39What follows is based on the debate of those three nights in November. 
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second problem was the proposed scope of the investigation. Wood’s original motion 
limited the committee to the recent crisis and the problem of currency. To the honorable 
members, however, the crisis had antecedents: the Bank Act with its currency 
limitations was flawed; the legislative thinking and procedures leading to the act were 
weak; and the railroad interests, the Corn Laws, and the gold supply at the Bank were 
all problems which needed additional attention. Thus, the members argued, cogently, 
that the whole thing would have to be gone into all over again.  
This led to the third problem: the hearings of 1840 and 1841 had included 
approximately 8000 questions, many of which received incomplete or inconclusive 
answers, or were linked to other questions unasked or unanswered. Some members 
admitted the problem but sought better answers. Other members argued that if the 
answers had not be found in earlier hearings, there was little use in recreating this 
recital. 
A fourth problem was that the Bank of England was seen as the center of the 
crisis. Parliamentary expectations projected onto the Bank at various times, conflicted 
with the Bank’s own stance: that it was either private and for profit and therefore acting 
only in its own best interests, or that it had refused to take on the responsibilities of a 
central bank. In each Bank Act, members had attempted to solve mercantile problems 
by assuming that a fix on the Bank of England would sort out the problems of the rest of 
the country. Lord Althorp’s presentation in 1833 had been the most cogent presentation 
of this argument: Althorp argued that England’s trade was international; international 
trade required gold and high-value international credit instruments. The Bank of 
England was the main gold repository for the country, located at the center of 
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international trade, London, and in touch with both bankers and manufacturers all over 
Britain wishing to do business with the rest of the world. Therefore, the Bank was best 
suited to serve as the gold respiratory, arbiter of prices, and vendor of trade services to 
the business community. The Bank, in Lord Althorp’s opinion, and in the opinions of 
many others inside and outside the government, was the ideal center of the money 
universe. The Bank was willing to be the center of the world-wide money universe, but 
refused to take responsibilities for that universe. 
Sir Francis Baring and Baron Rothschild would have disagreed with this analysis 
of the Bank’s responsibility. So would proprietors of Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland, the Bank of Ireland, the Linen Bank or a host of others. Allowing for the Bank 
of England’s undoubted centrality, the legal status of its currency, and the large 
reserves of gold (although Rothschilds in England held or had access to far greater 
reserves), these men would have argued that the Bank of England was powerful and 
rich, but subject to the same problems as any other bank or large company on the 
planet.  
 
Three questions had been raised by the Motion of the right hon. Baronet the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer: first, as to the causes of the pecuniary 
embarrassment of the country and of the late panic; secondly, whether that 
embarrassment or that panic had been produced or aggravated by the provisions 
of the Bank Charter Act or the conduct of the directors of the Bank of England; 
and thirdly, whether Her Majesty’s Ministers had deserved praise or blame for the 
advice they had tendered to the Directors of the Bank of England.40  
David Urquhart thought he spoke for the entire assembly when he stated that it 
was an “awkward time” to attempt to grant indemnity to the Bank and the ministers for 
an infraction of the law.41 He said he spoke for Scotland and Scottish banking when he 
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told the assembly that the end of England’s problems in banking would be at last to 
adopt Scotland’s banking law instead of trying to apply English law to Scotland. In 
addition, he argued that in the 1844 Act Peel had done the Bank a disservice in relation 
to the foreign markets and had interfered disastrously with England’s foreign relations.42 
Edward Ellice attacked the bill because it jeopardized the relationships among the 
government, the Bank of England, and the provincial banks.43  
Sir Charles Newdigate quoted Samuel Jones Loyd again, and raised what was 
perhaps the most puzzling problem of the entire history of the Act of 1844: when a 
merchant applied to the Bank for a loan, the Bank did not set up an account from which 
the merchant could write a check or withdraw paper currency (like a modern line of 
credit), nor did the Bank send a letter of credit to another British bank or foreign bank on 
the merchant’s behalf. Instead, the Bank handed paper currency to the merchant. This 
paper currency was then entered into an account that matched currency issue with the 
amount of bullion that remained in the vaults. In addition, the Act of 1844 required the 
Bank to reduce the amount of currency still available for loans. The practice of handing 
currency to the businessman instead of creating a line of credit was not prescribed in 
the Bank Act. It was Bank policy, and a very bad one in times of crisis because the 
Bank artificially limited its ability to respond further.44 Newdigate’s opening words 
suggest that he believed the government had forced the Bank into an indefensible 
position with the 1844 Act, perhaps not understanding that Peel had accepted the bill 
                                                                                                                                             
and issue additional Notes). The Bank had temporarily exceeded the limits of normal issue during the 
crisis when it finally moved took action in stem the crisis (far too late, according to its critics). The debates 




44See Charles Newdigate’s speech, ibid., 580.  
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from the Bank, fully developed. Newdigate’s concerns both for the Bank and for the 
country centered on the 1819 Act as well as the 1844 one; he joined a long line of 
speakers who quoted, derided, and taunted Peel about the bill.45 
The attacks on the Bank, Wood, the government’s policy, Peel, and the 1844 
Bank Act took so many directions, and raised so many relevant and irrelevant problems, 
that by their very attack methods, they created an environment in which they could not 
win. Wood got his committee, diluted the criticism, and allowed public opinion to settle. 
The problem in all this is that by opening up the problem for debate, Wood opened the 
door for a great many direct and indirect attacks against Peel, recalling 1819 and the 
bullion report, and opening him up to a long list of complaints about complicated and 
unhelpful national policy, befouled international relations, lack of care and concern for 
the “other” banks, lack of control over the Bank of England, and a general 
misunderstanding of banking principles that was ruinous to the country. 
Gladstone listened and learned from this debate. He later told John Morley that 
no man should attempt to revamp the Bank Act and British banking in general unless he 
was a very strong chancellor in a very strong government, and was personally very 
popular with the country. 46 
Whether or not the Bank Act had caused the crisis of 1847, Gash says Russell’s 
government and Peel were tied together. From his speech on November 30, Wood 
made clear that the government was intent on protecting Peel. Peel was intent on 
protecting the government. But Peel was the captive. Wood’s budget of 1848 was a 
disaster. When the Chancellor got caught between Disraeli and Cobden, Peel defended 
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46Morley, Gladstone 1: 518-519. 
 179
Wood, the income tax, and the motion to reduce income tax to one-year renewals.47 
Gladstone was one of few men who actually understood the problem that Peel had 
taken upon himself, saying that of all the MPs, Peel was the one with the smallest 
amount of freedom in supporting the government.48 
 
Oak Farm, Hawarden, and John Gladstone 
In 1846 Gladstone took financial control of Oak Farm and the Hawarden Estate 
on behalf of his wife, his sister-in-law, and his mother-in-law. Oak Farm contained coal 
and iron mines. Oak Farm went bankrupt during the commercial crisis 1847. Sir 
Stephen Glynne, Catherine Gladstone’s brother, was not financially minded, and there 
is evidence that the mines had been mismanaged.49 Glynne had mortgaged the 
Hawarden estate to invest more money in the mines. When Gladstone married 
Catherine in 1839, Stephen had given a tenth share in the Oak Farm works to each of 
his two brothers-in-law (George Lyttelton married Catherine’s sister). Gladstone was 
already helping Stephen out of his money muddles. Problems had begun as early as 
1844, but the panic of 1847 left a burden of £250,000 and little income for Stephen to 
live on.50 At one point in 1848 Gladstone wrote that Stephen’s affairs were desperate 
but not hopeless.51 At another point in the spring, Gladstone was examined in 
bankruptcy court about the Oak Farm case.52 
                                            
47Gash, Peel: 631. 
48Gash, Peel: 640. 
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52Ibid., 17/5/48; see also The Times, 18 May, 1848, 7d. 
 180
Matthew has argued that Gladstone’s work on Oak farm soured him against the 
banks and has used this argument to explain Gladstone’s attacks on the Bank of 
England.53 I believe this argument cannot be sustained. Gladstone was proud of his 
ability to save the estate, move Oak Farm out of bankruptcy, and reestablish his 
brother-in-law with a reasonable income. It was exactly the kind of financial problem he 
would enjoy from time to time for the rest of his life. The Oak Farm and Hawarden 
troubles may have saved Gladstone from a chafing insanity of inaction and a stronger 
and perhaps damaging response to Sir Robert’s strange political behavior. The work 
Gladstone did to understand the “masses of accounts,” coils of “interests and parties,” 
and “legal intricacies”54 were sufficient, he wrote to his father “to disqualify me for my 
duties in the House of Commons.” However, in a letter to his wife, he showed just how 
valuable the Oak Farm had been in helping him through troubled times: 
 
Do not suppose for a moment that if I could by waving my hand strike out for ever 
from my cares and occupations those which relate to the Oak Farm and 
Stephen’s affairs I would do so… It has evidently come to me by the ordinance of 
God; and I am rather frightened to think how light my lot would be, were it 
removed …55 
Gladstone worked closely with his father to improve the finances of his wife’s 
family. From 1847 to 1852, Morley says Gladstone’s political life was in partial 
abeyance. Hawarden had fallen onto his shoulders—“my daily and continuing care, 
while parliamentary action was only occasional.”56 The turning point was the sale of 
£200,000 of Hawarden estate land. Gladstone, with his father’s backing, took two-thirds. 
His brother-in-law, George Lyttelton, took one third, with Lord Spencer as his financier. 
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Gladstone worked so hard on Oak Farm and the refinancing of Hawarden (closed in 
1847), that by 1852, just when he was about to catapult himself and some of his friends 
into a new, post-Peel government, Hawarden was reopened and Stephen’s allowance 
was “rather more than doubled.”57 
In addition to his five children, including a new baby, and his new role as Latin 
tutor to his oldest son, Gladstone filled in the year 1849 with the care of his father, 
whose health was deteriorating. The old man’s favorite theme was the disaster of free 
trade.58 Gladstone lamented that he could not use his vacation months in the production 
of some great work, but admitted that God had taken over the management of his time, 
and was putting it to His use. Victorian fathers are not known for their kind and tender 
regard to their wives and offspring, especially when the number of children began to 
climb and wives began to have “women’s troubles.” Nevertheless, Gladstone allowed 
himself to be dragged away from parliament or a great work and set to work in “a 
discipline though God only sees if it has done its work” of caring for his family and for 
his father.59  
This type of grounding was important to Gladstone. Between the work he did on 
Catherine’s family’s estate, and the patience with which he listened to his father, his 
learning in finance increased. It was not now just theoretical. The Oak Farm disaster 
was real and men’s jobs in the mines depended on Gladstone’s ability to save the mine. 
His father’s carping on free trade gave Gladstone time to think. In his thinking in this 
period, his father’s complaints had the opposite effect that the old man wished. When 
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Gladstone became Chancellor, he moved forward on parts of Peel’s initiatives that he 
believed needed completion. The fact that he was willing, night after night, to listen to 
his father on free trade, demonstrates a kindness and rationality that may have been 
more of a benefit to his sanity than all the cathedrals he could visit and all the china he 
could purchase. He admitted in January of 1840 that he had forgotten his wife’s birthday 
and chastised himself for it.60 
 
Gladstone in Opposition 
In the period 1846-1852, Gladstone was in opposition against two factions: the 
Peel faction and the Russell faction. He did not at first understand his opposition to 
Peel. He began to understand his opposition to Russell’s government early enough, 
when he took exception to Sir Charles Wood’s plan to borrow money for Irish famine 
relief. Gladstone had emerged from the Peel government with a good deal of 
experience: he had grown out of his idealistic shell of the thirties and had sometimes 
argued for compromising a position or remaining in office against great odds, even 
when others were in favor of withdrawal and resignation. Both he and Peel had used the 
term “personal honor” as if it had some overwhelming, inarguable meaning that should 
sway a government. He now understood the word “compromise” and its political 
applications . He had threatened to resign, had resigned, and had been taken back in 
good grace. He had been praised, and it was not idle or empty praise, for the good work 
he had done on the railroads, the tariffs and customs, and a dozen other projects. He 
had gained an almost inexhaustible repertoire of experience in colonial business and 
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exports. He had contributed to the national revenue. He was, in fact, a well trained if 
slightly eccentric man in search of another job. 
When Gladstone left office in 1846, his political career was still tied to that of 
Peel. No one could know that the great man would die four years later; there was a 
possibility that the Queen would summon him again to form a government, and Peel 
might say yes. Peel might also nominate a new “Peel” to lead the party—Graham or 
another of the elder generation steeped in the Peel tradition. If Peel would not accept 
one of these roles, then the Peelites themselves would be required to take over and 
lead the party. If that happened, why should not Gladstone have a leading hand in the 
effort. 
Gladstone had resigned his Newark seat on 1 January, 1846. When the 
government fell, Gladstone did not hold a seat to which he could return for re-election. 
He was forced to re-invent himself somewhere else. On June 30, perhaps to bolster his 
spirits, he made a list of the major speeches he had made from 1839 through 1845: on 
sugar, Corn Laws, the inevitable coal whippers, and commercial treaties.61 On July 9 of 
that year he wound up his affairs at the Colonial Office, saw Peel, delivered his seals to 
the Queen, and had dinner with George Hudson. Hudson praised Gladstone, and 
expressed the wish that the younger man could lead the government. This conversation 
shows Gladstone’s dilemma very well: 
 
He said I wish you had been in Parliament & out of the Government: then you 
would have been ready to lead us. I said, had I been in Parlt. & out of Govt. I 
must still have been more actively implicated in these measures than I now am: 
for from my former concern with such subjects I must have constantly engaged in 
debate & partaken of the feelings that attended them.62 
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In 1847 he was forced to find himself another parliamentary seat. His luck fell in 
with Oxford’s need for a man to represent the university. It was to be a slightly 
uncomfortable fit. Gladstone was to describe his personal adherence to Peel as having 
“opinions … more akin to those of the liberals” but cherishing “personal sympathies and 
lingering wishes which made them tardy, perhaps unduly tardy, in drawing toward that 
party.”63 He was elected for Oxford because of his personal sympathies and lingering 
wishes, not his opinions, and found himself returned to the floor of the House of 
Commons where he listened, and evaluated Peel almost as a stranger. Peel’s 
assistance to the Russell government, and to Sir Charles Wood, Russell’s Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, in particular, may have given Gladstone his first step on the ladder to 
the chancellorship and his first talking point when he entered the chancellorship. He 
opposed Sir Charles Wood’s 1847 plan to borrow £8,500,000 for Irish famine relief and 
to pay for it with a three and a half per cent loan. On 24 February he read the financial 
statement and debate on the budget: “I know nothing but I lament the loan: at least as to 
the permanent charge, we should pay our way.”64 
Gladstone began to vote his conscience and thus to vote on occasion against 
Peel in 1847. To the astonishment of his querulous father, most of his friends, and many 
of his new Oxford constituency, he favored removal of Jewish disabilities. Removal 
would allow Jews, notably Lionel Rothschild, who had been elected for the City of 
London, to sit in Parliament.65 The Church was indignant, but Morley argues that 
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Gladstone saw removal as the final emancipation, the third step in a chain that had 
given the franchise and the magistracy to Jews already. In that light, Morley believes 
Gladstone saw the state for what it was and for what it was going to be.66 Gladstone 
kept his own counsel, apparently, for which he was accused, as he would many times 
later, of unwarranted secrecy. Keeping his own counsel was essential to Gladstone in 
his ability to work his way through large questions carefully. Not knowing this, or 
knowing and deploring his secrecy, his father attacked him: 
 
I shall certainly read your speech to find some fair apology for your vote: a good 
and satisfactory reason I do not expect. I cannot doubt you thought you withheld 
your opinions from me under the undecided state you were in, without any 
intention whatever to annoy me. There is, however, a natural closeness in your 
disposition, with a reserve towards those who may think they may have some 
claim to your confidence, probably increased by official habits, which it may 
perhaps in some cases be worth your inquiring into.67 
One thinks immediately of Lady Catherine de Bourgh: “I am almost the nearest 
relation he has in the world, and am entitled to know all his dearest concerns.”68 But 
Gladstone’s father’s meaning is more sinister: suggesting a personal character flaw, or, 
in the twentieth century, a psychological fault, which might require prayer and possibly 
of a doctor’s attendance. It was, of course, the flaw of over-possessiveness, the 
behavior of what we would now call a “control freak,” in the father, not the secretiveness 
of the son that was at fault. Early in Gladstone’s married life, he made an agreement 
with Catherine that he would either tell her nothing about his political life or tell her 
everything. When she chose everything, he stipulated the only quid pro quo would be 
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that she share nothing.69 He needed a sounding board and burden-sharer, and his 
experience of his father was that the elder Gladstone would do nothing but criticize and 
demand. The younger Gladstone’s ability to share with his wife the problems he faced 
and the torturous decisions he sometimes reached was probably the best antidote he 
could have had for his over-controlling father.70 If there was secrecy in government, 
Gladstone was not the first either to use it, or to suffer from it. In any event, Gladstone 
voted for in favor of “the Jew Bill” on its third reading in May 1848 “with a very clear 
conscience.”71 
Gladstone’s father was not done. Perhaps in a last-ditch effort to separate his 
son from free trade, the already ill man recommended that his son withdraw his loyalty 
from Peel. Gladstone admitted his sorrow “that the present course of events tends to 
separate and disorganize the small troop of the late government and their adherents.” 
Further, Gladstone told his father that he had voted against Peel on the West Indian 
question in 1848, and on Lower Canada. “However painful, then, it may be to me to 
differ from him, it is plain that my conduct is not placed in his hands to govern.”72 He 
later wrote to his wife: 
 
I cannot form to myself any other conception of my duty in parliament except the 
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simple one of acting independently, without faction, and without subserviency, on 
all questions as they arise. To the formation of a party, or even of the nucleus of 
a party, there are in my circumstances many obstacles. I have been talking over 
these matters with Manning … and I found him to be of the opinion which is 
deliberately mine, namely, that it is better that I should not be the head or leader 
even of my own contemporaries; that there are others of them whose position is 
less embarrassed, and more favourable and powerful.73  
Gladstone was, more than once, tempted to withdraw. But he conceived himself 
as a politician and parliament as his place of profession. His famous “the way to make 
parliament profitable” quote was embellished by adding it could hardly be advantageous 
to withdraw for years with the uncertainty of resumption.74 His letter to his wife is 
confirmed by Morley in his comment that in 1850 Gladstone had not yet gained the 
parliamentary authority to take a leading role. 
 But the beast was stirring. His first speech on foreign policy (Don Pacifico) 
identified him as a man capable of debate on problems of European politics and 
territorial borders.75 So far was the beast stirring that Gladstone disagreed with Peel 
about keeping the protectionists out of office.76 Like others, he felt that letting the 
protectionists have the government would show their true character to British voters and 
perhaps put an end to the protectionist wing of the conservative party. Gladstone 
shrugged off a plan for him to take leadership of the conservative party: 
 
People feel, I suppose, that Sir Robert Peel’s life and continuance in parliament 
were of themselves powerful obstacles to the general reorganisation of the 
conservative party, and as there is great annoyance and dissatisfaction with the 
present state of things, and a widely spread feeling that it is not conducive to the 
public interests, there arises in men’s minds an expectation that the party will be 
in some way reconstituted. I share in the feeling that it is desirable; but I see very 
great difficulties in the way, and do not at present see how they are to be 
overcome.77  
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This is a very fine example of a man-at-the-crossroads speech. Gladstone does 
not show us a man in despair, nor a man who was angry. He shows us a calm and 
analytical man. His former mentor has become a powerful obstacle to achievement of 
one of his own original goals—party reorganization. 
Parallel with his concerns about the possible damage Peel had done to the party, 
Gladstone recorded the debate on the 1844 Bank Charter that took place in February, 
1848, in the aftermath of the 1847 crisis. This crisis was critical and personal to 
Gladstone because Oak Farm had failed and his brother-in-law was nearly penniless, 
while the Hawarden estate was in jeopardy.78 Further, Gladstone was becoming 
intensely concerned about the government’s budget. On 24 January he had written to 
the secretary of the National Debt Office, Samuel Higham.79 On 21 February he tried to 
examine revenue papers, but was distracted by Oak Farm business. On 25 February he 
recorded a meeting that included Goulburn and Cardwell, at Peel’s house, for 
discussion of the budget and income tax. In this budget, expenditures exceeded 
revenue. Expenditures included Ireland, at £1,525,000; the Kaffir (Caffre) War, at 
£1,100,000; and an additional £245,000 for the Navy. Peel announced that had he been 
responsible, he would have borrowed money and would have renewed the income tax 
at three per cent, pledging the government to reduce the expenditure. Peel thought the 
country could abide an addition of one penny to the postage, raising it to two. This 
meeting was followed by a session at the House of Commons on the budget. 80 On the 
26th Gladstone worked on revenue and trade tables.81 On the 29th, Gladstone talked to 
                                            
78Gladstone, Diaries 4:17/2/48; also see Hansard’s xcvi: 803. 
79Ibid., 24/1/48. 
80Ibid., 25/2/48; also see Hansard’s xcvi, 1334. 
81Ibid., 26/2/48; also see “Tables of the Revenue, Population and Commerce of the United 
Kingdom … 1846,” Parliamentary Paper 1847-8 lxii, 1:131. 
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both Graham and Goulburn, noting that Graham agreed with him about the penny 
postage, and considered it a great mistake that the government did not introduce it. 
These notes suggest that by February 1848, Peel was heavily embroiled in his 
double game, trying to bring his followers around to support for the Wood budget with its 
loans in support of wars and Ireland while separating them from their own best interests 
and beliefs. Gladstone’s apparent first reference to the deficiency bills, those forced 
loans from the Bank of England to the government made on a quarterly basis, appears 
in February 1848. 
Between 1848 and 1850, Gladstone still spoke at Peel’s request, as on 10 
March, 1848, when Peel asked Gladstone to follow Disraeli in debate. Speaking after 
midnight, a precursor of the 1852 budget debate in which Gladstone unseated Disraeli, 
he spoke for an hour and a quarter, destroying many of Disraeli’s assumptions and 
conclusions, but given the hour and the mood of the House of Commons “had to throw 
over the chief part of my cargo of figures”—that is, he had to abandon many of his 
prepared remarks. Gladstone noted in his Diary that Peel was gratified.82 But Gladstone 
and other Peelites were no longer willing to follow Peel implicitly. The June 1848 vote 
on sugar duties split the Peelites: Gladstone, Cardwell, and Herbert voted with the 
opposition. Peel and Graham voted with the Russell government. From then on, the 
former ministers and their leader appear to have dealt with each new situation as it 
appeared. 
 
                                            
82Gladstone, Diaries 4: 10/3/48. 
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Preparation for Office 
The year 1850 seems to have been the turning point for Gladstone. The death of 
Sir Robert Peel in that year left the Peelites with a residual loyalty to each other; this 
loyalty made itself apparent in finance. Many Peelite meetings after Peel’s death 
centered on Russell and Derby government finance. On 15 May, 1851, Gladstone 
recorded a meeting at Cardwell’s house where the Peelites decided to stay out of the 
parliamentary committee then being formed on the income tax.83 On the 24th he met 
with Lord Aberdeen and Sydney Herbert on finance.84 He was also working on his own 
on the government’s finances, such as army and navy estimates85 and the hop duties.86 
On 22 April, the Peelites debated a resolution to repeal paper duties, a problem 
Gladstone would solve several years later.87 On 30 April, he spoke on the budget.88 
These cautious maneuvers, seen against the backdrop of a weak Derby government, 
suggest that Gladstone knew which way the wind would blow next, and prepared for it. 
In 1851 and 1852 he had read, marked, and inwardly digested. 
On 4 October 1851, Edward Cardwell delivered to him a completed manuscript of 
“Sir R. Peel’s Memoirs on Emancipation & Corn Law Repeal.” He read from seven in 
the evening until five the next morning. “They were deeply interesting: & infinitely 
suggestive” but of what, Gladstone is not clear.89 Gladstone’s memorandum of the 4th 
says only that he continued to believe that he and Wellington had been correct in 





87Ibid., 22/4/52; Hansard’s cxxi:983. 
88Ibid., 30/4/52; Hansard’s cxxi:51. 
89Sir Robert Peel, Memoirs, Edward Cardwell, Lord Mahon, Eds. (MS version, published in 1856); 
in Gladstone, Diaries 4: 4/10/51. This is one volume of the Peel letters and memoranda. Gladstone was 
attempting to get to the bottom of what Sir Robert was doing in some of his more abstruse political 
maneuvers. 
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arguing that Peel should not have resigned. Gladstone also acknowledged, however, 
that Peel was probably very tired.90 
Not all the conversations were financial. While Gladstone felt he was solidly 
placed in reference to the financial problems of the country, he saw his political ground 
slipping away. On 25 February, when the Derby government was beginning its short 
term in office, Gladstone made a round of the old reliables: Aberdeen, Graham, and 
Newcastle. Aberdeen spoke kindly of Derby, seeing him as “friendly to a liberal policy.” 
Sir James Graham thought he might join Sir John Russell and “the liberal party as 
such.” 
 
Sir James Graham said the question of Free Trade would be lost in that of 
Reform & the Constitution: for the people, if their bread were taxed afresh, would 
lay the blame on the present constituency & demand new institutions.91 
In a chance encounter with Lord Hardinge, a former Peelite, Gladstone learned 
that the lord had taken the title of Master of Ordnance as a military office under Derby’s 
government, and that the Duke of Wellington (an earnest supporter of Peel) had 
approved. This move of Peelites toward Derby seemed to Gladstone a clear indication 
that his own political ground was shaky. Gladstone’s reserve of conservative thinking 
made him wish for a quiet and graceful way to return to the conservative party. With 
defections like Lord Hardinge’s move to the Derby government, however, Gladstone 
saw that he must soon make an effort to remain a conservative, or take the road which 
his inclinations set before him, a move to the liberal party. In any case, his days as a 
Peelite were numbered. He needed to seek an office if he was to offer himself for office 
in any new government.  
                                            
90Ibid., 3/10/51. 
91Ibid., 25/2/52, and political memorandum, 399. 
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To Gladstone’s preparation for office, it is imperative to add his membership on 
the select committee on the Constitution and Management of the Board of Customs in 
1852 where he continued his independent defense of free trade. The Peelites still 
worried about free trade. With Derby in office, the worry increased, because now the 
government under Derby might introduce a motion to return to protection on a broad 
scale and put an end to some of Peel’s program. On the same day that Gladstone 
recorded a two-and-a-half hour meeting of that committee, Sir James Graham told him 
that Lord Russell had urged Mr. Gladstone and others to act together to save free 
trade.92 Another meeting on 31 March brought Aberdeen, Newcastle, Goulburn, and 
Gladstone together. Newcastle reiterated their need to stick together and “do nothing to 
mark their separation [from Graham].”93 
The prelude to the budget crisis that brought down the Derby government 
appears in a motion prompted by Lord Aberdeen’s encouragement, to force the 
government into stating what they intended to do about free trade.94 The free trade 
problem resolved itself because the conservatives were no longer interested in killing 
free trade; they found free trade more profitable than protection. For the time being the 
Peelites and the conservatives were one. On 27 November Gladstone attended a party 
                                            
92Ibid., 12/3/52. In the memorandum that accompanies the Diary entry, Gladstone wrote that Sir 
James Graham had hoped that Derby “would take a manly & explicit course & bring the question of Free 
Trade to issue with all reasonable dispatch.” 
93Ibid., 26/3/52, 31/3/52. “Apart from the witcheries, Graham was ready to take his place in the 
Liberal ranks ….” Gladstone identified four flavors for Peelites at this point: first, Graham, who had sided 
so strongly with Peel in the face of Peelite opposition to Peel’s maneuverings during the Russell 
administration; second Cardwell, Fitzroy, and Oswald, whom Gladstone thought would follow Graham; 
third, the great bulk of the men, “more or less undisguisedly anticipating junction with Lord Derby and 
avowing that Free Trade is their only point of difference”; and fourth, Gladstone himself with Lord 
Aberdeen and Sidney Herbert. But the comment about marking their separation from Graham is 
suggestive of something slightly more difficult: during Peel’s years of support for the Russell party and 
government, Graham  was Peel’s only staunch supporter, following him closely and never voting against 
Peel during the Russell government’s service. The remaining Peelites had felt somewhat estranged from 
Graham, and were now anxious to regain their former friendship and solidarity. 
94Ibid., 11/11/52. 
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at Lady Derby’s where her noble husband took Gladstone aside and thanked him for the 
level tone of his speech during the free trade debate. Derby said his great object was to 
collect men of similar views on the government and organize them to get things done. 
Gladstone responded that he spoke for Herbert, Goulburn and others, that their 
opinions had not changed since spring, and that the next thing they expected to see 
was the budget as an indication of the government’s intentions.95 And thus the Peelites 
sat outside the government, secure that they had managed to protect free trade, or at 
least to outlive the conservative urge to return to protection, and secure that they could 
still bring pressure on a government whenever they needed to. 
If one pauses to consider the question of Gladstone’s madness or perspicuity in 
political matters at this time, his understanding of politics, his standing with politicians, 
his intelligence, and his ability to act in a conciliatory manner must be admitted. He was 
taking his own course. He was reading steadily on taxation and revenue. He now 
acknowledged Aberdeen as his leader. He was still surrounded by Peelites who could 
and would pressure any government with which they did not share complete 
confidence. Gladstone was not alone, and he sat out because his primary friends and 
colleagues sat out. The tense months in which the Peelites waited for Derby to declare 
his government’s position on free trade may have been the very months in which 
Gladstone finally saw his way clear as to his political direction. 
He believed in free trade. He owed a great debt to Sir Robert for Peel’s support 
of Gladstone in government. He believed in, fought for, and still paced restlessly around 
                                            
95Ibid., Diaries 4: 2/11/52. Gladstone was being boxed in. Much as he might wish to return to the 
conservative party, much as he shied away from the crisis Peel had caused in the old conservative party 
over free trade, he could not join with other men to get things done unless one of the things left undone 
was destruction of free trade. 
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the battlements waiting for the conservative attack on free trade. Although he still failed 
to see what Peel had accomplished in destroying the old conservative party through his 
battle for free trade, further aid to Ireland, and other issues, what Gladstone now saw 
was a clear distinction: Peel had been in may ways either a new conservative or a 
budding liberal. Derby had another problem: he was trying to rebuild a party that Peel 
had destroyed. This was not an enviable position. Nor, did he have the right men to do 
the job. This is why he talked to Gladstone about finding men to do great things. This is 
why he wanted Gladstone. The problem for Gladstone, vis-à-vis Derby, is that without a 
full Derby agenda, Gladstone might find among the great things he might accomplish 
the destruction of free trade. 
Gladstone still wanted office, but office was not a benefit to be conferred by a 
superior. It was his right. One wonders why the Prince Consort had to steer Aberdeen 
toward Gladstone as chancellor, unless Aberdeen was afraid of Gladstone and his 
forthright manner. Derby and Palmerston had both wanted Gladstone in their 
government. The favor bestowed in by Lord Derby of addressing Gladstone publicly at a 
Derby party must have been noticed. The conservatives were courting Gladstone. 
Disraeli conceded that he agreed with the Peelites on free trade. One element of Peel’s 
legacy was safely reserved. Meanwhile, in demanding from Derby a budget that the 
Peelites could use to judge the government, Gladstone unfailingly put his finger on both 
the weakness of Derby’s government, and his own most precious ability to serve a 
government—finance. On 26 November he spoke to Lord Aberdeen about what he 
called “ministerial contingencies.”96 




In October, 1849, Gladstone took a twenty mile drive in Lord Aberdeen’s pony 
cart while they discussed Peel. Gladstone again spelled out his belief that Peel was in a 
false position—“false and in the abstract almost immoral.” “In this Lord A. agreed,” citing 
a case in which the government had lost a motion on foreign policy because of the 
scandalous manner by which the bill was introduced, and suggesting treachery to those 
who listened.97 To critics, this continual carping on Peel’s position and its falsehood 
might sound as if Gladstone was attempting character assassination, trying to overthrow 
a government, or trying to create a government of his own. In fact, he and other Peelites 
were defending their own reason and reputations. Gladstone’s comments in this case 
were addressed to another Peelite, Aberdeen, whose age and wisdom Gladstone 
respected. Gladstone still relied on the older men to guide him, and to act as his friends. 
He was not a fool. He was a man of considerable penetration, one who was aware of 
shifts in public opinion and purpose, and a man so unset in his ways he could respond 
to each new political and social reality as it presented himself. This chapter has shown 
that he was a man whose previous mentor had done him a lot of good, but had also 
demonstrated a great many false and dangerous positions and actions. 
Gladstone was still reporting dutifully to his father, but, perhaps tired of the 
continued harangue and also conscious of the older man’s failing faculties, Gladstone 
was not anxious to enter into time-consuming and irritating debates with the older man. 
The encounters with his father may have increased Gladstone’s reluctance to tangle 
                                            
97Ibid., 19/10/49. The referenced bill is in Hansard’s, cvii:616 (20 July, 1849). 
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with Peel over matters in which the Peelites had no direct power to intervene, and were 
led by a man who refused to do so. 
 
It is a very singular effect in two ways for first on account of his eminence he has 
lost the privilege which even much meaner men think essential to their position 
that of judging & voting freely; & the Govt. gains the benefit of this on account of 
its weakness since if it were strong enough to hold its own way the restraint 
would cease to operate.98  
And so we find Gladstone still finding his own way, not yet sure of the positive 
direction but far more sure than he ever had been of the negative directions he wished 
to avoid. He wanted any government in which he served to be honest, forthright, devoid 
of parliamentary manipulation, and predictable. He had not yet invoked the people in his 
thinking, but he would soon see that if his government was to be honest, it was the 
people it had to be honest to. 
 
Gladstone’s Reading 
This chapter had examined Gladstone’s life as a post-cabinet Peelite. He came 
down from office admiring and following Peel, but he soon learned to distrust Peel, 
refusing to help save the Russell government to protect free trade in the way that Peel 
decreed. When one encounters Gladstone’s adventures in adult education, and his 
phenomenal habits of buying books even when fully engaged on a mission of mercy, 
one might expect that the books he was reading had something to do with his behavior. 
First, his reading of The Diaries of Samuel Pepys, 5 Vols. (1828 edition) may 
have given him a beneficial model of the useful civil and government servant.99 Pepys 
                                            
98Ibid., 6/3/49, n.3,4, but dated 15 March, 1849; see also Add MS 44777, f.283. Gladstone wrote 
this memorandum on the same day Peel, Graham, and Cardwell voted with the government on the Irish 
poor law and Gladstone, Goulburn, Lincoln, and Herbert voted against it: Hansard’s ciii:314. 
99Ibid., 25/6/49. He returned to Pepys on 6/4/78. 
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worked hard to become a successful secretary of the navy, and his self education was 
prodigious: beginning with the multiplication table, he learned ropes and cables, the 
parts of a ship, and the ways that ships were built. He talked to seamen, ship-builders, 
and owners of the rope-walks. He read the histories of various battles. He kept his 
accounts in such good order that not even Parliamentary audits could catch him out. 
Like Gladstone, Pepys eventually overhauled an important branch of the government to 
make it more efficient. Pepys is fondly remembered by those who followed him in the 
Navy.100 
The largest portion of Gladstone’s financial reading during the period 1846-1852 
was on taxation. The approach taken by each author refers us to the eternal question, 
whose ox is being gored by each form of taxation? One of his most useful studies may 
have been Sir John Sinclair’s The History of the Public Revenue of the British Empire, 
1784-1790. 3 Vols. (apparently the first volume only, 1784).101 Other documents pitted 
land tax against income tax, direct taxes against indirect taxes, and cheap sugar against 
highly taxed sugar. Gladstone appears to have begun a study of national statistics in the 
proceedings of the Statistical Society of London, later the Royal Statistical Society.102 
Mid-Victorian statistics were not yet sophisticated, although statisticians were beginning 
to use more complex formulae in attempts to describe various phenomena. The 
government’s statistical reports were farther behind, relying primarily on narrative 
accounts of births, deaths, weddings, food production, rail and canal lines and other 
                                            
100Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (New 
York: Harper, 2004), 182-207, contain the chapter, “Mr. Peyps’s Navy.” 
101Gladstone, Diaries 4: 2/12/52. 
102Ibid., 3/4/52, when he first recorded an interest in the Royal Statistical Society. Also see 
Gladstone, Diaries 6:18/2/68, the entry that records his presidency of the 1868-9 season. For the history 
of the statistical societies, Royal and London, see Victor L. Hilts, “Aliis exterendum, or, the Origins of the 
Statistical Society of London,” Isis 69, no. 1 (March 1978), 21-43. 
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information. Gladstone continued his reading of statistical proceedings and occasionally 
attended meetings. 
Reading competed with his time as a friend, husband, father, son, politician, man 
of religion, savior of coal heavers, investor in railroads, and man of all seasons. 
Nevertheless, a close study of Gladstone’s reading suggests that books gave him an 
anchor and sense of centrality for his other activities. On at least forty-nine occasions 
between 1847 and 1866, he read or at least dipped into a book on banking, the Bank of 
England, currency, currency issue, gold, or the commercial crisis. Table 5 shows his 
reading during this period, organized by topic. 
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Table 5: Gladstone’s Reading, 1846-1852 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Trade Anonymous Abolition of the Navigation Laws (npd) 25 Mar 1847 
Trade George Frederick Young Free Trade and the Navigation Laws (npd) 5 Mar 1849 
Trade Charles Newdigate 
A Letter to the Right Hon. H. Labouchere on the Balance of Trade … During 
the Last Four Years (1849)b 24 Mar 1849 
Trade William Wolryche Whitmore Plain Thoughts on Free Trade (1849) 17 Dec 1849 
Trade Anonymous Finance and Trade of the United Kingdom (1852) 11 Feb 1852 
Trade W. S. Lindsay Letters on the Navigation Laws Reprinted from the Morning Herald (1849) 27 Feb 1852 
Accounting 
and Trade 
Trade F. C. Free Trade: Its Moral, Commercial, Agricultural, and Social Results … by FC (1852) 24 Sept 1852 
Bank of England and the 
1844 Bank Act John Francis History of the Bank of England, its Times and Traditions (2 vols.) 
19/11/47 
12/5/48 
Banking George Taylor Treatise on the Joint Stock Act of 1847 12 Oct 1847 
Banking Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton Financial and Commercial Crisis Considered 24 May 1847 
Currency Benjamin Sharp Plan for the Extension of the Currency 26 Nov 1847 




Currency Charles Enderby Our Money Laws the Cause of National Distress (1847) 29 Nov 1847 
Finance Henry Goulburn Financial Statement … (1846) 4 Jul 1846 
Finance David Mure The Financial Policy of Pitt and Peel (1847) 19 Jun 1847 
Finance Arthur Young An Enquiry into the Legality and Expedience of Increasing the Royal Navy by Subscriptions for Building County Ships (1783) 12 Apr 1848 
Finance Samuel Pepys The Diary of Samuel Pepys, 5 Vols. (1828) 25 Jun 1849 
Finance North British Review, Edward Cardwell Finance 10 (1848) 9 Nov 1852 
Taxation Anonymous An Argument in Defense of the Exclusive Rights Claimed by the Colonies to Tax Themselves (1774) 10 Feb 1846 
Taxation Blackwoods Edinburgh Review Taxation 61 (1847) 16 Feb 1847 
Taxation W. B. The Comparative Merits of Direct and Indirect Taxation (1846) 20 Mar 1847 
Taxation Matthew Higgins (Jacob Omnium) Cheap Sugar … First Letter (1847) 6 Nov 1848 
Taxation Matthew Higgins (Jacob Omnium) Cheap Sugar … Third Letter (1848) 6 Nov 1848 








Taxation Anonymous Property Tax Versus Income Tax, in a Letter to the Representatives of the United Kingdom (1848) 6 Mar 1848 
   (table continues) 
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Table 5 (continued). 
 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Taxation John Ramsay MacCulloch “A Treatise on the Succession to Property Vacated by Death” (1848) 7 Mar 1848 
Taxation Publius Thoughts on Finance and the Colonies (1846) 28 Apr 1848 
Taxation John Scott Letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on his Proposed Sale of the Land Tax (1798)d 12 Jun 1848 
Taxation John Scott Letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on his Proposed Sale of the Land Tax (1798) 12 Jun 1848 
Taxation Alexander Gibbon Taxation: Its Nature and Properties. With Remarks on the Incidence and the Expediency of the Repeal of the Income Tax (1851) 1 Jan 1851 
Taxation Laurence Heyworth On Economic Fiscal Legislation (1845)e 7 Jun 1851 
Taxation John Gellibrand Hubbard How Should Income Tax be Levied? Considered in a Letter to … D’Israeli (1852) 12 Nov 1852 
Taxation William Pitt the Younger The Speeches of … William Pitt in the House of Commons, 4 vols. (1806)f 15 Jun 1832 15 Mar 1852 
Taxation PP 1852 ix. 1: 463 First and Second Parts of the Select Committee Report on Income and Property Tax (1852) 25 Nov 1852 
Taxation Sir John Sinclair The History of Public Revenue of the British Empire, 3 Vols. (1784-1790) 2 Dec 1852 




Taxation John Gellibrand Hubbard Reform or Reject the Income Tax. Objections to a Reform of the Income Tax Considered, in Two Letters to the Times (1853) 30 Dec 1852 
Richard Whately Introductory Lectures in Political Economy (1843) 19/1/48 
Frederick Hill National Force. Economical Defence of the Country from Internal Tumult and Foreign Aggression (1848) 6/3/48 Political Economy 
W. Ellis Outlines of Social Economy (1846) 16/3/47 
Cost of War War Finance Josiah Tucker Cui Bono? What Benefits can Arise from the War? (1781) 10 May 1849 
Notes: 
aAll date references are to Volume 3 of the Diaries. Within a Topic, the publications are listed in the order in which Gladstone recorded reading 
them (right-hand column). 
bLabouchere was then president of the Board of Trade.  
cProbably that of 1845, Hansard’s, 3 lxxvii, 573. 
dMarked “probably.” 
eMarked “probably.” 






FIRST CHANCELLORSHIP, 1852-1855 
Introduction 
In 1854, Great Britain entered its first major war since the end of the Napoleonic 
war. The importance of this war has received due notice from historians. Less well 
understood were the attempts of Gladstone and his successor, Sir George Cornewall 
Lewis to finance the landing and subsequent battles, the prolonged siege of Sebastopol, 
and the drawn-out conclusion of hostilities. Gladstone got his fingers burned over 
finance, being driven away from his public stance that taxes, not loans should pay for 
the war, and being made aware that governments must pay fairly for the money they 
borrow. To his everlasting credit, this is the period in which Gladstone not only accepted 
a major cabinet position but redefined it, rewriting a portion of the British Constitution 
along the way, and beginning the work of redefining the Treasury for the next half 
century. 
The Bright Hope 
This chapter examines Gladstone’s first and periods of service as office of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, from December 1852 to February 1855. These were his 
appointment in Lord Aberdeen’s first and only government, and his three-week 
membership in the first Palmerston government. It should have been a successful run in 
office. Gladstone had read and thought about the government’s responsibilities to the 
people, and theirs to the government. His bookcases bulged with works on taxation and 
finance. He was also in close communication with the men leading the effort toward 
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government reform. Stafford Henry Northcote had been Gladstone’s private secretary. 
In 1853, as one of his first acts in office, Gladstone signed the order that launched the 
Northcote-Trevelyan research and report on reform of government civil service. He won 
his first two battles with the Bank of England. Gladstone was set for glory. But when war 
erupted in the Crimea, Gladstone’s was forced to pit his partisanship against his penury. 
While he preached taxes, he practiced borrowing, not always successfully. He hated 
war, but he was forced by his alliance with the Peelites that formed the 1852-1855 
government and by the determination of the British people to fight the war, to support it, 
and then study war for the rest of the period of this thesis. 
Three items are of interest to this thesis from this period: The first is the body of 
political and economic philosophy embodied in the Gladstone’s first three budgets with 
his intention of refinancing the national debt and using taxes to pay for the war. The 
second is his relationship to the Crimean War as a source of failure on his part. The 
third is his effort to redefine the government’s relationship to the Bank of England. He 
later wrote: 
 
The expenses of a war are the moral check which it has pleased the Almighty to 
impose upon the ambition and lust of conquest, that are inherent in so many 
nations… The necessity of meeting from year to year the expenditure which it 
entails is a salutary and wholesome check, making them feel what they are 
about, and making them measure the cost of the benefit upon which they may 
calculate.1 
This is an important combination of interests. Britain was regularly fighting small 
tactical engagements in its colonies and in China. But no British government had fought 
a strategic war since Waterloo. Crimea was to be a strategic war, not a tactical skirmish. 
Britain’s standing army was small compared to continental armies, and Crimea was to 
                                                 
1Gladstone, undated fragment, in Morley, Gladstone 1:513. 
 
 203 
show that French artillery, manpower numbers and training, ordnance, supply chains, 
and medical support all were far superior to those of Britain. In addition, Britain’s navy 
had experimented with iron cladding and steam engines, but the Navy was by no means 
converted to the then modern standards of iron cladding. When the Aberdeen 
government was forced into a war that Britain felt it must win, it committed itself and 
future governments to a long-term problem that would not be solved until well after 
1900—to create a standing army and staff, and to enable training for all ranks, 
especially in tactical maneuvering, signaling, and command decision-taking. All this 
would have cost a great deal of money, money that had not been included in the 
budgets of the previous forty years. 
As late as 1997, Gladstone has been described as “notoriously niggardly and 
cautious in matters of public finance.” 2 The problem with calling him niggardly is that it 
creates a context for the word cautious. Caution is generally accepted as a good thing 
in budgets and in budget planners. Having been in parliament for twenty years, 
Gladstone was aware of the importance of caution: that a poor harvest or a sagging 
economy could ruin a Chancellor of the Exchequer’s expectations for revenue. In 
addition, little wars in the colonies continued to flare up. China was particularly sensitive 
because in China Britain confronted her major European neighbors and the United 
States. While they all acted as allies in China, they must always have been sizing each 
other up in case war erupted in Europe or North America.  
The 1853 Gladstone budget contained expenditures for the small colonial wars 
as well as the standard fare of government responsibilities. This budget has been 
                                                 
2David Newsome, The Victorian World Picture: Perceptions and Introspections in an Age of 
Change (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 38. 
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documented, in its entirety, in terms of its overall concept and its massive reorganization 
of taxes, customs, and excise revenues. Our interest is directed to the ease with which 
Gladstone presented his budgets and had them accepted. Gladstone’s budgets were 
received in 1853 and 1854 (a stop-gap budget and a war budget) almost without 
criticism. The commercial crisis of 1847 had opened the floodgates for criticism about 
government policy, banking law, and the behavior of the Bank of England operating 
under a new Bank Charter that Peel had promulgated. By contrast, Gladstone appears 
to have carried no negative political baggage, and was generally well received. 
Held back until Peel’s death, Gladstone emerged into a Peelite administration, 
still slightly timorous (he asked Aberdeen what his powers as Chancellor were) but 
among friends. His knowledge of government operations increased; his beliefs in 
parsimony, paying off the national debt, and peace if possible were intact; and his need 
for secrecy in financial matters was left unshattered by the presentation of his first 
budget to the full cabinet. This last item requires discussion. Gladstone was later to 
instruct the young chancellors who served in his governments never to let their 
colleagues into the secrets of the budget until the plan was complete and formally 
presented to the full cabinet. His father had blamed him for his secretive behavior over 
the vote on Jewish Disabilities. In developing and presenting the budget of 1853, 
Gladstone was to have his own strictures on secrecy enforced. If he trusted his 
colleagues with part of the budget or partial reasoning on a key point, they could, all too 
easily, misunderstand details, and start a panic. Gladstone’s what-they-don’t-know-they-
can’t-start-a-fight-over rule shows that while he might have the numbers safely stowed 
in his mind, he wished to have the budget reviewed first in its entirety only when he 
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could defend it in its entirety. Therefore, he reasoned that the Chancellor’s responsibility 
was to keep the secret as long as possible, and to present the clearest possible picture 
of the entire budget to the cabinet before letting them have their voices. 
When he entered office, however, he entered with a good deal of energy. At the 
beginning of 1853, Gladstone was reading voraciously (including a book on wine 
duties), writing to at least one Italian economist, reading poetry, and managing walks by 
himself and with Catherine. On February 26, he read R. Hamilton’s Inquiry concerning 
the Rise and Progress, Redemption … and the Management of the National Debt 
(1813), an attack on Vansittart and his use of a sinking fund.3 In addition, he was 
meeting with and writing to large numbers of clergy, who may have been petitioning for 
preferment from the new and very church-minded Chancellor of the Exchequer, and 
fielding other requests for pensions and positions.4 
 
Deputations, Princes, and Governmental Contacts 
Gladstone learned from nearly everyone he met or corresponded with. A review 
of the Diary for Gladstone’s first chancellorship brings to mind the image of a duck, 
serenely floating on the surface and paddling like mad underneath. To those who 
celebrate the success of Gladstone’s budget speech of 1853, the record in the Diary 
may be of secondary value, but the fact remains that every day of his chancellorship, 
Gladstone created and benefited from a whirlwind of meetings, letters, memoranda, 
speeches, deputations, House of Commons appearances, and conversations. Nor 
should we forget the previous twenty years, when an MP growing from novice to 
                                                 
3Gladstone, Diaries 4:26/2/53. 
4Ibid., 4:20/2/53. He was beginning to feel the broad range of his responsibilities. 
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accomplished politico sifted his way down through endless layers of economic minutiae 
to get to the bottom of dozens of financial problems, and each time emerged with a 
better understanding about how Great Britain and its colonies were run. 
The following paragraphs describe the first two full months of 1853, a period 
when Gladstone was learning his job, preparing a budget, and moving into Downing 
Street. It is by no means extraordinary, except that it contains very little in the way of 
social contact, but does include his preparation for Lent: he believed that the press of 
work would make it imperative that he did not stint on food.5  
He had two or three conversations with the Prince consort, the man who had 
recommended him for the job, and at least one of which was on finance.6 He recorded 
deputations on products for which excise or duties were still being charged: chicory,7 
hops,8 coaches,9 post horses,10 malt spirits,11 and wine.12 The soap delegation was led 
by John Bright and Richard Cobden, the two radical reformers.13 To collect and verify 
the estimates he saw Sir James Graham “with his myrmidons on the Navy Estimates 
preparing for debate on the Navy estimates.”14 Gladstone saw Edward Cardwell at 
Home office on the Ordnance estimates as well.15 
To understand more about revenues, he met with “Mr. Reynolds,” joint solicitor to 
                                                 
5Ibid., 4:9/2/53. 
6Ibid., 4:1/2/53; 1/3/53; 4:16/2/53. 
7Ibid., 4:2/17/54. 
8Ibid., 4: 15/2/53, 4:2/17/53. 





14Ibid., 4:8/2/53; Hansard’s cxxiii: 997.For a discussion of the way the estimates were managed, 
see Sir Norman Chester, The English Administrative System, 1780-1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1981): 185-186, 194-197. 
15Gladstone, Diaries, 4: 9/2/53. 
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the Treasury from 1852, Charles Litchfield, senior treasury clerk, Charles Goulburn 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer in Peel’s last government), and William George Anderson 
(Mr. Anderson), assistant paymaster, all in February. He also wrote Edward Hall 
Anderson, Baron of the Exchequer on 18 February. 
The memoranda Gladstone wrote during his early months in office were 
numerous, and a review suggests the acted as aides de memoire in the preparation of 
his budget speech. On 4 January, Gladstone recorded correcting his paper on Income 
Tax again, suggesting that he had already worked on it more than once. He returned to 
it on the fifteenth of that month.16 On 1 February he reported conversations on income 
tax. On 2 February he wrote a minute on the estimates of gross revenue.17 Matthew 
looked for but failed to find an “untraced” memorandum following a meeting with Sir 
Charles Trevelyan on the consolidated annuities.18 His notes from a meeting on wine 
duties appear both in manuscript and in a report appeared in The Times.19 He recorded 
memoranda with the outline of a plan on Customs Duties;20 a visit from an 
advertisement duty deputation;21 and a two-and-a-half hour stint with Sir Charles 
Wood’s paper on income tax and other sources of revenue.22 In early March he took 
time from his budget plans to have a meeting with the National Debt Committee. “We 
changed the form of dealing with the Surplus.”23  
                                                 
16Ibid., 4:4/1/53, 4:15/1/53. 
17Ibid., 4:1/2/53, 2/2/53, n.10. On this date he wrote a minute on the estimates of gross revenue; 
Add MS 44636, n.10, f.1  
18Ibid., 4:3/3/53, n.5. 
19Ibid., 4:7/2/53; Add MS 44741: f.68; The Times, 8 February 1853, 4f. 
20Ibid., 4:11/3/53; Add MS 44741: f. 115. 
21Ibid., 4:12/3/53; Add MS 44741: f. 122.  
22Ibid., 4:12/3/53; Add MS 44572, f. 122 and 141. 
23Ibid., 4:4/3/53. This comment deserves to be investigated. 
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This brief account of the period from the first of January to early March suggests 
that the budget speech was no miracle, but the product of what others might see as a 
miracle, Gladstone’s relentless days and nights, his nearly endless meetings, 
composition of as many as twenty-three letters a day,24 and numerous memoranda. His 
work on the Income Tax and his prognostications that it could be discontinued in 1860 
have been noted, as has his inability to accomplish that goal. Less exciting, Gladstone 
put an end to a hundred-year-old public scandal by winding up the South Sea company 
(not without great cost to the government)—paying off, finally, those who had been 
swindled.25 One needs only to read the 1853 budget speech, all four hours of it, to see 
what the Gladstone whirlwind had planned for its first year in office. It may be safe to 
say that part of what rescued Gladstone from obscurity after the Crimea, and delivered 




Historians have taken Gladstone’s 1853 and 1854 budgets as the first indications 
of his ability to manage numbers. To a certain extent, they have followed the reasoning 
of learned people at the time, that Gladstone might have some little spark or 
understanding that others had not, and that Gladstone had taught them to think 
differently about government finance. Gladstone’s budgets were good, and only 
Jenkins, the former Chancellor of a twentieth-century Exchequer has been able to poke 
holes in them. Jenkins confirms the weaknesses that Gladstone himself found. Shannon 
                                                 
24Ibid., 4:15/3/53. 
25Ibid., 4:16/3/53; Gladstone wrote to the sub-governor of the South Sea Company. 
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and Crosby have excused Gladstone’s budgets from a general theme of madness 
strategies because his budgets do not fit the patterns these critics were attempting to 
establish. Nevertheless, the budgets brought Gladstone well into the public eye, and 
made him, for a time, a hero; for the long term they made him into a man with whom to 
be reckoned. Historians generally agree he was bringing new thinking to the budget and 
the budgetary process: 
 
In 1854 it was still agreed that the cardinal sin of the Younger Pitt and his 
immediate successors in financing the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was 
their vast expansion of the National Debt. For thirty years ‘the funding system’ 
had been a favourite target of a country convinced as never before that financial 
problems lay at the root of all the nation’s evils.26 
 
The 1853 Budget 
In 1853, Gladstone coveted only one cabinet position: Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. It is prudent, therefore, to ask about the constitution of this ancient office. 
The medieval Exchequer had been both a revenue collection agency and a court of 
law.27 Until 1787, the great reservoir of taxes, customs, excise, income from the 
sovereign’s lands, and other fees and dues, was called the Exchequer. The 
Exchequer’s entire function was to collect debts, punish and fine defaulters, make the 
money available to the government and king to spend and try those who failed to pay 
their obligations. The Act of 1787 separated the office from the fund. Under this act, the 
moneys collected by the great revenue departments (Inland Revenue, Customs and 
Excise, Post Office, and others) became the Consolidated Fund. When Gladstone came 
                                                 
26Olive Anderson, A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics During the Crimean 
War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), 190. 
27Its court of law survived until 1880 dealing with tax cases. 
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to office, his rights as chancellor depended partially on the ancient role of the 
Exchequer, and increasingly on the rising nineteenth-century demand for stable 
financial governance. The role of the Chancellor of the Exchequer had originally been to 
ensure the safety of the revenues collected by the nation’s tax collectors and make it 
available to the king to spend. Gladstone had taught himself that as chancellor he was 
responsible for much more, namely, the entire financial health of the government and of 
the country.28  
Gladstone wrote three budgets as chancellor in this period: a regular 1853 
budget, a preliminary 1854 budget, and the 1854 war budget. His job was not easy, as 
Morley has written: 
 
[Whig finance] not only bewildered parliament, but had filled merchants, bankers, 
ship owners, manufacturers, shopkeepers, and the whole array of general 
taxpayers with perplexity and dismay. Peel recovered a financial equilibrium …, 
but Peel was gone. The Whigs who followed him after 1846 had once more 
laboured under an unlucky star … They performed the unexampled feat of 
bringing forward four budgets in a single year … By 1851, floundering had 
reached a climax. Finance had thus discredited one historical party; it had broken 
up the other. It was finance that overthrew weak governments and hindered the 
possibility of a strong one. 
Morley argues that the finance of the United Kingdom was so complex that it 
required a man with “powers of a different order” than that of earlier chancellors—that 
the position required nothing less than a paradigm shift in thinking about the entire way 
the budget was managed, the kingdom envisioned, and the chancellor acted.29 Jenkins, 
supporting Morley, says Gladstone needed not so much a budget for the year of 1853 
as system of finance for the third quarter of the century.30 Gladstone’s new system of 
                                                 
28Edward Ettingdene, Lord Bridges, The Treasury (London: George Allen, 1966), 29. 
29Morley, Gladstone 1:458-459. 
30Jenkins, Gladstone, a Biography, 149. 
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finance consolidated several important trends: the use of the income tax as that 
powerful engine that could drive the country; a long view of finance, replacing the hand-
to-mouth existence of previous governments; beneficial reorganization of the tariffs and 
improvement in collection; efforts to put British industry on an even keel so as to avoid 
crises and business downturns and their concurrent reductions in tax collection. 
Gladstone’s grasp of what was required in a budget or financial statement must 
have been nearly absolute when he sat down to write his first draft. He had listened to 
at least twenty budget speeches. He had dealt with parts of the budget practically since 
his entry into the government, and understood much of the revenue side in extreme 
detail.31 On the purely economic side, he seems to have seen his job in 1853 as a 
swatting up exercise to refresh his memory and thus to produce a fiscally sound, turn-
around budget. He also was required to replace old financial constructs with new and 
intelligent ideas: putting down the continued resistance to the income tax, placing excise 
and customs an increasingly solid foundation, and linking the budget with the new social 
structure emerging in Great Britain.  
To these ends, he set himself to learn all the details of the full range of budgetary 
items quickly, draw up a complete state that could not be challenged on lack of detail, 
and present it early in the parliamentary calendar as a sign his government was taking 
firm control. His budget statement required a thorough demonstration of adequate 
                                                 
31Hirst, Gladstone as Financier, has discussed Gladstone before and during this period in three 
chapters: financial and political beliefs from repeal of the Corn Laws to 1852, 112-137; Gladstone in his 
first chancellorship, 138-154; and his war finance 155-166. This is a useful study, but precious pages are 
given over to foreign policy and politics which had been covered, by 1931, in other places. The examples 
are often useful and even illuminating, but do not provide the types of analysis that Sidney Buxton does. It 
appears from both Buxton and Hirst that Gladstone was sure of his numbers but unsure of his political 
position, and that this insecurity if anything hampered him in completing his duties as chancellor are far 
as he might have been able to do. 
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revenues, sensible spending policy, accuracy, and sympathy for various factions. These 
were matters in which his ability to gather information without sharing conclusions 
prematurely supported his work: before he announced his planned, he hoped to get 
each item as clear and accurate as possible.  
 The plan was so large and complex that Gladstone broke his own rule and 
explained it to Cardwell, then president of the Board of Trade. Cardwell was astonished, 
and Gladstone asked himself if he had the right to involve the cabinet in the plan. 
Gladstone then showed the full plan to Aberdeen, who frowned. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer went away and next day brought back a mutilated form of the budget, with 
the question about his rights as chancellor. Aberdeen asked him to bring his original 
plan to the cabinet.32 Aberdeen was granting him full rights in his new position. 
Those who read Gladstone’s 1853 budget speech and who exclaim over its 
breadth and courage may not be aware that this same budget terrified his fellow cabinet 
members.33 To Gladstone, the Peel protégé, cutting many of the most onerous taxes 
and reorganizing the rest seemed to be good sense, and his presentation to the cabinet 
cleared away many of his colleague’s fears.34 Argyll wrote that he had never heard such 
a speech (in cabinet) and said it had riveted his colleagues.35 Apparently, his colleagues 
                                                 
32Gladstone, Diaries 4:9/4/53 when he presented the budget to the full cabinet for the first time. 
33Ibid., 4:12/4/53. Not surprisingly, the battles between Gladstone and Palmerston seem to date 
from this year and the budget: In a memorandum of 12 April, Gladstone noted that Palmerston drew a 
distinction between the goodness of a plan and the practicability of implementing it, and said that he had 
always thought that Disraeli’s budget was a very good plan, but that he [Palmerston] did not believe it 
could be carried out.  
34Gladstone would have liked to remove the detailed line-item wrangle form early cabinet 
meetings but to fight the details out in the House of Commons. In the 1860s, Gladstone was forced to 
fight the budget out line by line in the cabinet, but he still claimed the privilege of secrecy until he was 
ready to fight the whole thing as a single document. Every time he made preliminary comments he deeply 




came unriveted as they sweated out the cabinet meetings of 11-12 April (Monday and 
Tuesday of the following week):36 
 
Lord Aberdeen said you must take care that your proposals are not unpopular 
ones & I replied that it was after applying the test of popularity that I was 
convinced the Budget would be damaged and weakened by the withdrawal of 
these two points [income tax continuation and extension of the tax to Ireland].37 
Aberdeen later became known for his dithering over decisions about the Crimean 
War, and this early behavior gave Gladstone pause. Like the rest of the Peelites 
Aberdeen favored peace—in Europe and in his cabinet.38 The cabinet’s response to 
Gladstone’s proposed budget nearly convinced Aberdeen that Gladstone could not 
succeed, but the prime minister had the grace to believe that no chancellor could be 
expected to succeed. The idea of a proactive chancellor, one who made policy through 
a budget, was not an accepted until Gladstone stood up in April 1853 and made it 
acceptable. Problems had often previously arisen about the competence and numeracy 
of those who took the job, and in the fact the belief was that no man had the 
competence and numeracy to deal with the entire job. Britain’s finance was supposed to 
have gotten out of hand.  
Gladstone was sure of his numbers; he was also sure of his plan; yet he could be 
hesitant. Why? First, his prime minister encouraged him one day and attempted to rein 
him in the next. Second, Palmerston had commented that Disraeli’s 1852 budget had a 
                                                 
36Ibid., 4:18/4/53. This was his first budget speech. 
37Ibid., 4:11/4/53. 
38Paul Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European 
Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1972), 12. Sir James Graham, now back in the fold after his heroic 
and single-handed defense of Peel, was first lord of the Admiralty; the Duke of Newcastle was Colonial 
secretary and secretary for War; the Duke of Argyll was Lord Privy Seal; and Sidney Herbert was 




good plan, but he [Palmerston] could not see how the plan could be achieved.39 The 
problem for Gladstone was simply whether he would be granted the constitutional right 
to present the plan to legislators and the people on behalf of his cabinet colleagues and 
endanger the government. MPs might throw the government out on the same night that 
the budget was presented. The people might set up a clamor the next day and 
accomplish the same thing. 
Palmerston’s comment about Disraeli’s plan shows us one element of 
Gladstone’s problem: good money sense (assuming a budget demonstrated that 
attribute) might not make good political sense. In this, Palmerston and Aberdeen 
agreed. When Gladstone presented his budget in 1853, cabinet disagreements focused 
primarily on the income tax, extension of the income tax to Ireland, and the soap tax, 
whether it should be cut completely or only in half. Gladstone had a good plan, but its 
magnitude, its paradigm shift, and the very numbers presented to a new cabinet made 
that cabinet shaky. Edward Ellice, a Peelite MP, thought the cabinet should consider 
dissolution; in doing so he showed how finance changed an economic problem into a 
political problem in an instant and demonstrated how a stampede into the purely 
political arguments could be accomplished. The government was “notoriously weak” 
and had already been beaten three times in a week with the budget speech four days 
off.40 
                                                 
39Gladstone, Diaries 4:12/4/53, 515 (second page of the memorandum). 
40Edward Ellice (1810-1880) was MP for forty-two years. He was generally liberal in his politics, 
supporting abolition of the corn laws and the navigation laws as well as the principles of free trade. One of 
his biographers notes that Ellice “felt a growing want of confidence in Mr. Gladstone” but suggests that 
this want of confidence dates from the 1860s, not 1853. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 6 
(Oxford: University Press, 1917), 666. 
 
 215 
But when Gladstone stood up, he was Robert Peel’s protégé, and for the next 
four hours dispelled a good deal both of his own trepidation and the House’s. In the 
discussion that follows, it is useful to remember that the budget speech is not a bill in its 
own right. It is a report to the House of Commons, sitting as a committee of the whole. 
Gladstone’s purpose was to help House members understand the current state of the 
economy, the need for changes in the way the government conducted its fiscal 
business, and the bills that required passage to turn the budget into a reality The 
speech, despite all the prognostications of failure, was a triumph.41 Jenkins says that 
Gladstone’s speech gave the impression of having brought a large ship into a 
constricted harbor with unusual deftness controlling latent power. He also says 
Gladstone’s speech probably got at least as many things wrong as Disraeli: 
 
… the centre-piece of his presentation was just as much of a rabbit out of a hat 
as anything which Disraeli had produced. What Gladstone indisputably did, 
however, was to set his proposals in a schematic framework, and to argue for 
them from first principles, as well as with a wealth of historical and comparative 
fiscal analogy.42 
Of the mistakes that Jenkins alluded to, the most egregious seem to be those 
that Gladstone himself later identified: the attempt at new finance through Exchequer 
bonds paying two and a half per cent, and the general state of the economy. Exchequer 
bonds were sold directly by the Exchequer to banks and individuals at a par value of 
£100.43 They paid interest, stated in percent per pound. They traded openly on 
exchanges, and after their sale, their prices fluctuated above or below par. Price 
                                                 
41Gladstone, Diaries 4:14/4/53. Gladstone reported that Herbert and Cardwell favored dissolution 
on 14 April. However, after Gladstone’s four-hour speech on the 18th, Sidney Herbert and wife (“the 
Herberts”) were one of the couples invited home with Gladstone to join in soup and Negus. 
42Jenkins, Gladstone, a Biography, 149. 
43For the creation of the debentures, see Add MS 44742, f.11. For permission to float this 
debenture, see Diaries 4:10/3/54 and Hansard’s, cxxxi:618.  
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fluctuations depended on the markets’ opinions of the value of these securities. These 
opinions were based on the ability of the government to pay the interest, the general 
financial situation, comparisons to other investments, and, in this case, the desirability 
of a bond that paid two-and-a-half per cent interest guaranteed by the government.44 
Regardless of market price, the percentage paid on them did not vary. The government 
paid the same interest quarter after quarter for the life of the security. 
In 1861 Gladstone was to write that the rates of interest paid on them was 
“wholly incompatible with the sound state of things,” and that he had not been quick 
enough in reading the signs of the times. Gladstone said he had sailed too close to the 
wind in his estimates. He suggested that this problem was due to his experiences with 
the financing of Oak Farm and Hawarden, where he also felt he had sailed near the 
wind (although with his father’s financing).45 Nevertheless, the story is quickly told: the 
rate was too low to attract investors who sought higher rates for their investments 
elsewhere.46 
The state of the economy is also quickly told: cautious. In a cautious economy 
investors have a great need to balance risk with return. There were already storm 
clouds over Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1853. Investors who feared the risk 
would invest in government bonds at the traditional yields, but not in a new, low-yield 
                                                 
44 Olive Anderson, “Loans vs. Taxes: British Financial Policy in the Crimean War,” Economic 
History Review xvi, 315-316; Gladstone, Diaries 4: 2/5/54.Gladstone opened his tenders on 2 May, 1854. 
“A failure: I shall have rough weather.  
45Letter to W. R. Farquhar, 8 March, 1861; quoted in Morley, Gladstone 1:473-474, n. This 
comment may have been the source of Matthew’s comment that Gladstone’s distrust of the banking 
system stemmed from the Oak Farm problems. See Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 118. 
46Clapham, Bank of England 1:252. Sir John says Gladstone asked the Bank to take the offers up 
or to see if there was interest in one of the continental exchanges. His timing was unwise: he was then 
involved with the Bank over the deficiency bills; in addition both the Bank of England and the continental 
exchanges were looking for higher interest rates to offset the risks of a continental war.  
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investment. Investors who believed war was coming understood the risks, but expected 
higher yield to balance the risk. 
The response to the financial statement was, nevertheless, loudly positive. The 
“no one has ever talked to us like that before” response underscored the need that 
Gladstone had identified and that Morley and Jenkins have understood. Gladstone 
might have used his new-found public image as support in his effort to confront the 
Bank of England in 1853. In fact, he did no such thing. For the rest of 1853 his 
speeches bristle with plans for improving English business and international trade. He 
spoke often and earnestly about individual customs rates, drawbacks, collection points 
and dates, and other arcane information on his various types of sugar, rice, timber, 
molasses, raisins, currents, and French wine. Tax collection—revenues, tax collectors, 
and revenue delivery dates—was a huge topic when the war with Russia was beginning 
to emerge from the vapor. Gladstone talked little of paying off the national debt. 
Matthew says that compared to Wood and Disraeli, the nation classified Gladstone as 
“in peacetime first, foremost, and almost always a safe chancellor.”47  
 
The 1854 Budgets 
Olive Anderson says that Gladstone used loans to fund the Crimean War far 
more than historians realize. The 1854 speech used what she calls references to Pitt’s 
War finance “in reality stale.” She argues that although Gladstone cited Pitt, he thought 
Gladstone, with borrowing thrown in. Six weeks after his 1854 temporary budget 
speech, the Treasury offered £6 million in Exchequer Bonds, repayable in three series 
                                                 
47Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 83. 
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of £2 million in 1858, 1859, and 1860 (placing hostages in the hands of fate and other 
chancellors).48 
To understand what kinds of reaction his speeches could generate, it is useful to 
examine the second budget of 1854.49 The budget of 1853 had been lauded. His first 
budget of 1854 was workmanlike but was widely understood to be a holding operation 
while the government studied the likelihood of war. The second budget, however, gives 
opportunity to examine the types of debate that could arise when Gladstone spoke. It is 
encompassed in a day like most other Gladstone days: 
 
Wrote to Master of Pembroke--Rev Mr Ralwinson--and minutes. Cabinet 2-3-1/2. 
Rode in forenoon. House 4-1/2-11. Budget Sp. 2 hours: subsequent debate & 
passage of arms with Mr. Disraeli. Saw Ld Chancellor--Sir A. Spearman--Mr 
Wilson cum Messrs. Wood Pressly and Timm. Read Pulling on City of London--
Parier on Attornies.50 
Gladstone’s speech opened with a foreign policy edge. Denying that his 
government meant to be extravagant, Gladstone set the groundwork for the point he 
wished to make vis-à-vis other nations:  
 
… we believe it well that foreign countries should see that the earnestness of the 
nation in the course upon which it has embarked may be measured by the 
promptitude with which the country proceeds to supply the means necessary for 
carrying out the course.51 
                                                 
48Anderson, Liberal State at War, 195. In fact, Gladstone did not believe in financing the 
government with taxes alone. He was not against borrowing. He was against what is known as unfunded 
debt: loans for which no method of repayment had been identified. 
49Hirst, Gladstone as Financier, 159-162. Hirst says that Gladstone’s planning was correct: he 
spoke in 1854, it was far from certain how long the war would last and how much it would cost. Gladstone 
believed that the “war economy” would stimulate manufacture of war materials thereby raising wages and 
workers’ ability to pay taxes. In truth, this was a bit like working a sinking fund: much more is invested in 
the purchase of war materials than is ever recovered by taxation. William Newmarch and George 
Cornewall Lewis thought it was better borrow money to pay for a war, but no one knew how long the war 
would last or how high interest rates would climb. 
50Gladstone, Diaries 4:6/3/54, n.6-8, emphasis on “passage of arms” mine; cum, Gladstone’s. In 
note 6, Matthew says Gladstone’s second budget met a deficit of £2,854,000 by doubling the income tax 




Like all money speeches, this one brought out problems that were not directly 
attached to the budget problem, including his recent failures to finance government 
expenditures with two-and-a-half percent securities and the size of the unfunded debt 
(£17,750,000).52 He also discussed comparative rates for loans in Paris. This was 
Gladstone sailing close to the wind. The unfunded debt was very high already and Sir T. 
F. Baring had accused him of attempting to use Exchequer bonds as a loan without 
calling them a loan. The speech was vulnerable on a number of other problems as well, 
but his hearers failed to grasp most of them. The troubles, questions, and jibes offered 
in the subsequent debate were, in fact, minor. 
Ball thought the instant increase in the income tax was unfair, since it was 
payable in April.53 Gladstone responded that the assessment was made on a yearly 
basis, that it was collected in two moieties, and that an adjustment could be made for 
falling income.54 Hume demanded more relief from indirect taxes.55 Willoughby and 
Williams attacked the Chancellor on his numbers and the additions to the national 
debt.56 In all, twelve men rose to speak once, while Hume, Williams, and Willoughby 
spoke twice (the house was in committee where speakers were not limited to one 
outing). Sir Francis Baring reminded Gladstone that it was “a wise and proper power—
of converting the unfunded debt into funded debt, which has repeatedly been done.” 
Gladstone responded, somewhat hotly, “No, never with deficiency bills.”57 
                                                 
52Ibid., 385. Gladstone said disingenuously that he did not propose to more than fill up the margin 
of missing funds except perhaps to the amount of £10,000 to £20.000 and add it to the unfunded debt. 
This is another “youthful indiscretion” since adding to the unfunded debt added debt at a higher interest 





57Ibid., 408. For deficiency bills, see a later section in this chapter. 
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The “passage of arms” with Disraeli referred (Diary), followed. Gladstone’s 
temperature may have risen for a moment: Disraeli, complaining that he had been 
silenced on several occasions when he would have spoken, now took his chance. It was 
a prepared speech covering some fourteen columns in Hansard’s.58 Disraeli thought he 
saw a discrepancy in the numbers. Gladstone showed him the correct piece of paper 
with the corrected number. In retrospect, it appears that Disraeli was miffed by the 
apparent acceptance of Gladstone’s budgets. If one reads Disraeli’s two long speeches 
in this debate, one finds faulty mathematics, risky assumptions, and one contradiction, 
demanding a view into the future and then admitting that it is impossible for any human 
being to see into that future: 
 
The Bank of England sooner or later must charge you the market rate of interest 
[instead of allowing the government to set an interest rate for the security], and I 
want to know what the market rate of interest is likely to be in the course of time. 
We are now involved in circumstances the result of which it is impossible for any 
human to see. Suppose you have a long continental war, and a great drain of the 
precious metals; are you going then to sanction the attempt to carry on the 
service of the country by the systematic aid of deficiency bills, and not by real 
balances in the Exchequer?59 
In this passage, Disraeli correctly insisted that the war might drag on, and that 
the interest rate charged for all new funded debt would increase as the war progressed. 
Gladstone ignored this possibility and simply refused to prognosticate on future discount 
rates. Disraeli was wrong in assuming that the government set the interest rate as 
Gladstone’s tenders had proven. The Court and governors of the Bank of England set 
its rates for loans of its own money and could if asked advise the government on the 
probable acceptance of a new tender at any specific interest rate. Gladstone had 
                                                 
58Ibid., 408-421. 
59Ibid., 420. The assertion that the Bank could increase the rate of interest on existing loans was 
not true; the assertion that the government would have to pay the market rate for new loans was true, and 
had been underscored by the debacle of the Exchequer Bonds. 
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already shown that he preferred low interest rates, but seems to have accepted the fact 
that war raised the risk and thus the demand for higher rates. The Bank of England did 
not stand alone in setting the market rate for government securities because the 
government also sold securities in t he bill and bond markets; those markets either 
bought or failed to buy if the interest rates suited them. Therefore, no chancellor could 
predict a future interest rate, but Gladstone might have made some educated guesses if 
he were willing to share them with Disraeli. In addition, the Napoleonic wars had 
demonstrated that any government would have to borrow money to continue fighting. 
He knew he depended on the markets, the state of business, and the psychology of 
business people. He would later admit that he had been on dangerous ground. 
Disraeli did call attention to Gladstone’s reduction of interest on Exchequer bills, 
on which Gladstone anticipated a saving of £65,000 per year, and which unfortunately 
led to a loss of £36,000. While Gladstone denied the attack on the grounds in which it 
was stated, he did admit to a loss of the gift of prophecy. He also demanded that 
Disraeli examine the state of trade to understand what had changed in the country.60 In 
the end Gladstone was able to put down Disraeli’s attack, and it did not fuel a more 
general one, possibly because Gladstone turned one of his responses to Disraeli into a 
small filibuster of his own loaded with numbers.61  
                                                 
60Ibid., 421-422. Also see Jonathan R. T. Hughes, Fluctuations in Trade, Industry and Finance: A 
Study of British Economic Development, 1850-1860 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 28-29. Hughes 
says the 1848 depression was offset somewhat by importations of gold from California which triggered a 
recovery and boom until 1853. A bullion drain did occur beginning in 1854, but it was being offset by 
continued imports of American gold and new imports from Australia (where gold was discovered in 1851). 
A slump in exports made gold more difficult to buy (since exporters were not purchasing British 
manufactured goods). But war spending—in munitions, woolen cloth for uniforms, ship-building, and other 
areas—maintained employment and wages. 
61Ibid., 423-433, commencing with “To the fall of the Consol!” and ending with an offer to return to 
the subject with Disraeli at any future time. 
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Then Disraeli counter-attacked with a line-item joust that might have gone on for 
some time. Mr. G. A. Hamilton, seemingly willing to join Disraeli, found errors in 
Gladstone’s statement for the previous session, which Gladstone rebutted.62 Sir Fitzroy 
Kelly called attention to the time, and then made a three-column speech.63 Mr. Hillyard 
said he hoped the government would avoid the errors made by previous 
administrations;64 Mr. Drummond hoped the government would not tamper with the 
currency;65 Colonel Dunne asked how the Irish tax had been arrived at. The bills that 
would support the budget were introduced and received their first readings.66 
From this brief account, it may be safe to say that it was not the faint-of-heart 
who attacked Gladstone in debate. Members of Parliament might snarl. They might 
question the numbers. They might demand still more for the Army, the Navy, or the 
poor. They might carp about the income tax. But to stay on the floor with Gladstone, 
they had to find some reason to stand, and the ability to stand up to Gladstone’s 
response. And thus, in two tumultuous years, with war looming and war present, 
Gladstone began to make his mark as a man of numbers well able to lead the 
government’s financial government. 
 
Fighting the War 
Gladstone’s involvement in the war began when war clouds began to rise in 
eastern Europe, and was more moral than political. He sided with Aberdeen in refusing 








to make early commitments to Turkey.67 Gladstone was neither a moral or physical 
coward. He had been passionately interested in the welfare of eastern European 
Christians. He may have learned far more about the territories than most of his 
colleagues through his reading. He certainly sided with Argyll in the belief that if Britain 
were to be pulled into war, she should “at least first consider the costs, dangers, and 
incalculable consequences of fighting a European war for the sake of Turkey.”68 Later, 
Gladstone was to ignore the fact that Russia had earlier been in the wrong, and insisted 
on asking who now was in the right.69 
From his Diaries, we learn that Gladstone was doing a great deal of other work, 
and paying little attention except for budgetary business in attending to the war. He 
noted the beginning of “active assistance” to Turkey on 27 March, 1854.70 In May, aside 
from his supplementary budget speech, his only contributions were to write a long 
memorandum pressing for the use of Swedish mercenaries.71 In June he helped settle 
Lady Glynne’s estate.72 In June, he wrote another memorandum urging that Britain 
send enough troops to the Crimea to capture Sevastopol.73 He continually wrote to and 
met with Bank of England officials.74  
                                                 
67Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, 88. 
68Ibid., 89 
69Ibid., 132. 
70Gladstone, Diaries 4:25/3/54; Hansard’s, cxxxi:1352; Olive Anderson, “Great Britain and the 
Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854-55,” The Historical Journal 7, no. 1 (1964): 47-63. 
71Gladstone, Diaries 4:23/5/54; Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, 170. Prince Albert sat in on the 
discussions of bringing Sweden into the war, and argued that Sweden would not enter the war unless 
Austria did. The prince suggested extending the mercenary principle beyond Sweden to include Austria or 
any other country that would fight along side the British army. Schroeder says Gladstone thought using 
Swedish mercenaries was more honorable than the alternatives. 
72Gladstone Diaries 4:3/6/54, 4:6/6/54, 4:18/6/54. 
73Ibid., 22/6/54, n.3. 
74See the following section of this chapter. 
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As the following chapters will show, however, the Aberdeen government’s failure 
to execute the war in a satisfactory manner would haunt Gladstone for a long time.75 
Charges that he strangled or starved the war must be returned to their origins: the 
secretary for War and the Colonies (later secretary for War), and the Admiralty. Military 
men in parliament also underestimated the Russian military, miscalculated the use of 
Turkish and French troops, and overestimated the field commanders’ abilities to win a 
war with the support they were given.76 
In fact, Olive Anderson says that Gladstone did not finance the war, but his 
successor, George Cornewall Lewis, did. She calls Lewis “a distinguished scholar with 
strikingly independent financial ideas … no hot gospeller for war taxes, or indeed for 
any other policy.” She says that Lewis was not a follower of any popular theory of 
economics, and did not regard a budget as a great instrument of political ideals but 
“merely as a series of practical expedients for making ends meet from year to year.”77 
This may be the way some members of parliament felt as well, happy that Gladstone, or 
Lewis, Wood, or someone had things in hand. It is likely that many members 
understood expedients from their management of manors and farms, law practices, 
great factories, or shaky banks. 
                                                 
75Morley, Gladstone 1:495. He a Gladstone conversation in 1881: “I never can admit that divided 
opinions in that cabinet led to hesitating action or brought on war.” 
76For a short description of the historiography of this war, see Ann Pottinger Saab, The Origins of 
the Crimean Alliance (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 1-2. For a discussion of the 
themes used to describe discussions of Crimean finance, see Anderson, Liberal State of War: 185-186. 
77Anderson, Liberal State at War, 197. Also see Theodore Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian 
Generation, 1846-1886 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 118, 121 and Table 4.2. Hoppen shows that 
Lewis’s 1857 budget was innovative, but that Gladstone hated it because Lewis had “utterly reversed” 
fifteen years’ labor to draw down expenditures and taxation. Peel and Gladstone had been wed to free 
“free trade, balanced budgets, low taxation, sound banking, and a self-regulatory currency” —and, one 
might add, diminished borrowing. These practices were perpetuated until the First World War. Hoppen 
believes the efforts of Lewis, Disraeli, and others who believed in borrowing left no lasting legacy. Further, 
Hoppen cites the gentle rise in the cost of civil services, brought on to some degree by testing and 
improved salaries, as well as increases in staff, that raised government expenditure somewhat but which 
nowhere approached the expenditures of  policed states in continental Europe.  
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The Government’s Relationship to the Bank of England 
The Aberdeen government was already in a downward slide when Gladstone 
challenged the Bank of England to a duel. In fact, the decision of a rising financial 
cabinet minister to challenge the Bank of England may have been based on a growing 
realization that if Britain were going to fight at all, the government would have to borrow 
even more money from the Bank of England. If Gladstone was going to be forced into 
borrowing money, he certainly was searching for better ways to manage the debt. The 
fight was real. While Sir John Clapham failed to credit the seriousness of the conflict, 
John Morley did not. 
 
In the autumn [of 1854] he had a sharp tussle with the Bank of England, and 
displayed a toughness, stiffness, and sustained anger that greatly astonished 
Threadneedle Street.78 
From this tussle depend other actions involving the Bank of England, parliament, 
the Exchequer, and Gladstone: Gladstone’s plan to overhaul the financial operation of 
the government and national part of the Bank, written in 1856; the renewal of the Bank 
Charter in 1857, during which Gladstone sat stubbornly silent; the failure of the Bank 
Notes Bill in 1865; and passage of the Exchequer and Audit Act in 1866. 
This thesis has considered the “false position” that Gladstone believed subsisted 
between the Bank of England and Her Majesty’s government when he entered 
parliament. This false position informed his growing knowledge of government finance. 
In his reading, which is documented, and in his social, political and economic 
conversations, we have a resume of the adult-learning course that Gladstone pursued 
during his parliamentary career: on the Corn Laws, money, banking, trade, 
                                                 
78Morley, Gladstone 1: 518. 
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manufacturing, and a host of related topics. Vital to his education, for example, were his 
conversations and exchanges of letters with Sir James Graham, whom Morley identifies 
as the finest financial expert of the Peel and Peelite era. 
Gladstone’s interest was not in rewriting the 1844 Bank Act in 1854. He focused 
on restraining the Bank of England’s management of government finances. It was risky. 
Gladstone’s attack could have been labeled obstinate and wrong-headed because the 
government needed bank financing, as Olive Anderson has noted, to fight the war. In 
changing the financing operation, Gladstone effectively served notice that if he had a 
chance he would do more to change the relationship between the Bank and the 
government. His intention was part of his tactical advantage. Saving money for the 
government money by changing the way principle and interest payments were paid was 
his tactical goal. His strategic goal was to change the operational relationship between 
government and Bank by removing the Bank’s command over the government. This 
strategic intent set the stage for h is great 1866 Act on finance. 
Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy defined deficiency bills as special 
loans required to make good deficiencies in the Consolidated Fund from quarter to 
quarter. These loans were authorized by an Act of parliament in 57 George. III. c.48, 
sects. 6-14.  These sections considered the problem of the quarterly payments made by 
the government to various creditors, including vendors and contractors, and the 
thousands of people and organizations who held government securities paying quarterly 
interest. The money for these payments came from the Consolidated Fund, a single 
fund that received the income or taxes, duties, and loans, and made these quarterly 
payments. The Bank of England was the depository for the Consolidated Fund.  
 
 227 
Nearing the end of the quarter, both the Bank and the Treasury examined the 
state of the Consolidated Fund to determine whether the government could make its 
required payments. If the government lacked the sufficient funds, the Bank advanced 
the required money in unfunded loans on which the government paid interest until the 
advances were paid off. The Bank also took its payments directly from the Treasury 
without authorization, and without giving the government a chance to prioritize its 
payments from the Consolidated Fund or to change the amount and way they paid the 
bills.79 The authorization for the loan was a Treasury Warrant and the government gave 
the Bank Deficiency bills in exchange. While this device eased the government’s cash-
flow problems, the Deficiency did not require or receive parliamentary approval. The 
interest to be borne by the bills was not to exceed the rate of “three pence halfpenny per 
centum per diem.” This rate of interest shows why the Bills were intended to liquidated 
at the end of the subsequent quarter.80 
Times had changed, however, since George III. Revenue collection had 
improved. The economy, even in bad years, was producing more revenues. If quarterly 
payments on budgetary expenditures and the interest on the National Debt were 
correctly calculated, a careful Chancellor of the Exchequer like Gladstone would be able 
to anticipate a deficiency well ahead of time and take appropriate measures to keep 
ahead of the Bank and the bills. Nevertheless, the complexity of the problem suggests a 
reason for Gladstone’s frustration and the acrimony generated on both sides by his 
battle with the Bank of England. 
 
                                                 
79Clapham, Bank of England I:251. 
80Palgrave, Dictionary 1:533. 
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In his first spell at the Exchequer, Gladstone got across the Court [of the Bank of 
England] over the payment of dividends on the National Debt. It had been usual 
to credit the Bank by Treasury Warrant with the whole dividend on each class of 
stock on the first day of the quarter on which the payment would fall due—26 
March for the April dividends—and for the Chancellor, whose funds were [thus] 
depleted by this large payment, to issue interest-bearing Deficiency Bills for the 
full amount. Until paid out, this dividend money was “reckoned as part of the 
monies of the Bank.” Gladstone’s view—the Treasury view—was that public 
monies continue to be public monies until … disbursed.81 
Gladstone’s efforts to correct the management of the deficiency bills seem to 
stem from the monetary problems at the beginning of the war. Exchequer balances 
were low because Exchequer Bond funding had failed in the previous year. The 
Exchequer had been making good use of deficiency bills in purchasing and preparing 
ships and men for the war. In April, 1854, bullion was also draining from the Bank, and 
Gladstone wrote to James Pennington, a writer on currency and banking whom Peel 
had often consulted. The problem from Gladstone’s point of view was whether the 
government could borrow money or gold to fight a foreign war when gold was already 
draining from the Bank. Gladstone asked Pennington about the drain of bullion caused 
by the war to be fought on foreign soil. He also wrote to Henry Goulburn, a Currency 
School advocate, who believed the only way to stop the gold supply from contracting 
was to contract the circulating medium, and advised Gladstone against adding to the 
fiduciary fund by depositing extra government securities in the Issue Department.82 
George Arbuthnot, Peel’s former private secretary, showed Gladstone a mistake 
in his thinking by telling him to look at the bullion held in the Banking Department of the 
Bank of England, not the Issue Department. In his March 6, 1854, statement to the 
House of Commons, Gladstone was forced to agree that the failure of his earlier 
                                                 
81Clapham, Bank of England 1:253. 
82Gladstone to Pennington, 21 April, 1854, Add. MS. 44529, f, 86; Goulburn to Gladstone, 5 May, 
1854, Add. MS. 44162, f. 115; cited Anderson, Liberal State at War, 231, n.1. 
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financing scheme and the demands he was making on the Bank as well as imports of 
corn were putting heavy pressure on the Bank. On May 5, The Bank responded by 
raising its discount rate to five per cent. The price of government consols (par = 100) fell 
to 87.83 
Olive Anderson calls attention to a paper read by John Elliot Cairnes in 1853 in 
Ireland and published in 1854. Cairnes took drains of gold for granted, while assuming 
that convertibility of paper into gold was now also taken for granted. He struck at the 
contraction of circulation under the Bank Charter Act, which was now taken place 
through the rise in the Bank’s interest rate. He repeated a common theme in his writing 
that war had a disturbing impact on banking, with assertions that the 1844 Bank Act was 
unable to control the impact.84 It was a useful assertion, one that many people 
accepted, especially after casualty numbers began to come in: no one but the 
commanders in the field could have an effect on the loss of men, materials, and 
weapons, and the need to finance more if the battle were to be won.  
To the non-economic historian, a reasonable question is what practical use can 
be made of this information. Why, with a need for Bank financing, did Gladstone begin a 
fight with the Bank over the Deficiency Bills? To understand why Gladstone persisted, it 
                                                 
83Ibid., 232. 
84John Elliot Cairnes, An Examination into the Principles of Currency involved in the Bank Charter 
Act of 1844 (Dublin: Hodges & Smith, 1854; reprint, Fairfield: Augustus M. Kelley, 1989). Gladstone did 
not read this book, although he had read three other works by Cairnes—a book on slavery and America, 
the logical method of political economy, and a Fortnightly Review article on political economy and the 
land, all after 1854. See Gladstone, Diaries 14:324. Anderson, Liberal State at War, 232-233, n.1,2, cites 
Cairnes, An Examination, 3, 5, 40, 76 for the disturbance of war quote. Anderson refers to a lecture by 
Edmund Taunton (5 July, 1854) which states that the Bank Act in effect had cut off the government’s right 
hand in its ability to fight a war. She also cites Hamer Stansfield, A Few Reasons for the Immediate 
Reconsideration of the Bank Act of 1844 (1855); Anderson says that otherwise there was an important 
lack of discussion of the Bank Act during the war. Gladstone does not seem to have read Taunton 
(Diaries, 14: 575). Matthew does record Hamer Stansfield’s A Letter to Richard Cobden … on our 
Protective and Restrictive Currency Laws and his The Currency Act of 1844, the Cause of the Panic in 
October (1854) (Diaries 14:565). See the table of Gladstone’s Reading at the end of this chapter. 
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is necessary to look at the technical aspects of the deficiency bills and the ways in 
which they were issued. To do this, we must return to Palgrave: First, the deficiency bill 
was given to the Bank of England or the Bank of Ireland in return for cash which is 
placed in cash boxes of the Tellers of the various the government offices that had been 
in need. Under 57 George III, 6-14, the Treasury was empowered to request the funds 
and issued the bills when Treasury clerks decided that the consolidated fund had 
insufficient moneys to pay the Bank its quarterly payments (transferring government 
funds held in the Consolidated Fund account to the Bank of England’s accounts). The 
bills given to the Banks took the form of Exchequer Bills. The funds given to the 
Exchequer were in the form of moneys, or currency. 
The first problem that Gladstone faced was to stop the automatic advance of 
money authorized or rubber-stamped by the Treasury without Gladstone’s approval. 
The automatic transfers inflated the national debt in a way that surprised Gladstone 
every quarter. Another problem was to identify the source of the “moneys” advanced to 
the cash boxes at the Exchequer: if the Banking Department of the Bank of England 
dispersed the currency, then the government was competing for funds with private 
industry also gearing up for war. If somehow the Issue Department began dispersing 
money to the government, then the government was running into the limits of the Bank 
Act by taking currency issued against a diminishing reserve. No one had addressed this 
problem satisfactorily, and it is a point crying out for appropriate research. Arbuthnot’s 
recommendation that Gladstone watch the bullion supply in the Banking Department, 
not the Issue Department may solve this problem. The Issue Department was not 
allowed to lend money, only to exchange gold for paper currency. 
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The final problem was the interest rate of “three pence halfpenny per centum per 
diem.” This rate puts the interest payment on each £100 per year at 5.3%.85 While this 
rate is not excessive, it is, as every credit card holder knows to his or her peril, the kind 
of charge that can be run up excessively with interest charged on the previous unpaid 
interest as well as principle. Finally, we should remember that the Bank of England was 
charging management fees on the outstanding loans. 
Gladstone’s aversion to deficiency bills was not, therefore, an aversion to 
borrowing; it was an aversion to the creation of unfunded debt. Borrowing through 
Exchequer bonds and annuities guaranteed by revenues were part of the funded debt, 
and were therefore acceptable. Olive Anderson has shown that Gladstone was 
borrowing a good deal of money in one way or another; other sources have shown us 
that bankers such as Baring and Glyn knew and understood his borrowing. The problem 
was technical, and therefore to be solved by administrative fact-finding and legislative 
changes. There is no doubt that Gladstone wrote a good many letters to the Bank in the 
first half of 1854. Without the Parliamentary Correspondence, however, it is not possible 
through the use of the Diaries alone to determine whether all the letters applied to the 
problem of the deficiency bills. Sir John Clapham has provided some hints: 
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The Treasury, where Gladstone had long spells of service in the fifties and early 
sixties, was revising some of its methods and reconsidering some points in its 
relations with the Bank. The traditional Exchequer Bill had long since lost 
importance. The Bank took from the Treasury direct the Deficiency Bills, self-
liquidating each quarter, and not many of these… Bankers also turned away from 
the Exchequer Bill as its narrowing market became uncertain … The last funding 
operation for Exchequer Bills was undertaken in 1858 …86 
Claiming that public money was public money until it was paid to the investor, 
Gladstone changed the way this deal was made, first by fiat, and then by legislative 
action. In April, 1854, he announced he was assimilating dividend payments to the 
Consolidated Fund and paying dividends when they were needed. Thus, in October of 
that year, when the Bank believed the government owed £6,540,000 Gladstone 
authorized a warrant of £4,718,000. The Bank then made a tactical error, claiming that 
Gladstone had acted outside the law, and threatened that they would take the opinion of 
law officers of the Crown. Gladstone later recorded that if the Crown’s lawyers had 
agreed with the Bank, Gladstone would have agreed with the decision. However, the 
law officers sided with Gladstone. The Lord Chancellor said that the dates mentioned in 
the Acts were “merely directory quote.”87 
With the problem involving both the Solicitor General and the Lord Chancellor, 
Gladstone could hardly keep the problem out of the ken of the cabinet. But there is no 
question that Gladstone held the high ground when he stated that no Bank had the right 
to come between the fund holders and the government.88 
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Clapham notes that when Gladstone was succeeded by Cornewall Lewis in 
1855, Lewis refused to return to the former state of affairs despite the Bank’s urgent 
appeal. Reform had reached the Treasury and Exchequer. Lewis was not about to give 
up the advantages gained by small battle that his competition had fought and won. 
Gladstone introduced the Public Revenue and Consolidated Fund Charges Bill 
on 2 June, 1854. The primary effect of this Act was create a report of gross revenue and 
expenditure items to the house for a vote, instead of allowing the Treasury or some 
other department to spend money without authorization.89 In addition to the Treasury 
warrants used for deficiency bills, the main culprits were the revenue collection 
departments. Before the revenue departments sent their collections to the Exchequer, 
they had been in the habit of withdrawing their operating expenses and thus reducing 
the amount of the funds they turned into the central government.90 The Public Revenue 
Bill ended this practice. 
The bill categorized expenditures in schedules. All items listed in the first 
schedule were to be paid automatically from the Consolidated Fund. Items in other 
schedules were allowed with various levels of parliamentary control and a yearly vote. 
Thus, the bill allowed the government to prioritize its payments without help from the 
Bank of England. If Customs, Inland Revenue, and the Post Office were forced to 
estimate the these charges ahead of time, both they and parliament might find better 
ways to manage property, wages and salaries, and other expenses.91  
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The reason for this change was cash flow. As the budgets show, the revenue 
departments’ costs of doing business were approximately £4 million, money that until 
1854 had never reached the Consolidated Fund. Withholding these funds lowered the 
balance in the Consolidated Fund and failed to collect interest in the government’s 
account. By addressing the revenue collection expenses directly, Gladstone found an 
additional £4 million to use for a short term each quarter. The £4 million had also, in 
Gladstone’s words, “been exempted from control of the House.” Although he did not 
wish to add materially to the time spent in the House on votes of Supply, he felt the 
House ought to have a chance to say so.92 His actions also had a preventive 
component: he believed that in previous times the House had been a trifle lax in that 
they preferred to lay charges off on the Consolidated Fund, which was funded debt, 
than to find new sources of funding for new charges. 
 
The practical consequence of their doing so was, that these charges were 
placed, in some measure, beyond the control of the Treasury, they were 
forgotten by this House, and there was a great deal of neglect and abuse 
connected with this part of the public service.93  
Gladstone’s distinction between the use of the Consolidated Fund without further 
intervention by either the House or the Treasury and parliamentary oversight is an 
important one for students of government financing. As has already been suggested, 
the Consolidated Fund was a unified general fund, the balance of which resided in one 
or more accounts in the Bank of England and the Bank or Ireland, funds that earned 
interest during eighty-nine days of the quarter and used to pay bills and credit payments 
on the ninetieth day. If a particular government project was placed on the Consolidated 
                                                 




Fund list, it was required to be paid for at quarterly intervals from the Consolidated 
Fund.  
If, however, a project was “voted” as part of the annual supply list, each 
parliament had the opportunity to approve, disapprove, increase or decrease the 
expenditure. One such example was the courts. In English government tradition, court 
expenses were paid for by the courts themselves, primarily through collections of fines 
and fees.94 Gladstone used the example of the courts, allocating judges’ salaries to the 
consolidated fund but allocating all other fees to votes, thereby placing them under 
control of the House of Commons.95 
 
Reform 
In 1853, Gladstone had signed the order that launched the Northcote-Trevelyan 
inquiry into the operation of the civil service.96 The Northcote-Trevelyan report 
introduced civil service examinations, increased Treasury control over qualifications, 
salaries, and dismissal, and changed the way the permanent service served their 
elected cabinet officials. This was an enormous change in government operation.97 It is 
not a coincidence that the rise of Treasury control of expenditure, Gladstone’s ability to 
                                                 
94Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1960), 264.  
95Hansard’s cxxxiii:1262. 
96Jenkins, Gladstone, A Biography, 166. Palmerston informed Gladstone that he was against 
reform and that he wished Gladstone would not go ahead with it.  
97Roseveare, The Treasury, 80, 163, 165-166. In the early days of the eighteenth century the 
Treasury was misunderstood and often blamed for financial problems. In 1713 a standing order gave 
control of the Treasury to the House of Commons. Roseveare says the Treasury continued to be 
demoralized until Sir Charles Trevelyan became assistant secretary of the Treasury in 1840. Trevelyan 
set to work to learn the operation of the Treasury and showed that the Treasury was anxious for reform. 
Trevelyan was a serious reformer. He believed in the division of labor, one of the pillars of civil service 




rewrite the relationship between the government and the Bank of England and his 
demand for improved accounting should be joined. Hugh Coombs, John Richard 
Edwards, and Hugh Greener have traced the development of public accounts and 
public accounting from 1822 to 1856, and have shown that the major problems with 
government accounts were based in part on a serious flaw identified by Charles 
Trevelyan’s testimony in 1848—lack of division of labor—and in part by the lack of 
proper accounting and money management methods. In their study of the introduction 
of double entry bookkeeping in the British government, Coombs, Edwards, and Greener 
identified numerous documents that advocated improved methods of keeping accounts, 
recommendations for forms to be used in reporting to higher authorities, and other 
improvements, including what we know call “best in practice” departmental operation. 
For example, their work shows that in 1822 or earlier, a standing committee on public 
accounts reported yearly to parliament.98 Reports continued in 1829, 1830, 1831, 1837, 
1844, and 1845, but little action had been taken. But when Gladstone signed the 
warrant enabling Trevelyan and Stafford Henry Northcote to perform a comprehensive 
study of the entire government, reform began to take hold. The “First Report of Her 
Majesty’s Civil Service Commissioners for Conducting the Examination of Young Men 
so Proposed to be appointed to any of the Junior Situations in the Civil Establishments” 
presented a plan for change that gained impetus when Gladstone returned to 
Exchequer in 1859.99 
                                                 
98BPP 1822, vi: 293, Report from the Select Committee on Public Accounts of the United 
Kingdom, Annually Laid Before Parliament, 31 July, 1822; in Double Entry Bookkeeping, 1. 
99 John H. Fisher, “Chancery and the Emergence of Standard Written English in the Fifteenth 
Century,” Speculum 52, no. 4 (October 1977), 870-899. 
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In its quiet way, the Public Revenue and Consolidated Fund Charges Act is the 
second contribution Gladstone made in the long process of government reform. He was, 
to be sure, calling the House of Commons to heel for earlier careless behavior. In the 
debate that followed Gladstone’s 1854 speech on his bill, Hume said he was glad the 
present government had yielded to the opinions of the House. Glyn said he had always 
been surprised that the Treasury had not made this move before. Glyn, a banker, 
explained that he thought the financial advances made to the government had been 
exaggerated, and that “the possibility of any advance being required could only arise 
from the want of adjustment between the receipts and expenditure of the country.” He 
reminded the House that previous to 1844 or 1845, the payments to the Bank were 
made twice a year, but that Mr. Goulburn had changed them to four times a year without 
any great alteration in the amounts required to make the payments.100 
Williams stated that the measure before the house was one of the most important 
financial reforms ever submitted to Parliament, pertaining as it did to fifty-seven 
departments “hitherto the expenditure in them had been entirely without the sanction or 
even the cognizance of the House.” Now, for “the first time in the history of Parliament 
the House would have a control over the whole expenditure with the exception of the 
interest on the debt and some other charges, which amounted to about £2.5 million per 
year.101 
The Public Revenue and Consolidated Fund Charges Act is staid and apparently 
insignificant when compared to the majestic Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 
1866 with its creation of a true Audit Departments, allocation of salary decisions, and its 





harnessing of all estimating processes and departments to a single budgetary 
plough.102 Nevertheless, the Public Revenue Act became a pillar of Gladstone’s overall 
economic policy, and pragmatic enough to satisfy MPs uninterested in economical 
punditry. It was a practical and useful bill that failed to generate outrage, references to 
law officers, or three-night debates that entailed far-reaching unsolvable economic 
problems. As Chapter 7 will show, it was part of a long-term process by which the 
money men at the Treasury got control of the government, if not of the Bank, and held 
onto it until the World War I. 
 
Conclusion 
In a letter to his wife, Gladstone quoted a comment by George Cornewall Lewis, 
the man who succeeded him in 1855. Gladstone had been told that Lewis said, “It is a 
pity Gladstone puts so much heat, so much irritability into business. Now I am as cool 
as a fish.” To which Gladstone commented: 
 
The worst of being as cool as a fish is that you never get great things done, you 
effect no improvements and you carry no reforms, against the lethargy or 
selfishness of men and the tyranny of old custom.103 
Gladstone put heat into his battle with the Bank in order to convince the 
governors and directors that he was serious about reform. Clapham has admitted that 
the cool fish Lewis took advantage of Gladstone’s heat to maintain the new relationship 
between the government and the Bank that Gladstone had created. Gladstone, who 
always refused a baronetcy or higher title, who lost his temper on occasion, and who 
                                                 
102The bill was read for the third time and passed on Monday, 3 July 1854; Hansard’s, 
cxxxiv:1027.  
103Morley, Gladstone 1:519. 
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claimed he was no diplomat, had begun to claw away some of the confines in which 
earlier governments had placed themselves. In doing so he had found new freedom of 
government action in finance. His efforts would bear fruit, but the small successes he 
claimed in Aberdeen’s government only whetted his appetite to achieve more. As the 
next chapter shows, his frustrations of being out of office and being held partially 
accountable for the failure of the Crimean War w ere to become a double goad to force 
him back into office again, and, to challenge the Bank of England again. 
 
Gladstone’s Reading 
This thesis has already mentioned a few of the books Gladstone read during this 
period, such as the Colt manual that gave Jenkins such problems. The year 1853 
shows us a continuation of the reading he had already begun on taxation and finance. 
The table that follows lists books on accounting, the Bank of England, the budget, the 
civil service, currency, the national debt, and other topics we would expect to find in 
Gladstone’s library. He also did extensive reading on war. The list that appears here, 
however, is but a small percentage of his reading during his first chancellorship: he read 
novels, plays, and a good deal of religious literature. Given his reading list, his family life 
and travel, his continuing interest in Oxford education, and other problems, it becomes 
harder and harder to isolate two minds of Gladstone: he either operated out of one 
large, fully integrated mind, or bounced back and forth among several very small and 
loosely related ones. He rubbed his wife’s breasts to help her milk flow after every birth. 
He taught Tasso to his eldest son and daughter. He corresponded with dons and 
bishops. He began overhauling government finance. 
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 As this chapter has shown, one could hardly call the financial operations of a 
strong European nation to be one-dimensional or simple. The spirit malt duties are only 
one example of a problem that went on from year to year and involved several aspects, 
such as import duties, distilling, cattle feed, transportation, and foreign policy. The soap 
duties became a national crusade. After Crimea, Gladstone could have taken the Peel 
approach and settled down on the opposition bench in silence for the rest of his life. If 
the idea ever occurred to him, it occurred in the gap between one book and the next.104 
He would be chancellor again, through his own efforts and those of his growing public: 
forgiven for his follies, excused for sailing too close to the wind, and uncondemned for 
expecting revenues where none had appeared. His reading seems to have helped him 
weather the storms. 
                                                 
104A selection of the books he read on war is included because of implications for the cost of war. 
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Table 6: Gladstone’s Reading, 1852-1855 
 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Accounting William T. Thompson Tables of Interest (1853) 12 Jul 1854 Accounting 
and Trade Accounting John Caldecott A Practical Guide … to Bookkeeping by Double Entryb (1851) 17 Nov 1855 
Anonymous Two Letters to Sir Robert Peel on his Proposed Banking Measures; by an Ex MP (1844) 25 Apr 1853 
Hansard’s xxxiii, 264 Bank Debate of 1816 on Secrecy and Political Partiality of Directors,  12 May 1854 Bank of England 
Hansard’s Original Charter of Bank Act of 1694 (1694) 16 Nov 1854 
Banking James W. Gilbart The Elements of Banking (1852) 30 Mar 1854 
Banking The Economist Capital, Currency and Banking; Being a Collection from The Economist (1847) 29 Nov 1854 
Banking Revue des Deux Mondes Banking (Vol. 18) 14 Dec 1854 
Banking Anonymous The Bank in 1847 (ndp) 1 May 1854 
Banking Parliamentary Papers, xxxii. (1816),264 On Secrecy and Political Partiality of Directors 12 May 1854 
Currency New Quarterly Review Gold (review of publications on gold) 1 (1852) 31 Mar 1853 
Currency William Newmarch The New Supplies of Gold: Facts and Statements, Relative to their Actual Amount; and … Effects (1853) 29 Mar 1854 
Currency A. Milward The Decimal Coinage. A Letter to Gladstone Advocating the Issue of the Five Farthing Piece (1853) 5 Dec 1853 
Currency Henry Thornton An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802) 30 Mar 1854 
Currency William Thompson Decimal Numeration and … Coinage (1854) 17 Jul 1854 
Currency Hamer Standfeld The Currency Act of 1844, the Cause of the Panic of October 1847 (1854) 5 Oct 1854 
Currency William Frederick Spackman 
The Commercial Barometer from 1845 to 1853, Showing the Operation of the 
Present System of Currency (1853) 10 Dec 1853 
Currency A. Millard The Decimal Coinage. A Letter to … the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1853) 5 Dec 1853 




Currency E. Ryley 
Decimal Coinage. A Brief Comparison of the Existing Coins and Money on 
Account, of that Proposed by the Decimal Committee, and Against Another 
System (1853) 
6 Jan 1854 
Budget Quarterly Review, Croker Disraeli’s Budget xcii (1852) 11 Jan 1853 
Budget C. T. Trevelyan Manuscript on the Permanent Civil Services and Public Accounts (nd) 26 Jan 1853 Government 
Finance Budget J. M. Bineau “Rapport fait au nom du comite de finances sur le projet du budget rectifie des despenses et des recettes de l’excice” (1848) 10 Feb 1853 
   (table continues) 
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Table 6 (continued). 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Budget Hansard’s Henry Goulburn’s Financial Statement (1846) 4 Sept 1854 
Budget Hansard’s Parliamentary (Budget &c.) Debates (1793-6) 20 Mar 1854 
Budget Spencer Perceval Perceval’s Correspondence with the Bank (1809-1810) 19 May 1854 
Nat. Debt R. Hamilton Inquiry Concerning the Rise and Progress, Redemption … and the Management of the National Debt (1813) 26 Feb 1853 
Nat. Debt J. J. Grellier The History of the National Debt, from 1688 to the Beginning of 1800 (1810) 15 Apr 1854 
Taxation C. Babbage Thoughts on the Principles of Income Tax, 3rd ed. (1852) 5 Jan 1852 
Taxation John Ramsay MacCulloch A Treatise on the Principles and Practical Influence of Taxation and the Funding System (1843) 26 Jan 1853 
Taxation John Gorham Maitland Property and Income Tax. The Present State of the Question (1853) 27 Jan 1853 
Taxation Jelinger Cookson Symons A Scheme of Direct Taxation for 1853 (1853) 11 Feb 1853 
Taxation The Economist Income Tax 97 (1853) 29 Mar 1853 
Taxation Sir J. Kingsmill Taxation in Ireland in Connection with the Extension of the Property and Income Tax Acts to that Kingdom (1853) 7 Mar 1853 
Taxation The Economist Newspaper Stamps 98 (1853) 25 Mar 1854 
Taxation James Emerson Tennent Wine, its Use and Taxation. An Inquiry into the Operation of the Wine Duties on Constitution and Revenue (1855) 
25 Apr 1853 
[sic] 
Taxation Henry Court (Major) A Review of Income Tax in its Relation to the National Debt (1853) 10 Jun 1853 
Taxation John Ramsay MacCulloch  Historical and Critical Remarks upon the Tariff (1787) 24 Jun 1853 
Taxation A Citizen of Westminster The Land Tax, its Origin, Progress, and Inequality Stated in a Letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, … by a Citizen of Westminister (1837?) 23 Jul 1853 
Taxation William Taylor History of Taxation of England (1853) 21 Jul 1854 




Taxation Blackwood’s Edinburgh Review Income Tax Reform lxxiii (1853) 18 Feb 1853 
John Ramsay MacCulloch An Essay on the Circumstances which Determine the Rate of Wages and the Conditions of the Labouring Classes (1837) 10 Mar 1854 
James Mill Elements of Political Economy (1837) 7 Jan 1853 
Leon Faucher Dictionnarie de l’Economie Politique (1855) 12 Jan 1855 Political Economy 
John Ramsay MacCulloch “Life of Adam Smith,” Introduction to the MacCulloch edition of Wealth of Nations (1828) 11 Jul 1855 
  (table continues) 
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Table 6 (continued). 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
C. J. B. Ridell Remarks on the Organization of the British Royal Artillery (1852) 7 Dec 1852 
J. Ferguson “The Peril of Portsmouth; or, French Fleets and English Ports” (1852) 4 Feb 1853 
Richard Cobden How Wars are got up in India: The Origin of the Burmese War (1853) 18 Aug 1853 
Quarterly Review The War 21 (1855) 17 Jan 1855 
The Economist Army Reform 101 (1855) 3 May 1855 
Cost of War: War 
The Economist The War 101 (1855) 17 Jan 1855 
Notes: 
aAll date references are to Volume 3 of the Diaries. Within a Topic, the publications are listed in the order in which Gladstone recorded reading 
them (right-hand column). 
bDouble-entry book-keeping was an important topic in nineteenth-century reform. See Double Entry Bookkeeping. Also see Bruce G. Carruthers, 
Wendy Espeland, “Accounting for Rationality: Double-entry Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality,” The American Journal of Sociology 
97, no. 1 (July 1991): 31-69. The authors argue that accounting is a form of rhetoric in which the writer (or accountant, manager or chancellor of the 










OUT OF OFFICE AGAIN, 1855-1859 
Introduction 
For four years after he left Palmerston’s first government, Gladstone thought 
about, worried about, and almost tasted another term in office and another chance to 
work on finance. To say he fretted is to put his mental anguish mildly. Yet having left 
Palmerston behind over a perceived lack of policy, he refused to join Lord Derby’s 
conservative government with its promise of a gathering of good men to get things 
done.  
It was during this period that Gladstone wrote his financial “plan,” noted by 
Matthew. Matthew suggests that Gladstone accomplished every step of this plan when 
he next came into office, but I disagree. I contend that this plan was as important for the 
things that Gladstone did not accomplish as it is for the things Gladstone did. 
 
A Statesman Out of Office 
The period between the Aberdeen government and the second Palmerston 
government, the period described in this chapter, marks the effective end of Peelite 
power, the end of Whig power, the continued weakness of the remaining conservatives, 
and the rising importance of the liberals; thus, it is a period in which every government 
was required to be a coalition, and therefore potentially weak. Several problems 
haunted Gladstone: The first was the damage done to himself and his friends by the 
continued publication of books blaming them for the Crimean War. The second was the 
damage which the Palmerston and Derby governments did to finance in their efforts to 
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pay off the costs of the war and the remaining debts of the war. The third was whether 
any party or government would have both the political strength and economic acuity to 
reintroduce fiscal reform. The fourth was whether he (Gladstone) would be part of that 
party or government.  
Torn by all these considerations, Gladstone became his own man at last. The 
sweet dreams of Peelite power eroded rapidly in the face of competition between almost 
equally weak governments. He felt himself slipping into the liberal party, almost as if the 
Peelites were pulling him along, but with no actual desire to return to the conservative or 
Tory party. Gladstone has been described as fretful and confused, but so were the 
nation, and the two governments that served in this period. In fact, he was emerging not 
as a good party member, but as a strong, numerate politician around which a party 
might coalesce. When that party did coalesce, some of the mottoes on its banner would 
be ideas from the Peel legacy, and some that were purely Gladstone in origin. 
The parties of the later 1850s, led by Palmerston on the one side and Lord the 
fourteenth Earl of Derby on the other, courted Gladstone. Palmerston’s first government 
in 1855, immediately following Aberdeen’s, included Gladstone as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer for nearly three weeks before he and two of his friends resigned in 1855. 
Derby also wanted Gladstone, but Disraeli stood in Gladstone’s way at the Exchequer, 
the only office either of them wanted.1 Some of his angst during this period stemmed 
from his fear that George Cornewall Lewis and Benjamin Disraeli, Chancellors of the 
Exchequer for Palmerston and Derby respectively, would return to the borrow-and-
                                                
1Shannon, Gladstone 1:305, n.3. When Gladstone resigned from Palmerston’s first government in 
1855, Robertson Gladstone took over his father’s job of criticizing William. “It does not appear, admitting 
you had some cause, you were fully justified in going out of office …”  
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spend habits of former administrations, kow-tow to the Bank of England, and drive the 
country deeper in debt.  
In February 1856, a year after he resigned from Palmerston’s government, 
Gladstone wrote a plan for reorganizing the economic and financial government of the 
nation.2 It was barely a plan, incompletely expressed, more of a wish list, with no 
recommendations for the ways in which items of the plan should be carried out. He also 
wrote a memorandum to Aberdeen, stating that the Peelite power was primarily financial 
and recommending that the Peelites as a whole stay out of any potentially weak 
government unless they could bring their financial knowledge and management to bear 
on that government.3 These two documents support the general historiography of the 
Peelites and Gladstone in this period. Gladstone was still, in his heart, a Peelite, with 
nowhere to go, unless he went nearer to Palmerston. Matthew is correct: Gladstone 
literally ached to be back in office. Matthew characterized this as an uncharacteristic 
mid-Victorian attitude. Though he was courted by both sides, Gladstone could find no 
leverage point from which to vault himself into office, especially the Exchequer.  
 
The Palmerston and Derby Governments 
The period from 1855 to 1859 was for Gladstone an aloof, ascetic period in which 
he attended Parliament, managed to get himself elected when necessary,4 and spoke 
                                                
2Gladstone, Diaries 5:16/2/56; Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 106. Matthew calls it a “great 
programme of measures to be passed through when next in office.” The program is anything but. 
Gladstone knew very well that each item on the list required a change in Treasury operation, negotiation, 
carefully written legislation, or …all three, and that some items might meet extensive opposition. 
3Letter to Aberdeen, Gladstone, Diaries 5:13/3/56. During the crisis over a replacement for the 
Aberdeen government, Gladstone often maintained that the Peelites would only enter the government if 
Aberdeen led it, or if a place were found for him. When neither of these eventuated, Gladstone mourned, 
“how can we have an Aberdeen government without Aberdeen?” and later, “you are still our spiritual 
leader.” 
4Jenkins, Gladstone, A Biography, 163. Gladstone was defeated at Oxford in 1865 after serving 
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on the topics that interested or irritated him. These were few, most notably the problems 
associated with married women, their property, and divorce. With circumspection, he 
avoided trouble or public notice whenever possible, wrote on Greek classics, publishing 
his study of Homer, traveled with his family, gathered with Peelite friends, and 
apparently lay in wait. He rebuffed both parties. Jenkins says that Palmerston was 
terrified of Gladstone out of office because of his power to bring down a government.5 
Gladstone’s brief membership in Lord Palmerston’s government in 1855 came after a 
good deal of mental anguish. “Was the Aberdeen Cabinet without Lord Aberdeen one in 
which I could place confidence? I answer no.” 6 He later changed his mind, with 
Aberdeen’s help, writing:  
 
I repeated again that Lord Aberdeen’s declaration of confidence enabled me to 
see my way to joining. I hoped also that the formation of the Cabinet in this 
manner on the strength and by the means of his expressed judgment would tend 
to place him [Aberdeen] before the public eye in the high position he deserves to 
hold.7 
Gladstone’s notes on cabinet selection and meetings for the Palmerston 
government are detailed. Matthew rightly decided that reproducing these notes in or 
near their entirety would explain the tangled thoughts not only of Gladstone but of 
Aberdeen, Argyll, Graham, Herbert, and even Palmerston. From Gladstone’s notes 
Palmerston appears to have been panicked over the twin problems of taking over the 
war and running a country at the same time. Gladstone did what he could. During the 
two-and-a-half weeks that he was in office as Palmerston’s Chancellor of the 
                                                                                                                                                          
for nearly twenty years. 
5Jenkins, Gladstone, A Biography, 207 
6Gladstone, Diaries 5:5/2/55. The quote is from a political memorandum he wrote on that day. 
The letters (numbered 25-35) are in Philip Guedalla, Gladstone and Palmerston, Being the 
Correspondence of Lord Palmerston with Mr. Gladstone, 1851-1865 (New York & London: Harper & 
Brothers, 1928). 
7Gladstone, Diaries 5:6/2/55. 
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Exchequer, Gladstone introduced the supplemental ordinance estimate and attended “a 
small and very pleasant party” at Lord Overstone’s. Then, 
 
Yesterday we had our first Cabinet. It did not relieve the gloom of my 
impressions. Though it was a first Cabinet we were as I reported to Graham in 
the evening more Acephalous than ever; less order, less unity of purpose: 
Charles Wood had twice cried ‘Will the Cabinet decide something upon some 
point?’ Palmerston, though he had appeared more eveille [attentive or sprightly] 
than usual, had taken no lead. He introduced to the Cabinet three subjects: one 
the recal [sic] of Lord Raglan, which he tossed among us, without clear broad or 
strong views of his own, as if for what change might bring …8 
After three weeks of apparent wrangling without purpose, the three Peelites 
resigned. When they did, Gladstone lost his chance to further reform in government and 
to further his plans for reform in the relationship between the government and the Bank 
of England. 
As the Palmerston government grew away from Gladstone, finance was not the 
only thing that slipped out of his hands. Administrative reform was taking place without 
him. Where it had taken place under his auspices (as when Gladstone authorized the 
Northcote-Trevelyan study in 1852 that the Russell government had previously turned 
down), George Cornewall Lewis allocated praise away from Gladstone and the Peelites. 
“One of the great state papers of the nineteenth century,” the Northcote-Trevelyan 
Report was produced for Gladstone and delivered to him in November 1853, two 
months before he left office. Gladstone read it while he trained his daughter Agnes in 
Tasso and did Latin with his second son Stephy. At the same time he was also reading 
a work on decimal coinage, a selection of Horace Walpole’s letters, and some chapters 
of Pride and Prejudice. The Northcote-Trevalyan recommendations—competitive 
examinations and a central board for recruitment—seemed very sensible to Gladstone 
                                                
8Gladstone, Diaries 5:9/2/55. 
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but frightened the Queen. Conscious perhaps of the fright the report might give to 
legislators, the authors recommended that Customs, Inland, Revenue, and the Treasury 
should be let off from the full requirements of the paper. Gladstone had overridden this 
suggestion and from his chair at Exchequer had ruled that Customs, Inland Revenue, 
and the Treasury should be treated to the same rules as all the other departments in the 
government.9 
Yet when Lewis spoke on reform during the debate of 15-18 June, 1855, he 
listed the accomplishments of non-Peelites, and other governments than Aberdeen’s. 
Lewis focused on the work of 1848 and 1849 (Russell government) when Sir George 
Grey was Home secretary, Lewis was undersecretary, and Sir Charles Trevelyan was 
assistant secretary of the Treasury. In 1849 the Treasury had been reorganized under 
Trevelyan and Gibson Craig; revisions were made at the Colonial Office, both with good 
result. Under Lord Derby, in 1852, changes were made in several government offices in 
Dublin. Between 1852 and 1855, more changes took place in the War Office, Board of 
Trade, Poor Law Board, and Privy Council Office, Copyhold Enclosure and Tithes 
Commission, Board of Ordinance, Office of Works, Post Office, and the Board of 
Register General, but did not mention Peelite contributions. Lewis described civil 
service testing as a product of the Privy Council, not the Peelite government. The 
government, Lewis suggested, had survived and flourished without Gladstone.10 
                                                
9Gladstone, Diaries 3:30/6/42; Jenkins, Gladstone, A Biography, 165. Sir Stafford Henry 
Northcote had been Gladstone’s secretary in 1842. In 1853, Gladstone recorded “Much conv. with 
Northcote” and discussions with either Northcote or Sir Charles Trevelyan or both in the period 17-22 
November. The draft report reviewed by Gladstone suggested that Treasury, Customs, and Inland 





The Continuing War 
In searching for something else to do, Gladstone spent much of his time reading. 
Instead of soothing soothe his soul they seemed to fire it. He read William Newmarch’s 
Should the Money Required to pay the Expenses of the War be Raised by Loans or 
Taxes? (1855)11 and On the Loans Raised by Mr. Pitt … 1793-1801 (1855);12 reports of 
the war; and the monthly Bank of England bullion reports.13 In 1855 he both attended 
the hearings of the House of Commons committee on the war and read the reports.14 
He read two books by John William Crowe in the same day: Shadows of War (1856) 
and Our Army; or Penny Wise and Pound Foolish (1856).15  
The Aberdeen government had been brought down by a motion by a radical 
named Roebuck to have a commission examine the work of the Aberdeen government 
in managing the war. Roebuck’s tone had been clear: he intended to pillory the 
government, naming names and dishing out as much punishment as possible. Olive 
Anderson says the Peelites had an obvious reason for opposing Roebuck’s insistence 
on a House of Commons Committee. Newcastle, Graham, and Herbert had been heads 
of departments directly responsible for the war while Aberdeen led the government. She 
believes, however, that Gladstone took a rather different view. Rather than saving 
individual reputations, Gladstone worried more about separation of powers between the 
legislative branch of government in the House of Commons and the executive branch in 
the cabinet. She says Gladstone was already deeply involved in a patronage dispute 
                                                
11Gladstone, Diaries 5:12/2/55. 
12Ibid., 5:12/2/55. 
13Ibid., 5:6/3/55. 
14Ibid., 5:14/5/55, n. 8. He attended hearings on the 14th and 15th of May to hear testimony. He 




(over the summary dismissal of a Russell relative, J. T. Kennedy, from his position as 
commissioner of Woods and Forests) and the Whigs were attempting an uprising. To 
Gladstone, the encroachment of the legislative branch into an executive [cabinet] 
operation—the war—while the war was still being prosecuted by the executive branch, 
was a breach of the constitution; that through the cloud-screen of relations with the 
French dating back to 1792 and threats of parliamentary fact-finding groups sent to the 
war zone, the real problem was whether a government conducting a war should be 
immune from legislative enquiry.16 
Whatever the overriding reasons, the immediate aftermath of the war (1855-
1856) drove the Peelites back into each other’s arms, creating a fairly solid and 
consistent band of seven to ten men with enemies all around. Gladstone recorded 
meetings with Aberdeen and the rest of the Peelites and others all through May, 1855.17 
On June 5, 1855, he celebrated the fact that his eyes were becoming stronger when he 
traveled from Hawarden to London, by reading The Times and more minutes of the 
Sebastopol hearings.18 On the twenty-third, he again read evidence from the hearings 
and made a copy for Mrs. Herbert.19 On the twenty-fourth he recorded “Saw Lord 
Granville (2)—Sir J. Graham—E. Cardwell—Ld Aberdeen & conclave,” and then spoke 
“with my whole heart in the sense of peace, 10-12” and, “Read Sebastopol Evidence.”20 
                                                
16Anderson, Liberal State at War, 223-225. 
17Gladstone continued to be saddened and puzzled about the war throughout his life, a point we 
can see from his references. See Gladstone, Diaries 5:14/7/59, 6:26/8/63, 7:15/5/70, 8:21/12/74, 
9:6/11/76, 9:29/4/79,9:13/12/77. Gladstone dealt pretty crisply with the remnants of the War in the 1850s, 
rereading his own speeches of May and August 1855, but, to some extent, still reliving Crimea in the 
1870s, perhaps triggered by reading Sir Theodore Martin’s The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince 
Consort … with Portraits and Views (1875-1880). See idem, 9:25/11/78 when he wrote of his dislocated 
frame of mind and noted a letter of an apology to Tennyson for a misreading of “Maud” (Maud, and Other 
Poems, 1855), claiming distraction by the Crimean War. 
18Hansard’s, cxxxviii:1438. 
19Gladstone, Diaries 5:23/5/55. 
20Ibid.,5:24/5/55, n.1. Heathcote had made an amendment to Disraeli’s motion on negotiations. 
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The drama continued in parliamentary debate. On June 15, Gladstone returned 
to London after a short trip to Hawarden to find himself and the other Peelites accused 
of treason. Gladstone voiced his objection under parliamentary rules, and A. J. Otway, 
who had made the charge, was ruled out of order.21 Gladstone spoke later the same 
night on administrative reform.22 On 20 June, Gladstone read the final report of the 
Roebuck committee. It exonerated the army, but blamed the cabinet for failing to 
demonstrate sufficient foresight and planning.23 Still there was no end. In July, Roebuck 
entered a motion that the entire war cabinet (Aberdeen’s) be criticized for their handling 
of the war. On 16 July, Gladstone reported a conclave at Lord Aberdeen’s to work on 
“Eastern Papers.” On July 17, after what appear to have been lengthy negotiations, “We 
finally decided to oppose [Palmerston] Govt.” 
Parliament entered a new round of debate on the war over the Ottoman Loan in 
1855. The government supported it, but Gladstone did not, researching the problem of 
the 1854 convention signed by Britain, France, and Turkey,24 and speaking against it 
the following night.25 When the suggestion of the loan rose to the surface in 1855, Olive 
Anderson says many people began to remember sufficient numbers of Turkish blunders 
to restart earlier (1853-1854) the debate over Turkish credit. But she reports that the 
public and press now believed the war would last a long time, and the Turkish army was 
dissolving because they had not been paid. The Palmerston cabinet, buoyed by the loss 
of the foot-dragging Peelites in the cabinet, preached war at any cost. The foot-dragging 
                                                                                                                                                          
See also Hansard’s, cxxxviii:1036. 
21Ibid., 2036. 
22Ibid., cxxxviii:2098. 
23Parliamentary Paper ix, part 3:387. 
24Gladstone, Diaries 5:20/7/55, n.6. 
25Hansard’s, cxxxix:1226; Anderson, “Beginnings of Ottoman Debt,” 55. 
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Peelites, led by Gladstone, opposed them on the floor of the House of Commons 
whenever possible. The final, positive vote on the loan to the Ottomans took place in a 
“thin house” on July 20, nearly beaten by a combination of Peelites, conservatives, 
Manchester pacifists, and doctrinaire radicals. Anderson argues that the debate was not 
based on finance alone, but on old distrust of the French, and the high-handedness of 
the new government when compared to the incursions made by parliament into the 
operations of the previous one. Gladstone went further: lecturing the house on probable 
diplomatic and legal problems which he had thrashed out with the solicitor general. But 
the House, by a three-vote margin, and The Times with its implacable sense of right, 
won the argument. Once again, Gladstone had to be content.26 
By October 1855, some Peelites were reaching for closure. On the nineteenth, 
Gladstone recorded: “Milnes arrived [at Hawarden]: talks thunder & conflagration but 
gives up the War on its old grounds. Planned new bookcases for London.” Sidney 
Herbert arrived on the twentieth. Between sermons, children’s plays, and dinners, 
“Conv. with Herbert on War. We seem to be at nearly the same point to my great 
satisfaction … With Milnes on the War.”27 
 
The 1856 Gladstone Financial Plan 
Out of government, Gladstone nevertheless appears to have believed he would 
return to government and also to the Exchequer. In February he wrote and later 
amended a financial plan, or wish-list. This list caught Matthew’s attention, and, it 
appears, his imagination: “Even more uncharacteristic [than Gladstone’s wail of agony 
                                                
26Anderson, Liberal State at War, 225 
27Gladstone, Diaries 5:19-22/10/55. 
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to Wilberforce about wasting the best years of his life] was Gladstone’s action in 
drawing up in opposition (in February 1856) a great programme of measures to be 
passed through when next in office.”28 Gladstone’s memorandum comprises a host of 
somewhat related but unequal tasks that, if completed, would have required 
coordination from the Treasury, Inland Revenue, Customs, the cabinet, and the House 
of Commons, performing as a single team. The major victim of the plan would have 
been the Bank of England, and in this we see that Gladstone was not through fighting 
the Bank. The list is complex and appears to be internally contradictory. We can 
understand parts of it immediately, in its calls for redress in taxes. But it contained three 
basically constitutional changes: destruction of the Exchequer, creation of a new 
minister and “ministry of finance,” and nationalization of one half of the Bank of England. 
Gladstone was far from finished either with reform or with the Bank of England. 
 
The First List 
To understand this list and its importance, I have thought it best to reproduce it in 
Gladstone’s words and punctuation.29  The sentences in italics are Sir James Graham’s 
comments, written later in the year: 
 
1 To abolish the Exchequer, at the same time strengthening and accelerating 
the Audit? Yes, reorganise audit. 
Gladstone did not record his reasons for wishing to abolish the ancient 
Exchequer, but they are not difficult to find.30 He had been reading on French finance 
                                                
28Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874: 106. Unfortunately Matthew did not say why he found this list 
uncharacteristic. 
29Gladstone, Diaries 5:19/10/55 to 5:22/10/55 and n.18, “Memorandum of Finance.” Every item in 
the original list ends in a question mark. 
30Roseveare, The Treasury, 27-29, 42, 74-75, 112, 140. The Exchequer was reformed for the first 
time in the thirteenth century; in the nineteenth century it was well known for its resistance to change and 
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and recognized in it a more modern scheme of organization than the British system. 
Reform in the British government outside the Exchequer was taking place rapidly, but 
the Exchequer almost seemed immune from change: it continued to breathe the air of 
moth and mildew. Gladstone had attended many Exchequer meetings, and, dismayed 
with clutter, delay, and elderly supernumeraries, wandering vaguely through the halls. 
The fact that he always attended Exchequer meetings and sat on the court at one time 
speak for his attention to detail and tradition, but did not lessen his interest in reform.31 
 
2 To bring the Chancery and all other accounts for which the public are virtually 
liable under the controul of the Finances Department? Yes. Expect Chancery 
opposition. 
This operation was already in train. Government reorganization had proceeded to 
the point of evaluating each department, examining its personnel needs previous to 
establishing civil service examinations, and producing a list of exam topics that would 
provide the departments with the men and procedures they required, including double-
entry bookkeeping, languages, letter writing, and other skills.32 
 
3 To apply to the miscellaneous Estimates the same rules of voting and 
revoting as have already been applied to the Military Estimates? Important--
should not be delayed. 
This requirement was an extension of Gladstone’s Public Revenues and 
Consolidated Funds Act of 1856. It would require the House of Commons to spend even 
more time on the estimates than had been required by the 1854 Act. 
                                                                                                                                                          
its lack of accountability to parliament. Eventually, the Exchequer was required to give up control of loans 
to the government, and to subsume itself into the Audit Office. In 1834, the burning of the last set of 
Exchequer tallies, long planks of wood with notches representing Exchequer borrowing, and used until 
the sixteenth century, led to the destruction of the Houses of Parliament by fire. Roseveare suggests 
playfully that the Exchequer tallies took revenge on the House of Commons for earlier reforms. 
31Gladstone, Diaries, 4:25/2/53, 4:7/6/53. Gladstone took his duties seriously. 
32Double Entry Bookkeeping, 301-314. 
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4 To define the position of the Bank as the agent of the State with respect to 
Dividends and management of the Debt? Yes. But Bank will resist[,] rallying 
the money Interest to its aid. 
This item was to be one of the great sticking points in Gladstone’s next 
chancellorship. To change this relationship would require an overhaul of the Bank’s 
charter and possibly a restructuring of the Company of the Bank of England by its own 
profit-intent Court of Directors. The Bank of England had been formed in the same 
period as the British East India Company, and after the fall of the BEI Company in 1857, 
was to remain the only remnant of the great Company era.33 To turn a private 
corporation into an “agent of the government” (and presumably subject to government 
control) would require a very public overhaul of the charter, and possibly years of 
wrangling, with all the old faults and promises of the Bank dragged out for yet another 
re-enactment. Gladstone later told Morley that only a strong chancellor with a solid 
government majority could afford to change the government’s position vis-à-vis the 
Bank of England.34 One problem was always the Bank’s loans to the government. 
Another was the fact that even when others took up the loan in the form of purchase of 
annuities, bills, and bonds, the Bank of England managed the payment of interest on 
these loans and government buy-outs when the government terminated a specific type 
of loan. Gladstone’s intent to turn the Bank into an “agent of the State with respect to 
Dividends and management of the Debt” has not been defined. 
 
5 To make further provision for true periodical statements of the Debt of the 
country on Saving Bank and other like accounts and for the liquidation of the 
same in case of need? Yes, think Legislation may be needless, administrative 
authority sufficient. 
                                                
33Between 1833 and 1855, the Bank Charter had been renewed twice, in 1833 (3 & 4 William IV, 
c.98) and in 1844 (7 & 8 Victoria, c. 32). 
34Morley, Gladstone 1:518-519, 650-651. 
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The Bank of England was not the only government creditor. The savings banks, 
Scottish banks, joint-stock banks, some private banks, and many individuals were also 
creditors. A report of this type would have kept the government’s debt information in 
front of all interested creditors as well as the general public. 
 
6 To regulate and limit the powers of the Minister of Finance in regard to the 
use of Deficiency Bills and Cons.[olidated] Fund Bills and the monies of the 
Comm[issione]rs for the redemption of the national debt? ‘I doubt the policy of 
stringent legislative prohibitions. Unforeseen circs. may render the prompt 
exercise of these powers necessary: but when exercised early publicity with 
its attendant responsibilities should be enforced by law.[‘]35  
This item became an element in the Act of 1866. 
 
7 To make further provision for efficient departmental aid and counsel to the 
Minister of Finance and for the compilation and continuance of proper 
Financial Records? Is against Bureaucratic Wishes the C. of E. [chancellor of 
exchequer] to have aid of ‘efficient subordinates’. 
The reforms of the mid-Victorian period that gave the chancellor efficient aid and 
council led to what Henry Roseveare calls the great days of the Treasury, a period that 
would last fifty years, and which was generally considered an unfortunate excursion into 
alternate approaches to civil service management.36 
 
8 To investigate the question [of] what nearer relation shd. be established 
between the British Govt. and the management of Indian Finance. ‘Indian 
receipt and expenditure virtually British in the last resort and should be so 
regarded and controuled[‘.]37 
This problem was directly faced after the Mutiny. 
                                                
35Matthew does not explain why this one item is opened with a single quote, but closes it anyway. 
Gladstone, Diaries 5:105-106. 
36Roseveare, Treasury, 125. Henry Roseveare asserted that “What was needed was something 
more fundamental than Exchequer reform; nothing less than a complete re-planning of national 
accounting …” The result was a plan, slow to begin but gathering momentum throughout the nineteenth 
century, that led to total Treasury control over all departments. Roseveare argues that one of the highest 
expressions of this is in the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866. 
37This was written before the Indian Mutiny of 1857. After the Mutiny, the British Government 
removed the British East India Company and replaced it with government officials and government 
budgeting, moving its finances into the mainstream of the British budget. See the budgets in Chapter 7. 
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9 To provide for the extension of the existing (3-1/2 and ?) 2-1/2 per cent 
Stocks? If without serious shock to credit 3% cd. be converted into 2-1/2, the 
advantage wd. be very important: especially as the present tendency of 
money to increase in quantity and to decrease in value. 
Given Gladstone’s problems in 1853—those of issuing new bills at two and a half 
per cent—he would have been wise to test the feeling of the market, perhaps by talking 
to his correspondents among the bankers or his dining companions Lord Overstone38 or 
Baron Rothschild before he did so.39 
 
10 For the abolition of the Paper Duty? Desirable. 
This item depends entirely on what Gladstone meant by paper duties. The Stamp 
Duty was repealed in July 1855 and replaced with a postage charge based on weight 
(which affected The Times because of its bulk, more than it did other papers). Repeal of 
the newspaper duty occurred in 1861. 
 
11 For the reduction of the Wine Duty? If reduction small, the effect will be 
insignificant: if large, malt and Spirits revenue will be affected. Wine will be for 
this generation the luxury of the rich: does not feel the necessity urgent. 
 
12 For the reduction of the Malt Sugar and Coffee Duties? [No comment.] 
 
13 For the reduction and equalisation of duties of Insurance and other Stamp 
Duties? Cries aloud for immediate cons[ideratio]n. 
 
14 For the increase of Income Tax 1857-60 but with descent and extinction in the 
latter year? ‘To insure a pacific policy and an economical Expenditure, the 
early cessation of the Income Tax is for the best security the most powerful 
lever for operating on the public mind in this direction. If we are not involved in 
a fresh war this will be a grand subject for debate in the approaching 
Session’. 
                                                
38Gladstone, Diaries 14:159, 14:460. Gladstone read several works of Samuel Jones Loyd, Lord 
Overstone. Jones Loyd first appears in the Diaries in 1853. It is, however, strange that neither Buxton, 
who had a good deal of interest in all Gladstone’s financial thinking, and Morley, who paid close attention 
to Gladstone’s friendships, should never have mentioned Loyd. Buxton had no interest in currency, and 
his references to the Bank of England focus on suspension of the 1844 Bank Charter Act in 1857, and 
changes in accounts with the Bank of England. See Buxton, Finance and Politics 1: 88, 165; 2: 17. Morley 
mentions only the Bank Charter Act of 1833: Morley, Gladstone 3, 300; and conflicts with the Bank 1: 
518-519, 650-651. 
39See Gladstone, Diaries 14:221.Gladstone appears to have met Baron Nathan de Rothschild for 




15 For the extention and increase of the House Duty [house tax] upon the 
determination of the Income Tax?’ If the Inc. Tax be remitted a duty on 
H[ouses] to a larger extent is a fair substitute. Graduation in an I. T. is the 
incline wh. hurries to spoliation. Graduation of an H. T. is self imposed acc. to 
the means of the occupant and a tax on the dwelling acc. to valuation within 
moderate limits is fairest and best mode of getting at “the means and 
substance” of each head of a family[‘.] 
 
16 To make further provision for the absorption of the Private Note Circulation? 
‘16-19 bear on the double question of Banking & Currency. I am disposed to 
think that the time has arrived when a new settlement with the B. of E. is 
necessary and the whole of these questions must be duly consd. and 
determined. A strong Govt. would legislate without a Commn of Inquiry. A 
weak one will seek for time.40 
 
17 To authorise at certain rates of interest the issue of Notes upon the deposit of 
Govt. Securities in lieu of the deposit of bullion. 
This item refers to the relationship between the issue of notes backed by bullion 
and issue backed by government securities. Legislation would have been required to 
change the operation of the 1844 act. 
 
18 To pay off the Bank Debt by the issue of Notes and to put an end to the 
privileges of the Bank in regard to issue, retaining its agency and machinery 
for the public issue? 
This paragraph also requires a good deal of definition. First, it should be restated 
in the order in which legislation and government action would be required: 1) to put an 
end to issue by the Bank of England entirely, and possibly by all other banks of issue; 2) 
to purchase the agency and machinery used by the Bank for currency issue, hire the 
workers, and set up production of notes backed by government securities, not gold; 3) 
to pay off the debt owed by the government to the Bank by issuing sufficient currency to 
pay the Bank of England. Second, for the Bank to accept payment, an Act revoking the 
                                                
40In fact, the Bank Charter came up for renewal in 1857, and although a significant amount of 
debate called for drastic changes to Bank operation and the law as expressed in 1844, no significant 
changes were made to the Bank’s privileges and responsibilities. See Chapter 7. 
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use of Bank notes as legal tender and instating the use of government notes as legal 
tender would be required. The Bank would thus find itself holding millions of pounds in 
government notes as the only recompense for decades of patient lending and inspired 
coercion against the government. The uproar involved, the dangers both to internal 
commerce and international commerce, and the strongly held belief in gold as real 
money, would have to be overcome by strong government action. 
Further, the question must be raised as to how this clause relates to item 4, 
making the Bank an agent of the state. One wonders which alternative Gladstone 
preferred. 
 
19 To authorise issue of notes for the public account to a certain limit beyond the 
present one without deposit? 
 
20 To investigate the practicability and economy of resuming the issue of notes 
below £5 convertible into gold at the Bank and its branches, and to be legal 
tender in payment of taxes? 
Gladstone’s earlier item, number 18, suggests that the government should take 
over the machinery and possibly the personnel of the Bank related to issue. To do this, 
the government would have had to confiscate and melt the Bank’s note plates. The 
government would also create its own plates, and could easily create £1 and £5 notes, 
possibly to huge public delight. 
21 To approximate to an equalisation of the issues at the different periods of the 
year as far as may be by relieving the ends/beginnings of each quarter.41 
                                                
41This is the most ‘technical’ of the technical issues to which Matthew refers. Accounts were paid 
quarterly. Those owing money to the government paid in legal tender: gold or Bank of England notes. The 
government paid in a variety of ways. The result was always a drain of gold and Bank notes paid into 
various accounts. Several authors, including Thomas Tooke, An Inquiry into the Currency Principle 
(1844), 121-122, recommended staggering the payments to control the temporary currency and gold 
drains. Tooke saw two specific problems. First, he wrote that promoters of the Currency Principle thought 
any person who held a Bank of England note would be anxious to get rid of it, by turning it in to the Bank 
at the earliest moment. Second, that the amount of notes held by the public was determined by the 
specific purposes for which the public intended use the notes. Neither argument held true in practice. 
Many people held Bank of England notes as a convenience, a thing of value easily hidden and less likely 
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This item appears to refer to the periodicity of cash flow in the nation. 
Professional salaries were paid and tradesmen’s accounts were paid at the end of the 
quarter and taxes were also due. Salaries could be paid in cheques, gold coins, other 
coins, or paper currency. Taxes could not: by law taxes were paid in legal tender, and 
for most of Britain that meant Bank of England notes (or notes from an Irish or Scotch 
bank allowed to issue legal tender). Taxes were deposited by regional banks into the 
Bank of England or Bank of Ireland to the credit of the consolidated funds. 
 
The Second List 
On the following Wednesday (20 February), Gladstone rephrased his memo, in a 
more unified version: 
 
1 To complete the construction of a real department of Finance. 
2 To determine and define the position of the Bank as the Agent of the State 
with regard to public account Loans and dividends. 
3 [Numbered 3 in the draft] To determine the rules of issue. 
4 To readjust taxation--especially with reference to the juncture of 1860. 
5 [Also numbered 3 in the draft] To bring all really public accounts under the 
controul of the Treasury. 
6 To make further provision for the custody and management of monies in the 
hands of the public: and for the security of depositors in Savings Banks and 
the like. 
 
Permanent advisors. 1. Master of the Mint. 2. Comptroller of the N. D. 
[National Debt] Office. 3. First Clerk (hereafter Sec. or A[ssistant] Sec.) 
Revenue Room.42  
                                                                                                                                                          
to theft or pilfering than an equivalent amount of gold, and easy to use in an emergency. Second, Bank 
notes were the only legal tender in Britain, and therefore much needed when quarter day arrived with its 
tax, mortgage, and other payments and the settlement of accounts wit h high-ticket vendors such as 
tailors, drapers, carriage makers, and other suppliers of luxuries. 




Five categories of change emerge from the memoranda: (1) taxation and tax 
collection, (2) repeal of more customs and excise duties, (3) constitutional changes to 
the Exchequer and Treasury, (4) alterations to the management process or the National 
Debt, (5) changes to the organization and management of the Bank of England. 
 
Taxation and Tax Collection 
Gladstone wanted to end the income tax in 1860—The “juncture of 1860.”43 He 
wished to replace the income tax with another, equally dependable, and easily 
collectable tax. Sir James Graham’s comments suggest that he agreed on the house 
tax as a levy that represented actual wealth and taxability, relieving the poorest, and 
presumably all renters, from paying. A canon in emerging liberalism, however, was that 
payment of taxes should be direct and that people should understand the costs of war, 
the poor, and other problems faced by the government.44  
 
Repeal of More Customs and Excise Duties 
The lists of taxable and dutied items had already been dramatically reduced. 
Here, Gladstone was taking the next logical step. Taxes on alcoholic beverages and the 
duties on hops and malt became political problems in Gladstone’s later administrations. 
                                                
43Buxton, Finance and Politics 1:189-217, “1860.” 
44C. F. Bastable, “The Rule of Taxation for Revenue as a Canon of Public Finance,” The 
Economic Journal 13, no. 52 (December 1903), 505-510; Leone Levi, “On the Distribution and 
Productiveness of Taxes with Reference to the Prospective Amelioration of the Public Revenue of the 
United Kingdom,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 23, no. 1 (March 1860), 37-65; Leone Levi, 
“Statistics of the Revenue in the United Kingdom from 1859-82, in Relation to the Distribution of 
Taxation,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 47, no. 1 (March 1884), 1-33. 
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All fell foul of various temperance organizations; in addition, legislation on malt was 
particularly difficult because it could also be used to feed cattle.45  
 
Constitutional Changes to the Exchequer and Treasury 
This group of changes encompasses both the cabinet and the House of 
Commons. The designation of “Finance Minister,” used to distinguish it from other 
offices such as “chancellor,” “first lord,” and “secretary,” suggests a massive overhaul of 
positions, offices, and public opinion. One sees how “a real department of Finance.” 
would reshape people’s expectations both of the way money was collected and the way 
it was spent. In a relatively small kingdom a centralized taxing agency would have 
streamlined tax collection, reducing costs, while making revenues more secure through 
consistent estimation, delivery, and audit. A reorganized finance department might even 
have been ordered to pay close attention to agricultural and manufacturing downturns 
with a view toward readjusting  expenditures to match revenue expectations. The House 
of Commons would have been required to change its own procedures to allow for 
changes in the way that money bills are voted. 
On the other hand, the budget process would have required far more 
parliamentary debate, compromising other bills, especially those private bills which 
increasingly clogged parliamentary arteries. In the 1840s and 1850s, Gladstone already 
worried about the time required to process bills. In the 1850s and 1860s, the supply lists 
                                                
45Temperance workers paid strict attention to customs and excise laws on drink. They saw 
taxation as a reasonable way to remove liquor from the hands of working men and to end the evils 
caused by drink. See A. E. Dingle, “Drink and Working Class Living Standards in Britain, 1870-1914,” The 
Economic History Review, new series 25, no. 4 (November 1972), 608-622; Henry Higgs, “Workmen’s 
Budgets,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 56, no. 2 (June 1893), 255-294; J. E. Williams, “The 




expanded dramatically, and ministers attempted to throw out private bills as sessions 
lengthened. When Gladstone became prime minister, his cabinet regularly cut out bills 
that could not be passed in a normal session.46 
 
Changes in National Debt Management 
These changes would have limited or ended unauthorized government loans. 
When Gladstone first ascended to the Chancellor’s chair, the national debt was already 
a nine-digit problem, ranging from some £700,000,000 to (at times) £900,000,000.47 
Sidney Buxton, whose study of the national debt traced it from 1789 to 1886 and 
provided balance sheets for the years 1866 to 1886, has shown how the debt grew, 
leveled out, and even, sometimes, contracted (typically when Gladstone was in office).48 
Since its founding in 1694, the Bank had lent more than half this money to the 
government and had brokered security purchases by the City and individual investors. 
As the government’s biggest lender, the Bank was vitally interested in the credit-
worthiness of the borrower, as were the thousands of individuals, other banks, stock-
jobbers, and companies that held government bonds. The government had its own 
National Debt Commission, but the real work of management was performed by the 
Bank for a management of the debt.49 Gladstone managed to cut the debt fee during his 
                                                
46See J. A. Thomas, “The House of Commons, 1832-1867: A Functional Analysis,” Economica, 
no. 13 (March 1925), 49-61; William Taylor, “A Statistical and Historical View of the Statute Law of the 
Realm, and of the Number of Statutes passed in Each Reign from the Earliest Recorded Period to the 
Present Time,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 17, no. 2 (June 1854), 143-158. 
47In addition to the sources cited above, see, E. L. Hargreaves, The National Debt (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1930); Jones, Nevin, “The British National Debt, Part 1,” 205-224; Leone Levi, “On the 
Progress and Economical Bearings of National Debts in this and Other Countries,” Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London 25, no. 3 (September 1862), 313-338.  
48A discussion of the differences between Gladstone’s and Disraeli’s budgets appears in H. C. G. 
Matthew, “Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics of Mid-Victorian Budgets,” The Historical Journal 22, no. 3 
(September 1979), 615-643. 
49Clapham, Bank of England 2: 255-6. 
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administrations, but the Bank continued to collect both its management fees and the 
interest on the portion of the national debt which it held in its own right. 
In retrospect, no matter whether the changes suggested in these plans were 
completed, the plan itself is both comprehensive in some areas and unfortunately 
inadequate in others. Gladstone was challenging the Bank on its strong side where it 
had a good deal of support. Without some thought to enabling actions, it was a plan 
doomed to fail. 
 
Missing Items 
Gladstone’s plan of reform was also inadequate in areas where he must have 
known problems to exist, pressing problems where British government action might 
have led to more security and fewer crises. These problems include the other banking 
systems operating in Great Britain (Scotland and Ireland), the effects of changes in 
British banking on international markets, and the public information efforts required to 
ensure that the changes did not cause a crisis in the money markets. 
He ignored the first item for the time being. He made no reference to the Scottish 
banks, the country banks, and the rising number of joint-stock banks, especially those 
that issued notes.50 At various times questions had been raised in the House of 
Commons about the relationship of, for example, the Act of 1844 to the Irish and 
Scottish banks.51 More than one chancellor was forced to rise and state that he had 
                                                
50See David J. Moss, “The Bank of England and the Country Banks: Birmingham, 1827-33,” The 
Economic History Review, new series 34, no. 4 (November 1981), 540-553; J. W. Gilbart, “The Laws of 
Currency, as Exemplified in the Circulation of Country Bank Notes in England, since the Passing of the 
Act of 1844,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 17, no. 4 (December 1854), 289-321; idem, 
History and Principles of Banking; Pressnell, Country Banking. 
51Gladstone, Diaries, 4:1/7/1853, 6:6/2/64, 6:8/2/64. He appears to have known about the 
Scottish banking problem, these are the only entries in the Diaries. 
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taken these problems under review, but that he had no plan at present to apply changes 
to the operation of the outlying banks. More to the point, constant references to Scottish 
banking in parliament and in the press suggested that the Scottish system was indeed 
more flexible, and far less likely to cause a deep crisis.52 The union of Scotland and 
Ireland with England had made little change to the banking in these two countries. 
Scottish banks were already well established, less likely to failure, and highly profitable. 
Many issued their own currency, and special provisions had been made for them to 
clear (exchange currency) through London.53 Several had deposit accounts with the 
Bank of England. If the British government were to take over currency issue, the 
Scottish and Irish banks would require accommodation, or at least rules that limited 
circulation.54 
The country banks seemed to puzzle most lawmakers, who saw them as a 
problem but not as a solution to the areas of commerce that the London banks refused 
to touch. The country banks issued smaller notes than the Bank of England. They knew 
their customers well, and were less likely to fail because of speculation or bad loans. 
Some private bankers were as sophisticated as London bankers, reading the bullion 
                                                
52For descriptions of the Scottish banks in detail, see Charles A. Malcolm, The History of the 
British Linen Bank (Edinburgh: T. & A. Constable for the bank, 1950); Richard Saville, Bank of Scotland, 
A History, 1695-1995 (Edinburgh: University Press, 1996); L. M. Cullen, “The Exchange Business of the 
Irish Banks in the Eighteenth Century,” Economica, new series 25, no. 100 (November 1958), 326-338; 
Frank Whitson Fetter, “Legal Tender During the English and Irish Bank Restrictions,” The Journal of 
Political Economy 58, no. 3 (June 1950), 241-253. 
53For an overview of Irish currency, see Cormac O Grada, “The Irish Paper Pound of 1797-1820: 
Some Cliometrics of the Bullionist Debate,” Oxford Economic Papers, new series 45, no. 1 (January 
1993), 148-156; J. W. Gilbart, “On the Laws of Currency in Ireland, as Exemplified in the Changes that 
Have Taken Place in the Amount of Bank Notes in Circulation in Ireland Since the Passing of the Act of 
1845,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 15, no. 4 (December 1852), 307-326. 
54Hansard’s, cxiviii:452. This problem was raised in the House of Lords on 10 December, 1857, 
when Lord Monteagle wished to know what effect bullion withdrawal from the Scotch and Irish banks had 
on commercial pressure in Great Britain and on the Bank of England. 
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reports and adjusting their lending patterns accordingly, and being very careful that 
sufficient cash in their vaults exceeded deposits.55 
These banks required a thorough legal appraisal, one that protected all their 
rights and interests, and gave them legislation separate from vague references to joint-
stock banks and joint-stock banks of issue. Private and “country” banks would have 
benefited by a uniform set of laws that specified their operating limits, requirements for 
capitalization, and guarantees of safety in periods of down-turn. Because these laws 
failed to materialize, individual banks fell victim to one of two types of liquidation in the 
nineteenth century—bankruptcy and buy-out. Luther A. Harr has published a 
penetrating and useful study of bank consolidation in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century in which “the Big Five” purchased banks, including banks that had purchased 
other banks.56  
The second problem that Gladstone failed to include was that of international 
exchanges. When Lord Althorp introduced his plan for rechartering the Bank of England 
in 1833, he spoke of European markets turning against the British.57 The problem was 
based on the actual price of an ounce of gold in the unregulated world market compared 
to the set price of £3 17s. 10-1/2d. established by law in 1819. To understand this 
problem, it is necessary to compare the relationships among three prices: the price of 
                                                
55Pressnell, Country Bankers, 6, 134, 409, 444, 460, 490, 511. An association of country bankers 
was formed in the 1790s, and operated throughout the nineteenth century to maintain communication, 
voice concern over government measures, and provide aid to members. Pressnell has shown that 
country bankers worked closely with the mints over the production of coinage. In addition, some banks 
were known to carry out their own gold trade with the continent. 
56Luther A. Harr, Branch Banking in England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1929), Appendix A-1 through A-4. The Big Five were Barclays, Lloyds Bank, Midland Bank, National 
Provincial Bank, and Westminster Bank. The appendices provide “family trees” for the banks, showing 
how they acquired smaller banks. 
57Hansard’s, xviii:169. This is Lord Althorp’s introduction of the bill to renew the Bank Charter, 
May 31, 1833. 
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an ounce of gold in pounds, shillings, and pence compared to the price of an ounce of 
gold in livres, dollars, German, Italian, or Spanish currency; the price of an English 
pound when presented at a European bank; and the price of a British-made good, such 
as calico, iron, or butter, in a local market. The principle in question was called 
convertibility: the ability of anyone to walk into the Bank of England or one of its 
branches and pay a fixed value in notes to receive an ounce of gold. 
When the market went against Britain, these ratios gave continental money 
dealers the ability to use their local currencies to purchase Bank of England paper 
currency cheaply. The small-scale broker might purchase English pounds from 
Continental banks where Gladstone and other English tourists cashed their pounds to 
buy local currencies. The large-scale broker bought English pounds paid for European 
goods and raw materials, such as corn. The merchants paid for their goods at a 
disadvantageous rate in Bank notes, bullion, or bills or exchange, or were required to 
pay in gold. Brokers holding English notes took them to Britain where they purchased 
English gold at the fixed price, transported the gold back to a country where they sold it 
at a profit. 
English bankers and business men apparently refused to see the danger, and 
after 1833 thought they were safe under the Bank Act of that year. As James Wilson 
was to state during the 1847 debate, many had been complacent, and had been 
bankrupted because they had not been safe. They looked to the times when their gold 
supplies provided them with extra credit in terms of favorable exchange rates, not at the 
times when the exchange rates turned negative. They failed to see that negative 
exchange rates could make their own transactions more expensive and could drive their 
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neighbors and colleagues to bankruptcy in a crisis. This blind-sidedness tended to turn 
them against any attempt to disrupt the fixed rate of pounds and gold in the British 
market, a strangely short-sighted view of men whose primary trading partners were 
European and American.58 The diversity of trade suggests that a merchant might argue 
that trade was all right if his trade was all right, even if all the firms and mills around him 
were crashing and suspending business. 
 
The End/Beginning of Another Plan 
Matthew was fascinated with Gladstone’s two versions of a financial reform plan, 
and wrote that Gladstone gained all or most of these goals when he again began 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. This is an optimistic claim; as Chapter 7 will show, it 
cannot be supported in fact through use of Gladstone’s legislative initiatives from 1859-
1866. The research for this thesis has shown that Gladstone’s plan never advanced in 
the specific state we have been privileged to see because he soon recognized several 
weaknesses in it, and gained a better understanding of his own strengths and 
weakness. Income tax was one of his strengths. His ability to write legislation, as 
demonstrated in his 1840s railroad bill and his 1854 Public Revenues and Consolidated 
Funds Act, was one of his strengths. Organizing and leading public debate on a banking 
problem was one of his weaknesses . As the following chapter will show, Matthew’s 
                                                
58News items in The Times suggest the complexity of the banker’s problems in dealing with 
exchanges. It was a form of “good news, bad news” communication. See idem, Friday, 30 October, 1857, 
5 reporting that most departments of business had enjoyed a “quiet and satisfactory day” with “an 
improved feeling … generally observable.” A letter to the editor on the same date reported data on recent 
railway collisions and the danger of the railroads, placed on the same page with “Railway and Mining 
Shares,” and a report on the meeting of the East Indian Railway at the London Tavern at which the 
directors felt deep regrets over consequences of the mutiny in India. The mood of the paper followed the 
mood of the country. See idem, Monday, 9 November (4c), when Messrs. Dennistoun & Co., one of the 
largest firms connected with the American trade, suspended trading. 
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suggestion that Gladstone accomplished most of his goals in the 1856 list by his actions 
from 1859-1866 is a bit more complicated than that. Gladstone did not accomplish all of 
it, but in accomplishing what he did he primarily played from his strength. 
Gladstone’s letter to Lord Aberdeen, spelling out what the Peelites should and 
should not do in relationship to government formation presents with a curious “other 
half” of the Gladstone plan for financial government.59 While Matthew emphasizes a 
man crying out for office, and ready to enter financial office with a manifesto for change, 
Gladstone’s letter to Lord Aberdeen shows why Gladstone might never have entered 
office again. He introduced his topic by saying he was trying to give “a practical 
consideration to political contingencies before they arrive, especially as they may never 
arrive at all.”60 This is either Gladstone seeing to far into a program, or inviting by 
Aberdeen or others to see into “ministerial contingencies,” as Aberdeen apparently 
invited him to do in November, 1852. Gladstone wrote that the situation is not normal 
because the country was returning to peace, a “great civil juncture,” with all 
establishments—army, navy, and other—returning to normal after being expanded 
uncontrollably. Gladstone followed this with a condemnation of the fashion “of laying the 
blame of all our evils on parsimony.” While parsimony has killed tens, other causes had 
killed thousands. Britain had spent the money. Gladstone noted that state expenditure 
has tripled in less than three years, but that the department of finance was very 
                                                
59Gladstone, Diaries 5:13/3/56. The letter covers three pages in the Diary. 
60This is the type of Gladstonian “in and out” statement that confuses historians. Gladstone may 
have meant that he accepted the fact that he was borrowing trouble, but his “especially” clause could 




backward and that much should be done to modernize it. To do this required a strong 
government, but a strong government was not to be found.61 
Strong governments have failed to form, said Gladstone, because certain strong 
men would not serve in them, and would only wrangle if they did. Gladstone believed 
that in 1855 no combination of men existed who could create a strong government. 
Gladstone quoted Canning’s “men not measures” statement and said it was out of date, 
but his alternative lacks logic: “the present moment is one that calls for measures, and 
that will estimate men chiefly with reference to measures.” But Gladstone had seen 
parliament in action: the desperate goals of one moment were the ideas to be forgotten, 
by men, at the next: men might pass measures, but men of courage, tenacity, and 
eloquence were required to keep these measures in place. This is why civil service 
reform was so important: beyond men and measures had to stand the methods, forms, 
and memories that maintained the new, turned old, rules and the willingness of civil 
servants to police themselves. 
To an aging but still feisty Aberdeen, this may have sounded like more of 
Gladstone’s thinking too deeply about a subject to be useful. But we cannot overlook 
the possibility that Aberdeen might have been called again to the palace (if Russell, 
Palmerston, Derby, or Disraeli failed), nor the fact that Gladstone was attempting to 
distance all the Peelites from the aftermath of the Crimean War: 
 
In all that has preceded, I have been suggesting rather than removing difficulty. 
And I must confess that it is not diminished, when we pass from the abstract to 
the concrete. For, so far as I am able to judge, when we look at the names of 
those persons, who would be publicly regarded as most likely to be at the head 
of an administration after the crisis we have supposed, I am very doubtful 
whether they are men, whose ready and cordial adoption of such a policy [of 
                                                
61Gladstone, Diaries 5:13/3/56. 
 
 272
measures?] & and whose adherence to it as a matter of life or death for their 
Cabinet, could be safely taken for granted. 
Gladstone concluded that liberals were effective champions of public reform and 
economy when not in office, and spendthrift in office. He confessed he did not see how 
it could be the duty of the Peelites, or of Gladstone himself, to take office with the 
liberals. Instead, it would be more advantageous to the country (and less of a headache 
to the remaining Peelites) if they stood out of line when a weak cabinet was being 
formed. He concluded:  
 
To whatever cause these speculations & inclinations may be due, let me assure 
you they are not owing to any mere antipathies in any direction whatever. I find it 
one of the chief comforts of public life, amidst many discomforts, that, as years 
pass away, antipathies also and resentments if they have existed, disappear; and 
one of the chief comforts of the present time in particular, that all the motives and 
considerations, bearing upon personal conduct, are so evidently and directly 
summed up in the answer to the one question, What do the public interests 
require?62 
 
The 1857 Bank Charter Debate63 
That part of the public interest that required restructuring of British finance, 
banking, and currency received another airing in 1857 when George Cornewall Lewis 
moved the renewal of the Bank Charter.64 The debate reproduced most of the same 
                                                
62Gladstone, Diaries 5:13/3/56. 
63Hansard’s, cxv-cxviii: various entries. The debate with respect to the Bank Charter Act of 1857 
really is the debate over two bills and an overwhelming problem: the bills were a renewal of the Bank 
charter, the Bank Issue Indemnity Act, and the Joint Stock Banks Limited Liability Act. The overwhelming 
problem was Commercial Crisis. The relevant bills, committees, and debates appear in  
64 See Clapham, Bank of England 2: 226-227. It was an unfortunate time to be rechartering the 
Bank of England. Clapham calls the commercial crisis of 1857 the first truly world-wide crisis, felt as far 
away as South Africa, South America, the Far East, and central Europe. British attention was focused on 
India, where Delhi had not been retaken. Britain was estimated to hold £80 millions in United States 
stocks and bonds, and many United States firms held open credits in English banks. Between the 25th 
and the 29th of September, one hundred and fifty banks in Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Rhode 
Island stopped payment. Sixty-two of the sixty-three New York banks suspended payment. In October, no 
fewer than 1415 U. S. banks stopped payment. The shock hit Liverpool first, and then the rest of the 
country, spreading to Amsterdam and Berlin. 
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arguments that Gladstone had participated in and read about, and much that is familiar 
to modern historians: the lists of authorities who had written against the 1844 Act and 
the quotations from their works; the lists of authorities who had written in favor of the 
Act; the vituperation expressed in all the debates on topics such as Bank notes, gold, 
and commercial distress. The debates show that Sir James Graham was right when he 
thought the time to act upon the Bank and its Charter had come, but wrong to believe 
that anything could be done. 
 For those unfamiliar with nineteenth century parliamentary debates and the 
ballet routine of bill introduction, readings, amendments, committees, reports, further 
readings, votes, divisions, passage, rejection, adjournment, or royal assent, the 
legislative process of nineteenth century England seems arcane if not archaic. 
Gladstone well understood that a Bank Act opportunity stood before him in February, 
1857, although he was deeply immersed in Italian affairs.65 He was also aware that as a 
former Chancellor of the Exchequer with extensive dealings with the Bank in his resume 
he was likely to be called to be a member of the committee, and he was.66 He saw 
Edward Cardwell and the Chancellor on 5 February with reference to a committee on 
the Bank Charter. He attended the House on the sixth when the Bank Act was 
introduced.67 He spoke to Lewis about what Gladstone called the Currency committee, 
and which was really Lewis’s first attempt to name those who would serve on the select 
                                                
65Gladstone, Diaries 5: 5/2/57, a memorandum of a meeting with Lord Derby of three hours 
duration on Italy. 
66 Hansard’s, cxlv:192, 223. George Cornewall Lewis, Chancellor of the Exchequer, moved for a 
select committee on 11 May, 1857. Gladstone was made a member, along with Benjamin Disraeli, Sir 
James Graham, Sir Charles Wood, and several members of the banking fraternity including Sir Francis 
Baring. It also included David Ricardo’s son, John Lewis Ricardo.  
67Gladstone, Diaries 5:6/1/57; 5:3/2/57, n.5; Hansard’s, cxliv:137, 259. Gladstone spoke on the 
renewal of the charter in his response to the Queen’s address. 
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committee on the Bank Act.68 
When the House of Commons met in committee, they were forced to come to 
grips with the proposed Bank Act bill as proposed by the government: the members 
wanted a bill that redressed the problems they saw in the Bank and in the 1844 Act. 
They enumerated those problems in debate, the principle problem being that the Bank 
of England had issued too much paper currency during the crisis, and it was now 
suggested that the Bank should be brought to book for exceeding the law. 
They had to deal with what the bill was not.69 It was not about the actions, 
responsibilities, and attitude of the Bank of England. Clauses 1 and 2 provide a sort of 
universal introduction. Clause 3 shows the true intent of the Bank Act: 
 
Provides that the second section of the Joint-Stock Companies Act, 1856, shall 
be repealed so far as it relates to persons [unreadable] together for the purpose 
of banking, subject to a proviso that no existing or future Company shall be 
registered as a Limited Company.70 
In other words, the 1857 Bank Charter Bill was about compromising its 
competition. Clause 3 passed, and for nearly six months joint-stock banks lost the 
protection of limited liability granted to the partners as individuals. Limited liability is now 
a staple of corporate law. In 1857, considerable work had gone into laws allowing 
creation of joint-stock companies, joint-stock banks, and joint-stock bank operation 
within a sixty-five mile radius of London. The Bank Act of 1857 attempted to remove the 
safety net for partners, making the formation of a new bank much more risky than it 
                                                
68Gladstone, Diaries 5:5/2/57, n.1,2; 6/2/57; 11/2/57; 14/2/57; 18/2/57. Gladstone did serve on the 
committee: A three-and-a-half hour conclave took place at Lord Aberdeen’s on the sixth, but this may 
have referred to refer to Italy, not to the Bank bill. The income tax was already being hotly debated as 
well. Gladstone and Lord Derby were in constant communication, apparently about finances. 




would be under earlier legislation. 
Clause 3 annulled the “second section of the Joint-Stock Companies Act, 1856,” 
as it extended to banking and stated that no existing or future Banking Company would 
be registered as a limited [liability] company. As has been shown, the bill passed into 
law. Clause 12, appears to support a suspicion raised in clause 3, that the bill was not 
about the Bank of England, but about some other type of banking altogether. 
Parliament, having been rushed to judgment in August of 1857, found itself rushed back 
to judgment in November of that year, meeting throughout December, leaving its fine 
Victorian Christmas in shambles, and driving to the House in the sleet of January. In the 
interval between adjournment of the regular session in 1857 and their return in 
November, the 1857 commercial crisis had reached its full force, and the government 
had again suspended the 18 44 Bank Act Bank of England to allow the Bank to respond 
to the crisis. Under the unlimited liability forced upon joint-stock banks by Clause 3, 
joint-stock-bank partners were forced to risk their personal wealth if one of their partners 
defalcated on a personal loan for which he had pledged his bank shares. In fact, the 
Bank Act was primarily about removing joint-stock banks from the free competition they 
had begun to enjoy with the Bank of England. Clause 12 would allow any seven 
individuals, through subscriptions of only £350 each to form a joint-stock bank,71  but 
whether any bank could survive without limited liability was open to serious question. In 
short, the Bank Charter renewal act of 1857 reads almost like a trap, luring members 
into partnerships and then setting upon them when they were most vulnerable to attack 
because they faced full liability. 




The commercial and financial crisis took place between adjournment of the 
regular session in 1857 and the calling of a special session in October. During this 
period the Bank had exceeded the issue allowed by the 1844 Bank Act, and the 
government had suspended the Act in order to allow the country to recover its economic 
equilibrium. The record of second session of the year (October-December, 1857) is one 
of the most interesting in the history of British banking, because it records the efforts of 
parliamentarians to come to grips with several aspects of banking at the same time, 
many of them in a contradictory state. The debate seems to have been nearly 
continuous. The Bank Issues Indemnity Bill led off: Sir George Lewis asked leave to 
bring in a bill that would indemnify the Governor and Company of the Bank of England 
“in respect to certain issue, of their notes.” In his oration, Lewis pointed out a difficulty in 
the Act of 1844, that it had limited issuance of paper currency to the extent of 
convertibility, that is, to the extent that these notes could be returned to the Bank of 
England and exchanged for gold at the legal rate. The notes were backed by gold in the 
Bank’s vaults and by the fiduciary securities.72 
Lewis reckoned that the total allowable circulation of bank notes in England, 
Wales, Scotland, and Ireland was approximately £88 million. The only portion of this 
circulation strictly covered by law through use of bullion was that of the Bank of 
England. Lewis recalled the statement of Sir Charles Wood, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in Russell’s first government, who had said he never did see the Act as a 
guarantee against panics.73 In total, three governments including Sir Robert Peel’s, had 
denied that the Bank Act of 1844 would avoid commercial distress and panics. In the 





climate of crisis arising (the first debate on the commercial crisis would take place on 
December 1857), no great imagination was required to see that this indemnity bill was 
intended as a prophylactic against undue disturbance or legal action against the Bank of 
England by litigants or legislators claiming that the Bank was legally at fault.  
While others argued about how and how much the Bank and the Bank Act had 
been at fault, Gladstone, who had been silent during the Bank Charter Act debate, 
entered the debate. He stated that by raising the discount rate and continuing to issue 
currency and loans, the Bank had enjoyed significant profit. He asked politely, and at 
some length, whether the indemnified Bank would feel sufficient guilt about its profits 
made during the crisis to share its profits with the government.74 Gladstone’s comments 
were quiet and to the point, far more interesting than any redress or blame against 
either the government of the Bank. Bank income during the crisis had risen dramatically 
both in London and in its branches.75 Gladstone’s point, and one which he would put 
into practice in his dealings with the Bank from 1859 on, was that the profit from the 
rising rate allowed by the government and resulting in higher income at the Bank should 
be consigned to or at least shared with the government.76 
While this debate continued, Headlam introduced an amendment to the Bank Act 
of 1857 aimed at limiting the liability of the proprietors of joint-stock banks. Headlam 
stated that he had not suddenly discovered that his proposal was a good idea, but that 
                                                
74Clapham, Bank of England 2:429. The Bank rate at the beginning of 1856, 1857, and 1858 was 
already high for the Bank, standing at 6% in 1856 and 1858, and 6-1/2% at the beginning of 1857. In 
1857, during the months of the crisis, it rose from 6% to 10% before finishing the year at 9%. By the end 
of 1858, the rate had returned to 2-1/2%. 
75Ibid., 433. Just how much the income rose is not possible to calculate from Clapham’s data. It 
merely shows income from discounts, but these may include discounts on commercial paper taken during 
the period, but may or may not include fees charged for purchase of Bank of England Notes. To 
understand the real impact of the rising rate, one would need to separate the returns from the Banking 




he had been thinking so since 1847, the last year of great commercial stress. He stated 
that when he had investigated the causes for the failures of joint-stock banks,  
 
a conviction strengthened by subsequent observation and confirmed by the 
events of the recent monetary crisis—that the principle of unlimited liability of 
shareholders was a chief moving cause of the mismanagement of joint-stock 
banks; and further than that the mismanagement of these banks, by leading on to 
their ultimate failure, most materially aggravated and precipitated a national crisis 
…77 
He demonstrated his reasoning with experience, in cases he had seen on a 
regular basis: one shareholder in a joint-stock bank had gambled his entire fortune in 
the market, which he was entitled to do under the current law, without warning his fellow 
shareholders. This one man’s failure would be the ruin of the others, at no fault of their 
own.78 Thinking that it was saving the public from the danger of a bank that speculated, 
the government had in fact placed every honest and prudent joint-stock share-holder at 
great risk, thereby ruining otherwise prudent banks, limiting competition, and in fact not 
saving many of the public from ruin. 
 
The daily records of the Court of Bankruptcy told of failures of this kind. The 
unlimited liability of the shareholders in a joint-stock bank rendered 
mismanagement probable, easy, and possible, and led to fatal consequences. 79 
Little attention is given to the Acts that came out of these efforts—of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to save the Bank of England, of Headlam to save a 
sizeable number of other banks in the nation, and of Gladstone to gain a share of the 
Bank’s profits for the government. Yet each shows that little weaknesses around the 
edges of the banking industry were visible. This is not a surprise. They had been visible 






for some time. Now, however, those who saw these weaknesses were beginning to see 
ways of cracking into them. 
Looked at realistically, the nation had too much at stake to do severe damage to 
the Bank of England without considering the consequences first. The nation may also 
have been beginning the long process of learning just how much of the business was 
not only performed but performed reasonably well by the hundreds of other banks that 
held the small towns, county seats, ports, and vast cities of the nation together and 
connected them with the rest of the world. Britain was a long way from understanding 
this phenomenon, and the Bank of England was still a long way from understanding its 
part in the network. There would continue to be downturns, but at least some 
courageous souls, not all of them economists, not all of them liberal heroes, not all of 
them Gladstone, were beginning to understand and work around the edges. 
 
Conclusion 
In effect, both governments of the period 1855 to 1859 and Gladstone bet each 
other that they could survive without one another. They did, but not well, and not for 
long. Palmerston’s government fell on the politically unsound Conspiracy to Murder bill 
he brought to the House of Commons after an attempt on the Emperor of France failed, 
and English goods and locations were identified with the assassin. Gladstone toppled 
Derby’s government himself with a raid on Disraeli’s 1859 budget speech.  
The three bills of 1857 and the commercial crisis associated with them once 
more demonstrated that the Bank of England was a seriously flawed institution, that its 
position was arrogant and supported by many of the nineteenth century governments, 
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and that it could and would do great damage to the banking community unless other 
bankers simply shrugged their shoulders and learned to live with the Bank, the currency 
law, and the operations of the exchanges. 
Samuel Loyd Jones, Lord Overstone, was perhaps the best known and most 
experienced banker of the age, a man of strong beliefs about banking. Beginning in 
1833 and ending in 1857, he argued for several rules which, if applied to the 
government, banking, and the Bank of England, would make banking and safe. First, he 
believed in a single issuer of currency, that being a single bank. He believed that the 
Bank of England should be required to make full and regular reports on the accounts of 
its bullion.80 He also believed that there should be perfect convertibility between gold 
and paper.81 Overstone wrote that he had published his testimony from 1857 because 
he believed that the events of that year, if properly understood, gave no evidence of a 
failure in the 1844 Act. 
This type of thinking, from one of the most respected bankers, speakers, and 
publishers on banking of the age, carried great weight. The questions directed to 
Overstone during the hearings of 1857 show just how far ahead of parliament he was in 
his thinking about banking, and how far parliament would have to travel to reach his 
level of understanding. For example, Benjamin Disraeli asked the banker what would 
happen if the Bank’s Issue Department were transferred to the government. 
Overstone’s testimony shows that the bill would probably have been too difficult to 
                                                
80Samuel Jones Loyd, Lord Overstone, The Evidence Given by Lord Overstone Before the Select 
Committee of the House of Commons of 1857 on [the] Bank Acts with Additions (London: Longman, 
Brown, 1858; reprint, Clifton: Augustus M. Kelley, 1973), v. 
81Overstone, testimony before a Committee of the House of Commons on Issue, 1840, in 
Overstone, Evidence, vi. 
 
 281
frame in a way that it could have been passed.82 
In answer to question 4161, Overstone described the “system” by which the 
government and the Bank of England did business as a “variety of successive bargains 
between the Government and the Bank,” never “simplified into one direct payment for 
the whole business.”83 
In this climate, it is of little wonder that Gladstone wanted government in his own 
hands. He wanted control of budgets and governmental reform. He also wanted the 
variety of successive bargains to be in his own hands. He had demonstrated his 
mastery of some small part of the government’s business with the Bank in his work on 
deficiency bills and in the Public Revenues Act. 
For all Gladstone’s angst during the period 1855-1859, documented by various 
authors, he made himself wait. He was to have a long run in the Exchequer, from 1859 
to 1866. He was to accomplish several good works, although the populace at the time 
was more inclined to believe him a miracle worker. In hindsight, we are correct to ask 
what it was about the period 1855-1859 that strengthened Gladstone to the point that he 
was able to accomplish his good works. As the following chapter will show, his financial 
reform “plan” was not the stuff of government reform, lacking as it did a strategic 
mission statement, suggestions for enabling legislation, day one measures, and a scale 
by which Gladstone the reformer could write “completed” after the final item on the 
docket. But Lord Overstone has provided a better clue than all the items in Gladstone’s 
1856 lists. Gladstone’s reading and his apparently growing ability to integrate and 
                                                
82See for example, Overstone, Evidence, 224-227, questions 4156-4165, which encompass the 





organize his thinking may be added to this clue to show Gladstone what he could 
accomplish. 
Gladstone’s relationship with the Bank of England thus emerges as a territorial 
dispute between two neighboring countries, doomed to battle along the borders they 
shared for a long period of time. Becoming more and more cognizant of their respective 
strengths and weaknesses, they skirmished here and there, one sometimes winning or 
saving disaster by a reasonable short-term treaty. The period described in this chapter 
is, in my mind, an important period in the history of banking, the ability of the 
government to deal with banking, and in Gladstone’s development as the next man who 
would try his hand at good works in Britain’s finance. 
 
Gladstone’s Reading 
While it is true that Gladstone continued his religious and church-related studies 
as well as his studies and writings on classical topics, he continued to read extensively 
on political economy, government finance, currency, foreign trade and banking. The 
following table shows the authors, titles of the books, publication dates, and reading 
dates for the period 1856-1859. 
This is the most important period of his reading in the Bank and the Bank Act. It 
is equally important because of his reading in currency. With this reading, he met, again 
and again, ideas about the varieties of successive bargains that might be made with the 
banking industry and the Bank of England.  
By far the biggest block of his reading, however, is in the cost of war. Gladstone’s 
continuing concern about his position in financing or failing to finance the Crimean War 
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led him to read everything he could lay his hands on regarding the Crimean War. As the 
following chapter will show, his reading on the cost of war helped him in his continued 
evaluation of the strength of North and South in the American Civil War, and in the 





Table 7: Gladstone’s Reading, 1855-1859 
 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Accounting and Trade: 
Accounting J. Caldecott 
A Practical Guide for Retail Tradesmen and Others to Bookkeeping by Double 
Entry (1851) 21 Nov 1855 
Bank Act Edmund Phillips Bank of England Charter, Currency, Limited Liability Companies, and Free Trade (1856) 14 Feb 1856 
Bank Act James Horsburgh (Lt. Col.) The Errors and Evils of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 (1855) 17 Feb 1857 
Bank Act Samuel Jones Loyd Thoughts on the Separation of the Departments of the Bank of England (1844) 10 Feb 1857 
Bank Act George Combe Currency Question Considered in Relation to … the Bank Restriction Act 
(1856) 
24 Apr 1856 
Bank Act George Arbuthnot Pamphlet on the 1844 Bank Act (1856) 28 Jul 1856 
Bank Act Thomas Tooke On the Bank Charter Act of 1844; Its Principles and Operation (1856) 8 Jan 1856 
Bank Act Edward Norton The Bank Charter Act of 1844 Truthfully Considered, 2nd Edition (1857) 12 Nov 1857 
Bank of 







England J. H. MacConald 
“The Errors and Evils of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 as Divulged by Lord 
Overstone” (1855) 17 Feb 1857 
Banking James W. Gilbart The History and Principles of Banking (1834) 4 Feb 1856 
Banking John Ramsay MacCulloch Considerations on Partnerships with Limited Liability (1856) 2 Apr 1856 
Banking Charles Sikes Good Times; of, the Savings Bank and the Fire-Side (1854) 24 Dec 1856 
Currency Edwin Hill Principles of Currency. Means of Ensuring Uniformity of Value and Adequacy of Supply (1856) 15 Jan 1856 
Currency J. Taylor A Catechism on the Currency  (1835) 25 Mar 1856 
Currency W. Huskisson “The Question Concerning the Depreciation of our Currency Stated and Examined” (1810) 27 Mar 1856 
Currency J. R. MacCulloch, ed 
Tracts … on Metallic and Paper Currency, 1844-1857 (Lord Overstone), 
especially “Letter to the Editor of The Times on the Bank Charter Act 1855-6. 
(1857) 
16 Mar 1857 
Currency Samuel Jones Loyd Decimal Association. Answers to the Questions … by Lord Overstone to the 
Decimal Coinage Commissioners (1857) 
22 Apr 1857 




Currency Unknown “Decimal Coinage. A Short and Easy Method … “ (1854) 31 Jul 1855 
   (table continues) 
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Table 7 (continued). 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 




(continued) Currency Edward Norton 
National Finance and Currency with the Operations of Gain or Loss of Gold in 
Peace and War (1860) 12 Nov 1857 
Finance William Newmarch On the Loans Raised by Mr. Pitt … 1793-1801 (1855) 16 Mar 1855 
Finance Nicholas Vansittart Outlines of a Plan of Finance (1813) 7 Feb 1856 
India Henry St. George Tucker Review of the Financial Situation of the East India Company in 1824 (1825) 22 Jun 1858 
Government 
Finance  
Taxation The Economist Gregg on Taxation 111 (1856) 24 Jan 1856 
Hesiod Opera (Works and Days) (ancient, no specific date) 14 Jan 1856 
William Pollard Essays on Subjects of Political Economy (1850) 15 Feb 1856 Political Economy 
Aristotle Politics (nd) 14 Aug 1856 
The Economist Military Expenditure 115 (1856) 25 Jan 1856 
W. Brereton The British Fleet in the Black Sea, While Under the Command of Vice-Admiral J. W. D. Dundas (1856) 19 Jan 1857 
William Newmarch Should the Money Required to Pay the Expenses of the War be Raised by Loans or Taxes? (1855) 12 Feb 1855 
W. Filder “The Commissariat in the Crimea” (1856) 18 Mar 1856 
Somerset John Gough 
Calthorpe Letters from Head-Quarters, or the Realities of the War in the Crimea (1856) 21 Mar 1857 
John William Crowe Our Army; or, Penny Wise and Pound Foolish (1856) 29 Apr 1856 
Parliamentary Paper, 1855, 
xxxiii.  “Medical Commissariat in the Crimea”  7 May 1855 
C. de Bazancourt The Crimean Expedition, to the Capture of Sebastopol, 2 vols. (1856) 28 May 1854 
P. B. Maxwell “Whom Shall we Hang? The Sebastopol Inquiry” 18 Jul 1855 
Cost of War: War 
William Newmarch Should the Money for the War be Raised by Loans or Taxes? 12 Feb 1855 
Notes: 
aAll date references are to Volume 3 of the Diaries. Within a Topic, the publications are listed in the order in which Gladstone recorded reading 
them (right-hand column). 
bMarked “probably.” 
cThe publication date suggests that Gladstone read an early draft, and thus may have been a friend of the author. 
dGladstone disputed Newmarch’s interpretation in the House, 20 April, 1855; see Hansard’s, cxxxvii:1953. 




SECOND CHANCELLORSHIP, 1859-1866 
Introduction 
When Gladstone again kissed hands and accepted the seals as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer in 1859 as part of Palmerston’s second office, he also accepted 
responsibility for living up to the opinions and hopes of his supporters and his own 
aspirations. He meant to make a very large name for himself and he did. Two years 
after he left office under the last of the old generation of prime ministers, he formed his 
own government for the first time. His nearly seven years as chancellor under 
Palmerston had made him so popular that his accession to the head of a government 
was required by the people he had worked so hard to serve. 
Much of his popularity came from the measures that people found good—fiscal 
responsibility; continued cuts and reshaping of taxes, customs and excise duties; and 
understandable speeches that endeared him to the common man and woman. As this 
chapter will show, some of his popularity with bankers, money men, and the City of 
London, stems from what he did not do. He did not follow his 1856 plan in some of its 
most revolutionary aims. He did not restructure the Treasury and Exchequer and he did 
not nationalize the Bank of England or its Issue Department. 
 
In Office at Last 
This chapter describes the final period under discussion in this study of William 
Gladstone’s relationship with the Bank of England: the Palmerston and Russell 
governments of 1859 to 1866. Matthew says that Gladstone returned to the Exchequer 
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a seasoned professional man with a clear-cut agenda. This may be. However, to say 
this is to reckon without Gladstone’s opinion of Palmerston and the difficulties that 
Gladstone clearly perceived in joining a Palmerston government. It is also to reckon 
without Gladstone’s continuing but now diminishing insecurities about serving, anxieties 
which he largely overpowered in six and a half years of working with two somewhat 
cranky but mostly predictable prime ministers. This chapter will show that Gladstone 
found strength, salvation, and meaning in two of the greatest of government quagmires: 
numbers and administration. By  producing budgets that solved Palmerston’s domestic 
difficulties before they happened, most of which either broke even or produced 
surpluses, Gladstone nevertheless managed to pay for rebuilding the Navy, erect 
fortifications, cut tariffs (again), and please most of the people most of the time. By 
pushing through the House of Commons the great Exchequer and Audit Departments 
Act of 1866,1 he placed the final stamp on the authority of the Treasury to administer 
and control the other departments in the government, including the navy, the army, and 
ordnance. 
The years 1859-1866 include two great Gladstone achievements—the budgets 
for those years and the Exchequer and Audit Department Act; the period also covers an 
accommodation of sorts between Gladstone and the Bank of England, demonstrated by 
his even-handed management of the Bank’s difficulties with Overend, Gurney and 
                                            
1The proper title is the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 29 & 30 Victoria, c. 39. See 
Roseveare, The Treasury, 31. He places the origins of true British finance with proper tax collection and 
audits of accounts at 1066 when the Upper Exchequer was assigned the job of auditing the Exchequer 
accounts of receipt. He places the birth of modern parliamentary control of the public purse, which 
included audit, at 1866 when the Exchequer and Audit Departments the Act was passed. There is 
historical reason for confusion: an Exchequer Act was passed in 1783 and an Exchequer Audit Act was 
passed in 1785. See Sir Norman Chester, The English Administrative System, 1780-1870 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), 127, 136, 140, 198. Many writers, including Matthew, have abbreviated the title 
of the 1866 Act by leaving out the word “Departments.” 
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Company, the bill brokerage company. In this period, Gladstone’s attempt to overturn 
the 1844 Bank Act through extension of currency issue to private and joint-stock banks 
willing to pay for the privilege failed passage. Gladstone accepted the inevitable and 
withdrew the bill after extensive debate and newspaper coverage.  
Gladstone’s real achievements were in his budgets. Many Chancellors of the 
Exchequer had treated the budget process as a seasonal one, working from January 
through March or April when they delivered their budget speeches. Under Gladstone the 
budget season was a year-round concern. When he was not actually writing one, 
coaxing it through the cabinet, or convincing the House of Commons to agree to its 
principles and supplementary legislation, he was watching the harvests, reading on coal 
production, and checking up on the actual collection of revenues. The importance of 
Gladstone’s reforms in the budget-making process has often been overlooked: 
 
By twentieth-century standards, nineteenth-century budgets were economically 
insignificant, and post-Keynesian economic historians have paid little attention to 
them. But Keynes himself pointed to the importance of ‘the state of psychological 
expectation’, which was subjective, as a factor in the development of the 
economy, and he stressed that ‘the state of confidence, as they term it, is a 
matter which practical men always pay the closest and most anxious attention’.2 
The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act was a great culmination of the drive 
toward reform in government operation, focused both on taxation and spending, and on 
the control of the great spending departments in the government—Army, Navy, and 
Ordnance. As such, it is a bill that could never have been passed if Palmerston had still 
been alive. It is also Gladstone’s only recourse after the failure of the Banks of Issue Bill 
to control the Bank of England. 
                                            
2Matthew, “Disraeli, Gladstone,” 615, n.2-3. 
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The Overend, Gurney difficulties—their attack against the Bank of England and 
then their complete financial failure—focus on Gladstone’s relationship with the Bank of 
England. By the 1860s, Gladstone’s relationship with the Bank had been mellowed, by 
at least four influences: his continued contact with the Bank over government finances, 
his contacts with Lord Overstone, his contacts with the Rothschild family, and his 
readings on finance and banking. Thus, despite his uneasy and sometimes hostile 
feelings toward the Bank and its efforts to make the most of its government contracts in 
the 1850s, by the 1860s, he had grown accustomed to dealing with them. 
The Banks of Issue Bill was a failed Gladstone initiative. If passed, it would have 
redressed some of the main problems suffered by private banks as a result of the 1844 
Bank Act. In effect, the bill offered to make issue more accessible to bankers and also 
to reinstate some of the protection stripped from them by the Bank Act of 1844. This bill 
failed for a number of reasons, and demonstrated the weakness of a relatively strong 
and well-liked chancellor, even one who served in a strong government. 
In its conclusion, this chapter will examine the validity of Matthew’s claim that in 
the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, Gladstone completed the program he had 
presented to Sir James Graham in 1856. Matthew argued that with a prime minister 
interested in foreign policy, Gladstone would have a free hand in the Exchequer: 
 
A prime minister whose chief interest was bound to be in the area of foreign 
policy could have advantages for a Chancellor of the Exchequer with his own 
programme of legislation, and a programme it was. Gladstone as Chancellor 
between 1859 and 1866 introduced, step by step, the items in the programme he 
had drawn up in 1856, the last item, the Exchequer and Audit Act [sic], being 
passed shortly before the government resigned in 1866.3  
                                            
3Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 109. 
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This chapter will show that although Gladstone gained a good deal of what he 
had wished for in 1856, the resolution is neither so simple nor as complete as Matthew 
suggests. Thus, this chapter concludes with an assessment of Gladstone’s gains and 
losses and assesses why he did not get all he had wished for. 
 
The Second Palmerston Government 
The Palmerston government was exceptionally strong,4 but as likely as any weak 
government to be stressed by bickering, disagreements, deceit, and trouble—money 
being one of the main causes. Gladstone’s numeric and administrative problems in 
developing a working budget resulted not from a lack of funds, the threat of war, or 
financial crisis in industry and banking, but primarily from a lack of procedure and 
control in the departments outside his control. Matthew opined that with the prime 
minister focused on international diplomacy, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would 
have an easy time. Morley, Jenkins, and the Diaries show this statement to be false.5 
Palmerston and Gladstone fought continually about money: Palmerston followed the 
Disraeli line that the government should set the budget and the people should pay for it; 
Disraeli, rather astonishingly, was closely aligned with the Financial Reform Association 
on income tax, one of the reasons he launched plans for progressive taxation on items 
of income and wealth.6 Gladstone believed in general that the government should figure 
                                            
4Hoppin, The Mid-Victorian Generation, 719-720.The Palmerston government has surprisingly 
little reorganization and very few outright resignations, regardless of Gladstone’s threats.  
5Jenkins, Gladstone, 207. Jenkins entitled chapter 13 “The Hostile Partnership with Palmerston,” 
noting that there was no doubt why Palmerston wanted him in the cabinet: Gladstone could devastate a 
government from the outside, but would produce a decently run office of finance. But that the last thing, 
Jenkins believed, that Palmerston wanted was a “moralizing, powerful, and cheese-paring Chancellor.” 
6See Matthew, “Disraeli, Gladstone,” 618, 624.The Liverpool Financial Reform Association spoke 
for direct taxation, and, with others, recommended a “National Budget” of 1848 that included a permanent 
income tax and death duties, accompanied by stringent retrenchment. Debate raged for years, and when 
Gladstone came to the Exchequer in 1859, his 1860 budget was attacked inside the cabinet on the 
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out how much revenue was available and then set the budget. This fundamental 
difference of approach sparked many battles between Gladstone and Disraeli in 
debates, and between Gladstone and Palmerston in cabinet meetings and letters. 
Palmerston believed in reasonable taxation, but he also believed in borrowing where 
taxation would not bear sufficient revenue to achieve the government’s policy.7 These 
continuous arguments were exacerbated by Palmerston’s intermittent pleasures in 
teasing Gladstone.8 
Nevertheless, the wrangling between the two men, the support that Palmerston 
gave to those who wanted to spend money, and his backstabbing of Gladstone to the 
Queen made Gladstone a truly beleaguered figure. Meanwhile, he did wish to make 
more cuts in customs and excise, notably in tea, sugar, malt, and imported wine and 
brandy. Gladstone can neither be credited nor blamed for the commercial treaty with 
France. That was a Board of Trade initiative, not that of the Exchequer. If the treaty 
succeeded in passage in both countries, Gladstone could balance the loss of customs 
revenue with a possible increase in revenues elsewhere. However, he still had to live 
with the continuing English distrust of France, the urge for fortifications to stave off a 
French invasion, and the temptation to raise a large standing army. 
Additionally, Gladstone’s 1860 budget, his first under Palmerston, was thought 
“too democratic.” Gladstone believed the French commercial treaty would be accepted, 
                                                                                                                                             
problem of income tax. Gladstone stuck by the Peelite maxim that policy determined the budget, but he 
was extremely sympathetic, Matthew says, to the idea of retrenchment in defense spending. He wrote, 
however, that he could not retrench on taxes until he saw how much retrenchment he was likely to 
achieve. With Palmerston as prime minister, the answer was very little. 
7William Gladstone, Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, Gladstone and Palmerston: Being 
the Correspondence of Lord Palmerston and Mr. Gladstone, 1851-1865, ed. Phillip Guedalla (New York & 
London: Harper & Brothers, 1928): for fortifications, 115-118, 123-124, 142-143, 148; for battleships, 113; 
for the paper duty, 57, 131-6, 138-142, 144-7; for nationalization of the railroads, 75, 291-292, 308-309, 
315-320. 
8Jenkins, Gladstone, 213. 
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and based his budget on the changes in revenue, especially import duty reduction, that 
would arise from this treaty. Gladstone also did not endear himself to the undemocratic 
members of the cabinet by asking for repeal of the paper duties, and the increase in 
income tax for those with income that exceeded £150 per annum.9 
The U. S. Civil War (often referred to in the English media as the American Civil 
War) gave both Palmerston and Gladstone some political and economic concerns. 
Shutting down cotton mills and dismissing workers in the first years of the war cut 
government revenues and tempted the British Navy to test the Union blockade of 
southern ports. Britain honored the Union’s blockade of southern ports for legal 
reasons. However, the Trent affair, in which a Union ship removed Confederate envoys 
traveling under a British flag, aroused a good deal of hostility and a demand for British 
Navy action against the Union. Finally, the problems perceived in Britain regarding 
British North America appear to have been based on the argument that if the Union lost 
control of the South, it might turn on Canada as an alternative land-mass; or, if the 
Union defeated the South, it might turn its military against Canada to consolidate its 
control of a most of North America.  
Europe also seemed to be a threat. David Krein argues that Palmerston’s and 
Russell’s adventurism in Europe, involving Austria, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and 
Germany, first made Britain the laughing stock of the continent and then drove the 
island nation into the policy of “splendid isolation” that lasted until the first world war. 
Gladstone, who believed in peace and peace-time economies, worried that 
                                            
9David F. Krein, The Last Palmerston Government: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the 
Genesis of “Splendid Isolation” (Ames: Iowa State University, 1978), 26. 
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Palmerston’s meddling and bluffing in Europe might lead a badly timed and badly fought 
British war.10 
All these threats resulted in an urgent outcry in the cabinet for more money. In 
1853 Gladstone told the House of Commons that the income tax should end in 1860. In 
1859, he knew that it could not. Although the revenue budget table that follows shows 
us that as estimated, income tax comprised less than nine per cent of the budget,11 and 
in actual revenue more than thirteen per cent, in fact, income tax revenue made a 
significant difference in several of the seven years Gladstone held office. Politically, 
income tax no longer seemed to be a problem.12 
And yet it continued to be. Consider the following comments, written at a time 
when the income tax might have been said to be well installed in the government’s 
budgets: 
 
One of the chief defects of the British fiscal system is the want of a settled order 
for its component parts, and of a due proportion of the several parts to each other 
and to the whole. The absence of well-understood and generally-accepted 
traditions on these points has produced evils of two kinds. One is the tendency to 
adopt the easiest method of meeting a temporary increase of expenditure without 
reference to principle; the other is the capricious and spasmodic manner in which 
the opportunities for remitting taxation are utilised … The history of the Income 
Tax is especially instructive as illustrating the absence of uniformity of design and 
continuity of purpose …13 
                                            
10Krein, Last Palmerston Government, 57, 148. Gladstone was not the only one who thought 
Palmerston was playing dangerously. Lord Clarendon thought Palmerston was foolish to fear a French 
war, but worried that Palmerston might precipitate it. Clarendon did what Gladstone could not in at least 
one case, by stopping Palmerston from taking drastic action in Denmark. 
11Buxton, Finance and Politics, 1:185-189; 2: 335. Income tax revenue for 1859-1860 was 
estimated at £5,600,000, while total revenue was estimated at £64,340,000, and the deficit was estimated 
to be £4,867,000. Income tax as estimated would have accounted for 8.7 per cent of total revenue. 
Gladstone wrote that in time of peace he rejected borrowing. 
12Ibid. The actual income tax revenue for 1859-1860 was £9,596,606, while total revenue was 
£71,089,669, and a surplus of £1,587,380 emerged. Gladstone had underestimated. This may be a 
rookie mistake or the economy performed better than expected. Detractors of Gladstone could easily 
argue that he accepted the estimated deficit too readily. This is not born out by the Diary entries. 
13G. H. Blunden, “The Position of the Income Tax in the British Fiscal System,” The Economic 
Journal 2, no. 8 (December 1892), 637-652. It is, perhaps, the very meagerness of tax’s contribution to 
the national budget that caused so much criticism to be heaped on it later. The policy regarding income 
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These words were written in 1892, while Gladstone was still alive. Jenkins’ 
comments about Gladstone’s ability to set a financial course for the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century take on added meaning when we examine these words. Krein says 
Gladstone survived because he was adept with his job while Palmerston, distracted by 
foreign policy, was wonderfully inept at it. If Palmerston kept the political pot boiling and 
encouraged British jingoism, he was able to distract the British people. But Krein argues 
that in spite of the problems over the cotton blockade, the economy was so stable that 
people had little to complain about financially. In fact, the Overend, Gurney crisis that 
occurred in 1866 and triggered the third suspension of the 1844 Bank Act was not 
caused by a generally economic crisis. It only came about because of the company’s 
overextension and its relationships to other bill and bond brokers.14 
Palmerston’s private diplomacy, says Krein, was a bluff. From a military 
standpoint, Britain was extremely weak compared to the massive armies that 
continental powers could raise (only about 20,000 men on the continent in the 1860s).15 
Palmerston was not fool enough to try to raise the manpower required to face Bismarck 
on land, and the British navy would not have been able to invade Europe deeply enough 
to make an impression on any capital: “continental statesmen began to treat British 
                                                                                                                                             
tax varied from chancellor to chancellor as the parties traded places in the government. Blunden traced 
the use of the income tax through various governments and concluded that the tax never seemed to 
achieve either the promise of fulfilling the government’s dreams or of relieving the people from paying 
other taxes. 
14Roseveare, The Treasury, 183. Lord Salisbury offered a different interpretation 1900. Recalling 
all those years of “splendid isolation” he attacked the Treasury for fostering an “isolation of inferiority” and 
listed military prowess as one of the most devastating: no conscription, no caste of military experts, no 
open ladder of promotion, and no effective secret service.  
15Leone Levi, “On the Progress of the Expenditure of the United Kingdom,” Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London 24, no. 1 (March 1861), 55-73, 59, Table C, “Average Force of the British 
Army 1800-59.” For the year 1859-60, Levi put the number of home and colonial armies at 132,000 men 
and listed another 15,000 as volunteers. He says that of the total of £15,000,000 nearly half went for pay, 
allowances, provisions, fuel, and clothing. About a third was spent on warlike stores, fortifications, 
barracks, and wages of artificers. The remaining one-sixth was used to pay rewards and pensions. 
 
 295
power with relative indifference.”16 In 1859, Queen Victoria told her new Chancellor of 
the Exchequer that he should write a very large budget.17 His budgets may not have 
seemed “big” by the Queen’s standards, but with domestic policy under control, seemed 
to give the people what they wanted, including fortifications to defend England from the 
French. Buxton argues that the “‘wilderness of figures” relieved by disquisitions on 
“philosophy and the principles of taxation” of Gladstone’s speeches relieved the 
monotony of the moribund sessions of the Palmerston 1860s. In all, Gladstone financed 
a Palmerstonian government in which the First Lord could dabble, tempt his queen with 
adventure, and avoid risking rebellion without running up the debt for an unneeded war. 
Sidney Buxton wrote that aside from finance, domestic legislation was meager 
during Palmerston’s second government, although foreign politics were in a disturbed 
state. He claimed that suspicion of the French, sympathy for Italy, detestation of Russia, 
dislike of the “North,” and compassion for Denmark led to heated debates, but not to 
war.18 In this Buxton, who wrote almost a century before Krein, believed Palmerston’s 
foreign policy was generally successful, producing fairly moderate results, well within 
the limits of British power.  
The United States Civil War caused great arguments, about which side to 
recognize and which outcome to hope for.19 Surprisingly, it was Gladstone, not 
                                            
16Krein, Last Palmerston Government, 7 
17For a thorough description of the pressures that Gladstone faced, see Roseveare, Treasury, 
Evolution, Chapter 7, “The Victorian Treasury and its Masters,” and especially 183-195 describing 
Gladstone’s “overthrow by the defense scare.” 
18Buxton, Finance and Politics 2: 4. 
19Kenneth Bourne, “British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862,” The English 
Historical Review 76, no. 301 (October 1961), 600-632; Kinley J. Brauer, “British Mediation and the 
American Civil War: A Reconsideration,” The Journal of Southern History 38, no. 1 (February 1972), 49-
64. These are just two of many useful articles on this topic. Bourne has looked at the myth of the 
“undefended frontier” in North America used by the United States to hold Canada hostage for the good 
behavior of Great Britain. The Palmerston government faced the possibility of war with the Union after the 
Mason and Slidell incident in 1861. Bourne says that Britain was not caught flat-footed: the government 
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Palmerston, who was believed to tip the balance with his famous paragraph about 
southern achievements: 
 
We know quite well that the people of the Northern States have not yet drunk of 
the cup and they are still trying to hold it far from their lips—which all the rest of 
the world see they must nevertheless drink of. We may have our own opinions 
about slavery; we may be for or against the South, but there is no doubt that 
Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are 
making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more difficult than either, 
they have made a nation.20 
Modern historians may look with indulgence at this part of Gladstone’s speech, 
delivered in a northern, cotton-starved textile city. England was nearly as divided as the 
United States was by the war—about slavery, manufacturing in the industrial Union, 
interruptions of shipping, the fate of Canada, and some lingering suspicions about 
Mexico. In the end, the people and government of England could only agree to disagree 
and await the outcome. In fact, Gladstone’s words can be read either as a reason to 
side with the South, or, as an argument for sitting out the war and letting the people of 
the United States settle their own problem. Gladstone is accused of threatening the 
delicate equipoise of British opinion. What is true is that he certainly challenged 
Palmerston’s equanimity. 
In the twenty-first century, this little “side comment” appears more as a 
disinterested and even expression of the political realities in North America than a signal 
                                                                                                                                             
had the experience of two previous wars with the United States as well as plenty of evidence from 
investigations of the Canadian border problem and the reports of the number of troops necessary to 
defend Canada if war broke out. The problem of whether Great Britain would intervene and attempt to 
mediate a solution to the war is reviewed and new conclusions drawn in Brauer’s article. He argues that 
the decision not to mediate occurred after the Battle of Antietam. Brauer that Antietam’s real significance 
of Antietam was that it convinced the British government that no decision could be taken until after the U. 
S. elections of 1864, when Lincoln would, presumably, dig his own political grave and the peace platform 
would take over the government and sue for peace with the South. 
20Jenkins, Gladstone, a Biography, 237, n.11. Jenkins says Gladstone was known for his 
rhetorical habit of making a bold statement and then temporizing. “We may have our own opinions … we 




of recognition. While Jenkins believed it was a “major indiscretion, stating that the 
attempt of the North to uphold the Union by force was lost and implying strongly that 
Britain was about to recognize the Confederacy,” we might be allowed alternatively to 
believe that it is again a “hard-headed response of an able politician”21 who looked with 
analytical eye and cold rationality on the obvious progress made by the South. The 
Confederacy had won major battles. Having penetrated the North, it had forced the 
Union to retreat and regroup. In the textile north of England, Gladstone simply said his 
piece to workers and owners who wanted to hear from a government official; he, and 
they, were concerned about the future and their incomes. Gladstone never pursued the 
topic further, and withdrew from the debate. But to call this statement a blunder is to 
forget that the economic health of the country and that the possible and real problems of 
economic failures were also Gladstone’s problems to deal with. 
 
The Budgets 
In spite of Victoria’s 1859 injunction to Gladstone to write a very large budget, he 
determined to preach economy from the first.22  He had two reasons for this decision: to 
get British finances under control before Palmerston accidentally or purposefully 
committed Britain to a war, and then to provide Palmerston with the resources to fight a 
war if the war was truly Britain’s to fight.23 Gladstone was not a pacifist, nor did he 
                                            
21Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 107. Matthew used this phrase to describe Gladstone’s entry 
to Palmerston’s cabinet in 1859. 
22Roseveare, Treasury, Evolution, Chapter 7, 195. 
23Thomas F. Gallagher, “British Military Thinking and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War,” 
Military Affairs 39, no. 1 (February 1975), 19-22. It is difficult to justify the argument that Gladstone was 
stingy or autocratic during his seven-year position as chancellor. His budgets generally provided 
Palmerston, the Admiralty, and the War Office what they needed, if not necessarily all they ardently 
wanted. He borrowed when necessary, preferring funded to unfunded debt. Sir Stafford Northcote’s and 
Sidney Buxton’s detailed studies of the budgets for these years show how and where Gladstone 
economized. However, the total spending packages for these years were so large some critics began to 
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intend to starve the Army or the Navy of the men and materials they needed to fight 
legitimate wars. His reading may have contributed greatly to his understanding and he 
was still reading about the Crimean War. In addition to the books on the suffering of the 
army in Crimea, Gladstone read on improved guns and iron-clad steamships with screw 
propellers.24 He also held regular conversations with men who understood military 
needs, such as the Duke of Cambridge, Commander and Chief of the Army,25 and Sir 
James Graham. Gladstone believed in invention, and read on it avidly. He could not but 
believe that any technological edge that Britain held over its enemies might give it the 
edge it needed if Palmerston did commit to a war. 26 
Gladstone delivered his first budget speech on 18 July 1859 and required only 
one hundred minutes to do it. It was provisional, meeting a deficit of more than £5 
million by raising the income tax from five pence to nine pence, and collecting the 
revenues in the first six months of the fiscal year. To say that his fiscal work for the year 
was finished after the budget speech is a misconception. Given the way that Gladstone 
worked, his job was never over. For the rest of the legislative year, he was required to 
answer questions about various expenditures, revenues, methods of collection, and 
new problems. He was also needed to nurse the Army, Navy, and Supply estimates 
through the House. Then, he was required to work the enabling legislation required to 
change malt, sugar, and other duties to new levels; he was also required to steer and 
                                                                                                                                             
believe that he was spending far too much for a country that was not at war. The problem, of course, was 
Europe. Thomas Gallagher had looked at the reorganization of the Army in the period following that of 
this thesis, and had concluded that the reforms were made primarily to redress the unwieldy organization 
of the Army: to make it smaller, more efficient, better equipped, but not a  behemoth that could face a 
mobilization of Prussian troops in the 1870s. 
24See the reading list at the end of this chapter. 
25See Gladstone, Diaries 4:12/1/53 and 5:2/4/59 (at Lady Waldgrave’s where “the Duke of 
Cambridge spoke with singular freedom”); also see idem 5:6/11/59, 5:6/3/60, and 6: 22/5/61. The Duke of 
Cambridge was the Queen’s cousin. 
26For Gladstone’s interests in invention and technology, see Chapter 2. 
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speak on changes in taxation. At the end of the legislative system, he was allowed to 
travel, check on the progress of the harvest,27 attend occasional cabinet meetings on 
other problems, and think about the budget before he plunged into actual estimates 
beginning in November. 
Having delivered his speech on July 18, he spent the 19th thinking about “the 
future of ‘our finance’.” On the following day, he worked Indian finance, now his 
responsibility.28 His memorandum of July 24 shows that the cabinet discussed the 
possibility of lending money to the Indian government “funds at our command, and on 
the footing of other borrowers.”29 
He returned to work on the 1860 budget in November, 1859. As in other years, 
military expenditures were at the top of the lists: the Admiralty, Army, Ordnance and 
their ministers were begging for Gladstone’s attention. On November 17 the cabinet met 
to discuss the problem of manning the Navy.30 On the 26th Gladstone read Sidney 
Herbert’s proposal to expand the army to face the French. Herbert’s mathematics 
assumed the Navy could not stop a French invasion. Two days later Gladstone wrote a 
long paper in response to Herbert on finance, but not, apparently, on manpower. On the 
30th he wrote, “very lonely on the question of Military Estimates” and read Sir C. W. 
                                            
27Gladstone, Diaries 14:714. Given the Irish famines of 1846 and 1847, which followed the 
removal of most of the grain duties (with increased purchases of foreign grain and the flow of gold out of 
the country), Gladstone was unlikely to ignore the quality of the harvest. His concerns about harvests 
span the years 1825-1890. 
28Llewellyn Woodward, The Age of Reform, 1815-1870, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 
441. After the Mutiny, Company rule came to an end and the British government took full control. 
Executive power had already been in the hands of the Crown, and Civil Service examinations for Indian 
government were instituted in 1853. The Act of 1858 moved all Company properties to the Crown and set 
up a new Indian government.  
29Gladstone, Diaries 5: July, 1859; Anderson, Liberal State at War, 222-226; Christopher Clay, 
Gold for the Sultan: Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance, 1856-1881: A Contribution to Ottoman and 
to International History (London: I. B. Tauriss, 2000). Many banks including Bank of England, Bank of 
France, Bank de Paris et des Pays Bas, The Rothschilds family firms, and Glyn Mills & Co. participated in 
these loans. For the inception of these loans. 
30Gladstone, Diaries 5:1/11/59 ff. 
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Pasley’s Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions of the British Empire (1810). On 3 
December he read Sir A. Slade’s Maritime States and Military Navies (1859). Two days 
after that, he wrote, “Stiff work …on the Estimates: I gained some points and lost more. 
We are in excess and in a fever.” His angst was mitigated somewhat when, on 
December 16th, he read Pitt’s bill to fortify the Royal Dockyards, and found that Pitt’s 
cabinet had split in much the same way Gladstone’s had.31 
The budgets have been discussed in detail in several places, most notably, 
Stafford Henry Northcote’s Twenty Years of Financial Policy and Sidney Buxton’s study, 
Finance and Politics.32 Gladstone appears, in spite of Palmerston’s constant criticism 
and the post facto additions of the service departments, to have streamlined the budget 
process simply by making it into a process—by knowing the men who competed for 
money, and using whatever abilities he had (“I am no diplomat”) to negotiate. Jenkins 
thought Gladstone’s 1853 budget had pulled at least as many rabbits out of his hat as 
Disraeli presented in the budget Gladstone struck down. By 1860, there were fewer 
rabbits to be had. Gladstone was not the only man to have helped streamline the 
process. But he did have seven years to perfect his approach, train the House of 
Commons in what to expect, and deal with the cabinet.  
                                            
31Gladstone, Diaries 5: November-December 1859. The timing of this comment signals the 
possibility that Palmerston wanted Gladstone involved while the estimates were being written by the 
service departments, and demonstrates Palmerston’s determination to work policy and finance together, 
while working for the highest estimates for the Army and Navy he could squeeze out of Gladstone. This 
was a dangerous game. On Gladstone’s 1853 budget Palmerston stated that no Chancellor of the 
Exchequer could create financial policy that would support the wants and needs of the government and 
the people. By forcing Gladstone into budget talks three or four months before he delivered the budget 
speech, and while the service departments were writing their preliminary wish-list estimates, Palmerston 
may have been trying to take away Gladstone’s ability to limit expenditure. 
32See Stafford H. Northcote, Lord Iddelsleigh, Twenty Years of Financial Policy. A Summary of 
the Chief Financial Measures Passed Between 1842 and 1861, with a Table of Budgets (London: 
Saunders, Otley, 1862); Buxton, Finance and Politics; Hirst, Gladstone as Financier.  
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Nor was he the only man to learn that a budget is not just about money, where it 
comes from and how it is spent. A budget is a highly political instrument of domestic and 
foreign policy. (He had shown this himself in his 1853 budget speech, noting that the 
European powers would be interested to see what Britain did vis-à-vis Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire, and it was as well to put that information on the table as soon as 
possible.) The budget had become an implement of domestic policy, with its demands 
for taxes, excise and customs payments, postal charges, and revenues from royal 
lands, and its bountiful spending list of museums, roads, help for the poor, gas lighting, 
sanitation, soldiers, sailors, ships, harbors, and bridges. One need no more than glance 
through the 1862 or 1863 Hansard Parliamentary Debates tables of contents to see that 
the lists of superannuations, gifts, hospitals, schools, training facilities, and other public 
works that routinely required revenues to sustain them, items that had previously only 
appeared in the pages of the debates themselves, had worked their way forward to the 
first forty pages of each volume, the table of contents.33 
Unlike many of his predecessors he showed no fear of what “the people” might 
think of his budget, but accepted as his the need to convince the people and the 
parliament what was good for them from a budgetary standpoint. He did believe that the 
budget was either a strait-jacket for the people or a gift bag like Santa’s to provide 
candy and comfort to the people. He believed the budget was a contract between the 
people and the government, preaching that honest people, working people, deserved 
good food and clean living that they could afford.34 Thus, he was a chancellor able to 
                                            
33In 1862 the table of contents of each volume of Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates was 
expanded to show more details regarding the business of each day. See, for example, 25 & 26th Victoria 
clxvii, 27 May-7 July, 1862, comprising thirty-five pages, and listing actions on bills, clauses agreed to and 
struck out, and Supply and Civil Service estimates, line by line. 
34Battiscombe, Mrs. Gladstone, 51, 95-98, 119, 129-34, 139. Catherine was described as “the 
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withstand his prime minister on some things, give in on others, and ride out the scares, 
such as the furor that arose when he proposed his tax on charities.35 
Table 8 recreates the expenditure side of the British governmental budget for 
1861-1862, written by Gladstone.36 The numbers look neat, professional, and well 
thought-out. Only those who read the Diaries, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, or 
other records, such as Buxton’s or Northcote’s, understand that behind these sanitary 
numbers are numerous battles, changes of opinion, dogmatic statements, and grim little 
promises to change matters next year.  
The debates on the expenditure side of the budget began when the session 
began, often months before the Chancellor of the Exchequer presented his budget 
statement. One puzzle to new readers is how the House of Commons could debate line 
items in the Army, Navy, or Supply budgets long before the chancellor made his 
speech. The answer is that in the nineteenth century the great spending departments 
prepared their own budgets, top-heavy with grand expenditures, beginning in November 
(at the same time Gladstone began working, often using their preliminary numbers). 
These lists were printed and available to the House of Commons soon after the opening 
of the session, and introduced by the Queen’s speech. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
genius of charities.”  
35Gladstone, Diaries 6:24/4/63, 6:4/5/63. 
36The figures used in the table and text of this section are taken from Buxton, Finance and 
Politics, 2:334-343.  
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Table 8: Budgeted and Actual Total Expenditure, 1861-1862 (₤) 
 
Expenditure Budget, April 15 
Estimate 1861a Actualb Actual Totalc
Debt Charge 24,304,638  
Terminable Annuities 
26,180,000
1,837,698  Debt 
Total   26,142,606
Armyd 15,026,000e 15,134,239f  
Army deficiency from 1859-60g 206,630  
Indian establishment 230,000 230,000  
 Navyh 12,029,000 12,598,042  
War Services 
Total   28,168,911
Consolidated Fund 1,930,000 1,945,572  
Civil Administration 7,737,000 7,831,377  Administration
i 
Total   9,776,949
Collection of Revenuej  2,568,243 2,568,243
Business Outlay 4,780,000   
Post Officek  2,131,338  
Packet Service 995,000 891,921  
Business Outlay 
Total   3,023,259
Total Estimated Expenditure 68,907,000l  69,679,968
Vote of Credit, Chinam 1,000,000 1,230,000  
Crimean Warn  53,431  
Stade Dues Redemptiono  153,086  
Other 
Total   1,436,517
Total Actual Expenditure   71,116,485
Unbudgeted Fortificationsp   790,000
Total Expenditure with Fortifications   72,086,485
Notes: 
aThe estimated amount in each column is the amount reported in the speech that the Chancellor 




bThis figure, or an approximation of it, is the amount reported in next-year’s budget speech in the 
section where the chancellor reported the actual expenditure for the past year. 
cThis is the total for the major head. 
dVarious supplemental estimates this year greatly confused the accounts. 
eThe estimate for the Canadian Expedition (included in the Army and Navy votes) was: Army, 
£609,400; Navy, £234,340, and substantially these sums were spent. 
fThe Indian Establishment charge increased this year. 
gItems that appear in this column in italics are extraordinary expenditures for the current year, not 
recurring expenses. The Deficiency listed here is not a standard entry, but its inclusion indicates that 
Gladstone had decided to pay it off and be rid of it. It would not appear again (until the next deficiency). 
However, the entry for the Indian Establishment continued to appear, in italics, through the 1866-1867 
budget. 
hThe Navy expenditure also includes some expenditure on the Chinese War, and £100,000 spent 
out of the supply estimate of £250,000. 
iThis is primarily the “Supply” budget. 
jThese are “cost of doing business” expenses. Her majesty’s revenue collectors, local tax men, 
and post-office personnel were primarily engaged in collecting money. However, there was a cost of 
collecting money, such as office buildings and warehouses, upkeep on buildings, roads and yards, 
salaries, and travel. These expenses are estimated separately from revenues they generated. 
kThe budget table presented by Buxton is very clear: the Post Office expenditure was not 
estimated in April, and is reported by result only. However, the result, £2,131,338, does not change the 
budget versus actual figures for the total expenditure to this point. The saving of £25,000 (on paper duty) 
on the Stationary vote and on Establishment charges is reckoned in the surplus as finally estimated on 
April 15, but not in the “basis” surplus. In both cases, the figures as given in the Budget are not quite 
added up, and the surpluses are given as £1,923,000 and £408,000. 
lA £20,000,000 discrepancy exists between the total shown for the estimate of 15 April of 
£68,907,000 total shown in Buxton’s table and the actual total for this column, which is £48,907,000. The 
problem lies either in the absence of an entry for Debt Charge, the first item under Debt or in a typesetting 
error. The figure in the Result column, £24,304,638 suggests one of four problems: Gladstone lacked the 
appropriate information to complete this column (unlikely, given his determination and the available 
information); or, he was forced into paying off more of the debt than he had planned (also unlikely given 
Palmerston’s urge to spend money elsewhere); the typesetter missed this expense in setting the table; or 
the typesetter truncated the two at the entry that would have made this a seven digit instead of a six-digit 
number. If the typesetter is at fault, he may also be at fault for bracketing the sub heads Debt Charge and 
Terminable Annuities and presenting the £6 million amount for the category. 
mGladstone was forced to take a vote of credit for the war in China, although he personally 
objected to the government’s entire China policy. 
nThe charges for the Crimean War may have included any number of petty charges concerned 
with bringing home the Army (alive and dead) and unpaid bills from previous years. 
oThe Stade Dues were a problem left over from the Hanover family possessions taken into British 
hands. See J. F. Chance, “England and Sweden at the Time of William III and Anne,” The English 
Historical Review 16, no. 64 (October 1901): 676-711. 
pGladstone, Diaries, May, 1861. The total of £4,304,638 and £1,837,968 is £6,142,606, a sum 
near enough to the estimate to represent a reasonable variation between budget and actual. This 
expenditure was introduced after the cabinet had approved the budget, much to Gladstone’s 
consternation and disapproval. 
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The Chancellor of the Exchequer typically delivers finance (budget) speech in 
March or April. In the mid-Victorian period the speech consisted of three main topics: a 
report of the previous year’s financial performance; a plan of finance—“ways and 
means”; and a list of proposed bills required to enable to the plan to work. Enabling 
legislation, seen later as “the Malt Bill,” or “the Sugar Bill,” or “the Income Tax Bill,” 
contained changes to individual sources of revenue required by the budget.37 By 
accident or design, the debates on the three great headings—Army, Navy, and 
Supply—thus conformed to Palmerston’s notion that the needs of the government 
should be understood, and the budget written to fit these needs; Gladstone’s budget 
speech conformed more to his assertion that the government should estimate the 
amount of revenue available from various sources, and then distribute these funds 
appropriately. 
In Table 8, the headings in the left-most column are the major items that 
Gladstone began to study each November in the year before the budget was required:  
debt, war services, administration, and costs of collecting the revenues; within each of 
these major topics are subheadings reported in the final budget. Those who read 
Gladstone’s finance speeches do well to keep the Northcote and Buxton’s books in 
hand both for the political descriptions in the chapters and for changes in the outcomes 
of specific line-items.38  The line items that appear below the Total Estimated 
                                            
37 See Jenkins, Gladstone, A Biography, 225. Each resolution became a bill to be debated in its 
own right. The budget often required modification after resolutions had been passed or defeated. For 
example, the 1860 budget included a resolution to raise the rate of income tax by one penny and a 
resolution to end the newspaper duties. Income tax passed. Abolition of the newspaper duties was struck 
down in the House of Lords with the connivance of Palmerston and the Queen. 
38Northcote, Twenty Years, Appendix A, Table of Budgets. 376-395. Buxton, Finance and Politics 
2: Appendix C, Budget Tables, 334-362. Buxton’s presentations of the budgets have the advantage of 
showing the major headings as well as the subheadings. Northcote has not used the major headings. 
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Expenditure were expenditures added after the budget had been presented to the 
House of Commons.39  The entire account, of course, was completed after the end of 
the year, when all the expenditures were collected. Thus, the term “Budget” used as a 
title for such a table is a misnomer unless the title also mentions the word “Actual” to 
show how the budgeted amounts vary from the actual results. 
As seen in Table 8, the expenses for the War Services—Army, Navy, and India—
collectively account for slightly more than the costs associated with the government’s 
debt liabilities, the main one being interest payments. This is an operating budget, with 
no reference to the modern accounting practices such as separating the capital budget 
from the operating budget, amortization, or depreciation. Payments for capital 
improvements, such as the new houses of Parliament, law courts, and the Thames 
Embankment were budgeted on a year-by-year basis, and were listed under Supply.  
As the notes for this table show, there were problems with bookkeeping, 
estimating, and spending which a subsequent financial report was expected to explain, 
but for which a chancellor was not expected to manage in real time. In other words, the 
government and the parliament accepted that during the year emergencies would occur, 
that money would have to be borrowed, and that surpluses would have to be sacrificed. 
Gladstone might act as rationally as possible in attempting to hold the government to 
the budget, but it was never the government’s intent to be held to the budget. 
Table 9 shows the revenue half of the budget. Gladstone’s revenues estimates 
were based on two types of data: revenue data from previous years, and Gladstone’s 
                                            
39Items that appear this far down in a budget of expenditures explain why Gladstone was so 
anxious to bring in a surplus every year. The parliamentary argument tended to be that the nation was not 
at war, forgetting China, colonies, trouble over the Danish-claimed duchies, and residual charges from 
previous wars (such as China). 
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proposed alterations, changes in taxation levels (such as reduction of wine duties), 
elimination of some taxes (paper duties) and additions of others (Indian receipts). 
Table 9: Budgeted Revenue, 1861-1862 (₤) 






Customsa 23,585,000 23,570,000 23,674,000
Exciseb 19,463,000 18,788,000 18,332,000
Stamps 8,460,000  8,590,945
House, Land, & Assorted other taxesc 3,150,000  3,160,000




Total   64,121,945
Post Office 3,520,000 3,510,000 3,510,000Revenue 
from 
Business Total   3,510,000
Crown Lands (net) 295,000  295,000
 Miscellaneous   696,534
 Army & Navy Receipts 1,400,000  1,400,000
 Army, Indian Receipts   230,000




Total   1,747,534
 Total Based on Previous Year 71,823,000   
 Total with Proposed Alterations  70,283,000 
Total   69,674,479
Surplus 1,916,000 401,000  
Deficit   (1,442,006)f 
Notes: 
aWine duties further reduced. 
bBuxton, Finance and Politics 2:3. Palmerston actually plotted with the conservatives to scuttle 
Gladstone’s proposal on the paper duty. The uproar caused a constitutional crisis.  
cIndian receipts increase this year. 
dIncome Tax reduced from 10d. to 9d. 
eFor all the debate about income tax, it still only represented sixteen per cent of the revenues for 
the state. Customs and Excise accounted for more than sixty-five per cent of these revenues. 
fThis figure is the actual level of expenditures for the year without fortifications. With fortifications 
the deficit actually was larger. 
 
 308
The budget speech that Gladstone delivered showed that he expected a modest 
surplus if all the bills he proposed passed. He wished to reduce wine duties, and to end 
the tax on newspapers. He also anticipated that the revenues from the China indemnity 
would reach the level demanded of the Chinese. In fact, the revenues from income tax 
and the Chinese indemnities fell far short. Gladstone had allowed for the reduction in 
income tax: the previous year had yielded £11,200,000, but with the reduction from 10d. 
to 9d., Gladstone expected the yield on income tax to be reduced by £850,000 to 
£10,350,000. Indeed, it yielded £15,000,000 more than his estimate, and customs, 
stamps, and other assorted taxes yielded slightly higher than estimated revenues. 
Nevertheless, when the actual total expenditure figures are compared with the actual 
total revenues, the services and parliament had managed to outspend Gladstone. The 
Post Office was also expected to return slightly less revenue. 
If one looks at the revenues table, showing adjustments for growth in increased 
anticipated revenues, and adjustments for tax reductions in lower anticipated revenues, 
one cannot but notice that two revenues, Crown lands and Army and Navy receipts 
were not expected to grow. While increments on Crown Lands (given over to parliament 
in the Queen Victoria’s coronation oath) might not be expected to produce more 
revenue year to year, they might, under poor weather conditions, be expected to 
produce less. Army and Navy receipts, however, might be expected to grow if either 
service took on more guard, garrisoning, or transport services for private person or 
corporations. In fact, both sources of revenues appear to fill a more ceremonial purpose 
than a revenue purpose, and thus might be passed over in the budget without comment. 
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If Gladstone was deficient in preparing a budget, it was in his expectation that the 
world would stay the same, and that Britain would be allowed to do her business without 
hindrance. It was a risky expectation, and one he managed to maintain only by 
enormous effort. Table 10 shows the results of Gladstone’s efforts. In 1859-60, 
Gladstone’s deficit was nearly twice Disraeli’s for the previous year. In 1860-61 and 
1861-62, Gladstone’s deficits were, for him, staggering, well in excess of £2 million 
each. Later years show that he had gotten the measure of Palmerston’s planning, and 
that he achieved the surpluses he so desperately wanted.  
Table 10: Governmental Budgetary Bottom Line, 1858-1869 (₤) 
 










1858-1859 Disraeli 65,477,284 64,663,882 813,402a ---- 813,402
1859-1860 Gladstone 71,089,669 68,644,232 2,445,437  858,057 1,587,380b 
1860-1861c Gladstone 70,283,674 72,842,059 (2,558,385)d 200,000e (2,758,385)
1861-1862 Gladstone 69,674,479 71,116,485 (1,442,006)f 970,000 (2,412,006)
1862-1863 Gladstone 70,603,560 69,302,008 1,301,552 1,050,000 251,552
1863-1864g Gladstone 70,208,964 67,056,286 3,152,678 820,000 2,332,678
1864-1865 Gladstone 70,313,437 66,462,206 3,851,231 620,000 3,231,321
1865-1866 Gladstone 67,812,292 65,914,356 1,897,936 560,000 1,337,936
1866-1867 Gladstone 69,434,567 66,780,396 2,654,171 450,000 2,204,171
1867-1868 Disraeli 69,600,218 71,236,242 (1,636,024) 530,000 (2,166,024)
1868-1869 Loweh 72,591,992 74,972,816 (2,380,824) 525,000 (2,905,824)
Notes: 
aIn a Palmerston government a surplus was both a wonderful and a dangerous thing. Gladstone’s 
announcement of a possible surplus before the cabinet in budget discussions in 1859 may actually have 
triggered the late announcement of a desire for fortifications. 
bThis surplus includes a reduction for the expenditure on the Chinese War. 
cOne state seceded April 1860. Six more seceded In January 1861. The Bank or England’s 
discount rate for the first seven months of 1861appears to have been sensitive to the threat to the 
manufacturing north, and it reached eight percent after the six states left the Union in 1861. Clapham 
says the scare was partly irrational, and sufficient cotton was brought in before the Union’s announced 
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blockade to carry the northern English cotton mills for several months; blockade runners continued to 
supply raw cotton, although speculators drove prices up. Gold was from Australia was filling the Bank’s 
vaults. From July to October the discount rate stood at two percent. See Clapham, Bank of England 2: 
257. 
dThe deficit in 1860-61 appears to result from a Vote of Credit for China and a repayment to India 
totaling £3,043,896. 
eFortifications are not included in Gladstone’s budgets, although he knew they would be 
demanded every year after 1861. I have not been able to find evidence of a separate capital budget. The 
expenditure should have been included in Supply. 
fThe deficit for 1861-1862 is more difficult to understand. One would expect a reduction in 
customs if the Union’s blockade of the South was having an effect, but the customs figures, which include 
customs payments on imported cotton, actually increased by a small amount. The far more likely culprits 
were another Vote of Credit for China, remaining expenses from the Crimean War, and a redemption of 
the Stade Dues; the three totaling £1,436,517. The deficit for that year, excluding fortifications, was 
£1,442,006. 
gClapham says that by 1863, investment in railways in India and Australia was driving the market. 
See Clapham, Bank of England 2: 257 
hThis is Gladstone’s first cabinet, 1868-1874. Gladstone himself succeeded Lowe in 1873. See K. 
Theodore Hoppin, The Mid-Victorian Generation, 1846-1886 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 721. 
In Gladstone’s mind, the budgets took the guise of Gladstone versus Palmerston 
for the good of the British people. Palmerston never accepted what he saw as cheese-
paring in his Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Gladstone ran significant risks in 
creating  surpluses in years when Palmerston wished to become involved in North 
America, Europe, or both, while the British people seemed unconcerned about the level 
of the national debt. The battle between the two men had several interesting aspects as 
shown in the budgets: The first and most obvious thing is that because Gladstone never 
took the Palmerston’s repeated demands for fortifications along the south coast of 
England in defense against the French for granted they failed to appear as a regular line 
item above the “Total Resulting Expenditure” line. Thus, his budgets were never 
inclusive, and his  problem with fortifications was made to look, through a bookkeeping 
trick, like extraordinary expense for which someone else was responsible.  
Second, it is clear that the problem with fortifications, such as the high level of 
expenditure in 1862-1863 on them, did serious damage to what would otherwise have 
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been a reasonable surplus of £1,301,552, reducing it to £251,552. This resistance on 
Gladstone’s part can be seen as stubbornness. Had he been less stubborn, he could 
have had his surpluses far sooner, and could have applied them to the national debt. 
Third, in spite of the problems with fortifications, as the country recovered from 
the deepest threats and layoffs caused by the United States Civil War, a decent surplus 
is to be seen in 1863-1864, and an even better one in 1864-65. To Gladstone, these 
surpluses were worth protecting because they could be used to pay down the national 
debt.40  
Fourth, his attempts to use the budgets to raise surpluses, and to use the 
surpluses to cut the national debt can reasonably be seen as his attempt to get the 
specter of the Bank of England with its management charges and demands for interest 
payments made on schedules set by the Bank, not the government. Gladstone needed 
maneuvering room. Putting it another way, he needed bargaining chips to use in his 
dealings with the Bank. From 1859 to 1866, his dealings with the Bank appear to have 
been farm more harmonious than in the earlier period. This fact alone tends to deny the 
validity of the claims that he was irresponsible, quick to anger, slow to calm down, and 
difficult for public people to deal with. It also helps to validate general mood exhibited in 
Matthew’s claim that Gladstone introduced the changes listed in his 1856 list step by 
step until he brought introduced an d gained passage for his Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act in 1866. The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act could have no 
                                            
40Robert Giffen, “The Financial Retrospect, 1861-1901,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 
65, no. 1 (March 1902), 47-85, 64 and Table II,” Amount of the National Debt, and Charge of Interest;” 
Jones, Neven, “The British National Debt: Part I;” idem “The British National Debt: Part II.” In 1861, Giffen 
showed that the national debt was £824,600,000 and that the annual interest and sinking fund charges on 
the budget were £26,300,000. These figures included the entire amount to be paid on annuities and the 
interest on the permanent funded debt, as well as appropriations for repayment of various short-term 
debts paid from year to year.  
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effect on spending authorized by the government and the passage of expenditures bills 
that exceeded revenue. Gladstone appears to have had two goals in mind from 1859 to 
1866: go meet each financial challenge head on, with sufficient surplus in the coffers to 
allow him to respond without borrowing, and to set the stage for a continued 
parliamentary life in which he must deal with the Bank of England. 
 
The Overend, Gurney and Company Problems, 1860, 1866 
Matthew has described Gladstone in 1859 as an able politician with a hard head 
and a program for action.41 This chapter suggests that Gladstone’s hard head, and the 
animosity it housed, were being tempered by five factors: the Bank of England itself; 
Gladstone’s social and political contacts with the bankers Lord Overstone and Lionel 
Rothschild, his growing friendship with Walter Bagehot, his work on parliamentary 
committees, and his reading. In 1857, Gladstone served on the Select Committee on 
Banking (listening to Baron Overstone assert that the only thing wrong with present 
banking operation was, perhaps, the currency), and allowed the Bank Act to pass 
without significant comment.42 The Overend, Gurney problem of 1860 gave him an 
opportunity, masterfully, to do nothing, and let the Bank reap both the turmoil and the 
rewards. Later, during the 1866 Overend, Gurney crisis, Gladstone again did nearly 
nothing, except to follow the process of his predecessors to restore confidence. His 
work and experience in these three areas suggest that he was not in the same 
                                            
41Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 107. The hardness of his head is certainly supported by the 
many photographs and paintings produced as Gladstone grew older. His face hardened, his eyebrows 
jutted, and his jaw seemed to brook no nonsense. The  softness and understanding so obvious in the 
youthful Gladstone seem all to have moved to the inside. 
42Overstone, Evidence Given. 
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combative mood as in 1852-1855, and that he was now aware of better tools for use in 
dealing with the Bank of England. 
 
The Overend, Gurney and Company Note-Run on the Bank, 186043 
Overend, Gurney and Company was a bill-brokerage with what appears to have 
been a deep-seated animosity toward the Bank of England. In 1860, both Overend, 
Gurney and Bruces (another London bill-brokerage) asked the Bank to relax their 
interest rates on bills (nearing four-and-a-half per cent). The Bank responded that there 
was not the smallest hope of relaxation. While Bruces took this information calmly, 
Overend, Gurney, prompted by “younger and ambitious hands” at the tiller, preferred to 
fight. They selected an interesting method. Since the passage of the 1844 Bank Charter 
Act, and especially after the crises of 1847 and 1857, the quantity and value of the Bank 
notes in circulation were closely watched numbers. In the week of 12 April 1860, the 
value of the Bank of England notes in circulation suddenly rose dramatically from its 
previous weekly level s by £1,622,000. In response, the Bank raised the discount rate to 
five per cent. Rumor said this withdrawal represented an Overend attempt to embarrass 
the Bank.44 On 17 April, a letter with a London, E.C., postmark was received at the 
Bank: “Overends can pull out every note you have, from actual knowledge the writer 
can inform you that with their own family assistance they can nurse seven millions.”45  
                                            
43Clapham, Bank of England 2:243. The page header on this page uses the word “putsch.” 
Remembering that Sir John wrote his history of the Bank of England during the World War II, we perhaps 
should not be surprised that he used such a term to describe the Overend, Gurney & Co. raid on the 
Bank of England. 




The threat was apparently taken as real. The results could have been 
catastrophic for the City. The Bank of England tended to lend using Bank notes, not 
letters of credit or other credit instruments. Therefore, the Overend, Gurney threat 
meant that by removing all the cash from their own deposit account at the Bank and 
asking their partners to do the same, they could remove all the Bank of England notes 
from the Banking side of the Bank, and Bank of England business in withdrawals and 
credits in Bank notes could be brought to a halt if the threat were made good.  
Alderman Salomons, an MP for the City, and a member of the London and 
Westminster Bank, put down a question for Gladstone in the House of Commons. 
Bonamy Dobree46 was the Bank’s governor at the time, having served his term as 
deputy governor during the 1857 commercial crisis, and was thus well trained in crisis 
management. Dobree and his deputy met with Gladstone on April 18.47 Dobree told 
Gladstone that the withdrawals appeared to represent some sort of consortium, 
consisting of Barclays, Bevan, and Company, Barnett, Hoares and Company, and 
Shepherd Brothers. He did not mention Overend, Gurney and Company. Dobree was 
convinced that Barclays could never have drawn that much money on their own. A 
review of the Overend, Gurney account showed that they rarely held more than 
£700,000 in their account at the Bank under normal operation. The story Dobree told 
was therefore the best estimate the governor could make of the threat to the Bank.  
                                            
46See Gladstone, Diaries 5:3/6/59. Dobree was a connoisseur of fine china and had shown his 
collection to Gladstone, who was also a collector.  
47Clapham, Bank of England 2:242, 243. 
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Clapham says Gladstone listened indulgently.48 When governor and deputy 
returned to the Bank’s offices after the meeting with Gladstone, they found that 
Overend, Gurney had returned the notes, each one cut in half, with another note saying 
they were “sorry for what they had done.”49 I quote Clapham directly because his 
opinion of Gladstone is well known, and Clapham was not any more conciliatory over 
this passage than at any other time. From context, we can assume that Gladstone had 
also talked to Overend, Gurney and Company representatives. 
 
Gladstone said in the House that they [Overend, Gurney] were most frank and 
had argued that their action was of the nature of a public protest against a public 
evil and a bad rule which tended to “throw … their legitimate business into the 
Bank of England.” Gladstone “gave no opinion on the existence of any such 
public evil.”50  
Gladstone admitted, and Clapham admitted on his behalf, that the Bank had 
acted with “perfect propriety and prudence.” Clapham finds in the Diary of 18 April, 
1860, the private comment that Gladstone was satisfied that the Bank had not yielded to 
Overend, Gurney.51 Clapham says Gladstone was much embarrassed, however, 
wishing to consider the needs of private firms but determined to avoid use of a term that 
sounded like a rebellion in the money market: 
                                            
48Clapham, 242-246; Gladstone, Diaries 6:18/4/60, n.7. It is difficult to identify his sources from 
Clapham’s meager footnotes. Under normal circumstances, we would assume that Clapham had full 
access to the Bank’s archives, but his book was published in 1945. The Bank of England can safely be 
presumed to have moved their archives to a safer location during the war, but just how Clapham used the 
archives is a story yet to be told. Either he had access to the vaults where these archives were stored, or 
the archives had been moved back to London after the Blitz.. In either case, his use of the word “putsch” 
is suggestive. On the other hand, Matthew identifies Gladstone’s April 18 meeting with the “Govr. & Dep. 
Govr. Bank” as a meeting on Overend, Gurney’s ‘putsch’ against the Bank. 
49Gladstone, Diaries 6:18/4/60, n.7; Clapham, Bank of England 2:243-244. Matthew says that the 
return amounted to £1.5 million in £1000 notes, cut in half. Neither source suggests whether the notes 
were accomplished by a deposit slip to restore the balances in Overend, Gurney’s accounts or the 
accounts of other banks. Nor does Clapham confirm that other banks were included in the “putsch.” 
50Clapham, Bank of England 2: 244; Hansard’s, clvii:2002. 
51Clapham, Bank of England 2: 245, n.1. In the note, Clapham wrote that Gladstone’s bias was 
against the Bank, but he found no evidence that Gladstone held any bias in favor of the market. His exact 
entry contains the words, “Diary, 18 April.” 
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But with Dobree’s statement before him[,] need he have opened with the 
ambiguous “l will not say that it was a concerted action in the natural 
interpretation of the word—namely an action determined on by a combination 
among a variety of parties”? He was pinned to the word “concerted” by 
Salomons’ question. All the facts he could not state. But he had great ingenuity of 
phrase; and if a firm of bill-brokers, two—and by suggestion three—firms of 
bankers and one firm of stock brokers are not a variety of parties, even though 
most of them are Quakers, what is? 
Gladstone later wrote to the Bank that he thought it had “come off on the whole 
winners.”52 
 
The Overend, Gurney and Company Collapse 
Those who castigate the Bank Act of 1844 by writing or saying that the Act 
caused Great Britain to suffer three great economic crises in the mid-Victorian period—
1847, 1857, and 1866—require contradiction. In fact, although the government 
suspended the 1844 Act for a third time, the crisis of 1866 cannot be ranked world-wide, 
nor even Britain-wide, a problem ranking with the other two. The first two crashes 
affected large blocks of the commercial population, and Clapham has shown it was the 
first truly world-wide crisis. Both the 1847 and 1857 crises came after months of rising 
currency issue and increased investment stressing many companies beyond their 
currency and asset limits. In the Overend, Gurney crisis of 1866, only one company was 
stretched to breaking point—Overend, Gurney themselves.  
Clapham complements Samuel Gurney’s “old sound business” sense for making 
Overend, Gurney the solid brokerage house that it was for so long, even though he 
admits the firm sometimes competed with the Bank of England. Clapham quoted Walter 
Bagehot’s obituary for the great firm, saying that in the years from 1860 to 1866 the 
                                            
52Ibid., 245. Clapham’s biases include Quakers make his discussions sometimes difficult to 
understand or defend.  
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“immensely rich partners” lost all their wealth, sold their shares of the business to the 
company, and then lost all their stock in the company failure. Those young and 
impetuous managers who had fomented the putsch in 1860 expanded into what 
Clapham calls flimsy paper and “all sorts of financing.”53 The company entered new 
fields, and was soon overextended in terms of resources and management skills.  
The crash came on Thursday, May 10: Overend, Gurney and Company, Ltd. 
failed for five millions.54 The panic came quickly. Friday, May 11th. City men turned to 
the Bank of England for support. The cash reserve in the Banking Department of the 
Bank of England stood at £5,727,000 on Monday, May 14 when business opened and 
its advances for the subsequent week are detailed in Clapham.55 Not all the companies 
connected with Overend, Gurney were in desperate trouble: only those who expected to 
receive payments cleared through Overend, Gurney in the near term suffered unless 
they had sufficient funds of their own or were able to borrow on their assets. The crash 
came quickly, and ended quickly, when the Bank of England was once again allowed to 
raise their interest rates for a short time under an agreement in which they promised to 
share the profits of those high rates with the government. 
But Gladstone did not escape embarrassment. He had made his budget speech 
eight days earlier -- 
 
He had spoken with exuberant confidence about economic progress and that 
race among nations in which “the people of the United Kingdom are by far the 
foremost.” He was anxious to pay off the National Debt before our [Britain’s] coal-
                                            
53Clapham, Bank of England 2:261. 
54“Failed for five millions” means that the company owed £5 millions, debts that were called in for 
payment, and Overend, Gurney could not pay with their liquid. Overend, Gurney may have had assets of 
three or four times that amount, but if they could not liquidate their assets and pay their immediate debts, 
there was in those days no way to stave off the creditors until the problem could be settled without a 
panic. 
55Clapham, Bank of England 2:264. The Bank lent more than £4 million on Monday alone. 
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measures began to give out … but he had hoisted no warning signals against 
over-trading of finance paper.56 
In retrospect, we would like to ask Sir John how he could have hoisted a warning 
signal unless he understood Overend, Gurney’s position. In fact, his “exuberant 
confidence was based on the same strengths that made the crisis so short in duration 
and so controlled. When he rose to answer Disraeli’s question on the failure on May 11 
he had not received a letter from the Bank asking for help. In the two-and-a-half hours 
before he went to the House, however, he had received a deputation of joint-stock 
bankers anxious to tell him about the panic. In his answer to Disraeli he stated that in 
spite of the deputation he had not the slightest idea that the Bank would ask for 
suspension. Whether he was confident in the Bank’s reserves and management, or 
whether he was, quite reasonably waiting on events, he had nothing to be embarrassed 
about. Given the rather silly problem of 1860, it is first no wonder that Overend, Gurney 
failed, nor that the rest of the financial world, gaining wisdom and confidence, road out 
the failure successfully. When the letter arrived on Friday evening, Gladstone 
immediately authorized the Bank to raise their rate of interest on loans without a 
qualm.57 
Most men at the time admitted that this crisis was not the Bank’s fault, and 
therefore believed that strictly speaking it was not the Bank’s problem to fix. The 
possibility exists that the Bank had begun to feel its responsibility as a bank of last 
resort and a banker’s bank. There had been no rising tide of events that suggested a 
crisis, and the Bank could not be accused of acting too late to stop the crisis when it 
                                            
56Ibid., 265. W. S. Jevons, an economist, had published a book entitled The Coal Question 
(1865), in which he predicted that Britain’s coal resources would give out in about one hundred years. 
Gladstone had read this book. See Diaries 6:1/2/66. 
57Clapham, Bank of England 2: 265.  
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happened. Between the 14th and the 18th the Bank had taken every action it could to 
protect itself and the public and it had lent more that £4,000,000 to businesses to save 
them from failure. The crisis was over almost as soon as it began, and was certainly 
settled by October 24.58 
 
The Banks of Issue Bill 
Had it passed, the Banks of Issue bill would have acted as a direct stab at the 
Bank of England. There had been other stabs from 1859 to 1866. Clapham says in 
1859 “Gladstone turned a formidable eye, which many years later a man who disliked 
him and feared him called that of a bird of prey” on the Bank.59 This formidable eye 
envisaged another large reduction in the amount the government paid the Bank for 
management of the national debt. It also included government assumption of the entire 
profit from Bank issue of currency. Gladstone also wanted to end other payments to the 
Bank, such as “house money,” and to reduce the number of “shuttings,” i.e., days when 
the Bank closed for business in order to catch up on its bookkeeping. Clapham says the 
Court of the Bank accepted these reductions rather sorrowfully and the new rules 
became law in 24 & 25 Vict. c.3.60 In 1860, he also worked on the national debt and the 
Bank’s profits from its management, and again worked on paying off the debt by selling 
                                            
58For the papers related to the crisis, see T. E. Gregory, Select Statutes, Documents, and 
Reports Related to British Banking, 1832-1928, 2 vols. (London: Frank Cass, 1964), Correspondence 
between the Government and the Bank, 124; The Times on the Crisis, 127; The Economist and the 
Crisis, 165; and the Report of the Provisional Liquidators, 181. 
59Clapham, Bank of England 2:255, n.2. 
60Ibid., 255-256. It is not clear whether these moves had anything to do with Gladstone’s previous 
plans to change the relationship between the Bank and the government in a meaningful and constitutional 
way, or whether he was still chipping around the edges. None of these actions changed the behavior or 
ownership of the Issue Department of the Bank of England. 
 
 320
Exchequer bills.61 He also paid some attention to the Bank’s rates on loans and 
currency issue.62 
In 1861, Gladstone returned to the attack with a meeting to reduce the Bank’s 
profits from debt management and reduce the value of subsequent annuities.63 He also 
prepared a series of resolutions aimed at resolving some of the tensions between 
savings banks and the Bank of England.64 
In 1863, Gladstone began to work on private banks of issue, perhaps based on 
an inquiry to the Treasury about suspension of some of the clauses in the 1844 Act (see 
below). His Diary note mentions a “Long conversation with the Gov. & Dep. Gov. on 
Private Issues.” Admittedly, this record might be ambiguous, but it is hardly likely that 
Gladstone, the determined public and private financier, should take his own private 
money problems, if he had any, to the Bank of England. Therefore, it is more probable 
that he referred to the private banks of issue.65 
On February 11, 1865, the House of Commons sat as a committee to hear 
Gladstone announce his Banks of Issues [sic] Bill. The purpose of the Act, he said, 
                                            
61See Clapham, Bank of England 2:255; Add MS 44591: f. 151 and 44749, f. 172; Gladstone, 
Diaries 6. Gladstone recorded a meeting with the Bank on 12/10/60, the same day he saw the National 
Debt commissioners. A memorandum on Bank profits appears 27/11/60. The cabinet meeting the day 
before had been devoted to finance and included sending the Exchequer bills to the Bank, and Bank 
remuneration on the National Debt. On 27/11/60 he wrote a memorandum on reducing the bank’s profits 
from debt management by £70,000. On 3/1/60 he had a meeting with the Bank on profits. On 3/12/60 he 
held a meeting that included both the Bank and a Treasury committee on using exchequer bills to reduce 
the debt and reducing the Bank’s profits.  Another meeting took place on 5/12/60 on the same two topics: 
Add MS 44591: f.151 and 44750, f.172. Finally, a meeting on Bank of England, 19/12/60 was on the 
Bank’s discount rates on discount rates, Add MS 44394, f. 325. 
62Clapham must have used Bank archives to identify these problems and raids. The archives 
include all the correspondence for the governors and deputy governors of the Bank. 
63Gladstone, Diaries 6:30/1/6. The purpose of the meeting on this date was to reduce the amount 
the government paid on debt management and the value of subsequent annuities (PP 1861, xxxiv: 177). 
64Hansard, clx:146; Gladstone, Diaries 6:7/2/61. The debate centered on  savings banks and on 
the Bank of England. In the House, Gladstone introduced the Bank of England plan, a new method of 
national debt payments to the bank. 
65Gladstone, Diaries 6:21/11/63. 
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would “create a new legal position for those banks of issue which may be disposed to 
avail themselves of its provisions.” Then he rehearsed the present law as it applied to 
private and joint-stock banks of issue in England and Wales under the Act of 1844.66 
First, the Act had left the banks of issue (country, private, and joint-stock) in possession 
of their issuing rights, but with no guarantees of continuing for a specific period. The 
Bank Act had imposed limitations on the amount of the bank notes that could be issued 
(and thus the value of the notes in circulation, and had thus limited the available 
currency for use in conducting conduct business.67 He stated that even if the lesser 
banks lost the power of issue, they would still be allowed to continue their other 
activities.  
The result had been that in the early 1860s some banks had petitioned the 
Treasury for removal of the banking restrictions on banks of issue under the 1844 Act.68 
But Gladstone stated that the bill he proposed was not a currency measure and would 
not interfere with existing rules for regard bank notes themselves, nor (and this is 
perhaps a problem) would it “bear in may material or palpable manner upon any of the 
                                            
66Banks in Scotland and Ireland were exempt from the 1844 Act, but were covered in an 1845 
Act. 
67See Pressnell, Country Banks, Table XI. He shows that an approximately 3:1 ratio existed 
between banks of issue and non-issuing banks in 1844, but that in 1884 both the number of banks and 
the ratios had shifted dramatically downward. In 1844, the number of provincial private banks of issue 
stood at 208 while the non-issuing banks numbered 65. The total circulation of the issuing private banks 
stood at £5,153,000. The number of issuing joint-stock banks stood at 72, while the non-issuing joint-
stock banks stood at 28. The total circulation of the issuing joint-stock banks was £3,478,000. In 1884, 
only 172 country banks remained, both issuing and non-issuing, and their total note circulation was 
£1,349,000. The total number of issuing and non-issuing joint-stock banks was 91, and their total 
circulation was only £1,541,000. In the same period, the Bank of England’s bank note circulation grew 
from £20,176,000 to £25,102,000. The overall reduction in bank note circulation suggests that issue was 
a problem finding solution in other ways, such as the use of running accounts and cheques, while country 
banks faced other troubles, such as bankruptcy, amalgamation, and competition.  
68For a study of private and joint-stock bank, see Arthur Crump, The English Manual of Banking, 
3rd. Edition. (London: Longmans, Green, 1878), esp. Ch. II, “Private Banks and Joint-Stock Banks,” and 
Ch. III, “Banker and Customer”; Pressnell, Country Banking, esp. Part I, “The Growth of Country Banking 
and the Origins of Country Bankers,” Part III, “The Work of Country Banks,” and Table 1, “The Numbers 
of Country Banks in England and Wales, 1784-1842.” 
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important questions connected with the issue of bank notes. It is not properly to be 
considered as a currency measure.”69  
The possibility of a limited corrective to the Bank Act of 1844 had come in a 
request from the National and Provincial Bank (Gladstone did not give a date, but it 
appears to postdate the request of the early 1860s petition).70 The National and 
Provincial had stated they were willing to pay for relief from the restrictions of the Act. 
The managers of the bank were speaking only for themselves, not for other banks. But 
Gladstone came to the idea of asking parliament to change the law for all the banks of 
issue if possible, perhaps through the possibility offered by the National and 
Provincial—payment for a license to issue.71 The bill he proposed would have the 
following characteristics: Any joint-stock bank72 with the privilege of issuing notes would 
be able to open a branch in London and pay (convert) its notes in London, but not issue 
them there, or within three miles of London. Private banks of issue would be allowed to 
take on additional partners and become joint-stock banks without losing their issue 
privileges. Any bank could take out a license from the government issue, with the 
provision that if parliament decided to end the license of issues, banks with outstanding 
                                            
69The Times, 11 Feb. 1865. 
70Gladstone, Diaries, 6:3/3/64. Gladstone wrote a memorandum on Bank of England bank notes 
(unfortunately listed in Matthew’s index as a memorandum on country bank notes). Until 1844, the 
country banks appear not to have been a concern of the Bank of England. Joint-stock banks became a 
concern and were under legislation from the first of joint-stock company legislation of the middle 1820s, 
when J. W. Gilbart, finding a breach in the joint-stock company legislation, opened the London and 
Westminster joint stock bank over the strenuous objections of the Bank of England. Nevertheless, the 
careless use of the term “country bank” to stand for all English and Welsh banking outside the Bank of 
England should be of concern to any historian studying this area of finance. 
71The Times, 11 Feb. 1865. Gladstone explained that the Act of 1844 forbade a bank to continue 
to issue if it took on more than six partners, thus becoming a joint-stock bank; transfer their privilege of 
issue to another bank; or if it set up a branch within the sixty-five-mile issue monopoly radius of the Bank 
of England’s home base on Threadneedle Street.  
72In The Times, the bill was at first referred to as the Banks of Issue Bill (without quotation marks, 
11 Feb. 1865); then the “Country Banks of Issue Bill (opening but no closing quotation marks, 13 Feb. 
1865); and finally the Bank Notes Issue Bill (24 Feb. 1865). The Times index used the third title and made 
the bill is easier to follow in The Times than in Hansard. 
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licenses would be compensated for their loss. The license, like a liquor license, would 
become a property of value. Under questioning, Gladstone admitted that the right would 
become an asset from which the creditors might benefit. 
It was an ingenious plan. Gladstone, who had just worked through several Acts in 
which he had converted some excise payments to licenses (such as hackneys), and 
had managed the licensing of restaurants that served wine, may have taken the 
licensing part of the scheme very much to heart.73 More important, however, is the fact 
that Gladstone no longer gave lip-service to Peel’s long-ago wish for a single bank of 
issue throughout the country. Gladstone now saw that issue was a way for the entire 
banking business to grow. He may even have taken to heart Lord Overstone’s 
comments that competition was good for banking.74 
Furthermore, there was precedent of a sort for joint-stock banks opening and 
doing business, including issue, in London. In the debate of February 13, Gladstone 
reminded MPs that the National Bank of Ireland and the National Bank of Scotland, both 
banks of issue, had opened banks in London.75  
Gladstone’s only problem was that no one liked the entire idea. The bill became 
a hot topic, but there was very little pro debate and a great deal of con. Debate on 24 
February included references to Bank of Scotland. Buchanan expressed disappointment 
that although debate on the Bank Act of 1844 had led to a promise that the banks of 
Scotland would have their day in parliament, this “small, and in some respects, 
objectionable measure” did not provide for that debate.76 He argued that since banks 
                                            
73Gladstone, Diaries 6:20/2/60. 
74Helms, Contributions of Lord Overstone: 61-65. Overstone believed that competition was good, 
but that multiple issue was not.  
75The Times, 13 February 1865. 
76Saville, Bank of Scotland, 301, 333, 363, 364, 406, 493. 
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were taxed on their issue, then the government ought to take the reciprocal obligation to 
guarantee the convertibility of their issue.77 
After furious debate Gladstone took back the bill and redrafted it, with the help of 
Walter Bagehot, economic writer and editor of The Economist since the death of James 
Wilson.78 Still the bill failed. Licensing, government guarantees of convertibility, and a 
host of other sticking points forced the government to withdraw it. Gladstone had lost 
the initiative first tentatively grasped in 1854 and 1857. He had to some extent chipped 
away at the Bank’s power himself, by attempting to reduce its profits, lower the interest 
rates on bank loans, and change the payment schedules.79 Gladstone’s politics must 
also be considered. If Gladstone was willing to lower the high art of banking to the level 
of a wine license for an eating establishment, he was not merely acting as a liberal, but 
as a radical, with reverence for none. Clapham and Jenkins, two writers willing to 
embarrass Gladstone’s memory on any occasion, did not even mention the bill.  
 
The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act and Reform 
An audit is an examination of accounts by an authorized person, accompanied by 
a statement that the audit is complete, and a report on the results.80 Audits are typically 
                                            
77The Times, 24 Feb. 1865. 
78Norman St. John-Stevas, “Introduction,” to Walter Bagehot, Bagehot’s Historical Essays, ed. St. 
John-Stevas (New York: University Press, 1966), xii. 
79Few Bank of England Charter Acts of the nineteenth century were primarily about the Bank of 
England, with the possible exception of the restrictions on currency issue in the Bank Act of 1844, or the 
allowances for higher capitalization and the granting of monopoly privileges of geography and operation. 
The granting of monopoly powers to the Bank always resulted in the restrictions that were “granted” to 
other banks—limitations on their locations, on their issue activities, and on the number of partners they 
could have. The Act of 1833 restricted operations of joint-stock banks and issuing banks to areas outside 
a sixty-five miles of the Bank of England’s main office, while it gave the Bank the right to set up branches 
in larger English cities. The Act of 1844 laid heavy restrictions on all banks of issue. The Act of 1857 laid 
the massive burden of full liability on the joint-stock banks until the passage of 21&22 Vict. c.91, An Act to 
enable Joint Stock Banking Companies to be formed on the Principle of Limited Liability (2 August 1858), 
was passed.  
80The Chambers Dictionary (Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap, 1999), 102. 
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used to verify accounts and to prove the honesty or dishonesty of those who have 
access to the funds. Audit is a British tradition. Before the 1866 Act, accuracy and 
accountability were not always equally traditional. The post of auditor of the Exchequer 
existed as early as 1314. An auditor of the receipt of the Exchequer was appointed in 
Elizabeth I’s reign. Under William III the audit had control of Exchequer issues. In 1834 
a comptroller-general of the Exchequer was appointed, debarred from sitting in 
parliament and removable on an address from both houses.81  
Gladstone took new and sharper aim at the entire process of handing public 
money. In general, Gladstone coped well with the yearly round of normal estimates, 
budgets, bill-nursing, and monitoring the economy. He did not cope well with 
Palmerston’s attempts to deceive him and slip additional expenditures under the radar 
of the budget process. In his first full year, 1860, Palmerston waited until the budget had 
been presented to Parliament and then demanded an additional £3,000,000 for the 
Navy, and tried to get Gladstone to agree to borrow money for fortifications against the 
French.82 Matthew says that Gladstone believed in measures, not men. Palmerston 
apparently had no use for process or measures, and Gladstone was, as the moderns 
say, all about process. Had Palmerston but known, he might have changed his tactics. 
But Palmerston was probably the chief  reason why Gladstone focused on the 
administrative reforms that comprised the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act but did 
                                            
81Palgrave, Dictionary 1: 71. 
82 Jenkins, Gladstone, A Biography, 219-220; Guedella, Palmerston Letters, 115, no. 48, Dec. 15, 
1859. Fortifications were forced to compete with the “expensive little war going on with China.” Sidney 
Herbert wanted to fortify Portsmouth and Plymouth and raise Martello towers along the south coast. 
Gladstone estimated that to do what Herbert and Palmerston wanted would cost an enormous sum, 
somewhere between £10 and £110 million. Gladstone received a “formidable letter” from Palmerston on 
15 December “so that we may come to a decision on the Fortifications Question.” This letter sets forth 
Herbert’s request for a cabinet on the fortification question, summarizes the main points, and states that 
Palmerston was most anxious to see these enacted.  
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not present it until after Palmerston’s death. This thesis contends that this act was as 
good a bill as Gladstone could get in his attempts to put a strait jacket on the planning, 
budgeting, appropriation, introduction into Parliament, passage, management, and 
financial control of funded line items.  
The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 186683 did not directly interfere 
with the Bank of England nor any other bank, except in the management, audit, and 
reporting of the Consolidated Fund. In this, Gladstone avoided contact with the Issue 
Department and focused on the Banking Department where the funds were held on 
account for the government. In fact, the concentration of deposits in only two banks—
Bank of England and Bank of Ireland—offered a bone to each in that the revenues gave 
the banks extra capital with which to work during each quarter.  
The Act was consistent the general movement for reform in government, and 
specifically set a standard for all departments to follow in managing their bookkeeping. It 
satisfied the House of Commons: MPs gained the right to demand an audit on any 
account they cared to name; if they did not like the results, they had two options: bring 
the problem up on the floor of the House of Commons and allow it to be resolved, or 
vote out the government. 
Gladstone’s bill concentrated full responsibility for the budget and for the entire 
fiscal year in three centers of activity: the Treasury’s budget-writing staff, the House of 
Commons, and the Audit department. 84 The concentration of total government control 
                                            
83Bridges, The Treasury, 25-6, 29, 115; Roseveare, The Treasury, 199-200, 139-142, 218, 248. 
Henry Roseveare called the act the keystone of the Treasury system. The passage of the Act took place 
28 June, 1866, just before the Russell government with  Gladstone as Chancellor left office. The Act was 
well received in parliament during debates, and has been haled in the twentieth century as one of the 
most important acts ever passed.  




in the Treasury gave primary control over the Civil Service and other departments 
including the War and Navy Departments, the revenue departments, and the Exchequer 
to the Treasury as well. As written and passed, this act does not exist to satisfy either 
Gladstone’s 1856 plan, as Matthew suggests, or some rare burst of maniacal anger. 
The Act is of a different character entirely, and shows how much Gladstone had evolved 
in ten years, from angry man to vehement statesmen. Oddly, Jenkins did not think 
enough of the Act either to praise it or to condemn it.  
Gladstone’s Speech Introducing the Act85 
Gladstone intention in introducing the bill was to “consolidate the duties of the 
Exchequer and Audit Departments, to regulate the receipt, custody, and issue of public 
monies, and to provide for the audit of the accounts thereof.” His proposed scheduling 
of parliamentary debate did not depend on urgency, but on expediency—as a 
reasonable outcome of reform he predicted quick passage. He proposed, after the 
second reading, to refer it to the Select Committee on Public Accounts where he 
thought the bill, related as it was “almost entirely relating to public accounts” would 
“receive a more impartial, authoritative, and searching examination before the 
Committee than it would in any other way.” He listed the objects of the bill: first, to 
consolidate the departments of Exchequer and Audit; second to conform to the 
principles recommended by a Committee on Public Monies, some years previous; third, 
to harmonize all proceedings and rid the government of a great deal of unnecessary 
and expensive book-keeping. Finally, during the past year parliament had discovered 
that many branches of public receipts and expenditure were not subjected to audit, 




many were not audited at all, and that the audit system was unsatisfactory. “Some of 
the expenditure was audited by the [existing] Audit Board, which was quite right; some 
of it by the Treasury, which was quite wrong …” The Government proposed to substitute 
a proper Audit Board and to perform audits on in all branches and in all steps in the 
budget, revenue, and expenditure year. The bill rapidly passed its first reading that very 
night. 
The text of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866 is, like most 
Victorian bills, torturous to read. It is longer than many other bills, such as the 1844 
Bank Act, and encompasses many suggestions and findings of the parliamentary work 
that had gone before it, including the Northcote-Trevelyan report, and earlier studies. To 
Gladstone it answered problems that he and others had identified, such as the times 
and places where audit was carried out, consequences to the department for failing an 
audit, responsibilities to parliament and the people, and the overwhelming problem of 
dealing with first lords like Palmerston, who meant to force the government into 
intentional or unintentional borrowing.86 
 
The Contents of the Bill 
The bill had several parts: a prologue and definitions, new positions to be created 
and the salaries for appointees, staffing, and dismissal the previous audit board. 
Another section showed how revenue and bank deposits were to be made—in the Bank 
of England and Bank of Ireland exclusively—and defined requirements for use of the 
                                            
86Gladstone, Diaries 4:2/2/53, 4:1/2/54, 4:27/7/54, 5:23/11/55. Gladstone recorded attending 
meetings of an Audit Board on these dates during his first chancellorship. Idem, 5:8/7/59, 5:21/1/60, 
6:1/2/61, 6:24/10/61. These dates identify meetings during the early days of his membership in the 
Palmerston government chancellorship. But see also idem 6:28/1/64, 6:18/7/64, 6:4/7/64 when Gladstone 
reported meetings of an Audit Commission.  
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deposit data by the Comptroller and Auditor General as his baseline for allowing the 
budgeted departments in spending the money. Clause 11 of the bill showed how the 
money was to be apportioned, first to the General Fund, and then, as appropriate to the 
various departments. Quarterly reports (Clause 12) were to show how the comptroller 
was to use the deposit details as well as the budgeted payments at the end of the 
quarter to determine whether or not a deficiency was expected. The Comptroller and 
Auditor General were to certify the deficiency, authorize a loan, and report to the 
Treasury. 
Departments were expected to spend money according to the details of their 
budgets. When the Treasury asked for money to pay accounts under authorization, both 
the banks and the Treasury were expected to report daily on these transfers from the 
General Fund. This is particularly important when money was shipped away from 
London, either to the outer reaches of Great Britain itself or to another part of the globe 
for government authorized use. Clause 14 explains the many uses of money under the 
subheadings of Supply and the ways in which this money was managed. 
Having battled with the various accounts, accounting methods, and other 
vagaries of the various departments in his turns as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gladstone was anxious to consolidate not only the procedures and control of these 
departments, but to consolidate and make sense of their accounts as well. Clauses 18 
and 19 gave the Treasury power to create accounts where needed (with stringent 
control upon the account owners and their heirs) and collapse all unnecessary accounts 
into the General Fund.87 
                                            
87Clause 18 states that on the death, resignation, or removal of the public officer in whose charge 
an account was opened, his successor became responsible for the account. It also states that if the public 
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In clause 16, we begin to see the fruits of this more careful management. The 
title of this clause is “Treasury to prepare Accounts showing Surplus Income applicable 
to Reduction of the National Debt.” Gladstone’s hope was that careful management 
would have two effects: first to stop the drain on the government caused by deficiency 
bills, and second, to turn around the process, using small surpluses to begin paying 
down the national debt.  
 
The Treasury shall cause One Fourth Part of such Surplus Income to be charged 
on the Consolidated Fund in the Quarter succeeding the Termination of such 
Account; and the Sum so charged shall be issued by the Treasury from Time to 
Time in the next ensuing quarter to the National Debit Commissioners, who shall 
apply the same, during the said Quarter, in redeeming Funded or Unfunded 
Debt, or in repaying to the Bank of England or to the Bank of Ireland any 
Advances made to them under the Provisions of this Act towards supplying the 
Deficiency of the Consolidated Fund during the said Quarter; and all Debit so 
redeemed shall be forthwith cancelled. And a Copy of every Account prepared by 
the Treasury as aforesaid, certified by the Comptroller and Auditor General, shall 
be laid before the House of Commons within Fifteen Days after the Expiration of 
the said quarterly Periods, if Parliament be then sitting, or if not sitting then within 
One Week after Parliament shall be next assembled. 
The office of the National Debt commissioners is not one of nineteenth-century 
Britain’s best documented departments. Some would argue that the National Debt 
commissioners were superfluous because the Bank of England managed the debt and 
charged the government a fee for management.88 Gladstone meant to make them more 
than a board that met once a quarter and authorized the latest statement of the national 
debt provided by the Bank.89 
                                                                                                                                             
officer died, his heirs were not to take possession of the account as constituting an asset of the 
deceased. 
88Clapham, Bank of England, 245. Sir John wrote as if the office did not exist, and pooh-poohed 
Gladstone’s attempts to cut the management fee. 
89Gladstone, Diaries 14:766. Gladstone noted numerous meetings with the National Debt 
commissioners from 1853 to 1866, and again in 1892. 
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In clause 20, the Bank of England and the Bank of Ireland became authorized 
agents of the state, in so far as they were allowed to open and keep accounts of 
government stocks and annuities, and to receive dividends paid by the stocks and 
annuities. To sensitive ears, the collection of dividends from government annuities 
sounds suspiciously like the ancient sinking funds of previous times.90 Almost certainly, 
however, the government was capable of purchasing its own bonds and stocks when 
prices were below par, collecting the revenues like other investors. The government 
could also sell bonds and stocks to generate cash when needed. In doing so, they might 
have intended to maintain a volume of such assets for other uses. 
Clauses 21-32 spell out the ways the departments were required to keep their 
books, provide their own quality control and error checking, and submit their books to 
the Audit Department for periodic audit as well as instant audits as requested by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the first lord of the Treasury, or parliament. The Audit 
Department’s baseline for this effort is the bookkeeping form that showed how much 
each department had been granted for each line item in its budget, and the amounts of 
money spent against each line item to date. Thus, the Comptroller enjoyed a clear view 
of the money situation, and also of the care and skill with which the money was being 
managed. 
Clause 27 specifically presents a clear use of expense account management, the 
need for vouchers to show how money has been spent, and the outcomes of failures: 
 
                                            
90See Carl B. Cone, “Richard Price and Pitt’s Sinking Fund of 1786,” The Economic History 
Review, new series 4, no. 2 (1951), 243-251. Also see Buxton, Finance and Politics, 1:4, 14. Idem, 1: for 
a view of Pitt’s sinking fund as an obstacle to financial reform and its abolition in 1829. Idem, 1:159, 165, 
2:217 for Lewis’s attempt to revive the sinking fund. Idem, 2: 209-210 for the fallacy of the sinking fund 
and the way Pitt was deluded. Idem, 2:217 for Northcote’s attempt to revive it in 1875. 
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Every Appropriation Account shall be examined by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General on behalf of the House of Commons; and in the examination of such 
Accounts the Comptroller and Auditor General shall ascertain, first, whether the 
Payments which the accounting Department has charged to the Grant are 
supported by Vouchers or Proofs of Payment [business expense report], and 
second, whether the Money expended has been applied to the Purpose or 
Purposes for which such Grant was intended to provide; … whenever the said 
Comptroller and Auditor General shall be required by the Treasury to ascertain 
whether the expenditure included … included in an Appropriation Account … is 
supported by the Authority of the Treasury, the Comptroller and Auditor General 
shall examine such Expenditure with that Object, and shall report to the Treasury 
any Expenditure which may appear, upon such examination, to have been 
incurred without such Authority … and if the Treasury should not thereupon see 
fit to sanction such unauthorised Expenditure, it shall be regarded as being not 
properly chargeable to a Parliamentary Grant, and shall be reported to the House 
of Commons in the Manner herein-after provided. 
This is of course post facto control. But its outcome could lead to several 
important improvements: identification of systemic errors of procedure or understanding 
in the departments, improved testing and training, improved communication between 
departments, and improved understanding in parliament of the ways in which money 
was handled, leading to a decreasing number of complaints about how badly some 
departments, operations, and wars were being handled. Reports to parliament were 
specifically described in clause 32 and included individual reports on the Army, Navy, 
Post Office, and Civil Service salaries and grants. The clause states that the reports are 
to be presented to the Treasury, but if the Treasury fails to deliver the reports to 
Parliament in a timely manner, the Comptroller was allowed to go over Treasury’s head 
and report directly. This is an interesting reversal for Gladstone, so anxious in the 1850s 
to protect the executive seat of government from the legislative, but now proposing that 
if the executive, in the guise of the Treasury, showed any reluctant to share financial 
and audit data, a branch of the executive was authorized to turn whistle-blower and go 
straight to parliament on its own. 
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In all the reports, the Audit Department was enjoined to call Treasury’s notice to 
every instance “in which it may appear … that a Grant has been exceeded.” This phrase 
puts the Audit Department and the Treasury on the alert for cost overruns.91 In the 
Revenue side of the budget table for 1861-2, for example, “A sum of £850,000 was 
repaid on account of savings in the last two years on Army and Navy grants, and 
applied to reduction of votes of credit.”92 
In addition to expenditure accounts, the Comptroller was also authorized to audit 
the accounts of all revenue departments, and all accounts that received the moneys 
deposited by revenue departments. These were accounts at the Bank of England or 
Bank of Ireland, and clause 33 opens the door to audits of the receiving banks. 
Specifically, the Comptroller was authorized to look into: 
 
Accounts of all Principal Accounts, the Accounts of the receipt of Revenue by the 
Departments of Customs, Inland Revenue, and the Post Office, the Accounts, of 
every Receiver of Money which is by Law payable into Her Majesty’s Exchequer, 
and any other Public Accounts which, though not relating directly to the Receipt 
or Expenditure of Imperial Funds, the Treasury may by Minute, to be laid before 
Parliament direct. 
Clauses 34-44 show how the examinations and certifications of accounts were to 
be managed. These harken back to the work on examinations already described in 
Chapter 5. 
Given Gladstone’s great concern for executive versus legislative powers and 
rights, and his equally great concern about men versus measures, it still may at first 
glance be difficult to understand why Gladstone thought this Act solved all his problems. 
In other words, in a non-party environment, how could this Act succeed in a Disraeli or 
                                            
91M. H. Port, “A Contrast in Styles at the Office of Works. Layard and Ayrton: Aesthete and 
Economist,” The Historical Journal 27, no. 1 (March 1984), 151-176. Some problems were not matters of 
deceit but of style. 
92Buxton, Finance and Politics 2: 347. 
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other government without a Gladstone to make it work.93 The willful act of one First Lord 
of the Treasury might destroy the entire effect of this Act unless parliament was there to 
intervene.94 The bill signals for us a change in Gladstone’s thinking, away from strong 
emphasis on executive rights, a stance he had learned from Peel; placing his faith in the 
body he had given his life to, parliament, taking leadership in auditing the performance 
of the Audit Department, and therefore government expenditure. Without strong party 
leadership, any MP—a Roebuck, Hume, or Bowring, for example—could demand a 
report of the performance of a specific department, thus invading what Gladstone had 
previously argued was executive privilege. Under the Exchequer and Audit Departments 
Act, a committee investigating expenditure and results to determine if money had been 
misspent. We are thus reminded of Peel warning his followers off when they attempted 
to attack the budgets of the first Russell government. But after 1866, any MP who 
wished to might openly challenge the government and its spending methods, and 
demand an audit. The Act also authorized members of parliament  to challenge the 
Bank and its management of government moneys if they wished. 
This thesis stops at 1866. The changes wrought by this Act, especially the ability 
to make these changes after the Russell government resigned and Disraeli took over, 
                                            
93Frank P. Fellows, “On our National Parliamentary Accounts, with Suggestions for Establishing a 
Doomsday Book Giving the Value of National Governmental Property or Assets as the Basis of a Sound 
System of Accounts, by which Expenditure for [the] Capital and Current Account[s] Shall be Separately 
Shown,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 36, no. 2 (June 1873): 277-302. Fellows argued that 
in reporting the estimates to parliament as Army, Navy, and Supply, the Treasury and the service 
departments were failing to complete their accounting duties by reporting the Capital and Current 
accounts separately, and therefore were confusing annual expenditures with long-term capital investment 
in buildings and other assets. 
94Gladstone, Diaries 5:24/6/59, n.6, where Matthew cites C. W. Halberg, The Suez Canal (1931), 
163. Also see Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: St. Martins, 1994), 
196-197. Disraeli purchased Suez Canal shares without parliamentary approval. In 1859 Gladstone had 
supported Britain’s building of the Suez Canal but the cabinet was against it.  Disraeli’s purchase of 
controlling interest on a Sunday afternoon in 1875 was described “a feat of legerdemain.”  
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may have taken years to become established practice. Yet Roseveare states that the 
Exchequer and Audit Act consolidated government operation under the Treasury and 
that the Treasury, with a strong hand on budgets, operations, and salaries was 
therefore a powerful agent of change and control. This thesis does not go past the year 
1866; however, for fifty years following the Act, the Act itself put Treasury officials in 
control, and government historians continue to think highly both of Gladstone and his 
Act for a long time to come.95 
 
What Gladstone Wished For and What He Got 
We return to Gladstone’s 1856 wish list for reform, and Matthew’s assertion that 
step by step Gladstone introduced his reforms in the 1859-1866 governments. 
Matthew’s assertion is that Gladstone introduced legislation on each of these points. His 
suggestion is that Gladstone succeeded in passing all twenty-one points in spite of the 
fact that some of them were contradictory. This section examines his twenty-one items 
on a line by line basis, to determine first if Gladstone introduced it during his time as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer under Palmerston and then Russell, and second to 
determine whether he succeeded in his initiative. 
The short answer is no, to both questions, and the contrary assertion supported 
by this thesis that Gladstone had changed dramatically, and that the times favored a 
change of approach, increased understanding, and control of the Bank through indirect 
rather than direct methods. Here is the list.  
 
                                            
95Buxton, Finance and Politics 2: 6. Buxton says only that  “in 1866, the very important Exchequer 




1. To abolish the Exchequer and strengthen the Audit.  
 The Exchequer was not abolished, but the Audit was certainly 
strengthened and accelerated under the Act of 1866. Therefore, only half of this 
item was accomplished. 
 
2. To bring the Chancery and other departments into the control of the Finances 
Department.  
 Sir James Graham had expected opposition. If by Finances Department 
we accept Treasury, than this was certainly accomplished. Coombs, Edwards, 
and Greener show no entry for the Chancery in the list of departments that 
submitted their requirements for Civil Service Examinations, but the Exchequer 
and Audits Act does not list exceptions such as the Chancery in its language. 
Therefore, Chancery opposition appears to have been swept away in the general 
movement to reform.96 
 
3. Apply parliamentary voting on a line-by-line basis for all miscellaneous estimates to 
place parliament firmly in control of all expenditures, reducing the number of 
automatic disbursements.  
 This requirement was an extension of Gladstone’s Public Revenues and 
Consolidated Funds Act of 1856. If we are to judge by the debates in Hansard in 
1862 or after, this requirement was already being implemented. This item was 
accomplished. 
 
4. Make the Bank and agent of the state with respect to payment of dividends and 
national debt management.  
 The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act contains a clause that makes 
the Bank the agent for government bonds, bills, and dividends. However, both 
the letter and spirit of the Act seem to have the opposite intention, of removing 
                                            
96Double Entry Bookkeeping, 308-314. 
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the Bank from its most annoying habits: direct management of the national debt 
and control of deficiency bills. Indeed, since the National Debt board was a part 
of the government, and the 1866 Act was intended to bring all government offices 
under audit control, regular audits of National Debt Commission office were likely 
to move control back toward the government. The Bank was not open to audit, 
but it remained a money-making joint-stock company. 
 
5. Make provision for true periodical reporting of the Savings Bank portion of the 
national debt, and for liquidation of the debt in case of need.97  
 The savings banks are not addressed in this bill. The Savings Banks Bill of 
1860 passed while the Savings Banks Monies Bill was defeated.98 
 
6. Regulate the use of deficiency bills and limit the powers of the minister of finance.99  
 This was accomplished in the 1866 Act through the quarterly payment 
system based on the amount of money in the Consolidated Fund account. 
 
7. The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act places control of records in the Treasury, 
not in the Exchequer.  
 The Act of 1866 removes nothing from the Exchequer, but places the 
Exchequer under the same audit control as every other department.100 
 
 
                                            
97Buxton, Finance and Politics 2: 27, 28, n.30. They were used for the creation of terminable 
annuities. Also see Albert Fishlow, “The Trustee Savings Banks, 1817-1861,” The Journal of Economic 
History 21, no. 1 (March 1961): 26-40; T. M. Hodges, “The History of the Newport and Caerleon Savings 
Bank (1830-1888),” The Economic History Review, new series 2, no. 2 (1949): 188-199; Henry W. Wolff, 
“Savings Banks at Home and Abroad,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 60, no. 2 (June, 1897): 
278-359. 
98For the Savings Banks Bill, see Gladstone, Diaries 5: 5/3/60 ff., 22/6/60, 20/7/60, 15/8/60 n, 
28/1/61, 7/2/61, 8/4/61 ff, 13/2/63. 25/3/63, 10/6/63. The Savings Banks Monies Bill was defeated 
20/7/60. 
99Deficiency bills are explained in detail in Chapter 5. 
100Of the year 1870, Henry Roseveare wrote that “What was needed was something more 
fundamental than Exchequer reform; nothing less than a complete re-planning of national accounting …” 
Roseveare, Treasury, 125. The result was a plan, slow to begin but gathering momentum throughout the 
nineteenth century, which led to total Treasury control over all departments. One of the highest 
expressions of this is in the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866. 
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8. Establish a closer relationship between the British government and Indian finance.  
 This was accomplished by the India Act of 1858, an Act that removed 
India from the rule of the British East India Company and instituted a British 
structure of rule uniformly over all of India. As Buxton has shown, Indian 
government finance was being integrated into British finance when Gladstone 
entered the Exchequer in 1859.101  
 
9. Trade existing Exchequer bills at 3-1/2 per cent for 2-1/2 per cent bills to lower the 
interest payments on government loans.  
 In 1854, Gladstone still had not come to grips with his failures in 1853 and 
1854. He proposed the unfortunately named Exchequer Bills bill in 1860, a draft 
of which is mentioned in November 1860.102 It was another of his failures, 
because he misread the market again and failed to see that the National Debt 
was not only accepted, but was a part of the national money and investment 
industry.103 His view of investment in government securities may finally have 
shifted after he began to meet with and correspond on a regular basis with 
Samuel Jones Loyd, Lord Overstone,104 Baron Rothschild of Rothschild’ Bank, 
Walter Bagehot,105 and other bankers.106 
                                            
101The Indian budget entries appear in Tables 1 and 2 in this chapter. See Lawrence James, Raj: 
The Making and Unmaking of British India (New York: St. Martin’s Griffen, 1997), 293; Buxton 2: 225 and 
Appendix A. 
102Gladstone, Diaries 5: 21/11/60. 
103“Percents and Sensibility: What did Early 19th Century Literary Characters Live on?” The 
Economist 377, no. 8458 (24 December 2005), 104-105. This article discusses the fact that so many 
people lived on the interest paid on money invested for them. Having money in the four per cents was 
considered respectable and safe, since it was secured by the government. But dropping the rate to two 
and a half per cent would have made the investment safe but unprofitable compared to solid railroad and 
shipping companies, and would have seemed a good deal more profitable with only a slight rise in risk. 
104Gladstone read several of Samuel Jones Loyd, Lord Overstone’s works. See Gladstone, 
Diaries 14: 460. Gladstone appears to have begun an acquaintance, and possibly a friendship with Jones 
Loyd in 1853. Gladstone, Diaries 14: 159. 
105Gladstone recorded his first meeting with Walter Bagehot in May, 1859, and mentioned him 
repeatedly until 1881. See Gladstone, Diaries 14: 10. 
106Gladstone appears to have met Baron Nathan de Rothschild for the first time in 1847. See 
Gladstone, Diaries 14: 221. 
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10. Abolish paper duties.  
 When it did occur, the abolition of paper duties led to one of the great 
social upheavals to the benefit of the middling and working classes of the 
nineteenth century, and helped rein in the Lords’ ability to veto a popular 
measure.107 
 
11. Reduce the wine duties.  
 When he reviewed this list in 1856, Sir James Graham had worried that if 
the reduction in wine duties was large, the malt and spirits revenues might be 
affected, because drinkers would move to wine. This may have been Gladstone’s 
secret wish, but drinking of spirituous liquors was so well established in Great 
Britain that the markets for both wine and spirits seem to have 
flourished.108Gladstone tinkered with wine duties again and again, beginning in 
1853 and ending in 1885. 
 
12. Reduce the malt sugar and coffee duties.  
 Coffee was not a major concern for Gladstone, but sugar certainly was. 
He had been involved in sugar duties since his work in the Board of Trade under 
Peel. The year 1844 had been a crisis year for the Peelites, who threatened to 
resign over sugar duties, a move Gladstone resisted. He reduced sugar duties in 
the 1860s.109 
 
                                            
107Hoppin, Mid-Victorian Generation, 216. Hoppin points to various remissions of duties from 
1853 to 1861 which allowed publishers to sell newspapers for a penny. 
108For work on his budgets regarding spirits, see Gladstone, Diaries 5: 5/4/53, 6/4/53, 11/1/60, 
26/2/60, 27/2/60, 28/2/60; 6:3/10/61, 4/10/61. For his work on spirit duties, see 6:11/1/60, 24/2/60. Malt 
was more complex because it was used in cattle feed as well as brewing. For his work on the malt tax, 
see 5:5/7/53, 12/7/53, 7/3/63. For a deputation of maltsters, see 6:1/4/62; for a deputation on the malt 
credit (duties paid in bond), see 6:24/2/63. 
109Gladstone, Diaries 3:24/4/44, 15/6/44 ff. For Danish claims on sugar, see 3:28/6/44, 23/7/44, 
8/11/44. The sugar debates were still a topic of debate in 1872 when Gladstone recalled the 1863 





13. Reduce and equalize the duties on insurance and other stamp duties.  
 This item apparently refers to documents that required a government 
stamp to be legal. Gladstone’s fire insurance bill was defeated 1865.110 
 
14. Increase the income tax for the years 1857 to 1860, but end the income tax in 1860.  
 This list was written after the Crimean War, when the national debt had 
again risen. The budgets for the period from 1853 to 1860 show that the income 
tax was never the driver of revenue that Gladstone, Peel, and others had 
imagined it, and therefore had little power to make or break Gladstone’s other 
vow of paying off the national debt before Britain’s supply of coal ran out. 
Palmerston and Gladstone were corresponding amiably about the tax 1865, 
discussing whether a change of one pence (five to four) might signal to the public 
whether the tax was being phased out entirely. Palmerston preferred to lower 
taxes that bore on the lower classes: tea, sugar, coffee, beer, or spirits.111 
 
15. Extend and increase the house duty after the outcome of income tax is determined.  
 A house tax was considered in 1864, but does not appear to have become 
a part of the budget.112 
 
16. Absorb more of the private note circulation.  
 Gladstone’s Banks of Issue Bill, which might have increased private note 




                                            
110See Gladstone, Diaries 6:21/3/65. 
111See Guedella, Gladstone and Palmerston, 320-326, letters 257-258. 
112Gladstone, Diaries 6:6/8/64. 
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17. Authorize specific rates of interest for issue of notes based on deposits of 
government securities.  
 The Bank Act of 1844 was not modified during Gladstone’s tour at the 
Exchequer. 
 
18. Pay off that part of the national debt held by the Bank and end the Bank’s privileges 
of issue. Take over note issue within the government.  
 This did not happen. 
 
19. Authorize issue of notes in excess of the limits set by the 1844 Act.  
 This item was not raised during the 1859-1866 governments. 
 
20. Issue notes of a value of £5 that can be converted into gold at the Bank and its 
branches, and can be used as legal tender to pay taxes.  
 It is surprising that Gladstone did not attempt to turn this idea into an act. It 
might have been very popular given the continuing pressure for smaller notes 
and the quarterly demands of issue at the end of each quarter for tax and bill 
payments. This problem would have been solved in the Banks of Issue bill by 
allowing banks with issue licenses to issue in the denominations they chose for 
themselves. 
 
21. Approximate to an equalization of issues to relieve the ends and beginnings of 
quarters.  
 The problem expressed in this item is quarter day and the heavy demands 
for legal tender to pay bills on that day. See Item 20. 
Once Gladstone was in office, Matthew argued, Gladstone systematically worked 
through the program he “had drawn up in 1856, the last item, the Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act, being passed shortly before the government resigned in 1866.” In this 
statement, Matthew appears to believe that Gladstone accomplished his entire program, 
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step by step, from his entry into the Exchequer office in 1859 to 1866.113 In fact, 
Gladstone had done a good deal, accomplishing what no other Chancellor of the 
Exchequer had done by asserting assertion of Treasury control over the rest of the 
government. The profits of the Bank had been reappraised, but not the role of the Bank. 
Duties had been reduced or abolished, including that on Gladstone’s favorite drink, 
wine. 
However, if we take this list as a whole, it is difficult to maintain that Gladstone 
got more than half the items he listed in 1856, and whether he even intended to. It is far 
more likely he forgot the list, allowed himself to evolve, and took his wins where he 
could find him. It is not the list he is remembered for. It is the Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act and his drive to continue those parts of the Peelite agenda he most 
loved: equalized taxation, low tariffs, and free trade. Times had changed. Gladstone had 
changed. The list of 1856 was not relevant. It had been swept away by larger and more 
complex economic developments. 
 
Conclusion 
If we view Gladstone’s performance as a change agent, budget manager, 
process organizer, and reformer during the period 1859-1866, we see many items that 
show why the Telegraph newspaper dubbed him “the people’s William.” He was 
sensitive to paycheck and breakfast-table problems such as taxes on food and 
newspapers, and by extension to the encouragement of reading and education. His 
speeches during this period always had a flavor of the don, lecturing his hearers on the 
                                            
113Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, 109. 
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way things worked so that he could explain more fully how things should work, but using 
many examples and alternate approaches to ensure they understood what he was 
driving at. This was not the idealistic Gladstone of the 1830s, but an enlightened man 
who understood the need for a contract between a man in government and people who 
voted for the government. Gladstone had become a “liberal” and a man of process. He 
created his own process for working on the budget each year, a process he later taught 
to his own chancellors when he led the government beginning in 1868. The Exchequer 
and Audit Departments Act extended the process and provide feed-back mechanism for 
improving the process. 
In the bills where he attempted to tinker with one reform or another, such as the 
Banks of Issue bill, he was not always successful, and could be remarkably maladroit. It 
was in the paradigm shifts, in Gladstone’s ability to recognize fundamental shifts in 
national agenda and national thinking where he was most successful. Thus, his 1853 
budget speech, his Public Funds Act, and his 1866 Exchequer and Audit Acts are of a 
piece, because they showed the nation a new direction for progress. 
We are forced to ask what Gladstone did in the 1859-1866 period that is different 
from the previous twenty-seven years since he came down from Oxford. First, he had 
sense enough to stay in a government, maintaining its strength. Second, he had 
softened his approach to expend kind words to Palmerston and his other cabinet 
colleagues whenever possible. By doing so he kept them as friends and gained their 
cooperation. Third, he found and maintained the friendships of Lord Overstone, Walter 
Bagehot, and Lionel Rothschild. Those friendships, combined with his reading, assisted 
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him to use his long run in the Exchequer to put policies into practice and judge their 
success or failure. 
The budgetary battles of the 1860s governments also show us Gladstone 
achieving humility where he had not previously had it. Giving up threats of resignation 
early in his chancellor ship, Gladstone learned that the budget was a give and take 
problem that lasted the full year, and appears to have made a point of learning to live 
with it. Thus, the new and safer operation of the nation’s finances—a system capable of 
supporting the Sunday afternoon legerdemain of a Suez stock purchase—was of a 
piece with the final graduation a competent statesman at Exchequer. This is a man who 
learned to work with the Bank of England, consented to pay for fortifications, and wrote 
some very charming letters to his prime minister, even while he may privately have 
been grinding his teeth. Gladstone’s contribution of the sense equipoise that served 
Britain so well came to maturity in this period. 
 
Gladstone’s Reading 
Once again we find that Gladstone’s reading carried and educated him through 
his tour of office. Gladstone did not give up reading when he entered office. If anything, 
he turned up the wick on his lamp and read longer on finance banking, taxation, and 
technology than in the periods when he was not in office. Because it encompasses 
more than six years, the list for this chapter is very long, even when limited to the six 
core topics defined in Chapter 2—Accounting and Trade, the Bank of England and the 
1844 Bank Act, banking and currency, government finance, political economy, and the 
cost of war. 
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This is a seven-year period with many journalists publishing full-length books, 
and more journals publishing works of substance on banking, government finance, and 
the problems of war. Looking at the riches appearing at his favorite bookstores and 
arriving in his mailbox, Gladstone was forced either to continue reading at a high rate, or 
to quit reading all together. His chose to read, and averaged nearly twenty books a year 
on these few topics during this period. 
Under the heading “Accounting and Trade” the focus has shifted from accounting 
and bookkeeping procedures to some more fundamental problems of trade in the 
1860s. The United States was one of Great Britain’s most important trading partners. 
Taking the threat of a war with the Union aside, the great danger to Britain was that the 
supply of wool on which the northern British mills relied would disappear. The books 
and articles on trade suggest that he was still looking for ways to advance free trade. 
His reading on “Banking and Currency” reaches the highest level of his career, 
possibly because of the length of the period, but also because he was attempting to find 
a way to accommodate banks of issue. In this area, it is no surprise to find he read both 
How to Mismanage a Bank (1960) to gain a clearer understanding of bank failures, and 
The History of Banking in America … (1861) with its comparison of practices in British 
and in the United States. He was also reading on exchanges: the London Clearing 
House, the principles of exchange, and the foreign exchanges. He must have been very 
interested in a book on the Bank Notes Issue Bill and its failure to become an Act. He 
also read widely on banking in France, and various books on savings banks. Currency 
and gold were on his mind: by my count he read twenty books on metallic currency, 
gold, paper money, depreciation, and decimal coinage. 
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In the area of “Government Finance” he read several books and articles on his 
budgets in Fraser’s Magazine, National Review, Blackwood’s, and Review de Deux 
Mondes. He also read Stafford H. Northcote’s book on the financial policy of Great 
Britain from 1842 to 1861. Since the Indian uprising on the subcontinent, Indian finance 
had fallen into the hands of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. Gladstone found 
himself with a new budget to manage and to integrate into the British national budget. 
Therefore, the four books he read on India, including one by James Wilson and one by 
Sir C. E. Trevelyan on the 1863-1864 budget would have been of great value. He read 
only two books on the national debt, but his reading in taxation is exactly what we would 
expect from a self-trained financial specialist: books on direct and indirect taxation, the 
relationship between foreign policy and taxation, sugar duties, and nationalization of the 
railroads. 
In all, he read forty-one books in government finance in this period, a consistent 
figure if we remember that he read twenty-four books in the years 1846-1852, years 
when he was not in office but working hard to learn, and twenty-two in the years 1852-
1855, when he was first in office in the Exchequer. 
He was also still reading on political economy: he read Richard Cobden’s 
recounts of three economic panics, Whewell’s lectures on political economy (lectures 
delivered to the Prince of Wales, and read parts of Adam Smith again. 
 After Crimea, Gladstone well understood that wars cost money and armed 
conflict removed a nation from its normal economic rhythms. Similarly, the Civil War in 
United States caused Gladstone to focus on a nation that was both an important trading 
partner and possible threat to Great Britain and her colonies—in Canada, the 
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Caribbean, and the Atlantic. Gladstone would have been a poor Chancellor of the 
Exchequer if he did not keep one eye pealed for the possibility of war and its likely 
costs.  
Here, then, is his reading list, used at least in part to continue his training as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, to expand his knowledge, to make him a better dinner 
partner and a more sociable man, and to help him survive the rigors of the game of 
government as he chose to play it.  
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Table 11: Gladstone’s Reading, 1859-1866 
 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Trade S. J. Loyd, Lord Overstone Speech … on the Treaty of Commerce [with France] (1860) 29 Mar 1860 
Trade Anonymous 
The Social, Political, and Commercial Advantages of Direct Steam 
Navigation and Rapid Postal Intercourse Between Europe and America via 
Galway, Ireland (1859) 
25 Jun 1859 
Trade Bernard de Mandeville The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices Public Benefits, 2nd Edition (1723) 21 Aug 1859 
Trade Henry George, Third Earl Grey 
Speeches . . on the Second Reading of the Corn Law Bill … March 9th, 
1842 (1860) 
7 Apr 1860 
Trade Revue des Deux Mondes, A. Cochut “La politique due libre echange,” Vol. xxxiii (1861) 26 Apr 1861 
Trade H. H. Vivian “Speech on the Commercial Treaty with France, 1860. Together with a Lecture on Coal, Delivered … 1856” (1861) 1 Aug 1861 
Trade F. M. Edge The Destruction of the American Carrying Trade (1864) 5 Feb 1864 
Trade Bernard de Mandeville A Modest Defence of Public Stews; or, an Essay Upon Whoring as it is now Practised in these Kingdoms (1864) 28 Nov 1864 
Trade E. H. K. Hugesson, Lord Brabourne Protectionist Parodies (1865)
b 16 Oct 1865 
US Civil War F. W. Olmstead Journeys and Explorations of the Cotton Kingdom, 2 vols.c (1862) 17 Feb 1862 
US Civil War Anonymous “How shall we Supply our Cotton Market? A Letter to T. Gibson” (1862) 28 Oct 1862 










US Civil War R. A. Arnold The History of the Cotton Famine from the Fall of Sumpter to the Passing of the Public Works Act (1864) 26 Jul 1864 
Henry Brookes The Bank Act of 1844 (1861) 30 May 1861 
John MacCay A General View of the History and Objects of the Bank (1863) 17 Nov 1863 
Thomson Hankey Banking: Its Utility and Economy. A Lecture … with … the Working and 
Management of the Bank of England (1864) 
16 Jan 1864 Bank of England 
Alexander Struthers Finlay Our Monetary System. Some Remarks on the Influence of Bullion in the Bank of England on Commercial Credit and the Rate of Interest (1864) 6 Feb 1864 
Banking Charles Sikes Post Office Savings Bank. A Letter … W. E. Gladstone (1859) 29 Nov 1859 
Banking Western Bank of Scotland How to Mismanage a Bank (1860) 13 Jan 1860 
Banking Arthur Scratchley A Practical Treatise on Savings Banks, Containing a Review of their Past History and Present Condition, and of Legislation on the Subject (1860) 
28 Apr 1860 
15 Jan 1861 




Banking R. D. P Alexandere “On Banks and Discount Houses” (MS, 1860) 17 Oct 1860 
   
   (table continues) 
 349
Table 11 (continued). 
 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Banking James Gilbart The Elements of Banking (1860) 1 Dec 1860 
Banking James William Gilbart The History of Banking in America: With an Inquiry How Far the Banking Institutions in America are Adapted to this Country (1861) 16 Feb 1861 
Banking W. Blake Observations on the Principles which Regulate the Course of the Exchange (1861) 11 Mar 1861 
Banking E. Wilson The Theory of the Foreign Exchanges (1861) 3 Oct 1861 
Banking James W. Gilbart The History and Principles of Bankingf  10 Nov 1863 
Banking Anonymous Reorganisation du systeme de banques--Banque de France--Banque de Savoie (1863) 19 Dec 1863 
Banking T. Hankey “Banking: Its Utility and Economy: A Lecture” (1864) 16 Jan 1864 
Banking A. C. V. Perier Les Societes de Cooperation (1864) 26 Apr 1864 
Banking William Paterson 
England’s Glory; or, the Great Improvement in Trade in General, to a Royal 
Bank … to be Erected (republished, 1865) 9/11865 
Banking James Stirling “Political Considerations on Banks and Bank Management” (1865) 20 Feb 1865 
Banking L. G. L. Guilhaud de Lavergne 
La Banque de France et les banques departmentales, suivi d’une notice 
historique sur la caisse d’excompte avant 1789 (1865) 25 Feb 1865 
Banking I. Pereire La Banque de France et l’organsation du credit en France (1865) 18 Apr 1865 
Banking Prince Adam Wiszniewski La methode historique appliquee a la refome des Banques et des Credit Mobiliers (1865) 6 May 1865 
Banking W. Rodwell On the Bank Notes Issue Bill, its Alterations, Amendments, and Withdrawal (1865) 31 Jul 1865 
Banking Anonymous The Broker Merchant’s Complaint … Dialogue between a Scrivener and a 
Banker (1866) 
12 Jan 1866 
Banking W. H. Ainsworth John Law the Projector, 3 vols.g (1866) 6 Apr 1866 
Banking W. Lewins A History of Banks for Savingsh (1866) 5 Jun 1866 
Currency J. Taylor A View of the Money System of England from the Conquest, with Proposals for Establishing a Secure and Equitable Credit Currency (1859) 16 Nov 1859 
Currency Charles. J. Jenkinson, Earl of Liverpool A Treatise on the Coin of the Realm (1859) 28 Nov 1859 
Currency J. R. MacCullock, ed. Tracts and Other Publications on Metallic and Paper Currency (1860) 1 Feb 1860 
Currency Quarterly Review Gold 107 (1860) 19 Jan 1860 





Currency Anonymous The Merchant’s Bane, or Antagonism Between Gold and the Bank of England (1861) 19 Feb 1861 
   
   (table continues) 
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Table 11 (continued). 
 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Currency John Welsford Cowell Letters to F. T. Baring on the Institution of a Safe and Profitable Paper Currency (1862) 26 Nov 1862 
Currency William Stanley Jevons A Serious Fall in the Value of Gold Ascertained, and its Social Effects set Forth (1863) 5 May 1863 
Currency T. Galbraith New Monetary Theory: the Absolute Depreciation of Gold Demonstrated to the Extent of Fifty Percent (1863) 11 Nov 1863 
Currency Sir Walter Scott A Letter to the Editor of the Edinburgh Weekly Journal from Malachi Malgrowther, on the Proposed Change of Currency (1863) 20 Nov 1863 
Currency Annual Register of 1845 Chapter 11: Currency Debates 28 Nov 1863 
Currency J. MacLaren Sketch of the History of the Currency (1863) 8 Dec 1863 
Currency D. Ryley Decimal Coinage. A Brief Comparison of the Existing System … Another System (1864) 6 Jan 1864 
Currency A. S. Finlay Our Monetary System (1864) 6 Feb 1864 
Currency A. D’Eichthal  De la Monnaei de Paper et des Banques d’Emission (1864) 28 Mar 1864 
Currency J. Taylor An Essay on Money (1864) 25 Apr 1864 
Currency William Rose Mansfield An Introduction of a Gold Currency in India (1864) 1864 
Currency J. H. Wainwright “Gold, Currency, and the Funded Debt” 12 Jul 1864 





Currency William Rodwell On the Bank-Notes Issues Bill, its Alterations, Amendments, and Withdrawal (1865) 29 Jul 1865 
Finance F. Bartholomy Simple expose de quelques idees financieres et industrielles (1860) 23 Feb 1860 
Finance Fraser’s Magazine Levy on the Budget (1860) 1 Mar 1860 
Finance Quarterly Review The Budget 107 (1860) 23 Apr 1860 
Finance National Review Budget 10 (1860) 24 Apr 1860 
Finance A. H. Brialmont Notes sur les Budgets 10 Aug 1860 
Finance J. Edouard Horne Des Finances de l’Autriche 25 Sept 1860 
Finance Blackwood’s Edinburgh Review Finance 89 (1861) 21 Jan 1861 
Finance Revue des Deux Mondes, August Casimir Victor Perier Finance 31 (1861) 5 Feb 1861 
Finance Blackwood’s Edinburgh Review, W. E. Aytoun Budget 90 (1861) 1 Jul 1861 






Finance S. Hooper “Speech on the Treasury Note Bill” 3 Feb 1862 
   
   (table continues) 
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Table 11 (continued). 
 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Finance Stafford H. Northcote, Lord Iddlesleigh 
Twenty Years of Financial Policy: A Summary of the Chief Financial 
Measures Passed Between 1842 and 1861 (1862) 2 Aug 1862 
Finance Anonymous Mr. Gladstone’s Finances, from his Accession to Office in 1853 to his Budget of 1862 (1863) 28 Jan 1863 
Finance British Quarterly Review Financial Statement xxxix (1864) 4 May 1864 
Finance M. A. Calman William Pitt. Etude financiere et Parlementaire (1865) 13 Jul 1865 
India J. Wilson “Financial Measures for India. A Speech Delivered … [in] Calcutta, 1860” 
(1860) 
28 Mar 1860 
India T. Hare The Development of the Wealth of India (1861) 22 Jun 1861 
India Sir C. E. Trevelyan The Indian Budget of 1863-4 (1863) 6 Jun 1863 
India W. N. Lees The Drain of Silver to the East and the Currency of India (1863) 25 Nov 1863 
Nat’l Debt Quarterly Review National Debt Commissioners (1859) 10 Aug 1859 
Nat’l Debt Edward Capps The National Debt Financially Considered (1860) 22 Feb 1860 
Taxation John Loude Tabberner Direct Taxation and Parliamentary Representation (1859) 25 Nov 1859 
Taxation Henry Booth Taxation, Direct and Indirect (1860) 6 Jan 1860 
Taxation Leone Levij On Taxation: How it is Raised and How it is Expended (1860) 21 Jun 1860 
Taxation Henry R. Sharman The Fire Duty: The Duty on Fire Insurance: Reasons for its Abolition or Reduction (1861) 11 Jan 1861 
Taxation Henry Booth Considerations on Licensing (1862) 30 Jan 1862 
Taxation P. Francis “Speech … Against the Exemption of Foreign Property in the Funds from 
the Duty on Taxation” (1862) 
26 Sept 1862 
Taxation G. W. Norman “An Examination of some Prevailing Opinions as to the Pressure of Taxation in this and other Countries” (1862) 20 Oct 1862 
Taxation James Russell Sugar Duties. Digest and Summary of Evidence Taken by the Select Committee, etc. (1862) 1 Dec 1862 
Taxation Samuel Morton Peto Taxation: Its Levy and Expenditure, Past and Future; Being an Enquiry into our Financial Policy (1863) 22 Jan 1863 
Taxation Sir Roland Hill Memorandum … on the Net Revenue of the Post Office (1863) 22 Nov 1863 
Taxation J. Russell Sugar Duties; Digest and Summary (1863) 1 Dec 1863 
Taxation Edmund Potter The Sugar Duties, A Letter to the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone (1864) 15 Jan 1864 




Taxation George Warde Norman An Examination of Some Prevailing Opinions as to the Pressure of Taxation in this and Other Countries, 4th Edition (1864) 1/21864 
   
   (table continues) 
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Table 11 (continued). 
 
Topic Author Title Reading Datea 
Taxation J. R. MacCulloch A Treatise on the Principles and Practical Influence of Taxation and the Funding System (1864) 29 Feb 1864 
Taxation Alfred Fryer The Sugar Duties. An Examination of the Letter Addressed by E. Potter to … W. E. Gladstone (1864) 16 Feb 1864 
Taxation William C. B. Farr A System of Life Insurance Which may be Carried out Under the Control of the Government (1864) 21 Feb 1864 
Taxation Leone Levi On the Sugar Duties (1864)k 6 Feb 1864 




Taxation J. Mitchell Plan for Lessening the Taxation of the Company by the Assumption and Improved Administration of the Railways by the State (1865) 2 Mar 1865 
James Mill Elements of Political Economy (1859) 10 Dec 1859 
Richard Cobden Three Panics: An Historical Episode (1862) 25 Apr 1862 
William Whewell Six Lectures on Political Economy (1863)l 15 May 1863 
Adam Smith An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1863)m 12 Dec 1863 
Henry Fawcett Manual of Political Economy (1864) 22 Jan 1864 
Political Economy 
John Smith An Enquiry into the Causes of Money Panics … Letter to M. Ross (1866) 28 Mar 1866 
Financing Nicholas Armstrong Army Purchase Question … Evidence of the Royal Commission (1860) 27 Feb 1860 
US Civil War Hansard’s Debate on Fortifications (1859) 17 Dec 1859 
US Civil War Sir William Gardiner Political and Legislative Considerations on National Defence: Addressed to the People of England (1860) 23 Jan 1860 
US Civil War Unknown The Army Purchase Question and the Report and Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission Considered (1860) 28 Feb 1860 
US Civil War T. E. Lesley The Military Systems of Europe Economically Considered (1860) 1 May 1860 
US Civil War Cowper Phipps Coles Spithead Forts. A Reply to the Royal Commissioners’ Second Report on our National Defenses (1861) 10 Jun 1861 
US Civil War E. P. Halstead Iron-cased Ships: A Series of Lectures Delivered Before the Royal United Service Institution … 1861 (1861) 3 Jul 1861 
Cost of War 
US Civil War Revue Contemporaine French Navy (1860) 10 Jan 1860 
Notes: 
aAll date references are to Volume 3 of the Diaries. Within a Topic, the publications are listed in the order in which Gladstone recorded reading 
them (right-hand column). 
bOr a later, untraced pamphlet. 
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cOlmstead was extremely critical of the economic abilities of the cotton South. 
d“Clearing” is a technical term in the banking context referring to the ways in which banks exchange credit instruments, such as the currency of 
country and joint stock banks, bills of exchange, and other paper. For example, a London business man might pay Bank of England notes to the owner 
of a manor in the west country, a recommended way to pay for land. The seller then deposited his Bank of England notes with his own bank. If this 
private or joint-stock bank did not care to keep these specific notes on hand, if they had not relationship with the Bank of England, and if they maintained 
a relationship with a clearing house in London, the west-country bank sent the Bank of England notes to the clearing house. If the clearing house held 
notes issued by the west-country bank, it returned them to the bank in exchange for the Bank of England notes. I f it did not, then it either returned some 
other credit instrument of interest to the bank or added the value of the Bank of England notes to the bank’s credit account at the clearing house. 
eOf the Receipt of the Exchequer, Gladstone, Diaries 5: 17 Oct 1860, n.6; Add MS 44749, f.148. 
fRead for the third time. 
gGladstone paid off the last of the South Sea Bubble investors in his 1853 budget. See Palgrave’s Dictionary 1, 182-183. 
hAn account of Gladstone’s measures in banking. Gladstone read this on the same day the government resigned over reform. See Gladstone, 
Diaries 6:5 Jun 1866, n.6. 
iGladstone, Diaries 6:16 Sept 1864, n.5. Matthew suggests that this is a reference (“probably”) to R. H. Patterson, The Economy of Capital; or, 
Gold and Trade. Unfortunately, I can find no reference to this publication in Stephens’ bibliography, which lists other Patterson works. Nor can I find 
references to a “City of Gold” in the works I have at hand. T. A. Stephens, Bibliography of the Bank of England (London: Effingham Wilson, 1897; 
reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968), who offers a chronological list or publications connected with the Bank of England, offers two indexes 
and a chronology of the banking period ending with 1897. Patterson may have been confused with W. Paterson, a founder of the Bank of England who 
wrote several publications, but I cannot find any reference to a City of Gold, surely a more seventeenth-century expression than nineteenth, in Stephens’ 
bibliography which provides a biography and list of publications for William Paterson. Surely this is one of Gladstone’s most puzzling reading references. 
jLeone Levi was one of the great finance and taxation statisticians of the nineteenth century. His publications include “On the Distribution and 
Productiveness of Taxes with Reference to the Prospective Amelioration of the Public Revenue of the United Kingdom,” Journal of the Statistical Society 
of London 23, no. 1 (March 1860), 37-65; “On the Progress and Economical Bearings of National Debts in this and Other Countries;” Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London 25, no. 3 (September 1862), 313-338; “On the Progress of the Expenditure of the United Kingdom,” Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London 24, no. 1 (March 1861), 55-73; “Statistics of the Revenue in the United Kingdom from 1859-82, in Relation to the 
Distribution of Taxation.” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 47, no. 1 (March 1884), 1-33. These publications provide us with a demonstration of 
how strong statistical analysis was becoming in the mid to late Victorian period. Levi also authored several books, two of which Gladstone read in the 
period covered by this chapter. 
kNot found. 
lThese lectures were written and presented to the Prince of Wales. Having read them, one wonders how the Prince managed to stay awake. 
mThree editions were available to Gladstone: the three-volume original (1776); the four-volume printing, ed. D. Buchanan (1814); or the four-
volume printing, ed. J. R. MacCulloch (1828). Matthew does not tell us which one he read on 12 Dec 1863, but lists all three versions and the dates on 





 CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
In 1866, when Gladstone again kissed hands and turned in his seals of office, he 
packed his family off for an extended holiday in Europe. Looking back, as he must have 
done from the Channel boat, he was entitled to contemplate what he had learned and 
accomplished over the thirty-three years since he came down from Oxford. He had risen 
from back bench and junior lord of the Admiralty to one of the four or five most powerful 
men in a long-running government. He had a kind, loving, and elegant wife who had 
born him eight good children. He was a man rich in friends as well as money, 
properties, and securities. He had bought and paid for an estate for his eldest son, and 
had found worthwhile positions for his other three. 
We cannot say which of these achievements satisfied Gladstone most. Historians 
are not mind readers. They typically judge great men by their greatest achievements. 
Often, however, they judge these men by their failure, unwillingness, or better judgment 
when a great man decides not to do what he has threatened, wished, or promised to do. 
Thus we may judge William Gladstone. 
He had accomplished a good deal. He put Britain on a new financial road. The 
roadbed of this road was a new approach to budgets—aimed at the prosperity, safety, 
health, and comfort of all British citizens. The aggregate for this roadbed was composed 
of sensible taxation and a reasonable control of expenditure. Yet a government’s 
finance does not run on a once-a-year budget, but on the everyday trundling of funds to 
schools, museums, arsenals, shipbuilders, soldiers, pensioners, clergymen, elderly 
widows, children, and hundreds of thousands of others who have earned the 
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government’s payments. The carts and barrows rode on the tarmac of Gladstone’s day-
to-day attention to revenues, the gold supply, the state of the currency, the nation’s 
temperament, the fecundity of the harvests, and the stability of Europe. Gladstone had 
made the Chancellorship of the Exchequer a full-time technical job requiring a man’s 
deepest attention to both the minutest detail and what we now call “the big picture.” 
Gladstone entered this work in 1852 as both a macro- and micro-economist in 
the making. A macro-economist is a person well versed in the finances of the 
government and the national economy, and understands relationships between, for 
example, taxation and unemployment. A micro-economist understands prices. 
Gladstone understood economics at both levels—able to see how a one-pence increase 
in income tax or a half-pence cut in the import duty on tea both changed the life of a 
family and the resources of a nation. Chapter 7 has demonstrated that even taken at the 
highest level, a nineteenth-century budget is a complex, three-dimensional document, 
which shows, over a period of time how the government intended to collect and spend 
money, as well as the results the government expected to achieve with both the 
collection and the expenditure. 
We can have little doubt that in his budgets and in his other speeches, Gladstone 
preached the welfare of the family and of the nation. His budget speeches were bread 
and butter to the mill owners, beer makers, railroad magnates, merchants, vegetable 
sellers, barge men, teachers, lawyers, and pensioners. Would the price of food rise? 
Would the cost of money rise? Would Britain and her dependents suffer prosperity or 
famine? The Times and newspapers around the world printed or reported on Britain’s 
annual budget. To these we may add the thousands of people who crowded into a city 
 
  356
hall, square, or train station to hear Gladstone speak. His speeches, often three to four 
hours in duration, covered all manner of subjects, from the budget to European peace. 
They heard him comment on the American South’s chances of making secession good 
or listened while he asserted that every man not permanently incarcerated or mentally 
deficient ought to be given the vote. 
Gladstone did still more. By associating his financial policy with a party, and by 
attempting to associate the party line with his financial policies, he attempted to draw a 
clear line between his party and the opposition. It was an attempt that did not always 
succeed, but he was the first chancellor of the nineteenth century to make a single 
economic policy, stick to it, and force the people to decide, at each election, which 
policy they wished to follow in the next government. 
The ramifications of Gladstone’s attack on the Bank of England go far beyond the 
restructuring of quarterly payments or some discomfort in the Parlour of the Bank of 
England. While Sir John Clapham has shown us his complete personal contempt for 
Gladstone as a man and government official, he has also demonstrated Gladstone’s 
power by reporting how deeply the Bank of England felt its security of its position and its 
strength, and how badly Gladstone threatened both by a simple investigation into 
quarterly payments on Deficiency Bills. Chapter 5 has reported how badly shocked the 
Bank was by Gladstone’s attack, and then, in what seems like a second wave, the 
vehemence of his attack, his willingness to meet law with law, and the fact that 
Gladstone, not the Bank, won the argument. 
We must not underestimate the Bank’s amazement. Secure behind its Bank 
Acts, which in the nineteenth century consisted primarily of solidifying the Bank’s 
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monopolies—geographical, currency-based, and legal—the Bank was complacent. 
These are not my words but Sir John Clapham’s, for at one point he even chided the 
directors for their complacency. While other Chancellors of the Exchequer had 
attempted to negotiate advantages in the amount of payments for Bank services and 
fees paid for renewals of the Charter, none until Gladstone appears to have tampered 
with the fabric of the contract between the government and the Bank. 
Morley and Jenkins have recognized what Gladstone did for the budget-writing 
and -management procedures of what Jenkins has called the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Neither has recognized what Gladstone accomplished by the simple 
and perhaps blinding realization that the Bank could be challenged, and the recognition 
that it could be challenged successfully. 
We return to Gladstone’s 1856 list, with its multiple suggestions for dismantling 
and reconstructing the Bank, making it more government-friendly and stripping it of 
currency issue. Looking over this list we ask why, when Gladstone found the Bank was 
vulnerable to the law in 1854, he did not go in for the kill in the period 1859 to 1866. The 
answer may very well lay in his reading. Chapter 2 has summarized, and the following 
chapters demonstrated in some detail, that while Gladstone’s reading on the Bank of 
England per se was light, his reading on general banking and currency was substantial, 
and in some periods phenomenal.  
I have suggested that Gladstone may be fairly evaluated in some cases by what 
he chose not to do. Clearly, in the period 1859-1866, he chose not to attempt to 
dismantle the Bank. I believe that the answer is that while the Bank appeared 
vulnerable, and easily shaken, its real strength was a very different thing compared to 
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the complacency that Sir John Clapham has demonstrated so well. The strengths come 
from the real and virtual networks in which the Bank sat. There were three. 
The first was a geographical network of manufacturing and shipping based on 
Britain’s world-wide trade. While many other ports also shipped to Asia, Africa, North, 
and South America, London was the location for Lloyds Insurance Company and a host 
of other insurance firms, manufacturer’s warehouses, and docks. Superimposed on this 
first network was a second virtual network consisting of money relationships some of 
which predated the founding of the Bank of England. These relationships included but 
were not limited to the Exchange built and donated to the City by Sir Thomas Gresham, 
the London Clearing House, the great private banks such as the Grasshopper and Liver 
Bird, and a host of other stock brokers, small banks, and investment firms. The Bank of 
England did not rest in the center of this network but slightly at a distance that was 
philosophical rather than geo graphical. For example, the Bank did not join the London 
Clearing House until well into the nineteenth century, well after both the Bank and the 
Clearing House had been established. 
The Bank itself was the heart of a third network, one that disconcerted outsiders, 
notably theorists without money to invest. It was a network based on central banking 
theories and the role the Bank of England played in the banking operation. In many 
ways the Bank of England, viewed from the outside, looked like a central bank—issuing 
the only legal tender in Great Britain, serving as a depository and safety net for other 
banks, including the Scottish and Irish banks, lending directly to the government, 
serving as the government’s broker, serving as a national depository for gold and silver, 
selling government securities to third parties, and for all practical purposes, setting the 
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interest or discount rate. 
This network was based on the membership of the Bank’s Board of Directors, 
largely composed of bankers, brokers, and insurance men plus interlocking strands of 
deposits, credits, gold, and currency transactions. Bank of England branches spread 
around the country operated side by side with local banks. Retinues of shippers, 
manufacturers, and industrialists were the Bank’s clients.  
The manifestations of central banking behavior in the Bank of England stem from 
its original charter, its Charter renewal acts, and certain natural behaviors of other 
British bankers, including but certainly not limited to the Scottish bankers. As this MA 
thesis has shown, the right to lend money to the government resides in the original 
charter. The role of banker’s banker resides in the natural of instinct of bankers to place 
part of their assets off-site in a safe repository and in the currency and finance 
exchanges of regional and local banks with the Bank of England. Control of currency 
issue, outside the problem of legal tender (a Bank of England monopoly) was granted 
de facto in the 1844 Bank Charter Renewal Act. 
James William Gilbart, banker and prolific writer on banking, published a book on 
American banking which showed just how easily a central bank could be set up and 
how, even more easily, it could be struck down through government’s refusal to renew 
the bank’s charter. A government, presumably even the British government, could 
refuse to renew a charter, even that of the Bank of England. Yet few chancellors had 
dared even to tamper with the payment schedule or the amounts involved in money 
transfers between the Bank of England and the Government of Great Britain—until 
Gladstone. By a simple request to change a payment schedule and reduce the number 
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of Deficiency Bills being used each quarter, Gladstone had driven the Bank to anger 
and to the law. How then would the bank have responded to a threat against the 
Charter itself? 
Gladstone recognized that although he might make many changes in the way he 
did business with the Bank, he could not change or revoke the Bank’s charter. Canny 
politician that he was, he was always anxious to be on the winning side of any battle he 
chose to join (as witness the fact that he sat out of most of the debate over the Bank in 
1857, one year after he wrote his list). Gladstone knew the real strength of the Bank, 
and understood that it was based not on arrogance but on network affiliations, money 
owed, marriages, past, present, and future deals, and the stability demonstrated by 
those who understood and worked within the Bank’s rules. I argue that rather than 
believing the Bank should be overthrown, he came to believe that it could not and 
should not be overthrown. 
We have two demonstrable clues to the Bank’s probable true strength. The first 
clue is the failure of opponents of the Bank to muster even a semblance of coherence 
and unity whenever the Bank became the subject of parliamentary debated. The second 
is Gladstone’s measurements of his own strength, possibly as a strategist, and certainly 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and finally of the strength of the party to follow him into 
battle against the Bank. 
Left with the assurance that challenging the Bank on the scale of his 1856 list of 
reforms might be dangerous and ridiculous, Gladstone worked hard on his alternatives: 
balanced budgets with surpluses that could be applied to the national debt and acts that 
would expand government’s privileges vis-à-vis the Bank. If possible, as shown by the 
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Banks of Issues bills, he hoped to help smaller banks as well. Britain’s general 
economic health during the 1860s gave him sufficient maneuvering room in which to 
produce balanced budgets in spite of Palmerston’s demands for fortifications against 
the French and a downturn in cotton manufacture stemming from the United States’ 
Civil War. The abortive attempt to overthrow the main thrust of the 1844 Bank Charter 
Act by licensing issue to banks that wished to enter the business simply came too late. 
One of its main threads, the government’s proposal to indemnify those who suffered 
when a licensed issuing bank went bankrupt, while modern in concept (as witness a 
similar measure in the formation of the United States’ Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation) was politically dangerous because it seemed to give an unfair advantage 
to a failing bank, even creating a reason for a bank to fail deliberately. 
Thus Gladstone was left with the option of legislation directed not at the Bank but 
at his own government—that is, any measure that could control the government’s side 
of the relationship with the Bank of England—as the only viable method of curbing the 
Bank’s incursions into government spending and borrowing. His 1855 Public Revenues 
Act showed him the way. The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act is a long, detailed, 
government-oriented piece of legislation as detailed in Chapter 7. Most of its clauses fall 
harshly on departments that had been slow to reform under the Privy Council Order that 
followed publication of the Northcote-Trevelyan report and the rise of Civil Service 
examinations. Twentieth-century historians, such as Lord Bridges, point to the fiscal and 
managerial control afforded to the Treasury over all other departments for the next fifty 
years that was established by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act. 
The mercilessness of this Act can be demonstrated by a series of clauses that 
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allowed a member of the government to establish an account at a local bank by which 
to perform his work for the government. The Act allowed the account to be in the man’s 
own name, and all was well as well as the man who did his work and survived the audits 
that might occasionally fall on his accounts. Psychologically, his family might never 
understand the difference between the man’s private accounts, if they existed, and his 
government account. But if the man died, the Act reserved the government’s right to 
confiscate the account on its own behalf and make life extremely unpleasant for the 
man’s heirs if they tried to claim the account as one of the man’s assets. When we 
consider that thirty years before, the Post Office, the Customs Service, and various 
other offices and embassies had deducted their expenses before relinquishing their 
accounts to the government, and “kept a little on the side” as a natural perquisite of 
office, we can see Gladstone, the cutthroat drafter of legislation exercising government 
reform to its last detail, presumably based on his own previous experiences and those 
of others. 
Far more subtle and dangerous are the clauses in the Act that affect the Bank of 
England and the Bank of England, designated banks for the management of 
government receipts deposited into the Consolidated Fund. The Act granted these two 
banks a virtual monopoly as holders of government deposits. Gladstone’s budgets 
showed revenues well in excess of £60,000,000 each year—from taxes, excise and 
customs collections, Post Office Receipts, crown-land rents, rebates from India, 
indemnities paid by China, and other sources. These funds, deposited only in these two 
banks, added greatly to their assets and power to invest. However, these funds carried 
with them two problems. The first was problem was the standard banking problem: that 
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in bank’s balance sheet a customer’s deposit appears not only as an asset but also as a 
liability. That is, on the customer’s demand, the bank is obligated to return these funds, 
including interest, to the customer. The second problem, built into the Act, was more 
insidious if used. By depositing government funds into these two banks, the government 
reserved the right to send auditors into the Bank to inquire into the Bank’s manipulations 
in managing the government’s money. 
Given the temporal limitations of 1833-1866 reflected in this MA thesis, 1866 
being the year in which this Act was passed, I have presented no evidence that the 
government ever made good on its legal right to put the auditors into the Bank of 
England. We do have evidence that despite the disorganized character of both support 
for and opposition to the Bank of England, when the Exchequer and Audit Departments 
Bill was introduced, it had little trouble in being passed into law, and the auditing clause 
passed with it. Gladstone may not have stopped the growth and importance and power 
of the Bank of England, and, on reflection, we have reason to believe he did not intend 
to. He did serve notice on the Bank that the wall erected against the government, 
behind which the Bank had thought itself inviolate in 1854, had some cracks in it. These 
cracks, the Act demonstrated, might be made wide enough at any time to let the 
auditors in. 
If we think back to the 1854, when Gladstone appears to have run himself ragged 
trying “to get to bottom of the Deficiency Bills,” we can understand the power that audit 
gave him. A full-out audit of government accounts held by the Bank of England would 
have identified the timing problem that constituted the major difficulties in the 
government’s payments and borrowing pattern represented by the Deficiency Bills. 
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The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act did no damage to Gladstone’s 
memory of his mentor, Sir Robert Peel. It did not damage the gold standard, the Bank’s 
privilege to print legal tender, its rights to additional issue on the demise of another 
issuing bank, or the contradiction of the Bank’s monopolies compared to Sir Robert’s 
desperate efforts to protect free trade. Instead, Gladstone simply found another way, 
through internal, government-related, reform-minded legislation, both to get control of a 
major relationship between the Bank and the government, and also to serve notice that 
the Bank should see to the cracks in its wall of supremacy. It was a solution all 
Gladstone’s own, one which the more rigid and doctrinaire Peel never would have 
considered. 
And so Gladstone carved his own way. Or did he? As the preface of this MA 
thesis has indicated, much work remains to be done. But it will be done with a much 
larger purpose than suggested in my original research problem—that 1856 list of 
financial reforms so loved by Dr. Matthew. Gladstone accomplished some of his goals. 
The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act is an achievement that Gladstone might not 
have been able to consider in 1854, nor even in his years of service with Palmerston 
from 1859 to 1865. It is a solid piece of reform legislation in the financial arena of 
government management. If Gladstone had found the power under either Palmerston or 
Russell, to go further, had he created his ministry of finance, taken currency issue into 
the government, and had closed the Exchequer, tradition-loving Britain might not have 
withstood the shock. We can only use Gladstone’s thinking, actions, and the outcomes 
he achieved. Bank’s of Issue through licensing was a direct attack on the Bank of 
England’s privileges—introduced, debated, taken back, redrafted, debated again—was 
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a failure, and has been forgotten. By contrast, the Exchequer and Audit Departments 
Act succeeded brilliantly, sweeping through parliament and still remembered as a highly 
respected piece of legislation. 
This thesis has argued that we are only beginning to understand Gladstone as a 
political economist. In a period when fiscal responsibility was under attack, it is time to 
revise our understanding of what Gladstone, money man, accomplished. The evidence 
is available. It is large and largely available. The sifting process is the work of a lifetime, 
and may never be complete. It should be substantial enough, however, to help 
historians realize the true level of reform that took place in British government finance in 




Published Primary Sources 
Contemporary Accounts and Materials 
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, Series 3, volumes xviii-clxxxi. 
The Times of London, 1852-1866. 
Austin, Jane. Pride and Prejudice. Norton Third Critical Edition. New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2001. 
Gladstone, William Ewart. The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and 
Ministerial/Prime-Ministerial Correspondence, 14 Volumes. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968-1994, notably,  
 Volume I, 1825-1832. M. R. D. Foote, Ed., 1968. 
 Volume II, 1833-1839, M. R. D. Foote, Ed. 1968. 
 Volume III, 1840-1847. M. R. D. Foote & H. C. G. Matthew, Eds., 1974. 
 Volume IV, 1848-1854. M. R. D. Foote & H. C. G. Matthew, Eds., 1974. 
 Volume V, 1855-1860. H. C. G. Matthew, Ed., 1978. 
 Volume VI, 1861-1868. H. C. G. Matthew, Ed., 1978. 
Select Statutes, Documents, and Reports Relating to British Banking, 1832-1928, 2 
vols. Gregory, T. E., Ed. Oxford: University Press, 1929; reprint, London: Frank 
Cass, 1964. 
Viscount Palmerston; William Ewart Gladstone. The Palmerston Papers: Gladstone and 
Palmerston. Being the Correspondence of Lord Palmerston with Mr. Gladstone, 
1851-1865. Guedalla, Philip, Ed. New York & London: Harper & Brothers, 1928. 
Victoria, Queen of England. Queen Victoria in her Letters and Journals [1819-1901]. 
Christopher Hibbert, Ed. New York: Viking Penguin, 1985. 
 
Pre-Period and Contemporary Documents and Books 
Bagehot, Walter. The Works and Life of Walter Bagehot, 9 vols. Mrs. Russell Barrington 
[Emilie Isabel Wilson Bagehot], Ed. Longmans, Green, 1915. 
Bagehot, Walter. Bagehot’s Historical Essays. Norman St. John-Stevas, Ed. New York: 
University Press, 1965. 
 
  367
Baring, Francis. Observations on the Establishment of the Bank of England and on the 
Paper Circulation of the Country (1797). New York: Augustus Kelley Reprints of 
Economic Classics, 1967. 
Buxton, Sidney. Finance and Politics, an Historical Study, 1789-1885, 2 Vol. London: 
John Murray, 1888; reprinted, New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966. 
 Vol. I: 1789-1866 
 Vol. II: 1867-1885 
Cairnes, John E. Principles of Currency: The Bank Charter Act of 1844. Dublin: Hodges 
and Smith, 1854; London: Ridgeway, 1854; reprint, New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1989). 
Fellows, Frank P. “On our National Parliamentary Accounts, with Suggestions for 
Establishing a Doomsday Book Giving the Value of National Governmental 
Property or Assets as the Basis of a Sound System of Accounts, by which 
Expenditure for [the] Capital and Current Account[s] Shall be Separately Shown.” 
Journal of the Statistical Society of London 36, No. 2 (June 1873), 277-302. 
Giffen, Robert. “The Gresham Law.” The Economic Journal 1, No. 2 (June 1891), 304-
306. 
Gilbart, James William. “A Ten Years’ Retrospect of London Banking,” Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London 18, No. 4 (December 1855), 333-344. 
Gilbart, James William. The History and Principles of Banking. London: Longman, Rees, 
Orme, Brown, Green, and Longman, 1834. 
Gilbart, James William. The History of Banking in America: An Inquiry How Far the 
Banking Institutions of America are Adapted to this Country; and a Review of the 
Causes of the Recent Pressure on the Money Market. London: Longman, Rees, 
Orme, Brown, Green & Longman, 1837. 
Gilbart, J. W. “The Laws of Currency, as Exemplified in the Circulation of Country Bank 
Notes in England, since the Passing of the Act of 1844.” Journal of the Statistical 
Society of London 17, No. 4 (December 1854), 289-321. 
Gilbart, J. W. “On the Laws of Currency in Ireland, as Exemplified in the Changes that 
Have Taken Place in the Amount of Bank Notes in Circulation in Ireland Since 
the Passing of the Act of 1845.” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 15, 
No. 4 (December 1852), 307-326. 
Levi, Leone. “On the Distribution and Productiveness of Taxes with Reference to the 
Prospective Amelioration of the Public Revenue of the United Kingdom.” Journal 
of the Statistical Society of London 23, No. 1 (March 1860), 37-65 
 
  368
Levi, Leone. “On the Progress and Economical Bearings of National Debts in this and 
Other Countries.” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 25, No. 3 
(September 1862), 313-338. 
Levi, Leone. “Statistics of the Revenue in the United Kingdom from 1859-82, in Relation 
to the Distribution of Taxation.” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 47, 
No. 1 (March 1884), 1-33. 
Loyd, Samuel Jones. The Evidence Given by Lord Overstone before the Select 
Committee of the House of Commons in 1857 on Bank Acts, with Additions. 
London: Longman, Brown and Company, 1858; reprint, Clifton: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1973. 
McCulloch, John Ramsay, Ed. A Select Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts and 
other Publications on the National Debt and Sinking Fund. London: Private 
Printing for Lord Overstone, 1857; reprint, New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966. 
McCulloch, John Ramsay. Ed. A Select Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts and 
other Publications on Paper Currency and Banking. London: Private Printing for 
Lord Overstone, 1857; reprint, New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966. 
Mun, Thomas. England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade. 
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3113/mun/index.html 
Northcote, Stafford H., Lord Iddelsleigh, Twenty Years of Financial Policy. A Summary 
of the Chief Financial Measures Passed Between 1842 and 1861, with a Table of 
Budgets. London: Saunders, Otley, 1862. 
Ricardo, David. The High Price of Bullion, a Proof of the Depreciation of Bank Notes. 
London: John Murray, 1810. 
http://socserv2/socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3113/ricardo/bullion. 
Ricardo, David. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London: J. M. 
Dent & Sons, 1912. Reprinted in Sraffa, Piero, Ed. The Works and 
Correspondence of David Ricardo 1. Cambridge: University Press for the Royal 
Economic Society, 1966. 
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 2 Vols. 
R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, Eds. Oxford: University Press, 1976, photo 
reproduction with minor corrections, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981). 
Stephens, T. A. Bibliography of the Bank of England. London: Effingham Willson, Royal 
Exchange, 1897; reprint, New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968.  
Taylor, William, “A Statistical and Historical View of the Statute Law of the Realm, and 
of the Number of Statutes passed in Each Reign from the Earliest Recorded 
Period to the Present Time”, Journal of the Statistical Society of London 17, No. 
2 (June 1854), 143-158. 
 
  369
Thornton, Henry. An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great 
Britain; Together with his Evidence Given before the Committees of Secrecy of 
the two Houses of Parliament in the Bank of England, March and April, 1797, 
some Manuscript Notes, and his Speeches on the Bullion Report, May 1811. F. 
A. V. Hayek, Ed. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966. 
Tooke, Thomas. A History of Prices, and of the State of the Circulation, from 1839 to 
1847 Inclusive: with a General Review of the Currency Questions, and Remarks 
on the Operation of the Act 7 & 8 Vict. c.32, 6 Vols. 4. London: Longman, Brown, 
Green, & Longmans, 1848. 
Tooke, Thomas. An Inquiry into the Currency Principle of the Connection of the 
Currency with Prices, and the Expedience of a Separation of Issue from Banking. 
London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1844; 
http://www.ecn.bris.ad.uk/het/tooke/currency.htm.  
Tooke, Thomas. Considerations on the State of the Currency (Ad Variorum of the First 
and Second Editions). Sydney: University Press Reprints of Economic Classics, 
Series 2, Number 8, 1966. 
Wolff, Henry W. “Savings Banks at Home and Abroad.” Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society 60, No. 2 (June, 1897), 278-359. 
 
Secondary Accounts 
Dictionaries, Sources, and Encyclopediae 
Chambers Dictionary. Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap, 1986. 
Klein, Gerald. Dictionary of Banking, 2nd Ed. London: Pitman, 1995.  
Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy, 3 Vols. Henry Higgs, Ed. London: 
MacMillan, 1926. 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 4 Vols. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, Peter 
Newman, Eds. London: MacMaillan, 1987. 
 
Biographies: Mr. Gladstone, Colleagues, and Friends 
Battiscombe, Georgina. Mrs. Gladstone, The Portrait of a Marriage. London: Constable, 
1956. 
Beals, Derek. “Gladstone and His Diary: ‘Myself, the Worst of All Interlocutors’.” The 
Historical Journal 25, No. 2 (June 1982), 463-469. 
 
  370
Bebbington, D. W. The Mind of Gladstone: Religion, Homer, Politics. Oxford: University 
Press, 2004. 
Bebbington, David & Swift, Roger. Gladstone Centenary Essays. Liverpool: University 
Press, 2000. 
Biagini, Eugenio F. Gladstone. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 
Buxton, Sydney. Mr. Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer—A Study. London: 
John Murray, 1901. 
Crosby, Travis L. The Two Mr. Gladstones: A Study in Psychology and History. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. 
Gash, Norman. Sir Robert Peel: The Life of Sir Robert Peel after 1830. Totowa (NJ): 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1972. 
Hilton, Boyd. “Peel: A Reappraisal.” The Historical Journal 22, No. 3 (September 1979), 
585-614. 
Hirst, Francis W. Gladstone as Financier and Economist. London: Ernest Benn, 1931. 
Jenkins, Roy. Gladstone: a Biography. New York: Random House, 1997. 
Jenkins, Terrance Andrew. Sir Robert Peel. Houndsmill (Basingstoke, Hampshire): 
Macmillan Press, 1999. 
Matthew, H. C. G. “Gladstone, William Ewart (1809-1898). Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10787. 
Matthew, H. C. G. Gladstone, 1809-1874. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
Morley, John. The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 3 Vols. London: MacMillan, 1903. 
Shannon, Richard. Gladstone, 2 Vols. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1982. 
 
The Bank of England and European Banking 
Bisschop, W. R. The Rise of the London Money Market, 1650-1826. First Dutch edition 
1896; first English edition, London: Frank Cass, 1910; reprint, New York: 




Chandler, George. Four Centuries of Banking as Illustrated by the Bankers, Customers 
and Staff Associated with the Constituent Banks of Martins Bank Limited 1, The 
Grasshopper and the Liver Bird, Liverpool and London. London: B. T. Batsford, 
1964. 
Clapham, John. “Loans and Subsidies in Time of War, 1893-1914”. The Economic 
Journal 27, No. 108 (December 1917), 495-501. 
Clapham, John. The Bank of England: A History, 2 Vols. Cambridge: University Press, 
1945. 
Cullen, L. M. “The Exchange Business of the Irish Banks in the Eighteenth Century.” 
Economica, New Series 25, No. 100 (November 1958), 326-338.  
Ehrenberg, Richard. Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance: A Study of the 
Fuggers and their Connections. H. M. Lucas, Trans. (Reprint) Fairfield (NJ): 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1985. 
Ferguson, Niall. The House of Rothschild, Money’s Prophets, 1798-1848. New York: 
Penguin Putnam, 1998. 
Fishlow, Albert. “The Trustee Savings Banks, 1817-1861”. The Journal of Economic 
History 21, No. 1 (March 1961), 26-40. 
Grada, Cormac O. “The Irish Paper Pound of 1797-1820: Some Cliometrics of the 
Bullionist Debate.” Oxford Economic Papers, New Series 45, No. 1 (January 
1993), 148-156. 
Harr, Luther A. Branch Banking in England. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1929. 
Hunt, Edwin S. The Medieval Super-companies: A Study of the Peruzzi Company of 
Florence.  Cambridge: University Press, 1994. 
Hunt, Edwin S.; Murray, James M. A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-
1550. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Kaeuper, Richard W. Bankers to the Crown: The Riccardi of Lucca and Edward I. 
Princeton: University Press, 1973. 
Malcolm, Charles A. The History of the British Linen Bank. Edinburgh: T. & A. Constable 
(for the bank), 1950. 
Melton, Frank T. Sir Robert Clayton and the Origins of English Deposit Banking, 1658-
1685. Cambridge: University Press, 1986. 
Morgan, Edward Victor. The Theory and Practice of Central Banking, 1797-1913. 
Cambridge: University Press, 1943; New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965. 
 
  372
Moss, David J. “The Bank of England and the Country Banks: Birmingham, 1827-33.” 
The Economic History Review, New Series 34, No. 4 (November 1981), 540-553. 
Pressnell, L. S. Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1956. 
Richards, Richard David. The Early History of Banking in England. New York: Augustus 
M. Kelley, 1965. (Reprint of original, 1929).  
Roover, Raymond de. The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494. New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1966. 
Saville, Richard. Bank of Scotland, A History, 1695-1995. Edinburgh: University Press, 
1996. 
Steefel, Lawrence D. “The Rothschilds and the Austrian Loan of 1865.” The Journal of 
Modern History 8., No. 1 (March 1936), 27-39. 
Strieder, Jacob. Jacob Fugger the Rich, Merchant and Banker of Augsburg, 1459-1525. 
Mildred L. Hartsough, Trans. Archon Books, 1966. 
Weintraub, Stanley. Charlotte and Lionel: A Rothschild Love Story. New York: The Free 
Press, 2003. 
White, Lawrence Henry. Free Banking in Britain: Theory, Experience, and Debate, 
1800-1845. Cambridge: University Press, 1984. 
Wood, Elmer. English Theories of Central Banking Control, 1819-1858, with some 
Account of Contemporary Procedure. Harvard Economic Studies, 64. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. 
Wood, John H. A History of Central Banking in Great Britain and the United States. 
Cambridge: University Press, 2005. 
 
English Economy and Politics 
Bastable, C. F. “The Rule of Taxation for Revenue as a Canon of Public Finance.” The 
Economic Journal 13, No. 52 (December 1903), 505-510. 
Bentley, Michael. “Victorian Politics and the Linguistic Turn”. The Historical Journal 42, 
No. 3 (September 1999), 883-902. 
Brauer, Kinley J. “British Mediation and the American Civil War: A Reconsideration.” 
The Journal of Southern History 38, No. 1 (February 1972), 49-64. 




Bruland, Kristine. British Technology and European Industrialization: The Norwegian 
Textile Industry in the Mid Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: University Press, 
1989. 
H. Buckley. “Sir Thomas Gresham and the Foreign Exchanges.” The Economic Journal 
34, No. 136 (December 1924), 589-601. 
Conacher, J. B. “Peel and the Peelites, 1846-1850.” The English Historical Review 73, 
No. 288 (July 1958), 431-452. 
Conacher, J. B. The Peelites and the Party System, 1846-52. Hamdon, CT: Archon 
Books, 1972. 
Deane, Phillis. The Evolution of Economic Ideas. Cambridge: University Press, 1978. 
Dingle, A. E. “Drink and Working Class Living Standards in Britain, 1870-1914.” The 
Economic History Review, New Series 25, No. 4 (November 1972), 608-622. 
Fetter, Frank Whitson. ________. “Legal Tender During the English and Irish Bank 
Restrictions.” The Journal of Political Economy 58, No. 3 (No. 3 (June 1950), 
241-253. 
________. “Some Neglected Aspects of Gresham’s Law.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 46, No. 3 (May, 1932), 480-495. 
Giffen, Robert. “The Financial Retrospect, 1861-1901”. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society 65, No. 1 (March 1902), 47-85. 
Hargreaves, E. L. The National Debt. London: Edward Arnold, 1930. 
Helms, Lloyd Alvin. The Contributions of Lord Overstone to the Theory of Currency and 
Banking. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1939.  
Herman, Arthur. How the Scots Invented the Modern World: The True Story of How 
Western Europe’s Poorest Nation Created Our World and Everything in it. New 
York: Three Rivers Press, 2001. 
________. To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World. New 
York: Harper, 2004. 
Hibbert, Christopher. The House of Medici: Its Rise and Fall. New York: Morrow, 1980. 
Higgs, Henry. “Workmen’s Budgets.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 56, No. 2 
(June 1893), 255-294. 




Hughes, Jonathan R. T. Fluctuations in Trade, Industry and Finance: A Study of British 
Economic Development, 1850-1860. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960. 
Jones, E. Gwen; Edward Nevin. “The British National Debt: Part I.” Economica, New 
Series 24, No. 95 (August 1957), 205-224. 
________. “The British National Debt: Part II.” Economica, New Series 24, No. 96 
(November 1957), 307-314. 
Lobban, Michael. “Blackstone and the Science of Law,” The Historical Journal 30, No. 2 
(June 1987), 311-335.  
Lyon, Bryce. A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England. New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1960.  
Matthew. H. C. G. “Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics of Mid-Victorian Budgets.” The 
Historical Journal 22, No. 3 (September 1979), 615-643. 
Medema, Steven G.; Samuels, Warren J. The History of Economic Thought: A Reader. 
London: Routledge, 2003.  
Mitchell, H. “The Gold Standard of the Nineteenth Century,” The Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science 17, No. 3 (August 1951), 369-376, 370.  
Philips, Almarin. “The Tableau Economique as a Simple Leontief Model”. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 69, No. 1 (February 1955), 137-144. 
Roover, Raymond de. The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494. New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1966. 
Williams, J. E. “The British Standard of Living, 1750-1850.” The Economic History 
Review, New Series 19, No. 3 (1966), 581-606. 
 
Government Reform 
Bridges, Edward Ettingdene, Baron. The Treasury. London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1966. 
Carruthers, Bruce G., Wendy Nelson Espeland. “Accounting for Rationality: Double-
Entry Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality.” The American 
Journal of Sociology 97, No. 1 (July 1991), 31-69. 
Chester, Sir Norman. The English Administrative System, 1780-1870. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981.  
 
  375
Coombs, Hugh, John Richard Edwards, and Hugh Greener. Double Entry Bookkeeping 
in British Central Government, 1822-1856. New York & London: Garland 
Publishing, 1997. 
Fisher, John H. “Chancery and the Emergence of Standard Written English in the 
Fifteenth Century.” Speculum 52, No. 4 (October 1977), 870-899. 
Gallagher, Thomas F. “British Military Thinking and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian 
War”. Military Affairs 39, No. 1 (Feb. 1975), 19-22. 
Port, M. H. “A Contrast in Styles at the Office of Works. Layard and Ayrton: Aesthete 
and Economist”. The Historical Journal 27, No. 1 (March 1984), 151-176. 
Roseveare, Henry. The Treasury: The Evolution of a British Institution. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969. 
Sainty, John Christopher. “The Evolution of the Parliamentary and Financial 
Secretaryships of the Treasury.” The English Historical Review 91, No. 360 (July 
1976), 566-584. 
Sainty, John Christopher. Office-Holders in Modern Britain, I. Treasury Officials, 1660-
1870. London: University of London, 1972. 
Thomas, J. A. “The House of Commons, 1832-1867: A Functional Analysis”. 
Economica, No. 13 (March 1925), 49-61. 
Trevelyan, Charles E., Edward Hughes, and H. O’Brien. “Sir Charles Trevelyan and 
Civil Service Reform, 1853-5.” The English Historical Review 64, No. 250 
(January 1949), 53-88. 
________. “Sir Charles Trevelyan and Civil Service Reform, 1853-5 (Continued).” The 
English Historical Review 64, No. 251 (April 1949), 206-234. 
Williams, Robert B. Accounting for Steam and Cotton: Two Eighteenth Century Case 
Studies. New York & London: Garland, 1997. 
 
Taxation, the Budget, and National Debt 
Anderson, Olive. A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics During the 
Crimean War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967. 
________. “Great Britain and the Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854-55.” The 
Historical Journal 7, No. 1 (1964), 47-63. 
Cone, Carl B. “Richard Price and Pitt’s Sinking Fund of 1786.” The Economic History 
Review, New Series 4, No. 2 (1951), 243-251. 
 
  376
Gottlieb, Manuel. “The Capital Levy and Deadweight Debt in England, 1815.” The 
Journal of Finance 8, No. 1 (March 1953), 34-46. 
James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. New York: St. 
Martin’s Griffen, 1997. 
James, Lawrence. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. New York: St. Martins, 1994. 
Kuhn, William M. “Queen Victoria’s Civil List: What did she do with it?” The Historical 
Journal 36, No. 3 (September 1993), 645-665. 
Newsome, David. The Victorian World Picture: Perceptions and Introspections in an 
Age of Change. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997. 
Oliver, Henry. “War and Inflation since 1790 in England, France, Germany, and the 
United States”. The American Economic Review 30, No. 5 (February 1941), 344-
351.  
Outhwaite, R. B. “Royal Borrowing in the Reign of Elizabeth I: The Aftermath of 
Antwerp.” The English Historical Review 86, No. 339 (April 1971), 251-263. 
Raven, James. “The Abolition of English State Lotteries”. The Historical Journal 34 
(June 1991), 371-389. 
Saab, Ann Pottinger. The Origins of the Crimean Alliance. Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1977.  
Schroeder, Paul. Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the 
European Concert. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1972).  
Woodruff, J. D. “Allied Debts, 1702-1914.” Journal of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 5, No. 3 (May, 1926), 134-149. 
 
Economic Thought 
Born, Lester Kruger. “The Perfect Prince: A Study in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-
Century Ideals”. Speculum 3, No. 4 (October 1928),477. 
Bowley, Marian. “Some Seventeenth Century Contributions to the Theory of Value,” 
Economica, New Series 30, No. 118 (May, 1963), 122-139. 
Costouros, George J. “Early Greek Accounting on Estates (Fourth Century B. C.)”. 
Working Paper Series, The Academy of Accounting Historians 2 (1979), 1-6. 
Forrester, David A. R. “Aspects of French Accounting History (1985). Working Paper 
Series, The Academy of Accounting Historians 4 (1989), 56-81. 
 
  377
Gordon, Barry. Economic Analysis before Adam Smith: Hesiod to Lessius. New York: 
MacMillan Press, 1975. 
Hutchison, T. W. “Bentham as an Economist,” The Economic Journal 66, No. 262, 
(June 1956), 288-306. 
Kellenbenz, Hermann. “The State of Bookkeeping in Upper Germany at the Time of the 
Fuggers and Welsers”, in Working Paper Series, The Academy of Accounting 
Historians 1 (1979), 87-98. 
Lowry, S. Todd. “Recent Literature on Ancient Greek Economic Thought,” Journal of 
Economic Literature 17, No. 1 (March 1979)65-86. 
Mate, Mavis. “The Indebtedness of Canterbury Cathedral Priory, 1215-95”, The 
Economic History Review, New Series 26, No. 2 (1973), 183-197. 
Meikle, Scott. Aristotle’s Economic Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
Muchmore, Lynn. “A Note on Thomas Mun’s ‘England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade’.” 
The Economic History Review, New Series 23, No. 3 (December 1970), 498-503. 
Niebyl, Karl H. “A Reexamination of the Classical Theory of Inflation,” The American 
Economic Review 30, No. 4 (December 1940), 759.  
O’Brien, George A. T. An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching. London: Longmans, 
Green, 1920. 
“Percents and Sensibility: What did Early 19th Century Literary Characters Live on?” 
Economist 377, No. 8458 (24 December 2005), 104-105. 
Scott, W. R. “Adam Smith at Downing Street, 1766-7”, The Economic History Review 6, 
No. 1 (October 1835), 79-89).  
Taeusch, Carl F. “The Concept of ‘Usury’ The History of an Idea.” Journal of the History 
of Ideas, Vo. 3, No. 3 (June 1942), 291-318. 
Yamey, B. S. “Scientific Bookkeeping and the Rise of Capitalism.” The Economic 
History Review, New Series 1, No. 2/3 (1949), 99-113. 
 
Statistical Reporting 
Hilts, Victor L. “Aliis exterendum, or, the Origins of the Statistical Society of London.” 
Isis 69, No. 1 (March 1978), 21-43. 
Silberling, Norman J. “British Prices and Business Cycles, 1779-1850.” The Review of 
Economic Statistics 5, Supplement 2 (October 1923), 223-347. 
 
  378
Silberling, Norman J. “Financial and Monetary Policy of Great Britain During the 
Napoleonic Wars”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 38, No. 2 (February 
1924), 214-233.  
 
Reviews 
Doolittle, I. G. Review of the facsimile edition of William Blackstone, Commentaries on 
the Laws of England (1765-9), 4 Vols. (Chicago/London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979). The English Historical Review 101, No. 398 (January 1986), 258.  
Hughes, Judith M. Review of Travis L. Crosby, Two Gladstones. Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 28, No. 3 (Winter, 1998), 449-450. 
Jenkins, T. A. Review of Travis L. Crosby, Two Gladstones. The English Historical 
Review 113, No. 454 (November 1998), 1348-1349. 
Weaver, Stewart A. Review of Travis L. Crosby, Two Gladstones. The American 
Historical Review 103, No. 4 (October 1998), 1251-1252. 
